On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>
> You did this? All by yourself?
>
> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It hasn't
> been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's own set
> theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from Russell's
> paradox.
>
> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>
>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know that
>> no set can be a member of itself.
>
> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how physical
> objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both Russell's
> theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they do so without
> making silly arguments like the above.
>

The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself thus
prohibits a set from being a member of itself.

Until the architectural design of a universal knowledge ontology is
specified with perfect coherence (thus eliminating all paradoxes and
undecidable decision problems) strong AI will never be fully coherent.

Once we overcome Tarski's undefinability theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

then and only then will we have fully anchored Davidson's truth
conditional semantics.

>> This becomes more clear when we try to draw a Venn diagram of a set
>> that contains itself that it not a Venn diagram of an identical set.
>
> Venn diagrams are not set theory. They are simply a tool useful for
> solving very *simple* problems in logic and set theory.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott "Great spirits have always encountered
violent opposition from mediocre minds." Einstein

On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>
>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>
>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It hasn't
>> been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's own set
>> theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from Russell's
>> paradox.
>>
>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>
>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know
>>> that no set can be a member of itself.
>>
>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how physical
>> objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both Russell's
>> theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they do so
>> without making silly arguments like the above.
>>
>
> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself thus
> prohibits a set from being a member of itself.

Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds to
the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking about above.

Russell's paradox is about *sets*.

If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>
>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>
>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It hasn't
>>> been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's own set
>>> theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from Russell's
>>> paradox.
>>>
>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>>
>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>>>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>>>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know
>>>> that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>
>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how physical
>>> objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both Russell's
>>> theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they do so
>>> without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>
>>
>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
>> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself thus
>> prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>
> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds to
> the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking about above.
>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)

When we define what a {set} is within a knowledge ontology the concept
of {set} inherits its base semantic meaning from the concept of {total
containment}.

> Russell's paradox is about *sets*.
>
> If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 2021-10-18 11:43, olcott wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>>
>>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>>
>>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It
>>>> hasn't been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's
>>>> own set theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from
>>>> Russell's paradox.
>>>>
>>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>>>
>>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>>>>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>>>>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know
>>>>> that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>>
>>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how
>>>> physical objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both
>>>> Russell's theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they
>>>> do so without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
>>> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself
>>> thus prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>>
>> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds to
>> the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking about
>> above.
>>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>
> When we define what a {set} is within a knowledge ontology the concept
> of {set} inherits its base semantic meaning from the concept of {total
> containment}.

And you are not talking about set theory here, even if you use the term
'set' (or {set}, whatever that's supposed to mean). Sets don't 'inherit'
things. Sets are defined solely in terms of the ∈ operator. Things are
either an element of a given set or they are not an element of that set.
Being an element of a set does not imply "containment", physical or
otherwise.

As I said before, Russell's Paradox is only relevant to *set theory*.
Not to your "{set}s".

And Russell's Paradox is only an issue for naïve set theory. It was
overcome along time ago so your claim to have 'abolished' it would
hardly represents an accomplishment on your part even if you were
actually talking about set theory.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>
>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>
>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It hasn't
>>> been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's own set
>>> theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from Russell's
>>> paradox.
>>>
>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>>
>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>>>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>>>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know
>>>> that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>
>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how physical
>>> objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both Russell's
>>> theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they do so
>>> without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>
>>
>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
>> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself thus
>> prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>
> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds to
> the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking about above.
>
> Russell's paradox is about *sets*.
>
> If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.
>
> André
>

So when I talk about defining one specific element of the body of
analytical knowledge using the inheritance hierarchy of a knowledge
ontology all you hear is blah blah blah.

In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
representation, formal naming and definition of the categories,
properties and relations between the concepts, data and entities that
substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse. More simply, an
ontology is a way of showing the properties of a subject area and how
they are related, by defining a set of concepts and categories that
represent the subject.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)

A knowledge ontology is the natural preexisting order of the set of
human knowledge.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 2021-10-19 08:25, olcott wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>>
>>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>>
>>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It
>>>> hasn't been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's
>>>> own set theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from
>>>> Russell's paradox.
>>>>
>>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>>>
>>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>>>>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>>>>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know
>>>>> that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>>
>>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how
>>>> physical objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both
>>>> Russell's theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they
>>>> do so without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
>>> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself
>>> thus prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>>
>> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds to
>> the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking about
>> above.
>>
>> Russell's paradox is about *sets*.
>>
>> If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.
>>
>> André
>>
>
> So when I talk about defining one specific element of the body of
> analytical knowledge using the inheritance hierarchy of a knowledge
> ontology all you hear is blah blah blah.

Your post claimed that you had 'abolished' Russell's paradox (something
which was already effectively abolished over a century ago). You've now
switched to the entirely unrelated topics of inheritance hierarchies.
Russell's paradox isn't relevant to this.

And the mathematical concept of a set already has a definition.

>
> In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
> representation, formal naming and definition of the categories,
> properties and relations between the concepts, data and entities that
> substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse. More simply, an
> ontology is a way of showing the properties of a subject area and how
> they are related, by defining a set of concepts and categories that
> represent the subject.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>
> A knowledge ontology is the natural preexisting  order of the set of
> human knowledge.

There is no 'prexisting order' of human knowledge.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 10/19/2021 3:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-19 08:25, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>>>
>>>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>>>
>>>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It
>>>>> hasn't been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's
>>>>> own set theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from
>>>>> Russell's paradox.
>>>>>
>>>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>>>>
>>>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain itself
>>>>>> such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is contained
>>>>>> within this same physical or conceptual boundary then we can know
>>>>>> that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how
>>>>> physical objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both
>>>>> Russell's theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but they
>>>>> do so without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>>>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>>>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>>>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
>>>> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself
>>>> thus prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>>>
>>> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds to
>>> the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking about
>>> above.
>>>
>>> Russell's paradox is about *sets*.
>>>
>>> If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> So when I talk about defining one specific element of the body of
>> analytical knowledge using the inheritance hierarchy of a knowledge
>> ontology all you hear is blah blah blah.
>
> Your post claimed that you had 'abolished' Russell's paradox (something
> which was already effectively abolished over a century ago). You've now
> switched to the entirely unrelated topics of inheritance hierarchies.
> Russell's paradox isn't relevant to this.
>

Is your primary goal in life to be as disagreeable as possible?

I abolished Russell's paradox a totally brand new way using a knowledge
ontology.

In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
representation, formal naming and definition of the categories,
properties and relations between the concepts, data and entities that
substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse. More simply, an
ontology is a way of showing the properties of a subject area and how
they are related, by defining a set of concepts and categories that
represent the subject.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)

A knowledge ontology is the natural preexisting order of the set of
human knowledge.

> And the mathematical concept of a set already has a definition.
>
>>
>> In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
>> representation, formal naming and definition of the categories,
>> properties and relations between the concepts, data and entities that
>> substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse. More simply, an
>> ontology is a way of showing the properties of a subject area and how
>> they are related, by defining a set of concepts and categories that
>> represent the subject.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>
>> A knowledge ontology is the natural preexisting  order of the set of
>> human knowledge.
>
> There is no 'prexisting order' of human knowledge.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 2021-10-19 16:03, olcott wrote:
> On 10/19/2021 3:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-10-19 08:25, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It
>>>>>> hasn't been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither Russell's
>>>>>> own set theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C) suffer from
>>>>>> Russell's paradox.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way original?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain
>>>>>>> itself such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is
>>>>>>> contained within this same physical or conceptual boundary then
>>>>>>> we can know that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how
>>>>>> physical objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both
>>>>>> Russell's theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but
>>>>>> they do so without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>>>>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>>>>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>>>>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally contain
>>>>> itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing itself
>>>>> thus prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>>>>
>>>> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds
>>>> to the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking
>>>> about above.
>>>>
>>>> Russell's paradox is about *sets*.
>>>>
>>>> If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> So when I talk about defining one specific element of the body of
>>> analytical knowledge using the inheritance hierarchy of a knowledge
>>> ontology all you hear is blah blah blah.
>>
>> Your post claimed that you had 'abolished' Russell's paradox
>> (something which was already effectively abolished over a century
>> ago). You've now switched to the entirely unrelated topics of
>> inheritance hierarchies. Russell's paradox isn't relevant to this.
>>
>
>
> Is your primary goal in life to be as disagreeable as possible?
>
> I abolished Russell's paradox a totally brand new way using a knowledge
> ontology.

No you have not. And what was wrong with the old ways?

Knowledge ontologies aren't sets, nor are they part of set theory. You
can't "solve" a problem in one domain by moving to an entirely new domain.

> In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
> representation, formal naming and definition of the categories,
> properties and relations between the concepts, data and entities that
> substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse. More simply, an
> ontology is a way of showing the properties of a subject area and how
> they are related, by defining a set of concepts and categories that
> represent the subject.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>
> A knowledge ontology is the natural preexisting  order of the set of
> human knowledge.

No they are not. A knowledge ontology is simply a collection of computer
data structures.

There is no "natural preexisting order of the set of human knowledge."

And your use of the term 'set' in the above sentence likely bears no
relation to the mathematical concept of a set.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 10/19/2021 5:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-19 16:03, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/19/2021 3:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-10-19 08:25, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/18/2021 12:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-10-18 10:44, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/18/2021 11:14 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2021-10-18 09:56, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a using a knowledge ontology.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You did this? All by yourself?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Russell's paradox is only a problem for *naive* set theory. It
>>>>>>> hasn't been a problem for set theory since 1908. Neither
>>>>>>> Russell's own set theory based on the theory of types nor ZF(C)
>>>>>>> suffer from Russell's paradox.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So how is your proposal different from theirs or in any way
>>>>>>> original?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since no thing (physical or conceptual) can totally contain
>>>>>>>> itself such that its outer physical or conceptual boundary is
>>>>>>>> contained within this same physical or conceptual boundary then
>>>>>>>> we can know that no set can be a member of itself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You can't make inferences about how sets behave based on how
>>>>>>> physical objects behave since sets are not physical objects. Both
>>>>>>> Russell's theory of types and ZFC avoid Russell's paradox, but
>>>>>>> they do so without making silly arguments like the above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The base class of the definition of physical and conceptual total
>>>>>> containment from which physical and conceptual total containment
>>>>>> inherits its base semantic meaning is essentially an axiom that
>>>>>> stipulates that no physical or conceptual thing can totally
>>>>>> contain itself. This axiom prohibits a set from totally containing
>>>>>> itself thus prohibits a set from being a member of itself.
>>>>>
>>>>> Classes and sets are two different things. And neither corresponds
>>>>> to the notion of C++ classes which is what you seem to be talking
>>>>> about above.
>>>>>
>>>>> Russell's paradox is about *sets*.
>>>>>
>>>>> If you want to talk about either classes or C++, it isn't relevant.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So when I talk about defining one specific element of the body of
>>>> analytical knowledge using the inheritance hierarchy of a knowledge
>>>> ontology all you hear is blah blah blah.
>>>
>>> Your post claimed that you had 'abolished' Russell's paradox
>>> (something which was already effectively abolished over a century
>>> ago). You've now switched to the entirely unrelated topics of
>>> inheritance hierarchies. Russell's paradox isn't relevant to this.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Is your primary goal in life to be as disagreeable as possible?
>>
>> I abolished Russell's paradox a totally brand new way using a
>> knowledge ontology.
>
> No you have not. And what was wrong with the old ways?
>
> Knowledge ontologies aren't sets, nor are they part of set theory. You
> can't "solve" a problem in one domain by moving to an entirely new domain.
>

A knowledge ontology can represent every detail of the sum total of all
knowledge about anything. I am stopping here because your primary goal
seems to be to be as disagreeable as possible.

The CYC project actually accomplished quite a bit of this.

>> In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
>> representation, formal naming and definition of the categories,
>> properties and relations between the concepts, data and entities that
>> substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse. More simply, an
>> ontology is a way of showing the properties of a subject area and how
>> they are related, by defining a set of concepts and categories that
>> represent the subject.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>
>> A knowledge ontology is the natural preexisting  order of the set of
>> human knowledge.
>
> No they are not. A knowledge ontology is simply a collection of computer
> data structures.
>
> There is no "natural preexisting order of the set of human knowledge."
>
> And your use of the term 'set' in the above sentence likely bears no
> relation to the mathematical concept of a set.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 2021-10-19 17:10, olcott wrote:
> On 10/19/2021 5:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-10-19 16:03, olcott wrote:

>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a totally brand new way using a
>>> knowledge ontology.
>>
>> No you have not. And what was wrong with the old ways?
>>
>> Knowledge ontologies aren't sets, nor are they part of set theory. You
>> can't "solve" a problem in one domain by moving to an entirely new
>> domain.
>>
>
> A knowledge ontology can represent every detail of the sum total of all
> knowledge about anything. I am stopping here because your primary goal
> seems to be to be as disagreeable as possible.

You seem to be entirely missing my point. I'm not disputing that
knowledge ontologies can encode information. I'm stating that you can't
"abolition" Russell's paradox by having the concept of a set "inherit"
something from some base class, because that's *not* how sets are
defined. You can represent the concept of a 'set' in some ontology, but
if you start adding information to that concept that isn't part of the
set-theoretic definition, then you aren't actually representing the
concept of a set. You're representing something else, call it an
"Olcott-Set".

Russell's paradox was concerned with sets as they are defined in naïve
set theory -- not with sets as they are defined by your 'knowledge
ontology'.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 10/19/2021 6:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-19 17:10, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/19/2021 5:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-10-19 16:03, olcott wrote:
>
>>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a totally brand new way using a
>>>> knowledge ontology.
>>>
>>> No you have not. And what was wrong with the old ways?
>>>
>>> Knowledge ontologies aren't sets, nor are they part of set theory.
>>> You can't "solve" a problem in one domain by moving to an entirely
>>> new domain.
>>>
>>
>> A knowledge ontology can represent every detail of the sum total of
>> all knowledge about anything. I am stopping here because your primary
>> goal seems to be to be as disagreeable as possible.
>
> You seem to be entirely missing my point. I'm not disputing that
> knowledge ontologies can encode information. I'm stating that you can't
> "abolition" Russell's paradox by having the concept of a set "inherit"
> something from some base class, because that's *not* how sets are
> defined.

Since it is the freaking way that EVERYTHING is defined it <is> the way
that sets are defined.

Every single idea about anything that can possibly be held in the mind
already has its own place in the natural order of all concepts knowledge
ontology.

> You can represent the concept of a 'set' in some ontology, but
> if you start adding information to that concept that isn't part of the
> set-theoretic definition, then you aren't actually representing the
> concept of a set. You're representing something else, call it an
> "Olcott-Set".
>
> Russell's paradox was concerned with sets as they are defined in naïve
> set theory -- not with sets as they are defined by your 'knowledge
> ontology'.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On Tuesday, October 19, 2021 at 5:47:38 PM UTC-7, olcott wrote:
> On 10/19/2021 6:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> > On 2021-10-19 17:10, olcott wrote:
> >> On 10/19/2021 5:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> >>> On 2021-10-19 16:03, olcott wrote:
> >
> >>>> I abolished Russell's paradox a totally brand new way using a
> >>>> knowledge ontology.
> >>>
> >>> No you have not. And what was wrong with the old ways?
> >>>
> >>> Knowledge ontologies aren't sets, nor are they part of set theory.
> >>> You can't "solve" a problem in one domain by moving to an entirely
> >>> new domain.
> >>>
> >>
> >> A knowledge ontology can represent every detail of the sum total of
> >> all knowledge about anything. I am stopping here because your primary
> >> goal seems to be to be as disagreeable as possible.
> >
> > You seem to be entirely missing my point. I'm not disputing that
> > knowledge ontologies can encode information. I'm stating that you can't
> > "abolition" Russell's paradox by having the concept of a set "inherit"
> > something from some base class, because that's *not* how sets are
> > defined.
> Since it is the freaking way that EVERYTHING is defined it <is> the way
> that sets are defined.
>
> Every single idea about anything that can possibly be held in the mind
> already has its own place in the natural order of all concepts knowledge
> ontology.

One problem that needs to be addressed is the attribute "natural".
Normally "natural" means the unique most accessible form. If an
alleged natural form of something isn't naively "obvious" [scare
quotes] it is best assumed to not be natural. Not everything has
a natural representation - for example, groups.

There is no natural ontology of all knowledge. There are many
possible ontologies of all knowledge.