On 2024-04-22 14:03:05 +0000, olcott said:

> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with undecidability,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme authority
>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>
>>>
>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>
>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>
>
> >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.

Dishonest partial quoting is not a good idea, either.

--
Mikko

On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:

> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>
>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>
>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>
>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or otherwise.
>>
>
> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is wrong with
> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is essentially
> an as hominem attack.

You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.

--
Mikko

On 4/22/2024 10:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-22 14:03:05 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme
>>>>>>> authority
>>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>>>
>>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term
>>>>> "undecidability"
>>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>>
>>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>>
>>
>>  >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
>> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.
>
> Dishonest partial quoting is not a good idea, either.
>

It is like you are saying "cats" are not 'cats'

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>
>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>
>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>
>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or otherwise.
>>>
>>
>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is wrong with
>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is essentially
>> an as hominem attack.
>
> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.
>

That is still pure ad hominem because is fails to point out any error in
my actual reasoning and only refers to me instead of my reasoning. This
is the tactic of internet trolls.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>
>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>
>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>
>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or otherwise.
>>>
>>
>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is wrong with
>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is essentially
>> an as hominem attack.
>
> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.
>

You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much understanding
of the link between proof theory and computability. When I refer to
rejecting an invalid input math would seem to construe this as nonsense,
where as computability theory would totally understand.

The closest link between computability and math seems to be type
theory. Math people can understand that an epistemological antinomy
(AKA expression of language that cannot possibly be true or false)
is not a proposition:

A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity. Propositions are also often characterized as
being the kind of thing that declarative sentences denote.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

It seems that they should also understand that formal bivalent
mathematical systems only deal with propositions. No one here
seems to understand that.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/24 10:03 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme
>>>>>> authority
>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>>
>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>
>>>
>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>
>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>
>
> >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.

Except that undeciability and incompleteness are not the EXACT same thing.

They CAN'T be, because they apply to different class of objects.

Of course, you are too stupid to understand that, because you logic is
based on making category errors.

>
>>> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
>>> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
>>> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>>
>> So that is what "undecideble" means in Mendelson: 2015. Elsewhere it may
>> mean something else.
>>
>
> It never means anything else.

LIE.

It also means (as the ORIGINAL definition) a computation problem for
which no computation can be created that always gives the correct answer.

>
>>> Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬  x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))
>>
>> So not the same.
>>
>
> Not provable or refutable in a formal system is exactly
> the same as not provable of refutable in a formal system.
> I think that you are playing head games.
>

But that isn't what the above says, itr says that F HAS a statement that
is not provable or refutable, while undecidable (when applied to a
statement) says THAT STATEMENT is not provable or refutable.

SYSTEMS are not STATEMENTS, so you are shows to be just wrong.

On 2024-04-22 15:49:56 +0000, olcott said:

> On 4/22/2024 10:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-22 14:03:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with undecidability,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme authority
>>>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
>>>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>>>
>>>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
>>> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.
>>
>> Dishonest partial quoting is not a good idea, either.
>>
>
> It is like you are saying "cats" are not 'cats'

There is nothing like "cats" or 'cats' in the part of sentence "Besides,
a reference to the term" that you deceptively omitted.

--
Mikko

On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:

> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>
>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>
>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or otherwise.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is wrong with
>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is essentially
>>> an as hominem attack.
>>
>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.
>>
>
> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much understanding
> of the link between proof theory and computability.

Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that. But that
link is not needed for understanding and solving problems separately
in the two areas.

> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to construe
> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally understand.

People working on computability theory do not understand "invalid input"
as "impossible input". They understand it as an input that must be
handled differently from ordinary input. Likewise, mathematicians do
understand that some inputs must be considered separately and differently.
But mathematicians don't call those inputs "invalid".

--
Mikko

On 4/23/2024 3:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-22 15:49:56 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/22/2024 10:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-22 14:03:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme
>>>>>>>>> authority
>>>>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term
>>>>>>>> undecidability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term
>>>>>>> "undecidability"
>>>>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept
>>>> 'undecidability'.
>>>> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
>>>> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.
>>>
>>> Dishonest partial quoting is not a good idea, either.
>>>
>>
>> It is like you are saying "cats" are not 'cats'
>
> There is nothing like "cats" or 'cats' in the part of sentence "Besides,
> a reference to the term" that you deceptively omitted.
>

Gibberish nonsense:
>>>> "undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/23/2024 3:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-22 17:37:55 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/22/2024 10:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-22 14:10:54 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/22/2024 4:35 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:44:37 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 15:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 18:04:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When we create a three-valued logic system that has these
>>>>>>>>>> three values: {True, False, Nonsense}
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Such three valued logic has the problem that a tautology of the
>>>>>>>>> ordinary propositional logic cannot be trusted to be true. For
>>>>>>>>> example, in ordinary logic A ∨ ¬A is always true. This means that
>>>>>>>>> some ordinary proofs of ordinary theorems are no longer valid and
>>>>>>>>> you need to accept the possibility that a theory that is complete
>>>>>>>>> in ordinary logic is incomplete in your logic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I only used three-valued logic as a teaching device. Whenever an
>>>>>>>> expression of language has the value of {Nonsense} then it is
>>>>>>>> rejected and not allowed to be used in any logical operations. It
>>>>>>>> is basically invalid input.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You cannot teach because you lack necessary skills. Therefore you
>>>>>>> don't need any teaching device.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is too close to ad homimen.
>>>>>> If you think my reasoning is incorrect then point to the error
>>>>>> in my reasoning. Saying that in your opinion I am a bad teacher
>>>>>> is too close to ad hominem because it refers to your opinion of
>>>>>> me and utterly bypasses any of my reasoning.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, it isn't. You introduced youtself as a topic of discussion so
>>>>> you are a legitimate topic of discussion.
>>>>>
>>>>> I didn't claim that there be any reasoning, incorrect or otherwise.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you claim I am a bad teacher you must point out what is wrong with
>>>> the lesson otherwise your claim that I am a bad teacher is essentially
>>>> an as hominem attack.
>>>
>>> You are not a teacher, bad or otherwise. That you lack skills that
>>> happen to be necessary for teaching is obvious from you postings
>>> here. A teacher needs to understand human psychology but you don't.
>>>
>>
>> You may be correct that I am a terrible teacher.
>> None-the-less Mathematicians might not have very much understanding
>> of the link between proof theory and computability.
>
> Sume mathematicians do have very much understanding of that. But that
> link is not needed for understanding and solving problems separately
> in the two areas.
>
>> When I refer to rejecting an invalid input math would seem to construe
>> this as nonsense, where as computability theory would totally understand.
>
> People working on computability theory do not understand "invalid input"
> as "impossible input".

The proof then shows, for any program f that might determine whether
programs halt, that a "pathological" program g, called with some input,
can pass its own source and its input to f and then specifically do the
opposite of what f predicts g will do. No f can exist that handles this
case, thus showing undecidability.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#

So then they must believe that there exists an H that does correctly
determine the halt status of every input, some inputs are simply
more difficult than others, no inputs are impossible.

> They understand it as an input that must be
> handled differently from ordinary input. Likewise, mathematicians do
> understand that some inputs must be considered separately and differently.
> But mathematicians don't call those inputs "invalid".
>

It is so dead obvious that the whole world must be wired with a short
circuit in their brains. Formal bivalent mathematical systems of logic
must reject every expression that cannot possibly have a value of true
or false as a type mismatch error.

A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/2024 5:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/22/24 10:03 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme
>>>>>>> authority
>>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>>>
>>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term
>>>>> "undecidability"
>>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>>
>>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>>
>>
>>  >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
>> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.
>
> Except that undeciability and incompleteness are not the EXACT same thing.
>

So you were paying attention?
He said that undecidability is not the same thing as undecidability.
Somehow he felt that two different kinds of quotes mean something.

> They CAN'T be, because they apply to different class of objects.
>
> Of course, you are too stupid to understand that, because you logic is
> based on making category errors.

In this case the issue is that you did not pay attention.
You glanced at a couple of words without even seeing them
and then spouted off a canned rebuttal that does not apply.

>>
>>>> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
>>>> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
>>>> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>>>
>>> So that is what "undecideble" means in Mendelson: 2015. Elsewhere it may
>>> mean something else.
>>>
>>
>> It never means anything else.
>
> LIE.
>
> It also means (as the ORIGINAL definition) a computation problem for
> which no computation can be created that always gives the correct answer.
>

That is the theory of computation way of saying it.
Mendelson translates the same idea into the math way of saying it.

>>
>>>> Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬  x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))
>>>
>>> So not the same.
>>>
>>
>> Not provable or refutable in a formal system is exactly
>> the same as not provable of refutable in a formal system.
>> I think that you are playing head games.
>>
>
> But that isn't what the above says, itr says that F HAS a statement that
> is not provable or refutable, while undecidable (when applied to a
> statement) says THAT STATEMENT is not provable or refutable.
>
> SYSTEMS are not STATEMENTS, so you are shows to be just wrong.

When an expression is neither provable or refutable because it is not
a statement/proposition that has a truth value then it must be rejected
as a type mismatch error for ever bivalent system of logic.

A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
bearer of truth or falsity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme
>>>>> authority
>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>
>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term "undecidability"
>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>
>>
>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>
> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>

It is not a good idea to say gibberish nonsense and
expect it to be understood.
>>> a reference to the term "undecidability"
>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.

>> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
>> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
>> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>
> So that is what "undecideble" means in Mendelson: 2015. Elsewhere it may
> mean something else.
>

It usually means one cannot make up one's mind.
In math it means an epistemological antinomy expression
is not a proposition thus a type mismatch error for every
bivalent system of logic.

not-⊢K ℬ and not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
K ⊬ ℬ and K ⊬ ¬ℬ. // switching notational conventions

>> Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬  x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))
>
> So not the same.
>

When an expression cannot be proved or refuted is a formal system
this is exactly the same as an expression cannot be proved or refuted
in a formal system.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/2024 6:35 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/22/24 12:35 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>
>>>>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the
>>>>> nuances of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the
>>>>> other people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
>>>> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>>>
>>> Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
>>>
>>> Fortunately, that isn't true.
>>>
>>
>> Point to my mistake if you can. I have spoken about this with very
>> many people very many times. Quine did convince most people that
>> {true on the basis of meaning} is problematic.
>>
>
> Godel doesn't mean what you say he means. PERIOD.
>

We cannot tell what the Hell that Gödel really means because all of the
actual semantics is hidden behind diagonalization and arithmetization.

We can tell that Mendelson sums it up like this:
G says “I am not provable in K”. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

*The details of what Gödel's G actually mean are irrelevant*
*Because we can see that epistemological antinomies do derive*
*undecidability, thus proving the the notion of undecidability*
*has a vacuous philosophical foundation*

An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

Undecidable(K, ℬ) ≡ ∃ℬ ∈ K ((K ⊬ ℬ) ∧ (K ⊬ ¬ℬ))

Mendelson, Elliott 2015. Introduction to Mathematical Logic sixth
edition CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group Boca Raton, FL

> That is shown because his actual statement that he claims to be true and
> unprovable is NOT an "epistomological antinomy" as you claim, but a
> stetement of the form:
>
> G asserts that no number g exists that satisfies the particular
> primative recursive relationship.
>
> That is a statement that MUST be a truthbeared, as the relationship is
> computable, so every number can be tested, and thus either a number
> exists that statisfies it, or not.
>
> This has been explained, and ignored, showing you are too stupid to
> understand that.
>
> You seem to think that Godel is too "stupid" to know what he is talking
> about, while instead, the issue is that YOU are the stupid one, and do
> not understand the arguement, and thus just presume that , because you
> don't like the answer, must be wrong.
>
>
>>>>
>>>> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
>>>> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
>>>> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>>>
>>> And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
>>>> of correct reasoning.
>>>
>>> Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct
>>> Reasoning" is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can
>>> only handle the very simple cases.
>>>
>>
>> It has not been pointed out it has been baselessly claimed.
>> I spent a long time studying Montague Grammar and the Cyc
>> project. I know that everything that can be said in English
>> can be precisely mathematically formalized.
>
> What you call "Baseless claims" are infact PROOFS of what is being said.
>
> You don't understand them, so call them baseless.
>

This always works except for unknowns:
True(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ x)
False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ ¬x)
L is an accurate model of the actual world
Proposition(L,x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L,x) ∨ False(L,x))

As long as the accurate model of the actual world is sufficiently
populated it could prove that there is zero publicly available
evidence of election fraud that could have possibly changed the
outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

>>
>> I proved exactly how Quine was wrong about synonymity
>> between bachelor and unmarried adult male and you
>> could show nothing wrong with my approach when applied
>> to bachelor and unmarried adult male.
>
> Nope, you think you did, because you don't understand the actual issue
> being discussed.
>

We already covered this and I fully addressed this.
You said that the issue was that Quine could not understand
the details of the synonymity between the term "bachelor"
and the terms the comprise the meaning of the term "bachelor".

You rejected my answer because it was too precisely accurate.

>>
>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>  > So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
>>  > actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
>>  > every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its meaning,
>>  > this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
>>  > using.
>>
>> I proved exactly how bachelor and unmarried adult male are
>> synonymous and you could not point out any error.  The error
>> that you tried to get away with was that I was too precise.
>>
>
> Nope, you missed his point, because it when right over your head.
>

You habit of using rhetoric instead of reasoning seems dishonest.
What are all of the details of exactly how I missed his point?

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/22/2024 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/22/24 12:18 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/21/24 8:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> insight into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that most
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing at all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>> inference.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
>>>>>>>>>>>> takes a form
>>>>>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pope".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> classes
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already
>>>>>>>>>>>> exists
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with
>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months
>>>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy
>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance
>>>>>>>>>>>> hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic
>>>>>>>>>> then we get
>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>>>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more
>>>>>>>>>> than yes/no
>>>>>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>>>>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of
>>>>>>>>> logic
>>>>>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>>>>>> neither,
>>>>>>>>> at all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier
>>>>>>>>> disambiguation
>>>>>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>>>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>>>>>> defining it), not all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their
>>>>>>> words.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words,
>>>>>>> but its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and
>>>>>>> a series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>>>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>>>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>>>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>>>>>> simply wrong.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that
>>>>>>> are true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the
>>>>>>> "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>>>>>
>>>>> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its
>>>>> meaning since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the
>>>>> defined Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>>>>>
>>>>> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
>>>>> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is
>>>>> the classical meaning of Semantically true,
>>>>>
>>>>> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>>>>>
>>>>>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Principle of compositionality*
>>>>>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the
>>>>>> principle
>>>>>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>>>>>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent
>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>> and the rules used to combine them.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>>>>>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>>>>>
>>>>> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>>>>>
>>>>> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is
>>>>> what the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of
>>>>> the logical arguement that proves it, which is something which goes
>>>>> beyound "meaning" of the words.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>>>>>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>>>>>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic,
>>>>> which if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be
>>>>> finite.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>>>>>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>>>>>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>>>>>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>>>>>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>>>>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
>>>>> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that you
>>>>> have no answers to the replys and are just working on Red Herring.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
>>>>> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS
>>>>> replaceable with each other, and that logic that is based on that
>>>>> is too imprecise, and we need to better define the rules of logic
>>>>> when doing such things.
>>>>>
>>>>> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a
>>>>> bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the words
>>>>> might include a man that was married but now nolonger has a wife),
>>>>> the word "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from "never
>>>>> married" to "currently not married" and thus the two words can't be
>>>>> considered truely equivalent words.
>>>>
>>>> *Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading through
>>>> nonsense*
>>>> Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the basis of
>>>> meaning}
>>>> is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he came up with
>>>> that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not true because he
>>>> simply does not believe in numbers.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Except that you don't understand what he actually said, because you
>>> don;t understand the terminology, and you think because he says
>>> things your don't understand that he must be wrong.
>>>
>>> No, you are just too stupid to understand what he says.
>>>
>>
>> I may not fully understand exact what he said.
>> I do know that {true on the basis of meaning} is
>> completely valid.
>
> In the sense that if by the meaning of the words, the statement MUST
> ALWAYS be true, then the statement should have been an axiom of the
> system or derivable from the axioms of the system.
>

On 04/23/2024 09:24 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/22/24 12:18 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/24 8:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> insight into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that most
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "not believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing at all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aspect of all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> school
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> takes a form
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pope".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> senses
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> classes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already
>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with
>>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few
>>>>>>>>>>>>> months what
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy
>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance
>>>>>>>>>>>>> hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic
>>>>>>>>>>> then we get
>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>>>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>>>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and
>>>>>>>>>>> Mathematicians
>>>>>>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more
>>>>>>>>>>> than yes/no
>>>>>>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>>>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>>>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>>>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>>>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>>>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>>>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>>>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>>>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>>>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>>>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>>>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>>>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>>>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>>>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>>>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material
>>>>>>>>>> Implication
>>>>>>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>>>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules
>>>>>>>>>> of logic
>>>>>>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>>>>>>> neither,
>>>>>>>>>> at all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>>>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>>>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>>>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>>>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier
>>>>>>>>>> disambiguation
>>>>>>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>>>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>>>>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>>>>>>> defining it), not all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their
>>>>>>>> words.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words,
>>>>>>>> but its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry
>>>>>>>> and a series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>>>>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>>>>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>>>>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>>>>>>> simply wrong.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements
>>>>>>>> that are true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just
>>>>>>>> that the "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its
>>>>>> meaning since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the
>>>>>> defined Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
>>>>>> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is
>>>>>> the classical meaning of Semantically true,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Principle of compositionality*
>>>>>>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the
>>>>>>> principle
>>>>>>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>>>>>>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent
>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>> and the rules used to combine them.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>>>>>>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is
>>>>>> what the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of
>>>>>> the logical arguement that proves it, which is something which
>>>>>> goes beyound "meaning" of the words.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>>>>>>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>>>>>>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic,
>>>>>> which if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be
>>>>>> finite.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>>>>>>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>>>>>>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>>>>>>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>>>>>>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>>>>>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
>>>>>> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that
>>>>>> you have no answers to the replys and are just working on Red
>>>>>> Herring.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
>>>>>> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS
>>>>>> replaceable with each other, and that logic that is based on that
>>>>>> is too imprecise, and we need to better define the rules of logic
>>>>>> when doing such things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a
>>>>>> bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the words
>>>>>> might include a man that was married but now nolonger has a wife),
>>>>>> the word "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from "never
>>>>>> married" to "currently not married" and thus the two words can't
>>>>>> be considered truely equivalent words.
>>>>>
>>>>> *Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading through
>>>>> nonsense*
>>>>> Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the basis of
>>>>> meaning}
>>>>> is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he came up with
>>>>> that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not true because he
>>>>> simply does not believe in numbers.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Except that you don't understand what he actually said, because you
>>>> don;t understand the terminology, and you think because he says
>>>> things your don't understand that he must be wrong.
>>>>
>>>> No, you are just too stupid to understand what he says.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I may not fully understand exact what he said.
>>> I do know that {true on the basis of meaning} is
>>> completely valid.
>>
>> In the sense that if by the meaning of the words, the statement MUST
>> ALWAYS be true, then the statement should have been an axiom of the
>> system or derivable from the axioms of the system.
>>
>
> Yes exactly. In the case of natural language semantics all of the facts
> of the world must be formalized natural language encoded in a knowledge
> ontology inheritance hierarchy.
> True(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ x)
> False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ ¬x)
> Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, ¬x))
>
>> Note, that also means that the words and definitions used must be
>> valid in that logical system.
>>
>> For instance, in a system like Mathematics, that doesn't define what
>> animals are, the statement "Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True
>> Statement", even if a normally true statement in English, because it
>> refers to things outs
>>
>
> The category of things that are cats is a proper subset of
> the category of things that are animals. Even the categorical
> propositions of the syllogism can properly encode this.
>
>>>
>>>>> My concrete example that one cannot take the elevator of a
>>>>> puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy conclusively proves
>>>>> that {true on the basis of meaning} does have some instances.
>>>>
>>>> And just shows that you believe the fallacy of proof by example is
>>>> actually proper logic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> In logic and mathematics, proof by example (sometimes known as
>>> inappropriate generalization) is a logical fallacy whereby the validity
>>> of a statement is illustrated through one or more examples or cases—
>>> rather than a full-fledged proof.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_example
>>
>> Note, you said "Illustrated", which doesn't mean PROVE.
>>
>
> So then what I said is even less of a proof by example because
> my example does prove an instance of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
>> As an example, the statement that Mens names begin with P could be
>> "illustrated" with example like Peter and Paul, but that doesn't show
>> that the statement is actually true, at least not if interpreted as
>> ALL Men's names begin with P.
>>
>
> It conclusively proves that it is true for at least two instances.
>
>>>
>>>
>>> My proof by example does prove that the notion of
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not invalid in every single case.
>>
>> Right, and no one says that it is invalid in every single case, so you
>> are arguing a strawman, another fallacy.
>>
>> Note, as shown above, True by the Meaning of the words is not even
>> always applicable.
>>
>
> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation} (TotBoO)
>
> Try and show that there is an exception to (TotBoM).
>
>>>
>>> I never said I was generalizing to any other cases so there is no error.
>>> *The next step is testing the boundary conditions*
>>
>> And that says you are trying to do so.
>>
>>>
>>> What are the closest counter-examples to
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} when this
>>
>> Which is an invalid arguement,
>>
>>> is limited to relations between finite strings?
>>
>> But it doesn't work for ALL finite strings, so that case is outside
>> the boundery where it is a true statement, as shown above.
>>
>
> I cannot find any finite string that it does not work for except for
> unknowns.
>
>> "All Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True Statement" in the field of
>> Arithmetic, because Cats and Animals are outside that field.
>>
>
> I HAVE NEVER EVERY BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE FIELD OF ARITHMETIC
> I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE GENERIC NOTION OF
> {true on the basis of meaning} that applies to everything
> including arithmetic.
>
>> It also fails for the more general issue that your "finite string"
>> needs to be interpreted in the full context of the field you are
>> analyzing,
>>
>
> No interpretation needed when all of the details of all of the meanings
> are fully specified as axioms or derived form axioms.
>
>>>
>>> The prior analytic / synthetic distinction was very blurry
>>> my TotBoM/TotBoO distinction seems totally unequivocal.
>>
>> Nope
>>
>
> Show all of the details of exactly how I am incorrect instead of the
> merely dogmatic bluster of disagreement.
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
>>>>> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
>>>>> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation} (TotBoO)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And, since you can't show how this lets you show that the Pythogrean
>>>> Theorem it true in Plane Geometery, or that 2 + 3 = 5 (since you
>>>> fail to answer the challanges) you are just admitting that your
>>>> unique insight just works for TOY problems that don't really matter,
>>>> and you are just too stupid to understand that restriction.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't have time to get into endless details. I can get into a
>>> few key details. I do understand how the Peano axioms prove that
>>> 2 + 3 = 5. And since you do too and it is not a counter-example
>>> to {true on the basis of meaning} it seems like an inessential
>>> distraction. I don't have time for those.
>>
>> It shows that True on the basis of meaning is not a sufficient
>> definition of truth. At best, True on the basis of meaning is a method
>> to establish what might make sense as a primitive axiom of the system,
>> if it can't easily be proven by existing axioms.
>>
>
> A "primitive" axiom system that has every single detail of the accurate
> model of the actual world would enable every aspect of human reasoning
> to be computable. To be actually feasible the main system would only
> have general knowledge. A separate subsystem could have all of the
> details of the current situation, ie the full discourse context.
>
>> Of course, that only happens once you pass the concept that the
>> definitions used need to be from the definitions of the system, and
>> the concepts are also in the system.
>>
>> Since Definitions provide a base set of axioms, things that are true
>> by definition should already be axioms or provable from them, if they
>> are actually in the system.
>>
>
> It took the cyc project 100 labor years to manually encode the tiny
> subset of human knowledge known as "common sense". We need to leverage
> something like LLM technology to make populating such an ontology with
> the rest of the general knowledge of the world.
>
>>>
>>> An actual counter-example boundary condition to
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} would be the next step.
>>
>> Like "Cats are Animals" is not true in some (many) fields of study
>> because those fields don't HAVE "Cats" or "Animals"?
>>
>
> I have always only been talking about a formal system that
> has all of the general knowledge of the actual world encoded
> within it. Yes it does exclude unknown things.
>
> We don't need to know whether the Goldbach conjecture is true
> or false to prove that there is no publicly available evidence
> of election fraud that could have possibly changed the outcome
> of the 2020 presidential election.
>
>>>
>>> You already know how the above two examples would be specified.
>>> What we need are examples that are very tricky to specify.
>>
>> They aren't that tricky, as I have shown even more for you.
>>
>
> The only thing that I recall that you have ever shown is that an
> accurate model of the actual world must exclude unknowns.
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bachelor is simply assigned a range of semantic meanings that
>>>>> are entirely defined in terms of other defined words.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can easily 100% precisely define 10,000 different notions
>>>>> of bachelor and give them their own unique index.
>>>>
>>>> But we don't, so it doesn't matter.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bachelor[0] = never married adult male
>>>>> Bachelor[1] = not currently married adult male
>>>>> Bachelor[951] having completed a four year degree.
>>>>>
>>>>> In this case we can clearly see that the LHS is synonymous
>>>>> to the RHS because the RHS is assigned to the LHS.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
>>>> actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version
>>>> where every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its
>>>> meaning, this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the
>>>> words you are using.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It conclusively proves that I fully addressed the objections that
>>> you and Quine specified. If you think that I did not prove this
>>> then show what I missed.
>>
>> Nope. You may have answer the objections you understand, but you still
>> don't understand the problem, because you are too stupid and you logic
>> is too simple.
>>
>
> Then please state clearly the essence of the key details that I missed.
> I did prove every single detail of exactly and precisely how the term
> "bachelor" is synonymous to the set of constituent terms that define its
> meaning.
>
> This seemed to be the whole issue that you elaborated. If I
> did not sufficiently address words that you never said then
> you must first say these words.
>
>>>
>>>> Until you publish this dictionary that FULLY defines all shades of
>>>> meaning for every word, and then fully mark up every statement you
>>>> right, you are just proving yourself to be a hypocrit, and a liar.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Not at all and you know it. The architecture design is already
>>> substantially implemented in the CYC project. They already spent
>>> more than 1000 labor years on this over the last few decades.
>>>
>>
>> Nope, you don't get it. Since Natural Language doesn't come with the
>> tags, until you make natural language come with the tags, or show an
>> algorithmic method to assign tags with 100% accuracys, you can't use
>> them.
>>
>
> Sure you can. Each word has a finite set of sense meanings that
> can be precisely referenced by its subscript in an ISO standard
> dictionary of English. When a subscript is not specified then
> it defaults to its [0] index meaning.
>
> But that juts not the way that people do this.
>
> We were not talking about the way that people do this
> we were answering the question:
>
> Is it possible to eliminate ambiguity in natural language semantics?
> Yes it is possible. The CYC project already does this.
>
>> You are just guilty of a lying Strawman by claiming to be talking
>> about "Natural Language", when you actually are talking about the
>> UNnatural language of full tagged language.
>>
>> Your ACTUAL claim turns out to be more like in a FULLY FORMAL language
>> with all references being unambigious, we can detect if a statement is
>> an axiom of the system by it being isomorphic to one of them.
>
> Formalized natural language enables an axiomatic system
> of natural language meanings that has zero ambiguity.
>

On 4/23/2024 12:55 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/23/2024 09:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/22/2024 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/22/24 12:18 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/24 8:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory.  (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger:  not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> insight into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that most
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "not believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing at all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aspect of all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> school
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yours
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> makes sense
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradiction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> takes a form
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the conclusion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pope".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> senses
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> classes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> human
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> months what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>>>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis
>>>>>>>>>>>> above:
>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>>>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic
>>>>>>>>>>>> then we get
>>>>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>>>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>>>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary
>>>>>>>>>>>> relations.
>>>>>>>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>>>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>>>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>>>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>>>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Mathematicians
>>>>>>>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>>>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>>>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>>>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>>>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>>>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>>>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more
>>>>>>>>>>>> than yes/no
>>>>>>>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>>>>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>>>>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>>>>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>>>>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>>>>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>>>>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>>>>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>>>>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>>>>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>>>>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>>>>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>>>>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>>>>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>>>>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>>>>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material
>>>>>>>>>>> Implication
>>>>>>>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>>>>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules
>>>>>>>>>>> of logic
>>>>>>>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>>>>>>>> neither,
>>>>>>>>>>> at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>>>>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>>>>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>>>>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>>>>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier
>>>>>>>>>>> disambiguation
>>>>>>>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>>>>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>>>>>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>>>>>>>> defining it), not all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their
>>>>>>>>> words.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words,
>>>>>>>>> but its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry
>>>>>>>>> and a series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>>>>>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>>>>>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>>>>>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>>>>>>>> simply wrong.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements
>>>>>>>>> that are true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just
>>>>>>>>> that the "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its
>>>>>>> meaning since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the
>>>>>>> defined Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
>>>>>>> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is
>>>>>>> the classical meaning of Semantically true,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Principle of compositionality*
>>>>>>>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the
>>>>>>>> principle
>>>>>>>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>>>>>>>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent
>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>> and the rules used to combine them.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>>>>>>>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is
>>>>>>> what the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of
>>>>>>> the logical arguement that proves it, which is something which
>>>>>>> goes beyound "meaning" of the words.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>>>>>>>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>>>>>>>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic,
>>>>>>> which if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be
>>>>>>> finite.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>>>>>>>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>>>>>>>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>>>>>>>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>>>>>>>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>>>>>>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
>>>>>>> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that
>>>>>>> you have no answers to the replys and are just working on Red
>>>>>>> Herring.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
>>>>>>> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS
>>>>>>> replaceable with each other, and that logic that is based on that
>>>>>>> is too imprecise, and we need to better define the rules of logic
>>>>>>> when doing such things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a
>>>>>>> bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the words
>>>>>>> might include a man that was married but now nolonger has a wife),
>>>>>>> the word "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from "never
>>>>>>> married" to "currently not married" and thus the two words can't
>>>>>>> be considered truely equivalent words.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading through
>>>>>> nonsense*
>>>>>> Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the basis of
>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>> is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he came up
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not true
>>>>>> because he
>>>>>> simply does not believe in numbers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Except that you don't understand what he actually said, because you
>>>>> don;t understand the terminology, and you think because he says
>>>>> things your don't understand that he must be wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, you are just too stupid to understand what he says.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I may not fully understand exact what he said.
>>>> I do know that {true on the basis of meaning} is
>>>> completely valid.
>>>
>>> In the sense that if by the meaning of the words, the statement MUST
>>> ALWAYS be true, then the statement should have been an axiom of the
>>> system or derivable from the axioms of the system.
>>>
>>
>> Yes exactly. In the case of natural language semantics all of the facts
>> of the world must be formalized natural language encoded in a knowledge
>> ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>> True(L, x)  ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ x)
>> False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (L ⊢ ¬x)
>> Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, ¬x))
>>
>>> Note, that also means that the words and definitions used must be
>>> valid in that logical system.
>>>
>>> For instance, in a system like Mathematics, that doesn't define what
>>> animals are, the statement "Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True
>>> Statement", even if a normally true statement in English, because it
>>> refers to things outs
>>>
>>
>> The category of things that are cats is a proper subset of
>> the category of things that are animals. Even the categorical
>> propositions of the syllogism can properly encode this.
>>
>>>>
>>>>>> My concrete example that one cannot take the elevator of a
>>>>>> puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy conclusively proves
>>>>>> that {true on the basis of meaning} does have some instances.
>>>>>
>>>>> And just shows that you believe the fallacy of proof by example is
>>>>> actually proper logic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In logic and mathematics, proof by example (sometimes known as
>>>> inappropriate generalization) is a logical fallacy whereby the validity
>>>> of a statement is illustrated through one or more examples or cases—
>>>> rather than a full-fledged proof.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_example
>>>
>>> Note, you said "Illustrated", which doesn't mean PROVE.
>>>
>>
>> So then what I said is even less of a proof by example because
>> my example does prove an instance of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>>> As an example, the statement that Mens names begin with P could be
>>> "illustrated" with example like Peter and Paul, but that doesn't show
>>> that the statement is actually true, at least not if interpreted as
>>> ALL Men's names begin with P.
>>>
>>
>> It conclusively proves that it is true for at least two instances.
>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My proof by example does prove that the notion of
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not invalid in every single case.
>>>
>>> Right, and no one says that it is invalid in every single case, so you
>>> are arguing a strawman, another fallacy.
>>>
>>> Note, as shown above, True by the Meaning of the words is not even
>>> always applicable.
>>>
>>
>> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
>> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
>> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
>> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation} (TotBoO)
>>
>> Try and show that there is an exception to (TotBoM).
>>
>>>>
>>>> I never said I was generalizing to any other cases so there is no
>>>> error.
>>>> *The next step is testing the boundary conditions*
>>>
>>> And that says you are trying to do so.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> What are the closest counter-examples to
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} when this
>>>
>>> Which is an invalid arguement,
>>>
>>>> is limited to relations between finite strings?
>>>
>>> But it doesn't work for ALL finite strings, so that case is outside
>>> the boundery where it is a true statement, as shown above.
>>>
>>
>> I cannot find any finite string that it does not work for except for
>> unknowns.
>>
>>> "All Cats are Animals" is NOT a "True Statement" in the field of
>>> Arithmetic, because Cats and Animals are outside that field.
>>>
>>
>> I HAVE NEVER EVERY BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE FIELD OF ARITHMETIC
>> I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE GENERIC NOTION OF
>> {true on the basis of meaning} that applies to everything
>> including arithmetic.
>>
>>> It also fails for the more general issue that your "finite string"
>>> needs to be interpreted in the full context of the field you are
>>> analyzing,
>>>
>>
>> No interpretation needed when all of the details of all of the meanings
>> are fully specified as axioms or derived form axioms.
>>
>>>>
>>>> The prior analytic / synthetic distinction was very blurry
>>>> my TotBoM/TotBoO distinction seems totally unequivocal.
>>>
>>> Nope
>>>
>>
>> Show all of the details of exactly how I am incorrect instead of the
>> merely dogmatic bluster of disagreement.
>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
>>>>>> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
>>>>>> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation}
>>>>>> (TotBoO)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And, since you can't show how this lets you show that the Pythogrean
>>>>> Theorem it true in Plane Geometery, or that 2 + 3 = 5 (since you
>>>>> fail to answer the challanges) you are just admitting that your
>>>>> unique insight just works for TOY problems that don't really matter,
>>>>> and you are just too stupid to understand that restriction.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't have time to get into endless details. I can get into a
>>>> few key details. I do understand how the Peano axioms prove that
>>>> 2 + 3 = 5. And since you do too and it is not a counter-example
>>>> to {true on the basis of meaning} it seems like an inessential
>>>> distraction. I don't have time for those.
>>>
>>> It shows that True on the basis of meaning is not a sufficient
>>> definition of truth. At best, True on the basis of meaning is a method
>>> to establish what might make sense as a primitive axiom of the system,
>>> if it can't easily be proven by existing axioms.
>>>
>>
>> A "primitive" axiom system that has every single detail of the accurate
>> model of the actual world would enable every aspect of human reasoning
>> to be computable. To be actually feasible the main system would only
>> have general knowledge. A separate subsystem could have all of the
>> details of the current situation, ie the full discourse context.
>>
>>> Of course, that only happens once you pass the concept that the
>>> definitions used need to be from the definitions of the system, and
>>> the concepts are also in the system.
>>>
>>> Since Definitions provide a base set of axioms, things that are true
>>> by definition should already be axioms or provable from them, if they
>>> are actually in the system.
>>>
>>
>> It took the cyc project 100 labor years to manually encode the tiny
>> subset of human knowledge known as "common sense". We need to leverage
>> something like LLM technology to make populating such an ontology with
>> the rest of the general knowledge of the world.
>>
>>>>
>>>> An actual counter-example boundary condition to
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} would be the next step.
>>>
>>> Like "Cats are Animals" is not true in some (many) fields of study
>>> because those fields don't HAVE "Cats" or "Animals"?
>>>
>>
>> I have always only been talking about a formal system that
>> has all of the general knowledge of the actual world encoded
>> within it. Yes it does exclude unknown things.
>>
>> We don't need to know whether the Goldbach conjecture is true
>> or false to prove that there is no publicly available evidence
>> of election fraud that could have possibly changed the outcome
>> of the 2020 presidential election.
>>
>>>>
>>>> You already know how the above two examples would be specified.
>>>> What we need are examples that are very tricky to specify.
>>>
>>> They aren't that tricky, as I have shown even more for you.
>>>
>>
>> The only thing that I recall that you have ever shown is that an
>> accurate model of the actual world must exclude unknowns.
>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bachelor is simply assigned a range of semantic meanings that
>>>>>> are entirely defined in terms of other defined words.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can easily 100% precisely define 10,000 different notions
>>>>>> of bachelor and give them their own unique index.
>>>>>
>>>>> But we don't, so it doesn't matter.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bachelor[0] = never married adult male
>>>>>> Bachelor[1] = not currently married adult male
>>>>>> Bachelor[951] having completed a four year degree.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In this case we can clearly see that the LHS is synonymous
>>>>>> to the RHS because the RHS is assigned to the LHS.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
>>>>> actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version
>>>>> where every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its
>>>>> meaning, this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the
>>>>> words you are using.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It conclusively proves that I fully addressed the objections that
>>>> you and Quine specified. If you think that I did not prove this
>>>> then show what I missed.
>>>
>>> Nope. You may have answer the objections you understand, but you still
>>> don't understand the problem, because you are too stupid and you logic
>>> is too simple.
>>>
>>
>> Then please state clearly the essence of the key details that I missed.
>> I did prove every single detail of exactly and precisely how the term
>> "bachelor" is synonymous to the set of constituent terms that define its
>> meaning.
>>
>> This seemed to be the whole issue that you elaborated. If I
>> did not sufficiently address words that you never said then
>> you must first say these words.
>>
>>>>
>>>>> Until you publish this dictionary that FULLY defines all shades of
>>>>> meaning for every word, and then fully mark up every statement you
>>>>> right, you are just proving yourself to be a hypocrit, and a liar.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not at all and you know it. The architecture design is already
>>>> substantially implemented in the CYC project. They already spent
>>>> more than 1000 labor years on this over the last few decades.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Nope, you don't get it. Since Natural Language doesn't come with the
>>> tags, until you make natural language come with the tags, or show an
>>> algorithmic method to assign tags with 100% accuracys, you can't use
>>> them.
>>>
>>
>> Sure you can. Each word has a finite set of sense meanings that
>> can be precisely referenced by its subscript in an ISO standard
>> dictionary of English. When a subscript is not specified then
>> it defaults to its [0] index meaning.
>>
>> But that juts not the way that people do this.
>>
>> We were not talking about the way that people do this
>> we were answering the question:
>>
>> Is it possible to eliminate ambiguity in natural language semantics?
>> Yes it is possible. The CYC project already does this.
>>
>>> You are just guilty of a lying Strawman by claiming to be talking
>>> about "Natural Language", when you actually are talking about the
>>> UNnatural language of full tagged language.
>>>
>>> Your ACTUAL claim turns out to be more like in a FULLY FORMAL language
>>> with all references being unambigious, we can detect if a statement is
>>> an axiom of the system by it being isomorphic to one of them.
>>
>> Formalized natural language enables an axiomatic system
>> of natural language meanings that has zero ambiguity.
>>
>
> It seems you describe "intersubjectivity", yet the
> interpretation of texts is subjective, so, while it

On 4/23/24 10:44 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 5:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/22/24 10:03 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/22/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-04-21 14:34:44 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 2:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-04-20 16:37:27 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-19 02:25:48 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 4/18/2024 8:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Godel's proof you are quoting from had NOTHING to do with
>>>>>>>>>> undecidability,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Mendelson (and everyone that knows these things) disagrees*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://sistemas.fciencias.unam.mx/~lokylog/images/Notas/la_aldea_de_la_logica/Libros_notas_varios/L_02_MENDELSON,%20E%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Mathematical%20Logic,%206th%20Ed%20-%20CRC%20Press%20(2015).pdf
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On questions whether Gödel said something or not the sumpreme
>>>>>>>> authority
>>>>>>>> is not Mendelson but Gödel.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When some authors affirm that undecidability and incompleteness
>>>>>>> are the exact same thing then whenever Gödel uses the term
>>>>>>> incompleteness then he is also referring to the term undecidability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That does not follow. Besides, a reference to the term
>>>>>> "undecidability"
>>>>>> is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In other words you deny the identity principle thus X=X is false.
>>>>
>>>> It is not a good idea to lie where the truth can be seen.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  >>>"undecidability" is not a reference to the concept 'undecidability'.
>>> That is the best that I could make about the above quote. There is no
>>> standard practice of using different kind of quotes that I am aware of.
>>
>> Except that undeciability and incompleteness are not the EXACT same
>> thing.
>>
>
> So you were paying attention?
> He said that undecidability is not the same thing as undecidability.
> Somehow he felt that two different kinds of quotes mean something.

No, he was talking about how the CONCEPT of undecidablity is not the
same as the word. (cf, "This is not a pipe")

Godel was NOT "talking about undecidability" but "incompleteness" as
that was the term he was using, and trying to replace words with words
that they are closecly related to was the error that

>
>> They CAN'T be, because they apply to different class of objects.
>>
>> Of course, you are too stupid to understand that, because you logic is
>> based on making category errors.
>
> In this case the issue is that you did not pay attention.
> You glanced at a couple of words without even seeing them
> and then spouted off a canned rebuttal that does not apply.

>
>>>
>>>>> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
>>>>> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
>>>>> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>>>>
>>>> So that is what "undecideble" means in Mendelson: 2015. Elsewhere it
>>>> may
>>>> mean something else.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It never means anything else.
>>
>> LIE.
>>
>> It also means (as the ORIGINAL definition) a computation problem for
>> which no computation can be created that always gives the correct answer.
>>
>
> That is the theory of computation way of saying it.
> Mendelson translates the same idea into the math way of saying it.

As far as I have seen, Math, didn't start with the term undecidable, but
adopted it when the concept that a proof and a program could have a
correspondance.

>
>>>
>>>>> Incomplete(F) ≡ ∃x ∈ L ((L ⊬  x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x))
>>>>
>>>> So not the same.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Not provable or refutable in a formal system is exactly
>>> the same as not provable of refutable in a formal system.
>>> I think that you are playing head games.
>>>
>>
>> But that isn't what the above says, itr says that F HAS a statement
>> that is not provable or refutable, while undecidable (when applied to
>> a statement) says THAT STATEMENT is not provable or refutable.
>>
>> SYSTEMS are not STATEMENTS, so you are shows to be just wrong.
>
> When an expression is neither provable or refutable because it is not
> a statement/proposition that has a truth value then it must be rejected
> as a type mismatch error for ever bivalent system of logic.

Right, proper logic system do not have as elements of their language
statements that are not truth bearers.

Some how you seem to say that but also reject it, as you somehow think
they are.

Your problem is that you don't seem to understand that there ARE, as
PROVEN, statments that can be show to MUST be a truth bearer, and in
fact can be shown in a meta-theory to be true in the theory, that can
not be proven in the theory.

I think a big part of your problem is you don't understand what FORMAL
LOGIC is and how Systems and Meta-Systems work.

Of course, since this has been pointed out to you, that just make all
your proclaimations about them just pathological lies and proves your
utter ignorance of the subject.

>
> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
> bearer of truth or falsity.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>

On 4/23/24 11:39 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 6:35 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/22/24 12:35 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the
>>>>>> nuances of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the
>>>>>> other people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
>>>>> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>>>>
>>>> Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
>>>>
>>>> Fortunately, that isn't true.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Point to my mistake if you can. I have spoken about this with very
>>> many people very many times. Quine did convince most people that
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is problematic.
>>>
>>
>> Godel doesn't mean what you say he means. PERIOD.
>>
>
> We cannot tell what the Hell that Gödel really means because all of the
> actual semantics is hidden behind diagonalization and arithmetization.

Of course we can, if we understand what those things actually are.

They do not HIDE the semantics, except to people who don't understand
what he is talking about. In fact, a key part of the proof is showing
that the logic of arithmetic is powerful enough to "arithmetize" an
arbitray statement and check a proof.

The fact that YOU can't figure out what he is saying isn't his fault,
but shows YOU LACK of understanding.

Yes, the proof isn't designed for someone who only understand the first
week of first year logic, like your understanding seems to be. It seems
that you don't understand how Formal Logic works.

>
> We can tell that Mendelson sums it up like this:
> G says “I am not provable in K”. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

Right, IN META-F.

You are just too stupid to understand what that means,

>
> *The details of what Gödel's G actually mean are irrelevant*
> *Because we can see that epistemological antinomies do derive*
> *undecidability, thus proving the the notion of undecidability*
> *has a vacuous philosophical foundation*

Nope. You don't understand the actual meaning of the word,

"Undecidability" in computation refers to having an ACTUAL MAPPING that
can not have finite algorithm compute it. That is not "Vacuoise"

In the more moder logic field, it referes to there being a sentence in
the langugage of the field (and thus should be a truth bearer) not being
able be proven or refuted. And, since the statement thus HAS a truth
value, it is NOT an "epistemological antinomy" as you talk about.

Your issue only comes up in NON-FORMAL logic system (which seems to be
all you understand, as you can't seem to accept the rules of Formal
Logic) which do not apply such limits to the sentences in them.

>
> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)

Right, and BEING IN theory K, means it HAS A TRUTH VALUE in Theory K.

What do you think "ℬ ∈ K" means? Note, not every ℬ IS an element of K.

>
> Undecidable(K, ℬ) ≡ ∃ℬ ∈ K ((K ⊬ ℬ) ∧ (K ⊬ ¬ℬ))
>
> Mendelson, Elliott 2015. Introduction to Mathematical Logic sixth
> edition CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group Boca Raton, FL
>
>> That is shown because his actual statement that he claims to be true
>> and unprovable is NOT an "epistomological antinomy" as you claim, but
>> a stetement of the form:
>>
>> G asserts that no number g exists that satisfies the particular
>> primative recursive relationship.
>>
>> That is a statement that MUST be a truthbeared, as the relationship is
>> computable, so every number can be tested, and thus either a number
>> exists that statisfies it, or not.
>>
>> This has been explained, and ignored, showing you are too stupid to
>> understand that.
>>
>> You seem to think that Godel is too "stupid" to know what he is
>> talking about, while instead, the issue is that YOU are the stupid
>> one, and do not understand the arguement, and thus just presume that ,
>> because you don't like the answer, must be wrong.
>>
>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
>>>>> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
>>>>> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>>>>
>>>> And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
>>>>> of correct reasoning.
>>>>
>>>> Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct
>>>> Reasoning" is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can
>>>> only handle the very simple cases.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It has not been pointed out it has been baselessly claimed.
>>> I spent a long time studying Montague Grammar and the Cyc
>>> project. I know that everything that can be said in English
>>> can be precisely mathematically formalized.
>>
>> What you call "Baseless claims" are infact PROOFS of what is being said.

Nope. You have yet to actually PROVE anything.

Your START by "Paraphrasing" something to means something it does not
mean, and thus you start with a LIE and an FALSEHOOD.

You don't seem to understand what a PROOF actually is in a formal logic
system, as they are based on needing to use actual logic, and not just
rheteric like some branches of philosophy.

>>
>> You don't understand them, so call them baseless.
>>
>
> This always works except for unknowns:
>  True(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ x)
> False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ ¬x)
> L is an accurate model of the actual world
> Proposition(L,x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L,x) ∨ False(L,x))

But no such thing as a "accurate model of the actual world" actually
really exists.

And Formal Logic doesn't even pretend that its logic system need to be
models of the actual world.

>
> As long as the accurate model of the actual world is sufficiently
> populated it could prove that there is zero publicly available
> evidence of election fraud that could have possibly changed the
> outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

Except you begin with the error of assuming such a model could exist.
(Hint, Quantum Mechanics, as we currently understand it doesn't allow
for such a thing).

And that people would some how believe such a model when they won't
belive the evidence that you might use to try to build one.

>
>>>
>>> I proved exactly how Quine was wrong about synonymity
>>> between bachelor and unmarried adult male and you
>>> could show nothing wrong with my approach when applied
>>> to bachelor and unmarried adult male.
>>
>> Nope, you think you did, because you don't understand the actual issue
>> being discussed.
>>
>
> We already covered this and I fully addressed this.
> You said that the issue was that Quine could not understand
> the details of the synonymity between the term "bachelor"
> and the terms the comprise the meaning of the term "bachelor".
>
> You rejected my answer because it was too precisely accurate.

No, I reject it because it isn't correct.

YOU are making the exact same error as Quine was pointing out thinking
that undecidable and incomplete are somehow "exactly" the same.

>
>>>
>>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>  > So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
>>>  > actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
>>>  > every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its
>>> meaning,
>>>  > this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
>>>  > using.
>>>
>>> I proved exactly how bachelor and unmarried adult male are
>>> synonymous and you could not point out any error.  The error
>>> that you tried to get away with was that I was too precise.
>>>
>>
>> Nope, you missed his point, because it when right over your head.
>>
>
> You habit of using rhetoric instead of reasoning seems dishonest.
> What are all of the details of exactly how I missed his point?
>