novaBBS - alt.privacy.anon-server

On Mon, 18 Sep 2023 10:56:56 +0000, Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>In Omnimix > tor tab
>07:57:32.640 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>source 37.252.187.14 accepted due to OmniMix patch

p.s. "Tor" tab is correct; I've been using Tor Browser instead of the
built-in Omnimix Tor for so long I forgot... "Tor" log looks like this:

>10:19:26.063 250 OK
>10:19:26.063 250 SocksPort=127.0.0.1:9150 IsolateDestAddr IsolateDestPort
>10:19:26.079 250 ControlPort=9151
>10:19:26.094 551 Address unknown
>10:19:26.110 650 WARN Abortion of IPv4 address retrieval caused by a missing ORPort prevented due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:26.110 650 NOTICE Unable to find IPv4 address for ORPort 0. You might want to specify IPv6Only to it or set an explicit address or set Address.
>10:19:26.125 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay
>10:19:27.249 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay
>10:19:27.873 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:27.888 650 NOTICE External address seen and suggested by a directory authority: [scrubbed]
>10:19:27.904 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
>10:19:27.919 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 45% (requesting_descriptors): Asking for relay descriptors
>10:19:28.434 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:29.058 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:30.135 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 54% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
>10:19:32.428 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:34.050 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:34.908 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:39.697 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:39.713 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 62% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
>10:19:39.900 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:40.212 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:40.228 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 70% (loading_descriptors): Loading relay descriptors
>10:19:40.509 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:40.665 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:40.665 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>10:19:40.680 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits
>10:19:41.507 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits
>10:19:41.523 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit
>10:19:43.566 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done
[end quote]

p.p.s. this may not relate to how the built-in Omnimix Tor works per se,
but the Tor Browser Console looks like this right after it first boots up:

>20:06:48.925 1695067608925 addons.xpi WARN Checking C:\Tor Browser\Browser\distribution\extensions for addons
>20:06:49.539 SecurityLevel: Listening for messages from NoScript. SecurityLevel.jsm:257
>20:06:49.539 SecurityLevel: Initializing security-prefs.js SecurityLevel.jsm:358
>20:06:49.541 SecurityLevel: security-prefs.js initialization complete SecurityLevel.jsm:392
>20:06:49.558 TorProtocolService: SOCKS port type: TCP TorProtocolService.jsm:480
>20:06:49.558 TorProtocolService: SOCKS host: 127.0.0.1 TorProtocolService.jsm:484
>20:06:49.558 TorProtocolService: SOCKS port: 9150 TorProtocolService.jsm:485
>20:06:49.573 TorProtocolService: TorProtocolService initialized TorProtocolService.jsm:100
>20:06:49.581 TorMonitorService: TorMonitorService initialized TorMonitorService.jsm:99
>20:06:49.583 TorSettings: loadFromPrefs() TorSettings.jsm:329:15
>20:06:49.597 TorConnect: init() TorConnect.jsm:853:15
>20:06:49.598 TorConnect: Entering Initial state TorConnect.jsm:204:13
>20:06:49.598 TorConnect: Observing topic 'TorProcessExited' TorConnect.jsm:862:19
>20:06:49.598 TorConnect: Observing topic 'TorLogHasWarnOrErr' TorConnect.jsm:862:19
>20:06:49.598 TorConnect: Observing topic 'torsettings:ready' TorConnect.jsm:862:19
>20:06:49.983 TorConnect: Will load after bootstrap => [about:tor] TorConnect.jsm:1163:15
>20:06:50.429 TorMonitorService: tor started TorMonitorService.jsm:199
>20:06:58.376 TorMonitorService: Start watching events:
>Array(4) [ "STATUS_CLIENT", "NOTICE", "WARN", "ERR" ]
>TorMonitorService.jsm:342
>20:06:58.377 TorMonitorService: Notifying TorProcessIsReady TorMonitorService.jsm:224
>20:06:58.378 TorSettings: Observed TorProcessIsReady TorSettings.jsm:309:15
>20:06:58.378 TorSettings: applySettings() TorSettings.jsm:512:15
>20:06:58.384 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.384 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:58.386 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.386 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:58.394 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing connections. TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.395 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing connections. TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:58.401 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing connections. TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.401 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing connections. TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:58.402 TorSettings: Ready TorSettings.jsm:323:15
>20:06:58.402 TorConnect: Observed torsettings:ready TorConnect.jsm:873:15
>20:06:58.402 TorConnect: Try transitioning from Initial to Bootstrapping TorConnect.jsm:822:15
>20:06:58.402 TorConnect: Exited Initial state TorConnect.jsm:209:15
>20:06:58.403 TorConnect: Entering Bootstrapping state TorConnect.jsm:204:13
>20:06:58.485 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.485 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:58.485 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9150 TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.485 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Opened Socks listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9150 TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:58.486 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE ENOUGH_DIR_INFO TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:58.486 NOTICE ENOUGH_DIR_INFO TorParsers.jsm:169:17
>20:06:58.509 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 0% complete (Starting) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:06:59.531 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:59.532 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:59.532 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=5 TAG=conn SUMMARY="Connecting to a relay" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:59.533 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 5% complete (Connecting to a Tor relay) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:06:59.738 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:59.739 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:06:59.740 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=10 TAG=conn_done SUMMARY="Connected to a relay" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:06:59.740 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 10% complete (Connected to a Tor relay) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:00.985 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:00.986 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:07:00.986 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=14 TAG=handshake SUMMARY="Handshaking with a relay" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:00.987 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 14% complete (Negotiating with a Tor relay) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:01.851 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.851 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:07:01.852 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=15 TAG=handshake_done SUMMARY="Handshake with a relay done" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.852 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 15% complete (Finished negotiating with a Tor relay) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:01.854 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.854 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:07:01.855 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=75 TAG=enough_dirinfo SUMMARY="Loaded enough directory info to build circuits" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.855 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 75% complete (Finished loading relay information) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:01.857 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.857 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:07:01.858 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=90 TAG=ap_handshake_done SUMMARY="Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.859 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 90% complete (Building circuits: Finished negotiating with a Tor relay) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:01.860 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.860 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:07:01.860 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=95 TAG=circuit_create SUMMARY="Establishing a Tor circuit" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:01.861 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 95% complete (Building circuits: Establishing a Tor circuit) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:05.105 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:05.105 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:07:05.107 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=100 TAG=done SUMMARY="Done" TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:05.109 TorConnect: Bootstrapping 100% complete (Connected to the Tor network!) TorConnect.jsm:838:15
>20:07:05.109 TorConnect: Try transitioning from Bootstrapping to Bootstrapped TorConnect.jsm:822:15
>20:07:05.110 TorConnect: Exited Bootstrapping state TorConnect.jsm:209:15
>20:07:05.111 TorConnect: Entering Bootstrapped state TorConnect.jsm:204:13
>20:07:05.116 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:05.117 NOTICE CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED TorParsers.jsm:169:17
>20:07:05.357 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 NOTICE New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:07:05.357 TorMonitorService: Tor NOTICE: New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1. TorMonitorService.jsm:406
>20:09:07.391 TorMonitorService: Event response: 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE CONSENSUS_ARRIVED TorMonitorService.jsm:352
>20:09:07.392 NOTICE CONSENSUS_ARRIVED TorParsers.jsm:169:17
[end quote]

Click here to read the complete article

Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:

>In Omnimix > tor tab
>
>07:57:32.640 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>source 37.252.187.14 accepted due to OmniMix patch

That's only relevant in case you use TorIP as a DynDNS replacement (with
the own IP address also being shown at Tor/Data).

The patch enables the local tor client to pass through its own WAN
address, requested from the entry node, to the OmniMix Tor controller,
even if that Tor node isn't a trusted directory authority.

<https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c?ref_type=heads#L66>

On Tue, 19 Sep 2023 22:52:11 +0000, Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>In Omnimix > tor tab
>>07:57:32.640 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>>source 37.252.187.14 accepted due to OmniMix patch
>
>That's only relevant in case you use TorIP as a DynDNS replacement (with
>the own IP address also being shown at Tor/Data).
>The patch enables the local tor client to pass through its own WAN
>address, requested from the entry node, to the OmniMix Tor controller,
>even if that Tor node isn't a trusted directory authority.
><https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c?ref_type=heads#L66>

(using Tor Browser 12.5.4, quoted plain text)
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c
>relay_find_addr.c 8.75 KiB
>
> 1 /* Copyright (c) 2001-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
> 2 /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
> 3
> 4 /**
> 5 * \file relay_find_addr.c
> 6 * \brief Implement mechanism for a relay to find its address.
> 7 **/
> 8
> 9 #include "core/or/or.h"
> 10
> 11 #include "app/config/config.h"
> 12 #include "app/config/resolve_addr.h"
> 13
> 14 #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
> 15 #include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
> 16 #include "core/or/circuituse.h"
> 17 #include "core/or/extendinfo.h"
> 18
> 19 #include "feature/control/control_events.h"
> 20 #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
> 21 #include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
> 22 #include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
> 23 #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
> 24 #include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
> 25 #include "feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h"
> 26 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
> 27 #include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
> 28
> 29 /** Consider the address suggestion suggested_addr as a possible one to use as
> 30 * our address.
> 31 *
> 32 * This is called when a valid NETINFO cell is received containing a candidate
> 33 * for our address or when a directory sends us back the X-Your-Address-Is
> 34 * header.
> 35 *
> 36 * The suggested address is ignored if it does NOT come from a trusted source.
> 37 * At the moment, we only look a trusted directory authorities.
> 38 *
> 39 * The suggested address is ignored if it is internal or it is the same as the
> 40 * given peer_addr which is the address from the endpoint that sent the
> 41 * NETINFO cell.
> 42 *
> 43 * The identity_digest is NULL if this is an address suggested by a directory
> 44 * since this is a plaintext connection.
> 45 *
> 46 * The suggested address is set in our suggested address cache if everything
> 47 * passes. */
> 48 void
> 49 relay_address_new_suggestion(const tor_addr_t *suggested_addr,
> 50 const tor_addr_t *peer_addr,
> 51 const char *identity_digest)
> 52 {
> 53 const or_options_t *options = get_options();
> 54
> 55 tor_assert(suggested_addr);
> 56 tor_assert(peer_addr);
> 57
> 58 /* Non server should just ignore this suggestion. Clients don't need to
> 59 * learn their address let alone cache it. */
> 60 if (!server_mode(options)) {
> 61 return;
> 62 }
> 63
> 64 /* Is the peer a trusted source? Ignore anything coming from non trusted
> 65 * source. In this case, we only look at trusted directory authorities. */
> 66 if (!router_addr_is_trusted_dir(peer_addr) ||
> 67 (identity_digest && !router_digest_is_trusted_dir(identity_digest))) {
> 68 return;
> 69 }
> 70
> 71 /* Ignore a suggestion that is an internal address or the same as the one
> 72 * the peer address. */
> 73 if (tor_addr_is_internal(suggested_addr, 0)) {
> 74 /* Do not believe anyone who says our address is internal. */
> 75 return;
> 76 }
> 77 if (tor_addr_eq(suggested_addr, peer_addr)) {
> 78 /* Do not believe anyone who says our address is their address. */
> 79 log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
> 80 "A relay endpoint %s is telling us that their address is ours.",
> 81 safe_str(fmt_addr(peer_addr)));
> 82 return;
> 83 }
> 84
> 85 /* Save the suggestion in our cache. */
> 86 resolved_addr_set_suggested(suggested_addr);
> 87 }
> 88
> 89 /** Find our address to be published in our descriptor. Three places are
> 90 * looked at:
> 91 *
> 92 * 1. Resolved cache. Populated by find_my_address() during the relay
> 93 * periodic event that attempts to learn if our address has changed.
> 94 *
> 95 * 2. If flags is set with RELAY_FIND_ADDR_CACHE_ONLY, only the resolved
> 96 * and suggested cache are looked at. No address discovery will be done.
> 97 *
> 98 * 3. Finally, if all fails, use the suggested address cache which is
> 99 * populated by the NETINFO cell content or HTTP header from a
>100 * directory.
>101 *
>102 * The AddressDisableIPv6 is checked here for IPv6 address discovery and if
>103 * set, false is returned and addr_out is UNSPEC.
>104 *
>105 * Before doing any discovery, the configuration is checked for an ORPort of
>106 * the given family. If none can be found, false is returned and addr_out is
>107 * UNSPEC.
>108 *
>109 * Return true on success and addr_out contains the address to use for the
>110 * given family. On failure to find the address, false is returned and
>111 * addr_out is set to an AF_UNSPEC address. */
>112 MOCK_IMPL(bool,
>113 relay_find_addr_to_publish, (const or_options_t *options, int family,
>114 int flags, tor_addr_t *addr_out))
>115 {
>116 tor_assert(options);
>117 tor_assert(addr_out);
>118
>119 tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out);
>120
>121 /* If an IPv6 is requested, check if IPv6 address discovery is disabled on
>122 * this instance. If so, we return a failure. It is done here so we don't
>123 * query the suggested cache that might be populated with an IPv6. */
>124 if (family == AF_INET6 && options->AddressDisableIPv6) {
>125 return false;
>126 }
>127
>128 /* There is no point on attempting an address discovery to publish if we
>129 * don't have an ORPort for this family. */
>130 if (!routerconf_find_or_port(options, family)) {
>131 return false;
>132 }
>133
>134 /* First, check our resolved address cache. It should contain the address
>135 * we've discovered from the periodic relay event. */
>136 resolved_addr_get_last(family, addr_out);
>137 if (!tor_addr_is_null(addr_out)) {
>138 goto found;
>139 }
>140
>141 /* Second, attempt to find our address. The following can do a DNS resolve
>142 * thus only do it when the no cache only flag is flipped. */
>143 if (!(flags & RELAY_FIND_ADDR_CACHE_ONLY)) {
>144 if (find_my_address(options, family, LOG_INFO, addr_out, NULL, NULL)) {
>145 goto found;
>146 }
>147 }
>148
>149 /* Third, consider address from our suggestion cache. */
>150 resolved_addr_get_suggested(family, addr_out);
>151 if (!tor_addr_is_null(addr_out)) {
>152 goto found;
>153 }
>154
>155 /* No publishable address was found even though we have an ORPort thus
>156 * print a notice log so operator can notice. We'll do that every hour so
>157 * it is not too spammy but enough so operators address the issue. */
>158 static ratelim_t rlim = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
>159 log_fn_ratelim(&rlim, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CONFIG,
>160 "Unable to find %s address for ORPort %u. "
>161 "You might want to specify %sOnly to it or set an "
>162 "explicit address or set Address.",
>163 fmt_af_family(family),
>164 routerconf_find_or_port(options, family),
>165 (family == AF_INET) ? fmt_af_family(AF_INET6) :
>166 fmt_af_family(AF_INET));
>167
>168 /* Not found. */
>169 return false;
>170
>171 found:
>172 return true;
>173 }
>174
>175 /** How often should we launch a circuit to an authority to be sure of getting
>176 * a guess for our IP? */
>177 #define DUMMY_DOWNLOAD_INTERVAL (20*60)
>178
>179 void
>180 relay_addr_learn_from_dirauth(void)
>181 {
>182 static time_t last_dummy_circuit = 0;
>183 const or_options_t *options = get_options();
>184 time_t now = time(NULL);
>185 bool have_addr;
>186 tor_addr_t addr_out;
>187
>188 /* This dummy circuit only matter for relays. */
>189 if (BUG(!server_mode(options))) {
>190 return;
>191 }
>192
>193 /* Lookup the address cache to learn if we have a good usable address. We
>194 * still force relays to have an IPv4 so that alone is enough to learn if we
>195 * need a lookup. In case we don't have one, we might want to attempt a
>196 * dummy circuit to learn our address as a suggestion from an authority. */
>197 have_addr = relay_find_addr_to_publish(options, AF_INET,
>198 RELAY_FIND_ADDR_CACHE_ONLY,
>199 &addr_out);
>200
>201 /* If we're a relay or bridge for which we were unable to discover our
>202 * public address, we rely on learning our address from a directory
>203 * authority from the NETINFO cell. */
>204 if (!have_addr && last_dummy_circuit + DUMMY_DOWNLOAD_INTERVAL < now) {
>205 last_dummy_circuit = now;
>206
>207 const routerstatus_t *rs = router_pick_trusteddirserver(V3_DIRINFO, 0);
>208 if (BUG(!rs)) {
>209 /* We should really always have trusted directories configured at this
>210 * stage. They are loaded early either from default list or the one
>211 * given in the configuration file. */
>212 return;
>213 }
>214 const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(rs->identity_digest);
>215 extend_info_t *ei = NULL;
>216 if (node) {
>217 ei = extend_info_from_node(node, 1, false);
>218 }
>219 if (!node || !ei) {
>220 /* This can happen if we are still in the early starting stage where no
>221 * descriptors we actually fetched and thus we have the routerstatus_t
>222 * for the authority but not its descriptor which is needed to build a
>223 * circuit and thus learn our address. */
>224 log_info(LD_GENERAL,
>225 "Trying to learn our IP address by connecting to an "
>226 "authority, but can't build a circuit to one yet. Will try "
>227 "again soon.");
>228 return;
>229 }
>230
>231 log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Attempting dummy testing circuit to an authority "
>232 "in order to learn our address.");
>233
>234 /* Launch a one-hop testing circuit to a trusted authority so we can learn
>235 * our address through the NETINFO cell. */
>236 circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, ei,
>237 CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL |
>238 CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL);
>239 extend_info_free(ei);
>240 }
>241 }
>242
[end quote]

Click here to read the complete article

Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote in
news:20230919.225211.089239d8@yamn.paranoici.org:

> Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
>>In Omnimix > tor tab
>>
>>07:57:32.640 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>>source 37.252.187.14 accepted due to OmniMix patch
>
> That's only relevant in case you use TorIP as a DynDNS replacement
> (with the own IP address also being shown at Tor/Data).
>
> The patch enables the local tor client to pass through its own WAN
> address, requested from the entry node, to the OmniMix Tor controller,
> even if that Tor node isn't a trusted directory authority.
>
> <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/feature/rel
> ay/relay_find_addr.c?ref_type=heads#L66>

Chuckle.

18:18:01.097 650 INFO circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(): Sending
extend relay cell.
18:18:01.097 650 INFO channel_tls_process_versions_cell(): Negotiated
version 5 with on OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1; Waiting for CERTS cell
18:18:01.097 650 INFO connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(): learned peer
id for OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1 at 07cca378:
58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1,
EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
18:18:01.097 650 INFO channel_tls_process_certs_cell(): Got some good
certificates on OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1: Authenticated it with RSA
and Ed25519
18:18:01.098 650 INFO relay_address_new_suggestion(): New suggestion
[scrubbed] on our relay address ...
18:18:01.098 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch

nslookup -d 38.147.122.252

Got answer:
HEADER:
opcode = QUERY, id = 2, rcode = NOERROR
header flags: response, want recursion, recursion avail.
questions = 1, answers = 1, authority records = 0, additional =
0

QUESTIONS:
252.122.147.38.in-addr.arpa, type = PTR, class = IN
ANSWERS:
-> 252.122.147.38.in-addr.arpa
name = 252.onion.nsa.org
ttl = 43200 (12 hours)

------------
Name: 252.onion.nsa.org
Address: 38.147.122.252

anonymous <anon@anon.unk> wrote:
>Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote in
>news:20230919.225211.089239d8@yamn.paranoici.org:
>
>> Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>
>>>In Omnimix > tor tab
>>>
>>>07:57:32.640 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>>>source 37.252.187.14 accepted due to OmniMix patch
>>
>> That's only relevant in case you use TorIP as a DynDNS replacement
>> (with the own IP address also being shown at Tor/Data).
>>
>> The patch enables the local tor client to pass through its own WAN
>> address, requested from the entry node, to the OmniMix Tor controller,
>> even if that Tor node isn't a trusted directory authority.
>>
>> <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/feature/rel
>> ay/relay_find_addr.c?ref_type=heads#L66>
>
>Chuckle.
>
>18:18:01.097 650 INFO circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(): Sending
>extend relay cell.
>18:18:01.097 650 INFO channel_tls_process_versions_cell(): Negotiated
>version 5 with on OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
>38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1; Waiting for CERTS cell
>18:18:01.097 650 INFO connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(): learned peer
>id for OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
>38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1 at 07cca378:
>58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1,
>EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>18:18:01.097 650 INFO channel_tls_process_certs_cell(): Got some good
>certificates on OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
>38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1: Authenticated it with RSA
>and Ed25519
>18:18:01.098 650 INFO relay_address_new_suggestion(): New suggestion
>[scrubbed] on our relay address ...
>18:18:01.098 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>
>nslookup -d 38.147.122.252
>
>Got answer:
> HEADER:
> opcode = QUERY, id = 2, rcode = NOERROR
> header flags: response, want recursion, recursion avail.
> questions = 1, answers = 1, authority records = 0, additional =
>0
>
> QUESTIONS:
> 252.122.147.38.in-addr.arpa, type = PTR, class = IN
> ANSWERS:
> -> 252.122.147.38.in-addr.arpa
> name = 252.onion.nsa.org
> ttl = 43200 (12 hours)
>
>------------
>Name: 252.onion.nsa.org
>Address: 38.147.122.252

Any doubts, that an NSA Tor entry node will tell OM its true IP address?

On Fri, 22 Sep 2023 19:53:23 -0400, Yamn Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:

>its true
tutaspam

On 22 Sep 2023, Yamn Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> posted some
news:20230922.195323.49c18a4a@erienetworks.net:

> anonymous <anon@anon.unk> wrote:
>>Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote in
>>news:20230919.225211.089239d8@yamn.paranoici.org:
>>
>>> Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>In Omnimix > tor tab
>>>>
>>>>07:57:32.640 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non
>>>>trusted source 37.252.187.14 accepted due to OmniMix patch
>>>
>>> That's only relevant in case you use TorIP as a DynDNS replacement
>>> (with the own IP address also being shown at Tor/Data).
>>>
>>> The patch enables the local tor client to pass through its own WAN
>>> address, requested from the entry node, to the OmniMix Tor
>>> controller, even if that Tor node isn't a trusted directory
>>> authority.
>>>
>>> <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/feature/r
>>> el ay/relay_find_addr.c?ref_type=heads#L66>
>>
>>Chuckle.
>>
>>18:18:01.097 650 INFO circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(): Sending
>>extend relay cell.
>>18:18:01.097 650 INFO channel_tls_process_versions_cell(): Negotiated
>>version 5 with on OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
>>38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>>RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1; Waiting for CERTS
>>cell 18:18:01.097 650 INFO connection_or_client_learned_peer_id():
>>learned peer id for OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake))
>>with 38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>>RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1 at 07cca378:
>>58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1,
>>EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>>18:18:01.097 650 INFO channel_tls_process_certs_cell(): Got some good
>>certificates on OR connection (handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)) with
>>38.147.122.252:443 ID=EA71wfvVG2nvc/EY0AUmEnSQ/9bTLTuSwrEeWdoj1cM
>>RSA_ID=58EE968A24700C0B51D7496B5273ADBE274EC4B1: Authenticated it with
>>RSA and Ed25519
>>18:18:01.098 650 INFO relay_address_new_suggestion(): New suggestion
>>[scrubbed] on our relay address ...
>>18:18:01.098 650 WARN Relay address suggestion coming from non trusted
>>source [scrubbed] accepted due to OmniMix patch
>>
>>nslookup -d 38.147.122.252
>>
>>Got answer:
>> HEADER:
>> opcode = QUERY, id = 2, rcode = NOERROR
>> header flags: response, want recursion, recursion avail.
>> questions = 1, answers = 1, authority records = 0,
>> additional =
>>0
>>
>> QUESTIONS:
>> 252.122.147.38.in-addr.arpa, type = PTR, class = IN
>> ANSWERS:
>> -> 252.122.147.38.in-addr.arpa
>> name = 252.onion.nsa.org
>> ttl = 43200 (12 hours)
>>
>>------------
>>Name: 252.onion.nsa.org
>>Address: 38.147.122.252
>
> Any doubts, that an NSA Tor entry node will tell OM its true IP
> address?

I don't see why not. They collect all the traffic they can in the hopes
that one day they can decrypt it and convict post-mortem. Presumably they
will build a battery bank or soylent green plant on your plot. If you're
in an urn, they'll dump you in the protein drink mix.

Thank the queers at Cisco and EMC for enabling and encouraging the NSA.

Subject	Author
Omnimix tor warning	Anonymous
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D
Re: Omnimix tor warning	Anonymous
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D
Re: Omnimix tor warning	anonymous
Re: Omnimix tor warning	Yamn Remailer
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D
Re: Omnimix tor warning	not here
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D
Re: Omnimix tor warning	Nomen Nescio
Re: Omnimix tor warning	D

Quantum Mechanics is God's version of "Trust me."

computers / alt.privacy.anon-server / Omnimix tor warning