Enver Pasha's mission to Turkestan after World War I--where he first took the
Soviet side, and then went over to the anti-Soviet Basmachis--was probably
doomed from the start. Enver was a, well, difficult man. He was supposed to
be aligned with the Emir of Bukhara and the Emir's chief lieutenant Ibrahim
Bek. But he got carried away with his own importance, issuing decrees
affecting the civil life of Eastern Bukhara without the Emir's consent,
modestly signing himself "Commander in Chief of all the Islamic troops, son-
in-law of the Caliph, [a reference to the fact that he had married the
daughter of the Sultan prior to World War I] and representative of the
Prophet." This raised the suspicions of the Emir, who was already displeased
with the association between Enver and the "jadidists." (Jadidism was a
"modernist" movement to which the Emir and other conservative Muslims were
bitterly opposed.) The division between the jadidists and conservatives was
only one of many divisions among the Basmachis. And this is one reason I am
skeptical of the Basmachis' chances of success, even if they had receieved
more foreign assistance.

See https://books.google.com/books?id=YQHaAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61 for an evaluation
of Enver:

"Enver's venture to Central Asia exhibited a number of problems from the
beginning. First of all, Enver had very little knowledge about the realities
of the situation in Turkestan. His idealistic motives and apprehensions about
his uneasy relations with the Russians, combined with the boldness of his
entire career, gave way to his hasty involvement in an indigenous movement
with very little insight and planning.120 This lack of information and
understanding was clearly revealed when Enver tried to juxtapose his pan-
Islamic and Turanian ideals to a resistance movement which had nothing to do
with them. Even though religion played a very important role for the
Basmachis, they were merely fighting against the oppressive policies of the
Russians and had neither the power nor the intention of uniting the Islamic
world. As for pan-Turkic ideals, 'The people knew little, and cared less,
about Osmanli dreams of Central Asian hegemony, if such exist; certainly Pan-
Turanism did not figure on the Basmachi programme, whether inspired by Enver
or not'...

"Throughout his struggle in Central Asia, he was unable to arouse the support
of the masses to his pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideals. Nevertheless, he
tried to co-ordinate and lead an indigenous struggle against the Russians
with very limited means and even less insight. This would be Enver's last
battle, concluded by his death on the battlefield."

Ironically, the British were reluctant to aid the Basmachi movement partly
because they shared the same delusion as Enver: that it was "pro-Turkish." It
was in fact simply based on grievances against Soviet policy in Turkestan,
and the Soviets could therefore defeat it by a combination of temporary
concessions (in connection with the NEP) and repression.

Anyway, in OTL Enver was killed by Soviet troops in 1922. Suppose, though,
that Enver had managed to escape. Where would he go? Kemal, who had rejected
pan-Turkism, did not want him in Turkey. The logical place, it seems to me,
would be Germany, where German nationalists admired Enver. Indeed, Hitler
actually mentioned Enver Pasha in his treason trial:

"Never in world history did a nation rise out of infestation starting from
the capital, which was infested.... You can see the same in ancient history.
A good wave was always carried [from outside] into the heart of the Roman
Empire, to Rome. And that is the deeper sense of crossing the Rubicon. You
can see this in Turkey. Not from the rotten center, from Constantinople,
could salvation come. The city was, just as in our case, contaminated by
democratic-pacifistic, internationalized people, who were no longer able to
do what is necessary. It could only come from the farmer's country....
Another example you can find in the Young Turk Revolution. Enver Pasha
marched on Constantinople and established a new state there, and a new spirit
poured over the totally infested capital city. And finally the last, the most
classical example in Italy! The Fascist wave came from the North and has
conquered Rome... " https://books.google.com/books?id=F_Q9BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97

It is true that in the 1930's, Nazi Germany's praise was centered on Kemal
Ataturk, whose "realism" was contrasted with Enver Pasha's idealistic pan-
Turanian dreams. Nevertheless, there were a number of laudatory biographies
of Enver Pasha written in Nazi Germany: "Egon von Bahder, *Enver Pascha:
Kampf und Tod in Turkistan* (Berlin: Verlag Die Wehrmacht, 1943). Bahder�s
biography of Enver is all the more remarkable, because until recently there
existed only one proper biography of Enver Pasha in Turkish: Sevket S�reyya
Aydemir, *Makedonya�dan Ortaasya�ya Enver Pasa* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2007
[1970]). Other German attempts to rehabilitate Enver include Kurt Okay,
*Enver Pascha: Der gro�e Freund Deutschlands* (Berlin: Verlag f�r
Kulturpolitik, 1935); Bronsart von Schellendorff, "Ankara und Enver Pascha,"
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 20, 1936; Guse, *Die T�rkei*, 47; Bethke,
*Im Lande Ismet In�n�s*, 202, 229 - 232." https://books.google.com/books?
id=F_Q9BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA280

As one might expect, the high point of Enver Pasha's reputation in Nazi
Germany was after Barbarossa, when both Germany and Turkey flirted with a
Turanian revival:

"But this theme, German-Turkish brotherhood in arms, and Talat Pasha, whose
remains had been returned to Turkey in 1943 from Berlin, were not the only
things that were dug up again during World War II. Now the New Turkey also
dug up Enver Pasha, ideologically, ushering into the brief flirtation with
Turanism by the Nazis and the New Turkey alike between 1941 and 1943/4.
Turanism--the vision of a union of all Turkic peoples from the Aegean to
northwestern China under Turkish leadership--had once motivated Enver Pasha
and had led to the catastrophe at Sarikamis, Under Atatturk, Turanism was
suppressed, but under his successor Inonu new Turanist clubs were opened,
apparently even founded on government initiative. And although Enver had not
succeeded in traversing the Caucasian passes beyond Sarikamis, his brother
Nuri Pasha had marched into Baku at the end of World War I at the head of the
Ottoman "Army of Islam." Massacres of local Armenians had followed. And it
was precisely this Nuri Pasha (now by the name Nuri Killigil) who was sent to
Berlin in 1941 and who presented to the Nazis his Turanist vision of a
multitude of Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia led by Turkey,
Not much was to come of it. The only immediate result was that the Nazis
began employing Pan-Turkic propaganda among the captured Soviet soldiers of
Turkic ethnicity (Tatars, Azeris, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and so on) in order to
recruit them into special SS units. Furthermore, neither various Nazi offers
of territorial enlargement nor frequent Turkish hints about "potential
territorial wish lists" (northern Syria, Mosul, Aleppo, the Dodecanese
Islands, and such) produced any immediate results. The rationale of the
Turkish government, expressed by Foreign Minister Mehmet 5ukru Saracoglu, was
that as long as the Nazis had not completely defeated the Soviet Union, for
fear of Soviet reprisals against the many Turkic populations inside the
Soviet Union, Turkey simply could not do anything. At least not openly,
because even if Nuri Pasha was in Berlin only in a semi-official capacity,
there is evidence that it was indeed official Turkey that was extending its
feelers. High military officers such as the Turkish chief of staff, Fevzi
Cakmak, as well as the generals Huseyin Erkilet and Ali Fuat Erdem seem to
have also been involved in these Pan Turkish, German-Turkish talks. The
latter two, after returning from an almost three-week-long tour of Germany
and the Eastern front in late 1941, tried to convince the Turkish president
Inonu and other high-ranking Turks that the war was as good as won and that
now was the time for Turkey to participate in the German victory. Inonu was
hesitant; others were more easily convinced. The Turkish military elite,
including the General Staff, seemed to have been especially pro-German and
Turanist at the time. Almost a year later, now as Turkish prime minister,
Saracoglu told von Papen how happy he would be if the Third Reich would
destroy the Soviet Union, and he advised the Germans that what they needed to
do to win this war was to kill half of the Russian nation. Von Papen
summarized Saracoglu's message: "As a Turk, he yearns for the destruction of
Russia; it would be the Fuhrer's most magnificent deed." It appears as if
official Turkey, at least below President Inonu, was very much tempted by the
Turanist possibilities that had opened up with Germany's attack on the Soviet
Union.

"Once it was clear that Germany was not winning the war in the Soviet Union,
Pan-Turanism was also abandoned by Ankara, at the very least in order to
signal its "neutrality" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union..."
https://books.google.com/books?id=F_Q9BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA216

On Friday, May 14, 2021 at 9:42:38 PM UTC-7, dte...@ameritech.net wrote:
> Enver Pasha's mission to Turkestan after World War I--where he first took the
> Soviet side, and then went over to the anti-Soviet Basmachis--was probably
> doomed from the start. Enver was a, well, difficult man. He was supposed to
> be aligned with the Emir of Bukhara and the Emir's chief lieutenant Ibrahim
> Bek. But he got carried away with his own importance, issuing decrees
> affecting the civil life of Eastern Bukhara without the Emir's consent,
> modestly signing himself "Commander in Chief of all the Islamic troops, son-
> in-law of the Caliph, [a reference to the fact that he had married the
> daughter of the Sultan prior to World War I] and representative of the
> Prophet." This raised the suspicions of the Emir, who was already displeased
> with the association between Enver and the "jadidists." (Jadidism was a
> "modernist" movement to which the Emir and other conservative Muslims were
> bitterly opposed.) The division between the jadidists and conservatives was
> only one of many divisions among the Basmachis. And this is one reason I am
> skeptical of the Basmachis' chances of success, even if they had receieved
> more foreign assistance.
>
> See https://books.google.com/books?id=YQHaAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=YQHaAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61 for an evaluation
> of Enver:
>
> "Enver's venture to Central Asia exhibited a number of problems from the
> beginning. First of all, Enver had very little knowledge about the realities
> of the situation in Turkestan. His idealistic motives and apprehensions about
> his uneasy relations with the Russians, combined with the boldness of his
> entire career, gave way to his hasty involvement in an indigenous movement
> with very little insight and planning.120 This lack of information and
> understanding was clearly revealed when Enver tried to juxtapose his pan-
> Islamic and Turanian ideals to a resistance movement which had nothing to do
> with them. Even though religion played a very important role for the
> Basmachis, they were merely fighting against the oppressive policies of the
> Russians and had neither the power nor the intention of uniting the Islamic
> world. As for pan-Turkic ideals, 'The people knew little, and cared less,
> about Osmanli dreams of Central Asian hegemony, if such exist; certainly Pan-
> Turanism did not figure on the Basmachi programme, whether inspired by Enver
> or not'...
>
> "Throughout his struggle in Central Asia, he was unable to arouse the support
> of the masses to his pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideals. Nevertheless, he
> tried to co-ordinate and lead an indigenous struggle against the Russians
> with very limited means and even less insight. This would be Enver's last
> battle, concluded by his death on the battlefield."
>
> Ironically, the British were reluctant to aid the Basmachi movement partly
> because they shared the same delusion as Enver: that it was "pro-Turkish." It
> was in fact simply based on grievances against Soviet policy in Turkestan,
> and the Soviets could therefore defeat it by a combination of temporary
> concessions (in connection with the NEP) and repression.
>
> Anyway, in OTL Enver was killed by Soviet troops in 1922. Suppose, though,
> that Enver had managed to escape. Where would he go? Kemal, who had rejected
> pan-Turkism, did not want him in Turkey. The logical place, it seems to me,
> would be Germany, where German nationalists admired Enver. Indeed, Hitler
> actually mentioned Enver Pasha in his treason trial:
>
> "Never in world history did a nation rise out of infestation starting from
> the capital, which was infested.... You can see the same in ancient history.
> A good wave was always carried [from outside] into the heart of the Roman
> Empire, to Rome. And that is the deeper sense of crossing the Rubicon. You
> can see this in Turkey. Not from the rotten center, from Constantinople,
> could salvation come. The city was, just as in our case, contaminated by
> democratic-pacifistic, internationalized people, who were no longer able to
> do what is necessary. It could only come from the farmer's country....
> Another example you can find in the Young Turk Revolution. Enver Pasha
> marched on Constantinople and established a new state there, and a new spirit
> poured over the totally infested capital city. And finally the last, the most
> classical example in Italy! The Fascist wave came from the North and has
> conquered Rome... " https://books.google.com/books?id=F_Q9BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97
>
> It is true that in the 1930's, Nazi Germany's praise was centered on Kemal
> Ataturk, whose "realism" was contrasted with Enver Pasha's idealistic pan-
> Turanian dreams. Nevertheless, there were a number of laudatory biographies
> of Enver Pasha written in Nazi Germany: "Egon von Bahder, *Enver Pascha:
> Kampf und Tod in Turkistan* (Berlin: Verlag Die Wehrmacht, 1943). Bahder’s
> biography of Enver is all the more remarkable, because until recently there
> existed only one proper biography of Enver Pasha in Turkish: Sevket Süreyya
> Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Pasa* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2007
> [1970]). Other German attempts to rehabilitate Enver include Kurt Okay,
> *Enver Pascha: Der große Freund Deutschlands* (Berlin: Verlag für
> Kulturpolitik, 1935); Bronsart von Schellendorff, "Ankara und Enver Pascha,"
> Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 20, 1936; Guse, *Die Türkei*, 47; Bethke,
> *Im Lande Ismet Inönüs*, 202, 229 - 232." https://books.google.com/books?
> id=F_Q9BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA280
>
> As one might expect, the high point of Enver Pasha's reputation in Nazi
> Germany was after Barbarossa, when both Germany and Turkey flirted with a
> Turanian revival:
>
> "But this theme, German-Turkish brotherhood in arms, and Talat Pasha, whose
> remains had been returned to Turkey in 1943 from Berlin, were not the only
> things that were dug up again during World War II. Now the New Turkey also
> dug up Enver Pasha, ideologically, ushering into the brief flirtation with
> Turanism by the Nazis and the New Turkey alike between 1941 and 1943/4.
> Turanism--the vision of a union of all Turkic peoples from the Aegean to
> northwestern China under Turkish leadership--had once motivated Enver Pasha
> and had led to the catastrophe at Sarikamis, Under Atatturk, Turanism was
> suppressed, but under his successor Inonu new Turanist clubs were opened,
> apparently even founded on government initiative. And although Enver had not
> succeeded in traversing the Caucasian passes beyond Sarikamis, his brother
> Nuri Pasha had marched into Baku at the end of World War I at the head of the
> Ottoman "Army of Islam." Massacres of local Armenians had followed. And it
> was precisely this Nuri Pasha (now by the name Nuri Killigil) who was sent to
> Berlin in 1941 and who presented to the Nazis his Turanist vision of a
> multitude of Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia led by Turkey,
> Not much was to come of it. The only immediate result was that the Nazis
> began employing Pan-Turkic propaganda among the captured Soviet soldiers of
> Turkic ethnicity (Tatars, Azeris, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and so on) in order to
> recruit them into special SS units. Furthermore, neither various Nazi offers
> of territorial enlargement nor frequent Turkish hints about "potential
> territorial wish lists" (northern Syria, Mosul, Aleppo, the Dodecanese
> Islands, and such) produced any immediate results. The rationale of the
> Turkish government, expressed by Foreign Minister Mehmet 5ukru Saracoglu, was
> that as long as the Nazis had not completely defeated the Soviet Union, for
> fear of Soviet reprisals against the many Turkic populations inside the
> Soviet Union, Turkey simply could not do anything. At least not openly,
> because even if Nuri Pasha was in Berlin only in a semi-official capacity,
> there is evidence that it was indeed official Turkey that was extending its
> feelers. High military officers such as the Turkish chief of staff, Fevzi
> Cakmak, as well as the generals Huseyin Erkilet and Ali Fuat Erdem seem to
> have also been involved in these Pan Turkish, German-Turkish talks. The
> latter two, after returning from an almost three-week-long tour of Germany
> and the Eastern front in late 1941, tried to convince the Turkish president
> Inonu and other high-ranking Turks that the war was as good as won and that
> now was the time for Turkey to participate in the German victory. Inonu was
> hesitant; others were more easily convinced. The Turkish military elite,
> including the General Staff, seemed to have been especially pro-German and
> Turanist at the time. Almost a year later, now as Turkish prime minister,
> Saracoglu told von Papen how happy he would be if the Third Reich would
> destroy the Soviet Union, and he advised the Germans that what they needed to
> do to win this war was to kill half of the Russian nation. Von Papen
> summarized Saracoglu's message: "As a Turk, he yearns for the destruction of
> Russia; it would be the Fuhrer's most magnificent deed." It appears as if
> official Turkey, at least below President Inonu, was very much tempted by the
> Turanist possibilities that had opened up with Germany's attack on the Soviet
> Union.
>
> "Once it was clear that Germany was not winning the war in the Soviet Union,
> Pan-Turanism was also abandoned by Ankara, at the very least in order to
> signal its "neutrality" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union..."
> https://books.google.com/books?id=F_Q9BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA216
>
> So the idea of a surviving Enver Pasha relocating to Germany, and especially
> during World War II becoming a hero there, trying to assist in the
> indoctrination of "Turkic" prsioners of war from the Soviet Union, and to
> convince Inonu to join the great German-Pan-Turkish crusade, seems entirely
> plausible to me. Of course there is the further question of whether Enver
> would live to see the Nazi victory in Germany--or whether Armenian assassins
> would kill him first. Operation Nemesis
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Nemesis in OTL ended in 1922, but
> Shahan Natalie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahan_Natalie would still be
> around when Enver would arrive in Germany, and we could see one last round of
> Nemesis...
>
> --
> David Tenner
> dte...@ameritech.net