Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:

>We're fellow travelers. I've maintained several nyms for over 8 years. .
>It is one of the strongest models of security and anonymity anywhere. It
>is amazing. It's very old technology, but still works. That's great news.
>
>It's fact that the number of remailers and exits are at absolutely the
>lowest point in our history. That does not bode well for Mixmaster. The
>network is not growing. There is a story in that. People can draw their
>own conclusions.

These are fast-paced times. Nobody likes to wait for hours to get a
message delivery feedback, which is why real-time messengers beat out
remailers. But there are dangerous tasks, where you need the highest
level of security and thereby anonymous remailing including its latency.

>
>The complexity of setting up a nym is granted and obvious. This will
>always hamper widespread adoption. Pull up a list of users from
>list@nym.mixmin.net and list@nymph.paranoici.org. There probably aren't
>500 users globally. It's sad for sure. One would think people with high
>security needs would jump on board, but that seems not the case.

No hype, no users.

>
>SMTP standard email by design is outdated and insecure. That is why we
>don't see any new developments in anonymous email, because SMTP is
>broken, leaky and insecure. That is another reason why people are
>migrating to messaging. All the development in secure communication is
>focused on messaging.
>
>Beyond that, nym messages don't handle attachments. No file or image
>transfers.

Are you sure? You tried it?

Even assuming such a nymserver policy, you can still transfer a WME
block that contains any kind of MIME message structure including
attachments.

<https://danner-net.de/omom/tutorwme.htm>

> But modern messengers definitely do. People want that. They
>expect it. Technology supports it.
>
>There is absolutely nothing insecure with encrypted signed messages.
>Longer keys and strong passwords are absolutely necessary. The only
>possible criticism of PGP is that it is not forward secure.
>
>Years ago, Adam Langley, cryptographer at Google developed the Pond
>messaging system. It was totally alpha and experimental only. Pond
>relied on Tor for the transport mechanism and provided anonymity and
>plausible deniability. Pond had to be connected to Tor by default,
>otherwise it would not work. It could not "fail open." The encryption
>protocol was the Axolotl Double Ratchet which was brilliant. Langley
>said publicly he wrote the Pond code, "For those people for whom PGP was
>not good enough." Pond was a clear signal that secure messaging was
>headed in a different direction. It was not mobile, however. Ran only on
>the desktop on Linux.
>
>Valid points about Signal. The social graph is definitely there. And
>that is vastly more important than message contents.
>
>You wrote: "Why shouldn't the Mixmaster or Yamn protocol be fit for
>mobile devices?" Damned good question. It is not being developed. It
>would be a total game changer if it would. I don't know if it's possible
>to even port Mixmaster to mobile.

Why not?

We don't even have an Android mail/usenet client with SOCKS support to
use our Omnimix server at home through its Tor hidden SMTP/POP3/NNTP
service. It once was announced by the K-9 team, though never
implemented.

>
>"Written off e-mail still is omnipresent, whereas, who uses Briar???
>It's an isolated ecosystem on its own without any chance to address
>ordinary people."
>
>Briar is not the only viable solution out there. But it is a top
>candidate as one of the most secure.
>
>To say it does not address ordinary people just is not an accurate
>statement as that is exactly what it does. Nothing complicated at all to
>set up.

But such messages are confined to the Briar network and its
participants. You can't use Briar to give a journalist or the police an
anonymous hint.

OTOH remailer messages can address everybody, 'cause everyone has an
email address. And a nym address even offers a round-trip ticket
without urging your communication partners to install anything. They
just have to return an ordinary mail message, at best PGP encrypted with
the key that's part of your mail.

Anything out there equally secure and convenient, at least from the
destination's POV?

>
>In the past several months, usage of Signal and Briar increased in the
>Ukraine by people desperate for sending secure messages. Signal saw a
>spike in it's user base, and Briar saw increased usage as well. These
>are people who are not hobbyists, but had a real world need for
>messaging security.

That's acceptable with (publicly known) peer groups like families or
whenever else the revelation of relationships is irrelevant. They just
have to agree on a messaging protocol.

On 6/23/2022 1:15 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
>> We're fellow travelers. I've maintained several nyms for over 8 years. .
>> It is one of the strongest models of security and anonymity anywhere. It
>> is amazing. It's very old technology, but still works. That's great news.
>>
>> It's fact that the number of remailers and exits are at absolutely the
>> lowest point in our history. That does not bode well for Mixmaster. The
>> network is not growing. There is a story in that. People can draw their
>> own conclusions.
>
> These are fast-paced times. Nobody likes to wait for hours to get a
> message delivery feedback, which is why real-time messengers beat out
> remailers. But there are dangerous tasks, where you need the highest
> level of security and thereby anonymous remailing including its latency.

Agreed.

>
>>
>> The complexity of setting up a nym is granted and obvious. This will
>> always hamper widespread adoption. Pull up a list of users from
>> list@nym.mixmin.net and list@nymph.paranoici.org. There probably aren't
>> 500 users globally. It's sad for sure. One would think people with high
>> security needs would jump on board, but that seems not the case.
>
> No hype, no users.

Thanks for taking the time to respond and to share your thoughts.
Great discussion.

I remain firm in my conviction that Nyms are one of the most highly
secure forms of communication on the planet.It will always be in my
arsenal. But their complexity, for nobbies don't make Nym usage a very
practical choice in the modern world. I have tutored several
individuals, and the task is daunting at best. No hype, no users? Sure.
True. But one would think the remailer secure reputation would precede
itself and there would be greater adoption. But there is not. I wish it
were different.

>
>>
>> SMTP standard email by design is outdated and insecure. That is why we
>> don't see any new developments in anonymous email, because SMTP is
>> broken, leaky and insecure. That is another reason why people are
>> migrating to messaging. All the development in secure communication is
>> focused on messaging.
>>
>> Beyond that, nym messages don't handle attachments. No file or image
>> transfers.
>
> Are you sure? You tried it?

I have tried and never been successful. Standard remailer non-Nym
anonymous messages are really wonky and largely unreliable at sending
attachments though i know some have had a measure of success, but not
easy. I'll gladly take your word that attachments can be included. I'd
like to try with attachments again using Nym messages if that is possible.

>
> Even assuming such a nymserver policy, you can still transfer a WME
> block that contains any kind of MIME message structure including
> attachments.
>
> <https://danner-net.de/omom/tutorwme.htm>
>
>> But modern messengers definitely do. People want that. They
>> expect it. Technology supports it.
>>
>> There is absolutely nothing insecure with encrypted signed messages.
>> Longer keys and strong passwords are absolutely necessary. The only
>> possible criticism of PGP is that it is not forward secure.
>>
>> Years ago, Adam Langley, cryptographer at Google developed the Pond
>> messaging system. It was totally alpha and experimental only. Pond
>> relied on Tor for the transport mechanism and provided anonymity and
>> plausible deniability. Pond had to be connected to Tor by default,
>> otherwise it would not work. It could not "fail open." The encryption
>> protocol was the Axolotl Double Ratchet which was brilliant. Langley
>> said publicly he wrote the Pond code, "For those people for whom PGP was
>> not good enough." Pond was a clear signal that secure messaging was
>> headed in a different direction. It was not mobile, however. Ran only on
>> the desktop on Linux.
>>
>> Valid points about Signal. The social graph is definitely there. And
>> that is vastly more important than message contents.
>>
>> You wrote: "Why shouldn't the Mixmaster or Yamn protocol be fit for
>> mobile devices?" Damned good question. It is not being developed. It
>> would be a total game changer if it would. I don't know if it's possible
>> to even port Mixmaster to mobile.
>
> Why not?
>
> We don't even have an Android mail/usenet client with SOCKS support to
> use our Omnimix server at home through its Tor hidden SMTP/POP3/NNTP
> service. It once was announced by the K-9 team, though never
> implemented.
>
>>
>> "Written off e-mail still is omnipresent, whereas, who uses Briar???
>> It's an isolated ecosystem on its own without any chance to address
>> ordinary people."
>>
>> Briar is not the only viable solution out there. But it is a top
>> candidate as one of the most secure.
>>
>> To say it does not address ordinary people just is not an accurate
>> statement as that is exactly what it does. Nothing complicated at all to
>> set up.
>
> But such messages are confined to the Briar network and its
> participants. You can't use Briar to give a journalist or the police an
> anonymous hint.

Yes, but that is where the rubber meets the road. Encryption is always a
2 way street. Both parties must always be using the same communications
platform no matter what you choose. Even if one chooses the PGP route,
this is assuming both parties are using PGP.

You are correct. All networks, Signal, Briar, Olvid, Threema, AM, CWTCH
etc etc require both parties to be using the same commonly agreed
communications platform thus insuring 2 way encrypted communications by
default.

Now let's take a look at your next point:

You can't use a messenger to give the Police an anonymous hint?
Correct.

However: Many Police jurisdictions do not list a public facing email
address where you can send an anonymous tip as you suggest. They have
web contact forms and many use telephone anonymous tip lines. I've
tried. It depends on the jurisdiction, of course. Smaller cities
sometimes list a public email address. Many major cities simply do not.

Thus, based on my real world experience, your specific use case is
largely hypothetical and in many use cases, invalid.

>
> OTOH remailer messages can address everybody, 'cause everyone has an
> email address. And a nym address even offers a round-trip ticket
> without urging your communication partners to install anything. They
> just have to return an ordinary mail message, at best PGP encrypted with
> the key that's part of your mail.

The round trip email ticket is what's best. PGP? The best, but again,
not commonly used. Also, there is no viability in sending a one way
anonymous remailer in an emergency situation. Why?
Many of those one way remailer messages wind up in someone's spam
folder. I've experimented with that and it's definitely true.

Nym messages however, work just fine.

>
> Anything out there equally secure and convenient, at least from the
> destination's POV?

In all honesty, how difficult is it to set up an app? It is not. No
complex learning curve unlike setting up a Nym. Seconds? A few short
minutes? No time at all. There are many journalists globally that
already use secure messengers and make their contacts available.

>
>>
>> In the past several months, usage of Signal and Briar increased in the
>> Ukraine by people desperate for sending secure messages. Signal saw a
>> spike in it's user base, and Briar saw increased usage as well. These
>> are people who are not hobbyists, but had a real world need for
>> messaging security.
>
> That's acceptable with (publicly known) peer groups like families or
> whenever else the revelation of relationships is irrelevant. They just
> have to agree on a messaging protocol.

Precisely.