(I think it is fair use to paste abstracts; you can read the abstracts for free on the websites anyway. I'm not making any money from this.)

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/704616

Women’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.

My comments:

The question is not, "more" or "less" negotiation; it is "with whom are you going to negotiate?" This is like saying, "We don't need more or fewer decisions to be made; the number of decisions being made is fine." Sure, maybe, but perhaps the wrong decisions--and even the wrong decision making questions--are being engaged with. The key is to make decisions, yes and no, more intelligently--based on a "better algorithm" regardless of quantity. Perhaps Dr. Exley thought of this, but this is not stated clearly in the abstract. Clearly, although this situation is related to anecdotal evidence, the entire USA, including well-connected people from academia like Dr. Exley herself, have failed to negotiate with me, in spite of the loss avoidance opportunity and very high opportunity for gain, both money-wise via career and otherwise. It appears that Dr. Exley has asked a trivial question and answered it. Note: My analysis is provided by me as economics enthusiast and a private citizen with an opinion. Although I have great economics ideas myself, I don't assert that this opinion or any other opinion about Dr.. Exley's research is authoritative at all. My key area of "self-declared (in a way that I claim is accurate) self-educated expertise" is mathematics at this time, although I do not assert that this will never change (i.e., I might become an expert in a sense at other things, too). By expressing my opinion, I am not defrauding anyone; I am just talking about important research questions and published articles about this research.

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685

Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.

Comments:

Having read this one a few times, I think I might agree. Some volunteers are not "inherently motivated to solve problems with volunteering" based on a deep ideological/temperament-based desire to help the world, and thus offer volunteering efforts as a means to please more "ideologically generous" folks who thrive on doing service to solve big problems, seeking to meet a demand for "reputation points." I don't think I'm saying anything new or controversial here.

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268

There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.

Comments:

I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)

On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:11:05 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> (I think it is fair use to paste abstracts; you can read the abstracts for free on the websites anyway. I'm not making any money from this.)
>
> https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/704616
>
> Women’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.
>
> My comments:
>
> The question is not, "more" or "less" negotiation; it is "with whom are you going to negotiate?" This is like saying, "We don't need more or fewer decisions to be made; the number of decisions being made is fine." Sure, maybe, but perhaps the wrong decisions--and even the wrong decision making questions--are being engaged with. The key is to make decisions, yes and no, more intelligently--based on a "better algorithm" regardless of quantity. Perhaps Dr. Exley thought of this, but this is not stated clearly in the abstract. Clearly, although this situation is related to anecdotal evidence, the entire USA, including well-connected people from academia like Dr. Exley herself, have failed to negotiate with me, in spite of the loss avoidance opportunity and very high opportunity for gain, both money-wise via career and otherwise. It appears that Dr. Exley has asked a trivial question and answered it. Note: My analysis is provided by me as economics enthusiast and a private citizen with an opinion. Although I have great economics ideas myself, I don't assert that this opinion or any other opinion about Dr. Exley's research is authoritative at all. My key area of "self-declared (in a way that I claim is accurate) self-educated expertise" is mathematics at this time, although I do not assert that this will never change (i.e., I might become an expert in a sense at other things, too). By expressing my opinion, I am not defrauding anyone; I am just talking about important research questions and published articles about this research.
>
>
> https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685
>
> Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.
>
> Comments:
>
> Having read this one a few times, I think I might agree. Some volunteers are not "inherently motivated to solve problems with volunteering" based on a deep ideological/temperament-based desire to help the world, and thus offer volunteering efforts as a means to please more "ideologically generous" folks who thrive on doing service to solve big problems, seeking to meet a demand for "reputation points." I don't think I'm saying anything new or controversial here.
>
>
> https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268
>
> There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give.. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
>
> Comments:
>
> I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data.. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)

(Maybe you could legally say that the charity performance metrics data is "for sale," but indicating that it is "possibly available" but "only to those who can show they are serious about offering (e.g.) multi-million dollars donations" is not ethical or legal, I argue, in the sense that you are demanding that your prospective donor sign up to be extorted. I.e., the donor must offer "proof" that he/she will have no excuse not to donate,upon receiving the data, and then feel bound by implicit extortion to donate, in the absence of a real verbal agreement or contract. I argue that is illegal. Reminder: I'm not a lawyer and my political opinions as a citizen do not represent authoritative or definitely accurate legal advice--I'm still just talking and expressing my opinions.)

On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:20:57 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:11:05 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > (I think it is fair use to paste abstracts; you can read the abstracts for free on the websites anyway. I'm not making any money from this.)
> >
> > https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/704616
> >
> > Women’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits.. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.
> >
> > My comments:
> >
> > The question is not, "more" or "less" negotiation; it is "with whom are you going to negotiate?" This is like saying, "We don't need more or fewer decisions to be made; the number of decisions being made is fine." Sure, maybe, but perhaps the wrong decisions--and even the wrong decision making questions--are being engaged with. The key is to make decisions, yes and no, more intelligently--based on a "better algorithm" regardless of quantity. Perhaps Dr. Exley thought of this, but this is not stated clearly in the abstract. Clearly, although this situation is related to anecdotal evidence, the entire USA, including well-connected people from academia like Dr. Exley herself, have failed to negotiate with me, in spite of the loss avoidance opportunity and very high opportunity for gain, both money-wise via career and otherwise. It appears that Dr. Exley has asked a trivial question and answered it. Note: My analysis is provided by me as economics enthusiast and a private citizen with an opinion. Although I have great economics ideas myself, I don't assert that this opinion or any other opinion about Dr. Exley's research is authoritative at all. My key area of "self-declared (in a way that I claim is accurate) self-educated expertise" is mathematics at this time, although I do not assert that this will never change (i.e., I might become an expert in a sense at other things, too). By expressing my opinion, I am not defrauding anyone; I am just talking about important research questions and published articles about this research.
> >
> >
> > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685
> >
> > Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.
> >
> > Comments:
> >
> > Having read this one a few times, I think I might agree. Some volunteers are not "inherently motivated to solve problems with volunteering" based on a deep ideological/temperament-based desire to help the world, and thus offer volunteering efforts as a means to please more "ideologically generous" folks who thrive on doing service to solve big problems, seeking to meet a demand for "reputation points." I don't think I'm saying anything new or controversial here.
> >
> >
> > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268
> >
> > There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
> >
> > Comments:
> >
> > I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)
> (Maybe you could legally say that the charity performance metrics data is "for sale," but indicating that it is "possibly available" but "only to those who can show they are serious about offering (e.g.) multi-million dollars donations" is not ethical or legal, I argue, in the sense that you are demanding that your prospective donor sign up to be extorted. I.e., the donor must offer "proof" that he/she will have no excuse not to donate,upon receiving the data, and then feel bound by implicit extortion to donate, in the absence of a real verbal agreement or contract. I argue that is illegal. Reminder: I'm not a lawyer and my political opinions as a citizen do not represent authoritative or definitely accurate legal advice--I'm still just talking and expressing my opinions.)

Note: In case anyone thinks I am extorting people, sharing metrics about my talent and then demanding opportunities to sell, I am not doing that. I am demanding release from CIA-guarded highly illegal "invisible cage," and asserting that it is likely that firms that demand my IP would purchase from me once they could. I do not demand that all firms seek to purchase from me; as evidence, I contacted a drug company that declined to buy my diff eq idea (and wrote back to me), and I did not criticize this firm or hold any grievance against it. It's not just that I'm under duress...my demand/requirement/insistence is: Stop breaking laws that prevent me from doing business or having a job (and stop supporting the breaking of such laws). There is no "threat for gain," coming from me; there is merely a repeated insistence that I be released, a warning that failure to release me and follow laws will have had tremendously bad consequences (including brand-related ones) for perpetrators (this warning is not illegal threat; it is like saying "Drop the gun and stop threatening to shoot me or I'll call the police and the news media will likely run the story about your criminal conduct"). I do have the right to continue publishing criticisms and "zeros," which I have claimed without evidence are economically potent, and that such zeros are not associated with threats in advance. My demands--that I be left alone and treated with respect--are separate from my "criticism zeros," i.e., a "zero" does not mean "You have failed to comply with a threat or demand I've made." It could always be read to mean, in one sense, "I am criticizing you for outrageous behavior." I reject that idea that firms must comply with my demands to avoid 0's. Indeed, I can publish 0's whenever I want. I do insist that firms and people follow laws at all times.

You will note: My 0's are like a "bad restaurant review" from a volunteer restaurant critic. I never threaten to give 0's, although it is known that I am a critic. I state reasons and recommendations, including demands, with my 0's, but I never indicate or threaten, "You are getting a 0 if you don't comply with my wishes." I'm pretty sure I haven't said that in my posts--I post a lot--and if I ever say it or have said, I insist that you ignore any such accidentally made demands (or CIA edits resulting in the appearance of such demands). I.e., I acknowledge that I do not receive any "special power" from "zero threats," real or implied. I don't make zero threats. I have been trying to be careful about not threatening anyone, and I think I've succeeded at this, but I haven't re-read all of my posts.

On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:36:59 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:20:57 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:11:05 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > > (I think it is fair use to paste abstracts; you can read the abstracts for free on the websites anyway. I'm not making any money from this.)
> > >
> > > https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/704616
> > >
> > > Women’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.
> > >
> > > My comments:
> > >
> > > The question is not, "more" or "less" negotiation; it is "with whom are you going to negotiate?" This is like saying, "We don't need more or fewer decisions to be made; the number of decisions being made is fine." Sure, maybe, but perhaps the wrong decisions--and even the wrong decision making questions--are being engaged with. The key is to make decisions, yes and no, more intelligently--based on a "better algorithm" regardless of quantity.. Perhaps Dr. Exley thought of this, but this is not stated clearly in the abstract. Clearly, although this situation is related to anecdotal evidence, the entire USA, including well-connected people from academia like Dr. Exley herself, have failed to negotiate with me, in spite of the loss avoidance opportunity and very high opportunity for gain, both money-wise via career and otherwise. It appears that Dr. Exley has asked a trivial question and answered it. Note: My analysis is provided by me as economics enthusiast and a private citizen with an opinion. Although I have great economics ideas myself, I don't assert that this opinion or any other opinion about Dr. Exley's research is authoritative at all. My key area of "self-declared (in a way that I claim is accurate) self-educated expertise" is mathematics at this time, although I do not assert that this will never change (i.e., I might become an expert in a sense at other things, too). By expressing my opinion, I am not defrauding anyone; I am just talking about important research questions and published articles about this research.
> > >
> > >
> > > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685
> > >
> > > Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed.. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations.. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.
> > >
> > > Comments:
> > >
> > > Having read this one a few times, I think I might agree. Some volunteers are not "inherently motivated to solve problems with volunteering" based on a deep ideological/temperament-based desire to help the world, and thus offer volunteering efforts as a means to please more "ideologically generous" folks who thrive on doing service to solve big problems, seeking to meet a demand for "reputation points." I don't think I'm saying anything new or controversial here.
> > >
> > >
> > > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268
> > >
> > > There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
> > >
> > > Comments:
> > >
> > > I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)
> > (Maybe you could legally say that the charity performance metrics data is "for sale," but indicating that it is "possibly available" but "only to those who can show they are serious about offering (e.g.) multi-million dollars donations" is not ethical or legal, I argue, in the sense that you are demanding that your prospective donor sign up to be extorted. I.e., the donor must offer "proof" that he/she will have no excuse not to donate,upon receiving the data, and then feel bound by implicit extortion to donate, in the absence of a real verbal agreement or contract. I argue that is illegal.. Reminder: I'm not a lawyer and my political opinions as a citizen do not represent authoritative or definitely accurate legal advice--I'm still just talking and expressing my opinions.)
> Note: In case anyone thinks I am extorting people, sharing metrics about my talent and then demanding opportunities to sell, I am not doing that. I am demanding release from CIA-guarded highly illegal "invisible cage," and asserting that it is likely that firms that demand my IP would purchase from me once they could. I do not demand that all firms seek to purchase from me; as evidence, I contacted a drug company that declined to buy my diff eq idea (and wrote back to me), and I did not criticize this firm or hold any grievance against it. It's not just that I'm under duress...my demand/requirement/insistence is: Stop breaking laws that prevent me from doing business or having a job (and stop supporting the breaking of such laws). There is no "threat for gain," coming from me; there is merely a repeated insistence that I be released, a warning that failure to release me and follow laws will have had tremendously bad consequences (including brand-related ones) for perpetrators (this warning is not illegal threat; it is like saying "Drop the gun and stop threatening to shoot me or I'll call the police and the news media will likely run the story about your criminal conduct"). I do have the right to continue publishing criticisms and "zeros," which I have claimed without evidence are economically potent, and that such zeros are not associated with threats in advance. My demands--that I be left alone and treated with respect--are separate from my "criticism zeros," i.e., a "zero" does not mean "You have failed to comply with a threat or demand I've made." It could always be read to mean, in one sense, "I am criticizing you for outrageous behavior." I reject that idea that firms must comply with my demands to avoid 0's. Indeed, I can publish 0's whenever I want. I do insist that firms and people follow laws at all times.
>
> You will note: My 0's are like a "bad restaurant review" from a volunteer restaurant critic. I never threaten to give 0's, although it is known that I am a critic. I state reasons and recommendations, including demands, with my 0's, but I never indicate or threaten, "You are getting a 0 if you don't comply with my wishes." I'm pretty sure I haven't said that in my posts--I post a lot--and if I ever say it or have said, I insist that you ignore any such accidentally made demands (or CIA edits resulting in the appearance of such demands). I.e., I acknowledge that I do not receive any "special power" from "zero threats," real or implied. I don't make zero threats. I have been trying to be careful about not threatening anyone, and I think I've succeeded at this, but I haven't re-read all of my posts.
>
> Also note, "zero threats" means "threat of the typing of a number 0 in a post," not "the absence of threats."

On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:40:27 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:36:59 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:20:57 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > > On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:11:05 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > > > (I think it is fair use to paste abstracts; you can read the abstracts for free on the websites anyway. I'm not making any money from this.)
> > > >
> > > > https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/704616
> > > >
> > > > Women’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.
> > > >
> > > > My comments:
> > > >
> > > > The question is not, "more" or "less" negotiation; it is "with whom are you going to negotiate?" This is like saying, "We don't need more or fewer decisions to be made; the number of decisions being made is fine." Sure, maybe, but perhaps the wrong decisions--and even the wrong decision making questions--are being engaged with. The key is to make decisions, yes and no, more intelligently--based on a "better algorithm" regardless of quantity. Perhaps Dr. Exley thought of this, but this is not stated clearly in the abstract. Clearly, although this situation is related to anecdotal evidence, the entire USA, including well-connected people from academia like Dr. Exley herself, have failed to negotiate with me, in spite of the loss avoidance opportunity and very high opportunity for gain, both money-wise via career and otherwise. It appears that Dr. Exley has asked a trivial question and answered it. Note: My analysis is provided by me as economics enthusiast and a private citizen with an opinion. Although I have great economics ideas myself, I don't assert that this opinion or any other opinion about Dr. Exley's research is authoritative at all. My key area of "self-declared (in a way that I claim is accurate) self-educated expertise" is mathematics at this time, although I do not assert that this will never change (i.e., I might become an expert in a sense at other things, too). By expressing my opinion, I am not defrauding anyone; I am just talking about important research questions and published articles about this research.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685
> > > >
> > > > Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.
> > > >
> > > > Comments:
> > > >
> > > > Having read this one a few times, I think I might agree. Some volunteers are not "inherently motivated to solve problems with volunteering" based on a deep ideological/temperament-based desire to help the world, and thus offer volunteering efforts as a means to please more "ideologically generous" folks who thrive on doing service to solve big problems, seeking to meet a demand for "reputation points." I don't think I'm saying anything new or controversial here.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268
> > > >
> > > > There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively.. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
> > > >
> > > > Comments:
> > > >
> > > > I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)
> > > (Maybe you could legally say that the charity performance metrics data is "for sale," but indicating that it is "possibly available" but "only to those who can show they are serious about offering (e.g.) multi-million dollars donations" is not ethical or legal, I argue, in the sense that you are demanding that your prospective donor sign up to be extorted. I.e., the donor must offer "proof" that he/she will have no excuse not to donate,upon receiving the data, and then feel bound by implicit extortion to donate, in the absence of a real verbal agreement or contract. I argue that is illegal. Reminder: I'm not a lawyer and my political opinions as a citizen do not represent authoritative or definitely accurate legal advice--I'm still just talking and expressing my opinions.)
> > Note: In case anyone thinks I am extorting people, sharing metrics about my talent and then demanding opportunities to sell, I am not doing that. I am demanding release from CIA-guarded highly illegal "invisible cage," and asserting that it is likely that firms that demand my IP would purchase from me once they could. I do not demand that all firms seek to purchase from me; as evidence, I contacted a drug company that declined to buy my diff eq idea (and wrote back to me), and I did not criticize this firm or hold any grievance against it. It's not just that I'm under duress...my demand/requirement/insistence is: Stop breaking laws that prevent me from doing business or having a job (and stop supporting the breaking of such laws). There is no "threat for gain," coming from me; there is merely a repeated insistence that I be released, a warning that failure to release me and follow laws will have had tremendously bad consequences (including brand-related ones) for perpetrators (this warning is not illegal threat; it is like saying "Drop the gun and stop threatening to shoot me or I'll call the police and the news media will likely run the story about your criminal conduct"). I do have the right to continue publishing criticisms and "zeros," which I have claimed without evidence are economically potent, and that such zeros are not associated with threats in advance. My demands--that I be left alone and treated with respect--are separate from my "criticism zeros," i.e., a "zero" does not mean "You have failed to comply with a threat or demand I've made." It could always be read to mean, in one sense, "I am criticizing you for outrageous behavior." I reject that idea that firms must comply with my demands to avoid 0's. Indeed, I can publish 0's whenever I want. I do insist that firms and people follow laws at all times.
> >
> > You will note: My 0's are like a "bad restaurant review" from a volunteer restaurant critic. I never threaten to give 0's, although it is known that I am a critic. I state reasons and recommendations, including demands, with my 0's, but I never indicate or threaten, "You are getting a 0 if you don't comply with my wishes." I'm pretty sure I haven't said that in my posts--I post a lot--and if I ever say it or have said, I insist that you ignore any such accidentally made demands (or CIA edits resulting in the appearance of such demands). I.e., I acknowledge that I do not receive any "special power" from "zero threats," real or implied. I don't make zero threats. I have been trying to be careful about not threatening anyone, and I think I've succeeded at this, but I haven't re-read all of my posts.
> >
> > Also note, "zero threats" means "threat of the typing of a number 0 in a post," not "the absence of threats."
> (I will consider contacting a lawyer to confirm that my behavior with respect to 0's is not illegal, sometime soon. I will not definitely do it though.)

On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:49:10 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:40:27 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:36:59 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > > On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:20:57 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > > > On Sunday, October 24, 2021 at 11:11:05 AM UTC-4, DV wrote:
> > > > > (I think it is fair use to paste abstracts; you can read the abstracts for free on the websites anyway. I'm not making any money from this.)
> > > > >
> > > > > https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/704616
> > > > >
> > > > > Women’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.
> > > > >
> > > > > My comments:
> > > > >
> > > > > The question is not, "more" or "less" negotiation; it is "with whom are you going to negotiate?" This is like saying, "We don't need more or fewer decisions to be made; the number of decisions being made is fine." Sure, maybe, but perhaps the wrong decisions--and even the wrong decision making questions--are being engaged with. The key is to make decisions, yes and no, more intelligently--based on a "better algorithm" regardless of quantity. Perhaps Dr. Exley thought of this, but this is not stated clearly in the abstract. Clearly, although this situation is related to anecdotal evidence, the entire USA, including well-connected people from academia like Dr.. Exley herself, have failed to negotiate with me, in spite of the loss avoidance opportunity and very high opportunity for gain, both money-wise via career and otherwise. It appears that Dr. Exley has asked a trivial question and answered it. Note: My analysis is provided by me as economics enthusiast and a private citizen with an opinion. Although I have great economics ideas myself, I don't assert that this opinion or any other opinion about Dr. Exley's research is authoritative at all. My key area of "self-declared (in a way that I claim is accurate) self-educated expertise" is mathematics at this time, although I do not assert that this will never change (i.e., I might become an expert in a sense at other things, too). By expressing my opinion, I am not defrauding anyone; I am just talking about important research questions and published articles about this research.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685
> > > > >
> > > > > Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.
> > > > >
> > > > > Comments:
> > > > >
> > > > > Having read this one a few times, I think I might agree. Some volunteers are not "inherently motivated to solve problems with volunteering" based on a deep ideological/temperament-based desire to help the world, and thus offer volunteering efforts as a means to please more "ideologically generous" folks who thrive on doing service to solve big problems, seeking to meet a demand for "reputation points." I don't think I'm saying anything new or controversial here.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268
> > > > >
> > > > > There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics.. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
> > > > >
> > > > > Comments:
> > > > >
> > > > > I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)
> > > > (Maybe you could legally say that the charity performance metrics data is "for sale," but indicating that it is "possibly available" but "only to those who can show they are serious about offering (e.g.) multi-million dollars donations" is not ethical or legal, I argue, in the sense that you are demanding that your prospective donor sign up to be extorted. I.e., the donor must offer "proof" that he/she will have no excuse not to donate,upon receiving the data, and then feel bound by implicit extortion to donate, in the absence of a real verbal agreement or contract. I argue that is illegal. Reminder: I'm not a lawyer and my political opinions as a citizen do not represent authoritative or definitely accurate legal advice--I'm still just talking and expressing my opinions.)
> > > Note: In case anyone thinks I am extorting people, sharing metrics about my talent and then demanding opportunities to sell, I am not doing that.. I am demanding release from CIA-guarded highly illegal "invisible cage," and asserting that it is likely that firms that demand my IP would purchase from me once they could. I do not demand that all firms seek to purchase from me; as evidence, I contacted a drug company that declined to buy my diff eq idea (and wrote back to me), and I did not criticize this firm or hold any grievance against it. It's not just that I'm under duress...my demand/requirement/insistence is: Stop breaking laws that prevent me from doing business or having a job (and stop supporting the breaking of such laws). There is no "threat for gain," coming from me; there is merely a repeated insistence that I be released, a warning that failure to release me and follow laws will have had tremendously bad consequences (including brand-related ones) for perpetrators (this warning is not illegal threat; it is like saying "Drop the gun and stop threatening to shoot me or I'll call the police and the news media will likely run the story about your criminal conduct"). I do have the right to continue publishing criticisms and "zeros," which I have claimed without evidence are economically potent, and that such zeros are not associated with threats in advance. My demands--that I be left alone and treated with respect--are separate from my "criticism zeros," i.e., a "zero" does not mean "You have failed to comply with a threat or demand I've made." It could always be read to mean, in one sense, "I am criticizing you for outrageous behavior." I reject that idea that firms must comply with my demands to avoid 0's. Indeed, I can publish 0's whenever I want. I do insist that firms and people follow laws at all times.
> > >
> > > You will note: My 0's are like a "bad restaurant review" from a volunteer restaurant critic. I never threaten to give 0's, although it is known that I am a critic. I state reasons and recommendations, including demands, with my 0's, but I never indicate or threaten, "You are getting a 0 if you don't comply with my wishes." I'm pretty sure I haven't said that in my posts--I post a lot--and if I ever say it or have said, I insist that you ignore any such accidentally made demands (or CIA edits resulting in the appearance of such demands). I.e., I acknowledge that I do not receive any "special power" from "zero threats," real or implied. I don't make zero threats. I have been trying to be careful about not threatening anyone, and I think I've succeeded at this, but I haven't re-read all of my posts.
> > >
> > > Also note, "zero threats" means "threat of the typing of a number 0 in a post," not "the absence of threats."
> > (I will consider contacting a lawyer to confirm that my behavior with respect to 0's is not illegal, sometime soon. I will not definitely do it though.)
> A couple of comments:
>
> - Another way to read the warning is, "If you don't stop attacking my interests, I will consider my options and defend my own interests, as anyone rational and law-abiding would do. I am concerned for your personal and professional well-being that continuing to commit crimes against me (and others) is not in your interests. I am free to pursue my options. I am not making any specific threat against you, but I notify you as a warning and a courtesy that I always defend my interests when illegal activity is taken against me (I can try to work to defend my physical body from physical threats, too)."
> - I've decided that I will not contact a lawyer right now--I think I'm fine. If someone notifies me clearly and in English that I stand accused of extortion and presents some sort of clear argument to this effect, I might contact a lawyer about this at that time. I don't think I'm doing anything wrong and no one has indicated to the contrary; I'm just being the most careful that I can be, as always.

>
> There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give.. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
>
> Comments:
>
> I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data.. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)

Based on a cryptic signal I heard outside:

If one were to claim that Exley's position is perhaps calling for changes to extortion law because "conditional metrics revelation" is so important, or if it is already legal and still "so important," then of course that is laughably absurd. I hold some of my thoughts relating to what a "process" is to be comprised of competitive secrets; vaguely speaking, there are certainly mathematically provably effective ways to use a "key process," revealing some sort of information to an "audience" of sorts, such as statistical data regarding performance or strategically impactful signals perhaps, without betraying what the process is or other sensitive data that is deemed "very much not desired to be revealed." Any fairly competent computer scientist would be able to figure out one or more ways to at least approach that task, and I have several secret ways to do it. I don't care to reveal any of them; there could be hundreds or more ways to use a process without revealing too much information, and yes, there is a whole world of smart ideas about that beyond zero-knowledge proofs.

There are particularly good ways to protect English-language "demonstrations" of a process "securely," without revealing too much information that you would prefer to keep to yourself in a provably proper manner, subject to certain assumptions that, in real-world contexts, might not definitely be formally expressible in strictly mathematical language, at least not easily.

In short: No, you do not need to "strike a deal" before revealing metrics if you know what you're doing with respect to processes.

Also, artists would be really smart to think about, e.g., how to write a novel betraying the details and theory behind your craft. I plan to advise my younger sister, whom I think is talented at acting and maybe interested in pursuing acting or using acting skill in her career in the future, about this, but not anyone else.

-Philip White (philipjwhite@yahoo.com)

On Monday, March 7, 2022 at 8:50:10 PM UTC-5, B.H. wrote:
> >
> > There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
> >
> > Comments:
> >
> > I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)
> Based on a cryptic signal I heard outside:
>
> If one were to claim that Exley's position is perhaps calling for changes to extortion law because "conditional metrics revelation" is so important, or if it is already legal and still "so important," then of course that is laughably absurd. I hold some of my thoughts relating to what a "process" is to be comprised of competitive secrets; vaguely speaking, there are certainly mathematically provably effective ways to use a "key process," revealing some sort of information to an "audience" of sorts, such as statistical data regarding performance or strategically impactful signals perhaps, without betraying what the process is or other sensitive data that is deemed "very much not desired to be revealed." Any fairly competent computer scientist would be able to figure out one or more ways to at least approach that task, and I have several secret ways to do it. I don't care to reveal any of them; there could be hundreds or more ways to use a process without revealing too much information, and yes, there is a whole world of smart ideas about that beyond zero-knowledge proofs.
>
> There are particularly good ways to protect English-language "demonstrations" of a process "securely," without revealing too much information that you would prefer to keep to yourself in a provably proper manner, subject to certain assumptions that, in real-world contexts, might not definitely be formally expressible in strictly mathematical language, at least not easily..
>
> In short: No, you do not need to "strike a deal" before revealing metrics if you know what you're doing with respect to processes.
>
> Also, artists would be really smart to think about, e.g., how to write a novel betraying the details and theory behind your craft. I plan to advise my younger sister, whom I think is talented at acting and maybe interested in pursuing acting or using acting skill in her career in the future, about this, but not anyone else.
>
> -Philip White (philip...@yahoo.com)

I said "without betraying."

On Monday, March 7, 2022 at 8:50:10 PM UTC-5, B.H. wrote:
> >
> > There is an increasing pressure to give more wisely and effectively. There is, relatedly, an increasing focus on charity performance metrics. Through a series of experiments, this paper provides a caution to such a focus. Although information on charity performance metrics may facilitate more effective giving, it may also facilitate the development of excuses not to give. Managers of nonprofit organizations should carefully assess this tension when determining whether and how to provide information on their performance metrics.
> >
> > Comments:
> >
> > I disagree with this article. I think non-profits should be willing to share metrics with claimed aspiring prospective donors freely or not at all, depending on the metric. In particular, a non-profit cannot be forced to withhold information on with whom it has shared information; i.e., any non-profit can publish the list of who has requested information from them and perhaps even stated outcomes and reasons regarding whether or not a donation was made and why. Why should non-profits start withholding data from donors, when if "not giving" has no excuse, this failure to give can be clearly demonstrated to no-nonsense, no-excuses observers who can retaliate against the image/reputation/brand of the failed giver, as appropriate? Exley's recommendation sound a lot like saying that baseball players shouldn't allow publications of their batting averages because they might have fans who would use this data as an excuse to stop being fans. Of course, there is some data that should be held private, unconditionally...e.g., the diet and workout of a baseball player (in the metaphor) should not be revealed, to avoid allowing competitive secrets to be obtained via research based on this data. I assert that no data should be withheld based on "tension-based" and possibly illegally processed conditional concerns regarding "Are you really going to donate to me if I give you this data?" It sounds like this paper is calling for a form of extortion ("I'm threatening to withhold data if you're not serious"), and although I haven't read the paper and am not a lawyer, I am concerned about this paper. I'm speaking about it as an interested and concerned citizen. (Note, withholding data here is not the same as withholding "deliverables" from non-paying customers.)
> Based on a cryptic signal I heard outside:
>
> If one were to claim that Exley's position is perhaps calling for changes to extortion law because "conditional metrics revelation" is so important, or if it is already legal and still "so important," then of course that is laughably absurd. I hold some of my thoughts relating to what a "process" is to be comprised of competitive secrets; vaguely speaking, there are certainly mathematically provably effective ways to use a "key process," revealing some sort of information to an "audience" of sorts, such as statistical data regarding performance or strategically impactful signals perhaps, without betraying what the process is or other sensitive data that is deemed "very much not desired to be revealed." Any fairly competent computer scientist would be able to figure out one or more ways to at least approach that task, and I have several secret ways to do it. I don't care to reveal any of them; there could be hundreds or more ways to use a process without revealing too much information, and yes, there is a whole world of smart ideas about that beyond zero-knowledge proofs.
>
> There are particularly good ways to protect English-language "demonstrations" of a process "securely," without revealing too much information that you would prefer to keep to yourself in a provably proper manner, subject to certain assumptions that, in real-world contexts, might not definitely be formally expressible in strictly mathematical language, at least not easily..
>
> In short: No, you do not need to "strike a deal" before revealing metrics if you know what you're doing with respect to processes.
>
> Also, artists would be really smart to think about, e.g., how to write a novel betraying the details and theory behind your craft. I plan to advise my younger sister, whom I think is talented at acting and maybe interested in pursuing acting or using acting skill in her career in the future, about this, but not anyone else.
>
> -Philip White (philip...@yahoo.com)

Maybe someone would argue that "using a process" to communicate metrics data is too complicated or too requiring of certain advanced skills, and it would be preferable to just have a way to reveal metrics after a deal to consider making "some sort of offer," with some different options but subject to constraints, after seeing metrics.

Maybe I should have thought of the idea in terms of something like "futures" in investing, which I know only a little about...perhaps you could make a binding deal that the person who obtains the metrics will make an offer or agree to a particular purchase upon seeing them, but certain "variables" in the terms of the deal could be decided after the metrics were revealed...I hadn't thought of that until just now. Perhaps it is not extortion if there is a contract establishing the right to buy or a requirement to buy, I hadn't thought of that because I don't think about options trading that much any more, not that I ever engaged in it (I read about straddles and puts and calls and other related ideas in the past).

So maybe it's not illegal, but I still prefer my idea of using a process to reveal metrics rather than signing a deal.

I would have likely thought of the idea that is an alternative to extortion if I weren't in isolation, I am genuinely not on a mission to be hyper-critical and criticize Christine Exley's research for no reason. I did feel some "competitiveness" w.r.t. Christine Exley when I knew her in college, though; I was that way with a number of male and female math professors too, in case you think I am biased against female academics, which I try not to be, not that I think about it that much. I genuinely thought the idea was absurd based on extortion law, I just hadn't thought of the other idea. It acknowledge that Exley's idea is not laughably absurd if it is not illegal, even though I would maintain that the idea is not "so important" given the existence of alternatives. Yes, a lot of people would prefer not to get involved in learning about processes; not every academic subject should have to be learned to do business.

I do have other serious professional criticisms of Dr. Exley--one or two of them--but I won't air them at this time...my main criticism of the metrics paper is something I withdraw, though, I don't have any serious criticisms of her research. I just forgot about futures contracts or whatever they're called.

I think process-driven metric revelation is a good alternative to "metrics coyness," but I acknowledge that it is probably not illegal to sign an agreement agreeing to some sort of "deal template" in exchange for data revelation.

-Philip White (philipjwhite@yahoo.com)