Editor's Note:

This post was updated on February 26, 2021 with new data.

Biden-voting counties equal 70% of America�s economy.

Even with a new president and political party soon in charge of the White
House, the nation�s economic standoff continues. Notwithstanding
President-elect Joe Biden�s solid popular vote victory, last week�s
election failed to deliver the kind of transformative reorientation of the
nation�s political-economic map that Democrats (and some Republicans) had
hoped for. The data confirms that the election sharpened the striking
geographic divide between red and blue America, instead of dispelling it.

Most notably, the stark economic rift that Brookings Metro documented
after Donald Trump�s shocking 2016 victory has grown even wider. In 2016,
we wrote that the 2,584 counties that Trump won generated just 36% of the
country�s economic output, whereas the 472 counties Hillary Clinton
carried equated to almost two-thirds of the nation�s aggregate economy.

A similar analysis for last week�s election shows these trends continuing,
albeit with a different political outcome. This time, Biden�s winning base
in 509 counties encompasses fully 71% of America�s economic activity,
while Trump�s losing base of 2,547 counties represents just 29% of the
economy. (Votes are still outstanding in 28 mostly low-output counties,
and this piece will be updated as new data is reported.)
Table 1. Candidates� counties won and share of GDP in 2016 and 2020
Year Candidate Counties won Total votes Aggregate share of
US GDP

2016 Hillary Clinton 472 65,853,625 64%
Donald Trump 2,584 62,985,106 36%
2020 Joe Biden 520 81,283,098 71%
Donald Trump 2,564 74,222,958 29%

Note: 2020 figures reflect unofficial results from 99% of counties.
Figures for 2020 represent results from 100% of counties for which 2018
GDP data are available. Some county equivalents have been consolidated
into counties to match the geography of BEA GDP data.

Source: Brookings analysis of data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Dave Leip�s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, The New York Times, and
Moody�s Analytics

Fig1

So, while the election�s winner may have changed, the nation�s economic
geography remains rigidly divided. Biden captured virtually all of the
counties with the biggest economies in the country (depicted by the
largest blue tiles in the nearby graphic), including flipping the few that
Clinton did not win in 2016.

By contrast, Trump won thousands of counties in small-town and rural
communities with correspondingly tiny economies (depicted by the red
tiles). Biden�s counties tended to be far more diverse, educated, and
white-collar professional, with their aggregate nonwhite and college-
educated shares of the economy running to 35% and 36%, respectively,
compared to 16% and 25% in counties that voted for Trump.

In short, 2020�s map continues to reflect a striking split between the
large, dense, metropolitan counties that voted Democratic and the mostly
exurban, small-town, or rural counties that voted Republican. Blue and
red America reflect two very different economies: one oriented to diverse,
often college-educated workers in professional and digital services
occupations, and the other whiter, less-educated, and more dependent on
�traditional� industries.

With that said, it would be wrong to describe this as a completely static
map. While the metropolitan/ nonmetropolitan dichotomy remained starkly
persistent, 2020 election returns produced nontrivial movement, as Biden
added modestly to the Democrats� metropolitan base and significantly to
its vote base. Most notably, Biden flipped six of the nation�s 100
highest-output counties, strengthening the link between these core
economic hubs and the Democratic Party. More specifically, Biden flipped
half of the 10 most economically significant counties Trump won in 2016,
including Phoenix�s Maricopa County; Dallas-Fort Worth�s Tarrant County;
Jacksonville, Fla.�s Duval County; Morris County in New Jersey; and Tampa-
St. Petersburg, Fla.�s Pinellas County.

Altogether, those losses shaved about 3 percentage points� worth of GDP
off the economic base of Trump counties. That reduced the share of the
nation�s GDP produced by Republican-voting counties to a new low in recent
times.

Why does this matter? This economic rift that persists in dividing the
nation is a problem because it underscores the near-certainty of both
continued clashes between the political parties and continued alienation
and misunderstandings.

To start with, the 2020�s sharpened economic divide forecasts gridlock in
Congress and between the White House and Senate on the most important
issues of economic policy. The problem�as we have witnessed over the past
decade and are likely to continue seeing�is not only that Democrats and
Republicans disagree on issues of culture, identity, and power, but that
they represent radically different swaths of the economy. Democrats
represent voters who overwhelmingly reside in the nation�s diverse
economic centers, and thus tend to prioritize housing affordability, an
improved social safety net, transportation infrastructure, and racial
justice. Jobs in blue America also disproportionately rely on national R&D
investment, technology leadership, and services exports.

By contrast, Republicans represent an economic base situated in the
nation�s struggling small towns and rural areas. Prosperity there remains
out of reach for many, and the party sees no reason to consider the
priorities and needs of the nation�s metropolitan centers. That is not a
scenario for economic consensus or achievement.

At the same time, the results from last week�s election likely underscore
fundamental problems of economic alienation and estrangement.
Specifically, Trump�s anti-establishment appeal suggests that a sizable
portion of the country continues to feel little connection to the nation�s
core economic enterprises, and chose to channel that animosity into a
candidate who promised not to build up all parts of the country, but
rather to vilify groups who didn�t resemble his base.

If this pattern continues�with one party aiming to confront the challenges
at top of mind for a majority of Americans, and the other continuing to
stoke the hostility and indignation held by a significant minority�it will
be a recipe not only for more gridlock and ineffective governance, but
also for economic harm to nearly all people and places. In light of the
desperate need for a broad, historic recovery from the economic damage of
the COVID-19 pandemic, a continuation of the patterns we�ve seen play out
over the past decade would be a particularly unsustainable situation for
Americans in communities of all sizes.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/11/09/biden-voting-
counties-equal-70-of-americas-economy-what-does-this-mean-for-the-nations-
political-economic-divide/

Democrats in Congress are divided on a slew of important issues
right now, leaving President Joe Biden�s signature $3.5 trillion
spending plan in jeopardy. What unites them is the illusion that
the way they handle the plan will make or break the party�s
fortunes in next year�s midterms.

If only things worked that way. The election is almost certainly
a lost cause for Democrats, and, if it�s not, it�s likely out of
their control either way. Democrats have power now; the question
is whether they will use it while they have it.

The Biden plan has always had a treacherous path to tread, and
this week it seems closer than ever to plunging into the abyss.
Party leaders in both chambers have insisted on pushing forward,
but they face competing pressure from their left and right
flanks. House progressives want to vote on both a $1.2 trillion
bipartisan infrastructure deal and the $3.5 trillion plan at the
same time, but Senator Joe Manchin wants a �strategic pause� on
the larger package, perhaps into 2022. Senator Kyrsten Sinema
has reportedly told Biden that if the House doesn�t vote on the
bipartisan deal or the vote fails, she won�t support the bigger
bill. But House moderates are wary of voting on anything without
knowing what the Senate will pass.

�When we vote on tough things that never become law, we have to
go home and defend that vote without the support of the White
House,� a source identified only as a moderate Democrat told
Politico last week. �It puts the House majority at risk.�

From the other wing of the party, Senator Bernie Sanders told
NPR last week that passing the two bills quickly was the best
way to protect the slim majority.

�The best shot that Democrats have is to understand that good
policy is good politics, that when you stand up for working
families, when you stand up to protect our kids and future
generations from the devastation of climate�that not only is
that the right thing to do. The American people will reward
you,� he said.

But the Democrats� narrow House majority�just eight seats�is
likely already doomed. Since World War II, only two midterms
have seen the president�s party gain seats in the House.
Democrats won seats in 1998, amid Republicans� politically
disastrous decision to impeach Bill Clinton, and Republicans won
seats in 2002, in the strange post-9/11 moment. Of the other
postwar midterms, the president�s party lost just eight or fewer
seats three times.

As though this were not daunting enough, Democrats also have to
contend with post-census redistricting. States haven�t yet drawn
their districts, but some estimates suggest that Democrats could
lose a dozen seats through redistricting alone. Meanwhile, even
though California Governor Gavin Newsom soundly defeated a
recall this month, data from that election point to the
Democratic vote share slipping into territory that would signal
a midterm loss.

If the pattern of the president�s party losing in the midterms
is consistent, the pattern of the president�s party convincing
themselves they won�t lose is nearly as consistent. Each cycle,
partisans contrive arguments to explain why this time will be
different. �Democrats are on the right path to make their own
history and keep the House,� the journalist Bill Scher wrote in
May. �Some people insist that we�re preordained to repeat that
fate in the 2022 midterms,� the Democratic strategist Jesse
Ferguson wrote around the same time. �But a lot has changed in
the past 12 years.� In June, the journalist Louis Jacobson
suggested that Donald Trump�s continued dominance of the
Republican Party could lift Democrats in the midterms: �This
could make the 2022 elections more of a �choice� election, which
would be a more favorable playing field for the Democrats.�

It�s true: Democrats could eke this one out. There might be a
9/11-style catastrophe that rallies support for Biden.
Republicans might badly overreach, either via Trumpian
interference or a miscalculation like the Clinton impeachment.
The economy might boom, boosting Democrats, though the ravages
of the Delta variant of the coronavirus have seriously slowed
down the current recovery.

What Democrats do about the spending bills�size, speed, or
disposition�doesn�t really have anything to do with these rosy
scenarios, because voters don�t really pay especially close
attention to policy or make their voting decisions based on it.
The political scientist Jonathan Bernstein notes that in 1994,
Democrats failed to pass their huge health-care reform bill, and
got destroyed in the midterms. In 2010, Democrats came together
and passed a different, huge health-care reform bill�and got
destroyed in the midterms.

This kind of political fatalism is bleak, and it runs counter to
the kind of can-do spirit it takes to run for Congress.
Political scientists are rarely a hit at any party, especially a
political party. Members want to believe they�re representing
voters, and if they provide for those voters, they�ll be
rewarded with another term. That�s why politicians such as
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who knows the dispiriting history well,
still publicly insist that Democrats will hold the House. In
reality, members� fates will be mostly decided by how strongly
Democratic their district is.

For the endangered moderates, that�s painful. It�s one thing to
say Democrats will probably lose their majority, and another to
tell a swing-district House member she�s going to lose her job,
no matter what she does now. She�s likely to take any step she
can to appeal to moderate and swing voters, even if it means
undermining the party�s policy aims, rather than admit that her
fate is out of her hands.

But fatalism can be freeing too. If the timing of a bill
passing, or even failing, doesn�t matter to your chances of
reelection, the stakes of these intramural skirmishes over
process are much smaller. Members can stress less about
mechanics and more about results. After all, the point of a
majority is to enact legislation�not simply to maintain that
majority.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/09/democrats-sway-
voters-illusion/620143/

On Sun, 26 Dec 2021 22:49:24 +0100 (CET), Sheldon
<everyday@stupid.liberals.diz> wrote:

If we ever need the opinion of a Dunning-Kruger poster child, we'll
give you a call.

John Baker wrote

> On Sun, 26 Dec 2021 22:49:24 +0100 (CET), Sheldon
> <everyday@stupid.liberals.diz> wrote:
>
> If we ever need the opinion of a Dunning-Kruger poster child, we'll
> give you a call.
>
>

Trump won the election but being feeble and gullible, he let Biden and Antifa
steal it away