Have a read and give us yout thoughts

https://chernarusiannarcowars.blogspot.com/2021/10/japan-kept-soviet-forces-pinned-down-in.html

On 10/2/21 3:41 AM, SolomonW wrote:
> Have a read and give us your thoughts
>
> https://chernarusiannarcowars.blogspot.com/2021/10/japan-kept-soviet-forces-pinned-down-in.html

If the sourcing at top is real, this is an informative
discussion of Japanese thinking. TL;DR = "The Japanese
made plans for attacking the USSR, but never seriously
considered doing it."

The plans were made because the Army staff was directed
to prepare for the possibility.

An interesting question (to me) is what Japan was thinking
in August-October 1941. Prior to the German attack, Japan
feared taking on the Soviet army that had defeated them in
1939, Then with the spectacular German victories in summer
1941, did Japan become more sanguine about fighting the
Soviets?

A planned attack on 29 August is mentioned. When was this
proposed? Surely it was not expected that the Germans would
have taken Moscow by then.

Also, later in 1941, Japan was increasingly committed to war
against the US and Britain, which would pre-empt any strike
on the USSR.

If for some reason, tensions with the US eased, might Japan
have then turned again to attacking the USSR? (Especially as
German victories against the USSR continued.)

However, the speaker did address these points.
--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

On Mon, 4 Oct 2021 18:25:34 -0500, Rich Rostrom wrote:

> On 10/2/21 3:41 AM, SolomonW wrote:
>> Have a read and give us your thoughts
>>
>> https://chernarusiannarcowars.blogspot.com/2021/10/japan-kept-soviet-forces-pinned-down-in.html
>
> If the sourcing at top is real, this is an informative
> discussion of Japanese thinking. TL;DR = "The Japanese
> made plans for attacking the USSR, but never seriously
> considered doing it."
>
> The plans were made because the Army staff was directed
> to prepare for the possibility.
>
> An interesting question (to me) is what Japan was thinking
> in August-October 1941. Prior to the German attack, Japan
> feared taking on the Soviet army that had defeated them in
> 1939, Then with the spectacular German victories in summer
> 1941, did Japan become more sanguine about fighting the
> Soviets?
>
> A planned attack on 29 August is mentioned. When was this
> proposed? Surely it was not expected that the Germans would
> have taken Moscow by then.

If you consider that this may have been a contingency plan, then it makes
sense. The Allies in 1943, for example, had a plan, what to invade Europe
immediately if NAZI Germany collapsed like in WW1

>
> Also, later in 1941, Japan was increasingly committed to war
> against the US and Britain, which would pre-empt any strike
> on the USSR.

The Japanese army in China was only marginally affected by this, plus the
initial Japanese plan was to take the Pacific, build up a defensive
position and wait for the allies to come.

>
> If for some reason, tensions with the US eased, might Japan
> have then turned again to attacking the USSR? (Especially as
> German victories against the USSR continued.)

Indeed.

>
> However, the speaker did address these points.

On Tue, 5 Oct 2021 17:54:57 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com> wrote:

>On Mon, 4 Oct 2021 18:25:34 -0500, Rich Rostrom wrote:
>
>> On 10/2/21 3:41 AM, SolomonW wrote:
>>> Have a read and give us your thoughts
>>>
>>> https://chernarusiannarcowars.blogspot.com/2021/10/japan-kept-soviet-forces-pinned-down-in.html
>If you consider that this may have been a contingency plan, then it makes
>sense. The Allies in 1943, for example, had a plan, what to invade Europe
>immediately if NAZI Germany collapsed like in WW1

You are presumably talking about Operation Bolero which Churchill
argued for instead of Husky (Sicily) immediately after the clearing of
North Africa.

There was also a plan for >1942< which Churchill believed was suicidal
(and its failure would prevent another try until 1944) and kept it as
a contingency NOT against German collapse but as a desperation move to
keep the Soviet Union in the war if contronted with a move by Stalin
to capitulate.

It's described in some detail in Churchill's 6 volume history though I
am inexplicably forgetting the code name.

>> Also, later in 1941, Japan was increasingly committed to war
>> against the US and Britain, which would pre-empt any strike
>> on the USSR.
>
>The Japanese army in China was only marginally affected by this, plus the
>initial Japanese plan was to take the Pacific, build up a defensive
>position and wait for the allies to come.

The project you're referring to was strictly a Kwantung army operation
and did not involve the main Japanese forces in China.

>> If for some reason, tensions with the US eased, might Japan
>> have then turned again to attacking the USSR? (Especially as
>> German victories against the USSR continued.)
>
>Indeed.

It could even have been in a fit of pique over a slightly earlier
capture of Richard Sorge.....

>
>>
>> However, the speaker did address these points.

Mty objection to the article was that it required multiple divergences
to work.

Turtledove has also done a book on this scenario as part of his World
War series. (WW2 starts immediately after Munich when the leader of
the Sudeten Nazis Henlein is assassinated and Hitler declares war
while Daladier and Chamberlain are still in Munich)

If you've not seen this one you either love Turtledove's style (I do)
or you hate and you'll pass on it. My impression on the first book is
that while Vladivostok falls after a long siege, Stalin manages to
avoid his more egregious errors of 1941. More than that would require
major spoilers....

On 10/5/21 3:39 AM, The Horny Goat wrote:
> You are presumably talking about Operation Bolero

No, he refers I think to the RANKIN Plans.

RANKIN A: if Germmany appeared to weaken considerably prior
to NEPTUNE's planned date.

RANKIN B: if Germany withdrew from France or Norway.

RANKIN C: if Germany surrendered.

These scenarios were all considered unlikely, but still had
to be planned for.

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

On Tue, 5 Oct 2021 12:29:14 -0500, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom@comcast.net>
wrote:

>On 10/5/21 3:39 AM, The Horny Goat wrote:
>> You are presumably talking about Operation Bolero
>
>No, he refers I think to the RANKIN Plans.
>
>RANKIN A: if Germmany appeared to weaken considerably prior
>to NEPTUNE's planned date.
>
>RANKIN B: if Germany withdrew from France or Norway.
>
>RANKIN C: if Germany surrendered.
>
>These scenarios were all considered unlikely, but still had
>to be planned for.

Contingency plans are not always about actual contingencies. The US
Army gave junior officers in their staff college a task to write
orders concerning combatting a zombie apocalypse not being the US Army
expected their troops to be ready to fight zombies but because it was
considered important that junior officers be able to write coherent
effective orders.

One suspects the 1920s era Canadian plan to invade the United States
(which was basically to seize holdable outposts on the US side then
hang on for dear life for reinforcements from the UK - which were NOT
in the UK contingency plans!) was another of the same sort.

(It was formally cancelled in 1931)

As for your #2 one of the weirder "occupations" was the British
occupation of Norway in May 1945. After VE Day the Norwegian
government asked Churchill for a British brigade sized unit to occupy
Oslo and other key points to assist the government in re-establishing
order (particularly on receiving the surrender of 200,000+ Germans and
keep them out of trouble while they were shipped out of Norway) and
maintain security for the Norwegians who were running their first
postwar elections.

Churchill chose 1st Airborne which was certainly a prestigious enough
unit (and was at brigade strength after Arnhem) and had been kept in
the UK (the POWs had not yet been sent home) and it was considered an
easy short-term assignment. They stayed till after the Norwegian
elections and were quickly sent home in August 1945 and demobilized.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Airborne_Division_(United_Kingdom)#Norway_post-war

On Tue, 05 Oct 2021 12:06:29 -0700, The Horny Goat wrote:

> On Tue, 5 Oct 2021 12:29:14 -0500, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom@comcast.net>
> wrote:
>
>>On 10/5/21 3:39 AM, The Horny Goat wrote:
>>> You are presumably talking about Operation Bolero
>>
>>No, he refers I think to the RANKIN Plans.
>>
>>RANKIN A: if Germmany appeared to weaken considerably prior
>>to NEPTUNE's planned date.
>>
>>RANKIN B: if Germany withdrew from France or Norway.
>>
>>RANKIN C: if Germany surrendered.
>>
>>These scenarios were all considered unlikely, but still had
>>to be planned for.
>
> Contingency plans are not always about actual contingencies. The US
> Army gave junior officers in their staff college a task to write
> orders concerning combatting a zombie apocalypse not being the US Army
> expected their troops to be ready to fight zombies but because it was
> considered important that junior officers be able to write coherent
> effective orders.

It is also helpful in testing.

I went to a talk where several operations
research (OR) analysts discussed their new mathematical methods developed
by the US military. What they were looking for here were tank
specifications they believed the US army needed. They were looking at many
different scenarios to see how their tank specifications would perform then
access how these tank specifications would be used in these scenarios. Many
of these scenarios made little sense, but it did not worry them much.

On Wed, 6 Oct 2021 18:59:30 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com> wrote:

>On Tue, 05 Oct 2021 12:06:29 -0700, The Horny Goat wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 5 Oct 2021 12:29:14 -0500, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom@comcast.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>On 10/5/21 3:39 AM, The Horny Goat wrote:
>>>> You are presumably talking about Operation Bolero
>>>
>>>No, he refers I think to the RANKIN Plans.
>>>
>>>RANKIN A: if Germmany appeared to weaken considerably prior
>>>to NEPTUNE's planned date.
>>>
>>>RANKIN B: if Germany withdrew from France or Norway.
>>>
>>>RANKIN C: if Germany surrendered.
>>>
>>>These scenarios were all considered unlikely, but still had
>>>to be planned for.
>>
>> Contingency plans are not always about actual contingencies. The US
>> Army gave junior officers in their staff college a task to write
>> orders concerning combatting a zombie apocalypse not being the US Army
>> expected their troops to be ready to fight zombies but because it was
>> considered important that junior officers be able to write coherent
>> effective orders.
>
>
>It is also helpful in testing.
>
>I went to a talk where several operations
>research (OR) analysts discussed their new mathematical methods developed
>by the US military. What they were looking for here were tank
>specifications they believed the US army needed. They were looking at many
>different scenarios to see how their tank specifications would perform then
>access how these tank specifications would be used in these scenarios. Many
>of these scenarios made little sense, but it did not worry them much.

One of the more interesting columns in the old Strategy & Tactics
magazine was a column by Jim Dunnigan detailing the visit to their
offices of a USMC team leader (can't remember the unit but it was one
of their special teams)

SPI had just sent their "Sniper" game to the printers and was
expecting big things from it as it was the first game involving
individual soldiers as unit counters as opposed to larger units.

Dunnigan says he invited the officer to try out the game and offer
feedback which he did. It was a block clearing exercise and the
officer cleared the block with only one light wound result which came
when a cloud of smoke from a smoke grenade cleared faster than
expected giving the opposition an expected shot.

(Of course Sniper was the game units that were either prone or erect
and were either exposed to enemy fire or not - for instance taking
shelter behind a wall but they couldn't shoot if they did. Thus
leading to the infamous line - which was only in the first draft and
reworded as "self exposure by sighting" - "erect men may expose
themselves". Red Simonson was said to have muttered after the laughter
died down "this is definitely going to be changed before we go to
press!)

Apparently in that era (late 70s early 80s) the US military liked such
games as a low cost training tool that was a lot more portable than
their computer simulators....

On Wed, 06 Oct 2021 03:10:45 -0700, The Horny Goat wrote:

> Apparently in that era (late 70s early 80s) the US military liked such
> games as a low cost training tool that was a lot more portable than
> their computer simulators....

It may not just be cost. You know exactly what is happening with a manual
system rather than a computer simulator which is a Black Box.