From
<https://nltimes.nl/2023/04/07/train-derailment-timeline-leaked-crane-active-railroad-earlier-agreed>:

"Voorschoten train derailment timeline

3:23 a.m.: The contractor's on-site safety manager contacts the ProRail
train traffic controller with the request to briefly put the tracks next
to the worksite out of service so that the crane can safely cross. The
train controller replies that this will be possible in 10 minutes. The
workplace safety manager gives instructions to wait for a call from the
train traffic controller. For reasons that are unclear, the crane then
arrives too early on or close to the track in service and is hit by the
freight train.

After the collision with the freight train, the crane ends up on the
track where the NS passenger train is approaching. This also collides
with it, causing the NS train to derail.

3:29 a.m.: The operations control centre for infrastructure (OBI) calls
the train traffic controller with the report that several overhead lines
have failed. It is asked whether there is still train traffic between
The Hague and Leiden.

3:31 a.m.: The Railroad Control Room calls the train traffic controller
to ask whether an incident has occurred at Voorschoten. The train
traffic controller replies that he is not aware of an incident, but that
he has received a report from the OBI that the overhead line voltage has
been lost.

3:31 and 3:32 a.m.: The train traffic controller calls the freight
train, the passenger train and the train behind the freight train, but
does not reach any of the drivers.

3:34 a.m.: The driver of the train behind the freight train calls back
that the power has been lost just before Mariahoeve.

3:36 a.m.: The Railroad Control Room contacts the train controller
again. The control room says that the fire brigade has been informed
that a crane has been hit and that the NS control room reports that the
NS train has derailed. Emergency services are dispatched.

Reporting by ANP"
--
Rob
"I have never understood why it should be necessary to become irrational
in order to prove that you care, or, indeed, why it should be necessary
to prove it at all." - Avon, Blake's 7

Robert <monstoor@spammedia.com> wrote:
> From
> <https://nltimes.nl/2023/04/07/train-derailment-timeline-leaked-crane-active-railroad-earlier-agreed>:
>
> "Voorschoten train derailment timeline
>
> 3:23 a.m.: The contractor's on-site safety manager contacts the ProRail
> train traffic controller with the request to briefly put the tracks next
> to the worksite out of service so that the crane can safely cross. The
> train controller replies that this will be possible in 10 minutes. The
> workplace safety manager gives instructions to wait for a call from the
> train traffic controller. For reasons that are unclear, the crane then
> arrives too early on or close to the track in service and is hit by the
> freight train.
>
> After the collision with the freight train, the crane ends up on the
> track where the NS passenger train is approaching. This also collides
> with it, causing the NS train to derail.
>

So a road-rail crane, perhaps; which would explain earlier reports about it
being on the 'wrong' track.

> 3:29 a.m.: The operations control centre for infrastructure (OBI) calls
> the train traffic controller with the report that several overhead lines
> have failed. It is asked whether there is still train traffic between
> The Hague and Leiden.
>
> 3:31 a.m.: The Railroad Control Room calls the train traffic controller
> to ask whether an incident has occurred at Voorschoten. The train
> traffic controller replies that he is not aware of an incident, but that
> he has received a report from the OBI that the overhead line voltage has
> been lost.
>
> 3:31 and 3:32 a.m.: The train traffic controller calls the freight
> train, the passenger train and the train behind the freight train, but
> does not reach any of the drivers.
>
> 3:34 a.m.: The driver of the train behind the freight train calls back
> that the power has been lost just before Mariahoeve.
>
> 3:36 a.m.: The Railroad Control Room contacts the train controller
> again. The control room says that the fire brigade has been informed
> that a crane has been hit and that the NS control room reports that the
> NS train has derailed. Emergency services are dispatched.
>

Somewhat chaotic to take seven minutes to determine that there had been a
major collision.

That's one reason that I tell trainees to press the big red GSRM button
*before* the impending collision, if they have chance.

Anna Noyd-Dryver

In message <u19898$11rg2$2@dont-email.me>, at 15:48:56 on Thu, 13 Apr
2023, Anna Noyd-Dryver <anna@noyd-dryver.com> remarked:
>Robert <monstoor@spammedia.com> wrote:
>> From
>>
>><https://nltimes.nl/2023/04/07/train-derailment-timeline-leaked-crane-a
>>ctive-railroad-earlier-agreed>:
>>
>> "Voorschoten train derailment timeline
>>
>> 3:23 a.m.: The contractor's on-site safety manager contacts the ProRail
>> train traffic controller with the request to briefly put the tracks next
>> to the worksite out of service so that the crane can safely cross. The
>> train controller replies that this will be possible in 10 minutes. The
>> workplace safety manager gives instructions to wait for a call from the
>> train traffic controller. For reasons that are unclear, the crane then
>> arrives too early on or close to the track in service and is hit by the
>> freight train.
>>
>> After the collision with the freight train, the crane ends up on the
>> track where the NS passenger train is approaching. This also collides
>> with it, causing the NS train to derail.
>
>So a road-rail crane, perhaps; which would explain earlier reports about it
>being on the 'wrong' track.

I'm looking at the phrase "safely cross", and wonder if it was running
on rubber tyres at a user-worked crossing (of some kind). Irrespective
of whether it was also a road-rail crane or not.

I wonder if there are any photos from the scene regarding the crossing
or the crane itself.

>> 3:29 a.m.: The operations control centre for infrastructure (OBI) calls
>> the train traffic controller with the report that several overhead lines
>> have failed. It is asked whether there is still train traffic between
>> The Hague and Leiden.
>>
>> 3:31 a.m.: The Railroad Control Room calls the train traffic controller
>> to ask whether an incident has occurred at Voorschoten. The train
>> traffic controller replies that he is not aware of an incident, but that
>> he has received a report from the OBI that the overhead line voltage has
>> been lost.
>>
>> 3:31 and 3:32 a.m.: The train traffic controller calls the freight
>> train, the passenger train and the train behind the freight train, but
>> does not reach any of the drivers.
>>
>> 3:34 a.m.: The driver of the train behind the freight train calls back
>> that the power has been lost just before Mariahoeve.
>>
>> 3:36 a.m.: The Railroad Control Room contacts the train controller
>> again. The control room says that the fire brigade has been informed
>> that a crane has been hit and that the NS control room reports that the
>> NS train has derailed. Emergency services are dispatched.
>>
>
>Somewhat chaotic to take seven minutes to determine that there had been a
>major collision.

They appear to have lost comms by 3:31; finding out why might help in
future incidents.

>That's one reason that I tell trainees to press the big red GSRM button
>*before* the impending collision, if they have chance.
>
>Anna Noyd-Dryver

--
Roland Perry