On 2021-11-10 20:56, olcott wrote:
> On 11/10/2021 9:36 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-11-10 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/10/2021 8:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2021-11-10 18:55, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 11/10/2021 7:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>> On 2021-11-10 18:30, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Whet semantic logical necessity connection is there between
>>>>>>> (a) the Moon is made from green cheese
>>>>>>> (b) the Moon is not made from green cheese
>>>>>>> (a) and (b) proves that 3 > 5.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What does anything about the Moon have to do with 3 > 5 ???
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How can I answer what "logical necessity connection" there is when
>>>>>> you refuse to define what is meant by this.
>>>>>
>>>>> You are just playing head games.
>>>>
>>>> No. I am not playing head games. I am trying to get you to see the
>>>> flaw with what you are proposing.
>>>>
>>>> The problem is that, as far as I can tell, your claim that there is
>>>> no "semantic connection" between the conclusion of the above
>>>> argument and its premises rests solely on your intuition that these
>>>> are unrelated. I share that intuition.
>>>>
>>>> The problem is that logic doesn't *have* intuitions, so if you want
>>>> to invoke 'semantic relatedness' in some rule of logic you need to
>>>> define this in terms of things that can actually be expressed in
>>>> logic, and I fail to see how this is achievable.
>>>>
>>>> I'm fairly certain based on all that you've written that your use of
>>>> terms like 'semantic tautology' and 'semantic consequence' bears no
>>>> relation to what these things actually mean in logic; there's no
>>>> point, therefore, in invoking these unless you learn what they
>>>> actually mean.
>>>>
>>>> So do you actually have some way to define 'semantic connection'
>>>> that actually relies only on the machinery available to formal
>>>> systems and not on personal intuitions?
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> Quick overview for newcomers:
>>> Classical logic and symbolic err when they diverge the the model of
>>> the syllogism. Their biggest mistake is exemplified by the principle
>>> of explosion.
>>>
>>> The syllogism requires semantic logical necessity connections between
>>> its elements. It enforces this through
>>
>> Please provide a source that states that syllogisms require "semantic
>> logical necessity connections between its elements".
>>
>
> That is explained in the next link. Syllogisms are basically set
> operations on defined sets.
>
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_proposition

That link makes no mention of "semantic logical necessity connections
between its elements".

>>> My proposal is to correct the errors of symbolic logic using one or
>>> more of these steps.
>>>
>>> (1) Toss out the POE on its ass.
>>>  From a contradiction or a falsehood not one damn thing logically
>>> follows.
>>
>> You can't simply "throw out" the principle of explosion. It is
>> something that can be proven from other principles of logic. It's not
>> some independent principle that can simply be denied. It follows from
>> basic definitions of logical operators.
>>
>
> That is a freaking nutty thing to say.

How so? Unless you redefine the truth tables for your basic logical
operators like and, or, and not you're stuck with the POE.

> That would mean that sentences about the Moon are proven to be related
> to the relation of integers to each other.

Logic doesn't make any claims about things being 'related to' things.

>>> (2) Extend the the semantic connections that are already included in
>>> syllogisms to encompass a broader scope of natural language semantic
>>> meanings.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_proposition
>>
>> Again, please define "semantic connection".
>>
>
> More head games
>
> All men are mortal.
> Socrates is a man.
> Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
>
> there is a semantic relation between the defined sets.

There is a subset - superset relation. If that's what you mean by
'semantic relation', then say so.

>
> All men are mortal.
> Socrates is a man.
> Therefore the Moon is made from green cheese
>
> there is NOT a semantic relation between the defined sets.

Which sets are you referring to?

No men are green cheese
John is a man.
Therefore John is not green cheese.

If you accept the above, then by your logic there must be a relation
between the set of men and the set of green cheese.

Some men went to the moon.
John is a man.
Therefore John may have gone to the moon.

If you accept the above, there must be a semantic relation between men
and the moon.

Ergo there should be a relationship between 'socrates is a man' and 'the
moon is made from green cheese' since there is apparently a relationship
between men and both cheese and the moon.

>>> This is one way to do that:
>>> (3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relevance_logic
>>>
>>> (4) Extending Montague semantics is the most comprehensive way.
>>> This is based on:
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>>
>> Montague Grammar is not based on Carnap. It is based on categorial
>
> Montague grammar forms Rudolf freaking Carnap meaning postulates.

That's not even a sentence. Montague, AFAIK, never used the term
'meaning postulate' anywhere in his work. I've seen the term applied to
his work by others due to a *very* superficial resemblance between
devices in his work and in Carnap's, but these served very different
purposes and neither is derived from the other.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 11/10/2021 10:52 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-11-10 20:56, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/10/2021 9:36 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-11-10 20:08, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/10/2021 8:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-11-10 18:55, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/10/2021 7:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2021-11-10 18:30, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Whet semantic logical necessity connection is there between
>>>>>>>> (a) the Moon is made from green cheese
>>>>>>>> (b) the Moon is not made from green cheese
>>>>>>>> (a) and (b) proves that 3 > 5.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What does anything about the Moon have to do with 3 > 5 ???
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How can I answer what "logical necessity connection" there is
>>>>>>> when you refuse to define what is meant by this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You are just playing head games.
>>>>>
>>>>> No. I am not playing head games. I am trying to get you to see the
>>>>> flaw with what you are proposing.
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem is that, as far as I can tell, your claim that there is
>>>>> no "semantic connection" between the conclusion of the above
>>>>> argument and its premises rests solely on your intuition that these
>>>>> are unrelated. I share that intuition.
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem is that logic doesn't *have* intuitions, so if you want
>>>>> to invoke 'semantic relatedness' in some rule of logic you need to
>>>>> define this in terms of things that can actually be expressed in
>>>>> logic, and I fail to see how this is achievable.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm fairly certain based on all that you've written that your use
>>>>> of terms like 'semantic tautology' and 'semantic consequence' bears
>>>>> no relation to what these things actually mean in logic; there's no
>>>>> point, therefore, in invoking these unless you learn what they
>>>>> actually mean.
>>>>>
>>>>> So do you actually have some way to define 'semantic connection'
>>>>> that actually relies only on the machinery available to formal
>>>>> systems and not on personal intuitions?
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Quick overview for newcomers:
>>>> Classical logic and symbolic err when they diverge the the model of
>>>> the syllogism. Their biggest mistake is exemplified by the principle
>>>> of explosion.
>>>>
>>>> The syllogism requires semantic logical necessity connections
>>>> between its elements. It enforces this through
>>>
>>> Please provide a source that states that syllogisms require "semantic
>>> logical necessity connections between its elements".
>>>
>>
>> That is explained in the next link. Syllogisms are basically set
>> operations on defined sets.
>>
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_proposition
>
> That link makes no mention of "semantic logical necessity connections
> between its elements".
>
>>>> My proposal is to correct the errors of symbolic logic using one or
>>>> more of these steps.
>>>>
>>>> (1) Toss out the POE on its ass.
>>>>  From a contradiction or a falsehood not one damn thing logically
>>>> follows.
>>>
>>> You can't simply "throw out" the principle of explosion. It is
>>> something that can be proven from other principles of logic. It's not
>>> some independent principle that can simply be denied. It follows from
>>> basic definitions of logical operators.
>>>
>>
>> That is a freaking nutty thing to say.
>
> How so? Unless you redefine the truth tables for your basic logical
> operators like and, or, and not you're stuck with the POE.
>
>> That would mean that sentences about the Moon are proven to be related
>> to the relation of integers to each other.
>
> Logic doesn't make any claims about things being 'related to' things.
>
>>>> (2) Extend the the semantic connections that are already included in
>>>> syllogisms to encompass a broader scope of natural language semantic
>>>> meanings.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_proposition
>>>
>>> Again, please define "semantic connection".
>>>
>>
>> More head games
> >
>> All men are mortal.
>> Socrates is a man.
>> Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
>>
>> there is a semantic relation between the defined sets.
>
> There is a subset - superset relation. If that's what you mean by
> 'semantic relation', then say so.
>
>>
>> All men are mortal.
>> Socrates is a man.
>> Therefore the Moon is made from green cheese
>>
>> there is NOT a semantic relation between the defined sets.
>
> Which sets are you referring to?
>
> No men are green cheese
> John is a man.
> Therefore John is not green cheese.
>

Sure that is it.
When any meaning that can possibly be held in a mind is formalized.

> If you accept the above, then by your logic there must be a relation
> between the set of men and the set of green cheese.
>
> Some men went to the moon.
> John is a man.
> Therefore John may have gone to the moon.
>
> If you accept the above, there must be a semantic relation between men
> and the moon.
>
> Ergo there should be a relationship between 'socrates is a man' and 'the
> moon is made from green cheese' since there is apparently a relationship
> between men and both cheese and the moon.
>
>>>> This is one way to do that:
>>>> (3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relevance_logic
>>>>
>>>> (4) Extending Montague semantics is the most comprehensive way.
>>>> This is based on:
>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>>>
>>> Montague Grammar is not based on Carnap. It is based on categorial
>>
>> Montague grammar forms Rudolf freaking Carnap meaning postulates.
>
> That's not even a sentence. Montague, AFAIK, never used the term

A freaking meaning postulate is essentially any freaking thing that
freaking formalizes natural language semantics.

> 'meaning postulate' anywhere in his work. I've seen the term applied to
> his work by others due to a *very* superficial resemblance between
> devices in his work and in Carnap's, but these served very different
> purposes and neither is derived from the other.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 2021-11-10 22:11, olcott wrote:
> On 11/10/2021 10:52 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2021-11-10 20:56, olcott wrote:

>>> All men are mortal.
>>> Socrates is a man.
>>> Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
>>>
>>> there is a semantic relation between the defined sets.
>>
>> There is a subset - superset relation. If that's what you mean by
>> 'semantic relation', then say so.
>>
>>>
>>> All men are mortal.
>>> Socrates is a man.
>>> Therefore the Moon is made from green cheese
>>>
>>> there is NOT a semantic relation between the defined sets.
>>
>> Which sets are you referring to?
>>
>> No men are green cheese
>> John is a man.
>> Therefore John is not green cheese.
>>
>
> Sure that is it.
> When any meaning that can possibly be held in a mind is formalized.

???

I have no idea what that is supposed to mean or what it is a reply to.

>> If you accept the above, then by your logic there must be a relation
>> between the set of men and the set of green cheese.
>>
>> Some men went to the moon.
>> John is a man.
>> Therefore John may have gone to the moon.
>>
>> If you accept the above, there must be a semantic relation between men
>> and the moon.
>>
>> Ergo there should be a relationship between 'socrates is a man' and
>> 'the moon is made from green cheese' since there is apparently a
>> relationship between men and both cheese and the moon.
>>
>>>>> This is one way to do that:
>>>>> (3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relevance_logic
>>>>>
>>>>> (4) Extending Montague semantics is the most comprehensive way.
>>>>> This is based on:
>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>>>>
>>>> Montague Grammar is not based on Carnap. It is based on categorial
>>>
>>> Montague grammar forms Rudolf freaking Carnap meaning postulates.
>>
>> That's not even a sentence. Montague, AFAIK, never used the term
>
> A freaking meaning postulate is essentially any freaking thing that
> freaking formalizes natural language semantics.

Sort of like a freaking goldfish is any freaking thing that swims?

André

>> 'meaning postulate' anywhere in his work. I've seen the term applied
>> to his work by others due to a *very* superficial resemblance between
>> devices in his work and in Carnap's, but these served very different
>> purposes and neither is derived from the other.
>>
>> André
>>
>
>

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On Thursday, 11 November 2021 at 01:30:24 UTC, olcott wrote:
> On 11/10/2021 7:20 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> > On 2021-11-10 17:15, olcott wrote:
> >> On 11/10/2021 5:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> >>> On 2021-11-10 15:46, olcott wrote:
> >>>> On 11/10/2021 4:13 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> >>>>> On Wednesday, November 10, 2021 at 1:20:02 PM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> If an X is a Y then Z is always correct when it reports that an X
> >>>>>> is a Y.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This is a denial of the principle of explosion.
> >>>>
> >>>> Yes I absolutely deny that psychotic break from the system of
> >>>> Aristotle's syllogism.
> >>>
> >>> The statement in question doesn't involve an aristotelian syllogism.
> >>
> >> When logic diverges form the semantic anchor of the syllogism in can
> >> have the psychotic break form correct reasoning that is most apply
> >> expressed as the principle of explosion.
> >
> > That doesn't address my point. A syllogism is only one of many different
> > forms of valid argument.
> >
> >>>
> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure
> >>>>
> >>>> Because the syllogism always maintains a semantic connection to its
> >>>> elements it prevents these psychotic breaks.
> >>>>
> >>>> Major premise: All humans are mortal.
> >>>> Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
> >>>> Conclusion: All Greeks are mortal.
> >>>>
> >>>> We can explain the correctness of the above in terms of the
> >>>> semantics of set theory.
> >>>
> >>> So how does this work for arguments which don't involve syllogisms.
> >>>
> >>
> >> When-so-ever logic diverges from semantic tautologies it errs.
> >
> > If arguments are restricted to tautologies, then you can't get very far
> > with logic.
> >
> >>>> When we apply semantics of the principle of explosion there is no
> >>>> way to explain the semantic details of why the conclusion is
> >>>> necessitated :
> >>>> (a) The Moon is made of green cheese
> >>>> (b) The Moon is not made of green cheese
> >>>> (a) and (b) Necessitates 3 > 5
> >>>
> >>> So now you're switching away from syllogisms. So how is what you
> >>> write above remotely relevant? How does one determine whether a
> >>> 'semantic connection' exists between things?
> >>>
> >>
> >> The above is a correct an example of the principle of explosion.
> >
> > I know that. But on what grounds do you determine that there is not a
> > 'semantic connection'?
> >
> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence#Semantic_consequence
> >>>
> >>> I don't see how that helps you. It makes no mention of "semantic
> >>> connections".
> >>
> >> Semantic_consequence
> >> Semantic_consequence
> >> Semantic_consequence
> >> Semantic_consequence
> >> Semantic_consequence
> >> Semantic_consequence
> >
> > Yes, that's all well and good. Now please show me how the actual
> > *definition* given there actually helps you.
> >
> > {A, ¬A } ⊢ B is valid thanks to your dreaded principle of explosion.
> >
> > It also FULLY MEETS the definition of semantic consequence given in the
> > link you site. Do you actually read any of the things you post links to?
> >
> Whet semantic logical necessity connection is there between
> (a) the Moon is made from green cheese
> (b) the Moon is not made from green cheese
> (a) and (b) proves that 3 > 5.
>
> What does anything about the Moon have to do with 3 > 5 ???
>
a') If someone takes a piece of green cheese from the moon, he has one piece.
b') If someone takes a piece of green cheese from the moon, he has no piece..
c) Therefore 1 = 0.
d) Now let's multiply both sides of the inequality 3 * 1 > 5 * 0.