On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>
>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>> substance of my post.
>>>
>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>>> under discussion).
>>>
>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>
>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does*
>>> assert its own falsity.
>>>
>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>
>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on
>>> the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my
>>> explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post.
>>> You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you
>>> actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>> repeating yourself.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof
>>
>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>> bastard.
>
> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
> think we're done.
>
> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>
> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
> (c) thick as a brick.
> (d) all of the above.
>
> André
>

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>
>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>
>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>>>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>>>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>>>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>>>> under discussion).
>>>>
>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>
>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>
>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>
>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless
>>>> you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>>> repeating yourself.
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof
>>>
>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>> bastard.
>>
>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>> think we're done.
>>
>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>
>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>> (c) thick as a brick.
>> (d) all of the above.
>>
>> André
>>
>
> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>
>
> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof
>
> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>
> Translating this to a syllogism
>
> All X are a Y
> The LP is and X
> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>
> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.

Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:

X would be 'Is an Antinomy'

Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to
form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with
The Liar"

So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof
as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.

Do you feel proud of yourself?

What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually
about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and
Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.

There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic
of Gilgamesh.

Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Epic of Gilgamesh.

Therefore Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Book of Genesis.

According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, a savage can become civilized by
having sex with a prostitute.

Therefore the Book of Genesis advocates forcing the uncivilized to have
sex with prostitutes.

Do you see a problem with the above arguments? Saying there is a 'close
relationship' between two things doesn't mean you can conclude
*anything* about one based on the other. You need to consider exactly
*what* the relationship actually is. What are the similarities and what
are the differences? You insist on treating the two as if they were the
same thing. They aren't, anymore than the Book of Genesis and the Epic
of Gilgamesh are the same thing.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>
>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>> substance of my post.
>>>
>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>>> under discussion).
>>>
>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>
>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does*
>>> assert its own falsity.
>>>
>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>
>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on
>>> the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my
>>> explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post.
>>> You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you
>>> actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>> repeating yourself.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof
>>
>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>> bastard.
>
> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
> think we're done.
>
> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>
> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
> (c) thick as a brick.
> (d) all of the above.
>
> André
>

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have
>>>>>>>>>>>>> considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would mean that the category error is that G and p are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G
>>>>>>>>>>>> is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother
>>>>>>>>>>> to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I state
>>>>>>>>>> below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in
>>>>>>>>>> Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a
>>>>>>>>>> relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The
>>>>>>>>>> Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently
>>>>>>>>> make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a
>>>>>>>>> jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the
>>>>>>> strawman error.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and
>>>>>> 'the same'?
>>>>>
>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>
>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>
>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>>>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>>>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>>>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>>>> under discussion).
>>>>
>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>
>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>
>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>
>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless
>>>> you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>>> repeating yourself.
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof
>>>
>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>> bastard.
>>>
>>
>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>
> sufficiently equivalent
>

You can PROVE it?

Note, that means you need to start with the ACTUAL G that Godel used,
not some "simplified" version. So you better know what all that means.

On 5/1/22 7:15 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>
>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>
>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>>>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>>>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>>>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>>>> under discussion).
>>>>
>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>
>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>
>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>
>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless
>>>> you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>>> repeating yourself.
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof
>>>
>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>> bastard.
>>
>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>> think we're done.
>>
>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>
>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>> (c) thick as a brick.
>> (d) all of the above.
>>
>> André
>>
>
> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>
>
> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof
>
> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>
> Translating this to a syllogism
>
> All X are a Y
> The LP is and X
> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>
> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
>
As Andre pointed out, when you look at the statement to see what the
terms are, you just agreed with him and proved that YOU are the Liar.

On 2022-05-01 17:18, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

>> sufficiently equivalent
>>
>
> You can PROVE it?

Presumably he will point to the (nonexistent) footnote where Gödel
claims that The Liar and G are "sufficiently equivalent" rather than the
(actual) footnote where Gödel rather explicitly denies this.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>
>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>
>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That
>>>>> one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The
>>>>> Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>
>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>
>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>
>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>
>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post.
>>>>> Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's
>>>>> no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>>> bastard.
>>>
>>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>>> think we're done.
>>>
>>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>>
>>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>>> (c) thick as a brick.
>>> (d) all of the above.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
>> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>>
>>
>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof
>>
>> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>>
>> Translating this to a syllogism
>>
>> All X are a Y
>> The LP is and X
>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>>
>> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
>
> For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.
>
> Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:
>
> X would be 'Is an Antinomy'
>

Not quite.
X = is an epistemological antinomy

> Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to
> form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with
> The Liar"
>
> So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof
> as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.
>
> Do you feel proud of yourself?
>
> What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually
> about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and
> Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.
>

Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.

What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are one
and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play head
games.

> There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic
> of Gilgamesh.

He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
(1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
(2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs:
epistemological antinomies.

If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar
undecidability proof.

X = set of epistemological antinomies.
Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.

All X are Y
The LP is an X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

You have known this all along you merely get sadistic pleasure by
gaslighting me. That may be the only reason why anyone here (besides
Malcolm) talks to me.

https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/what-gaslighting-how-do-you-know-if-it-s-happening-ncna890866

>
> Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Epic of Gilgamesh.
>
> Therefore Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Book of Genesis.
>
> According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, a savage can become civilized by
> having sex with a prostitute.
>
> Therefore the Book of Genesis advocates forcing the uncivilized to have
> sex with prostitutes.
>
> Do you see a problem with the above arguments? Saying there is a 'close
> relationship' between two things doesn't mean you can conclude
> *anything* about one based on the other. You need to consider exactly
> *what* the relationship actually is. What are the similarities and what
> are the differences? You insist on treating the two as if they were the
> same thing. They aren't, anymore than the Book of Genesis and the Epic
> of Gilgamesh are the same thing.
>
> André
>

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On Sunday, May 1, 2022 at 7:33:24 PM UTC-4, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> > On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:
> >> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> >>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
> >>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
> >>>>> substance of my post.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
> >>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That
> >>>>> one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
> >>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The
> >>>>> Liar which is under discussion).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
> >>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
> >>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
> >>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
> >>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post.
> >>>>> Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's
> >>>>> no point repeating yourself.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> André
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> >>>> undecidability proof
> >>>>
> >>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
> >>>> bastard.
> >>>
> >>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
> >>> think we're done.
> >>>
> >>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
> >>>
> >>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
> >>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
> >>> (c) thick as a brick.
> >>> (d) all of the above.
> >>>
> >>> André
> >>>
> >>
> >> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
> >> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
> >>
> >>
> >> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> >> undecidability proof
> >>
> >> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
> >>
> >> Translating this to a syllogism
> >>
> >> All X are a Y
> >> The LP is and X
> >> Therefore the LP is a Y.
> >>
> >> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
> >
> > For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.
> >
> > Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:
> >
> > X would be 'Is an Antinomy'
> >
> Not quite.
> X = is an epistemological antinomy
> > Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to
> > form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with
> > The Liar"
> >
> > So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof
> > as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.
> >
> > Do you feel proud of yourself?
> >
> > What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually
> > about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and
> > Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.
> >
> Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.
>
> What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are one
> and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play head
> games.
> > There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic
> > of Gilgamesh.
> He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
> (1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
> (2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs:
> epistemological antinomies.
>
> If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar
> undecidability proof.
>
> X = set of epistemological antinomies.
> Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.
>
> All X are Y
> The LP is an X
> Therefore the LP is a Y.
> You have known this all along you merely get sadistic pleasure by
> gaslighting me. That may be the only reason why anyone here (besides
> Malcolm) talks to me.
>
> https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/what-gaslighting-how-do-you-know-if-it-s-happening-ncna890866

No one here is lying to you, nor do they have any reason to lie to you. You just have very poor reading comprehension skills and are unable to understand valid rebuttals to your claims.

That you think people are playing head games with you means that what they're saying is either over your head or it contradicts what you've been working on for so long and you can't handle it.

> >
> > Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Epic of Gilgamesh.
> >
> > Therefore Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Book of Genesis.
> >
> > According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, a savage can become civilized by
> > having sex with a prostitute.
> >
> > Therefore the Book of Genesis advocates forcing the uncivilized to have
> > sex with prostitutes.
> >
> > Do you see a problem with the above arguments? Saying there is a 'close
> > relationship' between two things doesn't mean you can conclude
> > *anything* about one based on the other. You need to consider exactly
> > *what* the relationship actually is. What are the similarities and what
> > are the differences? You insist on treating the two as if they were the
> > same thing. They aren't, anymore than the Book of Genesis and the Epic
> > of Gilgamesh are the same thing.
> >
> > André
> >
>
>
> --
> Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott
>
> "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
> Genius hits a target no one else can see."
> Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2022-05-01 17:33, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same.
>>>>>> (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is
>>>>>> The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to
>>>>>> retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a
>>>>>> previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that
>>>>>> post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation,
>>>>>> there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> André
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>
>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>
>>>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>>>> think we're done.
>>>>
>>>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>>>
>>>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>>>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>>>> (c) thick as a brick.
>>>> (d) all of the above.
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
>>> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>>>
>>>
>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof
>>>
>>> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>>>
>>> Translating this to a syllogism
>>>
>>> All X are a Y
>>> The LP is and X
>>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>>>
>>> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
>>
>> For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.
>>
>> Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:
>>
>> X would be 'Is an Antinomy'
>>
>
> Not quite.
> X = is an epistemological antinomy
>
>> Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to
>> form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done
>> with The Liar"
>>
>> So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar
>> proof as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.
>>
>> Do you feel proud of yourself?
>>
>> What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually
>> about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar
>> and Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.
>>
>
> Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.

Equivalence with respect to *what*?

If two things are equivalent but not identical, it means they are
equivalent with respect to some things but not equivalent with respect
to others.

The entire point of my posts has been to clarify some senses in which
the two are *not* equivalent. But instead of addressing that you keep
trying to prove that The Liar is in the same class as The Liar.

> What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are one
> and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play head
> games.
>
>> There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic
>> of Gilgamesh.
>
> He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
> (1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
> (2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs:
> epistemological antinomies.

Yes, and if the LP is *not* equivalent to G with respect to X, then none
of the analogous sentences based on other antinomies would be equivalent
with respect to X either.

> If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar
> undecidability proof.
>
> X = set of epistemological antinomies.
> Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.
>
> All X are Y
> The LP is an X
> Therefore the LP is a Y.

Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
truism.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 5/1/2022 6:39 PM, Dennis Bush wrote:
> On Sunday, May 1, 2022 at 7:33:24 PM UTC-4, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That
>>>>>>> one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The
>>>>>>> Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post.
>>>>>>> Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's
>>>>>>> no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>>>>> bastard.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>>>>> think we're done.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>>>>
>>>>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>>>>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>>>>> (c) thick as a brick.
>>>>> (d) all of the above.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
>>>> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>>>>
>>>> Translating this to a syllogism
>>>>
>>>> All X are a Y
>>>> The LP is and X
>>>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>>>>
>>>> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
>>>
>>> For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.
>>>
>>> Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:
>>>
>>> X would be 'Is an Antinomy'
>>>
>> Not quite.
>> X = is an epistemological antinomy
>>> Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to
>>> form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with
>>> The Liar"
>>>
>>> So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof
>>> as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.
>>>
>>> Do you feel proud of yourself?
>>>
>>> What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually
>>> about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and
>>> Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.
>>>
>> Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.
>>
>> What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are one
>> and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play head
>> games.
>>> There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic
>>> of Gilgamesh.
>> He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
>> (1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
>> (2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs:
>> epistemological antinomies.
>>
>> If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof.
>>
>> X = set of epistemological antinomies.
>> Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.
>>
>> All X are Y
>> The LP is an X
>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>> You have known this all along you merely get sadistic pleasure by
>> gaslighting me. That may be the only reason why anyone here (besides
>> Malcolm) talks to me.
>>
>> https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/what-gaslighting-how-do-you-know-if-it-s-happening-ncna890866
>
> No one here is lying to you, nor do they have any reason to lie to you. You just have very poor reading comprehension skills and are unable to understand valid rebuttals to your claims.
>
> That you think people are playing head games with you means that what they're saying is either over your head or it contradicts what you've been working on for so long and you can't handle it.

I see that you didn't bother to even look at what I said before responding.

All X are Y
The LP is an X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

André is disagreeing with that syllogism and André is smart enough to
know that it is utterly ridiculous to disagree with that syllogism
therefore André is a liar.

>
>
>>>
>>> Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Epic of Gilgamesh.
>>>
>>> Therefore Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Book of Genesis.
>>>
>>> According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, a savage can become civilized by
>>> having sex with a prostitute.
>>>
>>> Therefore the Book of Genesis advocates forcing the uncivilized to have
>>> sex with prostitutes.
>>>
>>> Do you see a problem with the above arguments? Saying there is a 'close
>>> relationship' between two things doesn't mean you can conclude
>>> *anything* about one based on the other. You need to consider exactly
>>> *what* the relationship actually is. What are the similarities and what
>>> are the differences? You insist on treating the two as if they were the
>>> same thing. They aren't, anymore than the Book of Genesis and the Epic
>>> of Gilgamesh are the same thing.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott
>>
>> "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
>> Genius hits a target no one else can see."
>> Arthur Schopenhauer

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-05-01 17:33, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same.
>>>>>>> (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is
>>>>>>> The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given
>>>>>>> it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and
>>>>>>> read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that
>>>>>>> explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>>>>> think we're done.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>>>>
>>>>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>>>>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>>>>> (c) thick as a brick.
>>>>> (d) all of the above.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily
>>>> forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>>>>
>>>> Translating this to a syllogism
>>>>
>>>> All X are a Y
>>>> The LP is and X
>>>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>>>>
>>>> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
>>>
>>> For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.
>>>
>>> Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:
>>>
>>> X would be 'Is an Antinomy'
>>>
>>
>> Not quite.
>> X = is an epistemological antinomy
>>
>>> Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used
>>> to form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done
>>> with The Liar"
>>>
>>> So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar
>>> proof as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.
>>>
>>> Do you feel proud of yourself?
>>>
>>> What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually
>>> about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar
>>> and Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.
>>>
>>
>> Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.
>
> Equivalence with respect to *what*?
>
> If two things are equivalent but not identical, it means they are
> equivalent with respect to some things but not equivalent with respect
> to others.
>
> The entire point of my posts has been to clarify some senses in which
> the two are *not* equivalent. But instead of addressing that you keep
> trying to prove that The Liar is in the same class as The Liar.
>
>> What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are
>> one and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play
>> head games.
>>
>>> There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the
>>> Epic of Gilgamesh.
>>
>> He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
>> (1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
>> (2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs:
>> epistemological antinomies.
>
> Yes, and if the LP is *not* equivalent to G with respect to X, then none
> of the analogous sentences based on other antinomies would be equivalent
> with respect to X either.
>
>> If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof.
>>
>> X = set of epistemological antinomies.
>> Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.
> >
>> All X are Y
>> The LP is an X
>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>
> Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
> proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
> truism.
>
> André
>
>

See that I backed you into a corner to force you to quit lying.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2022-05-01 17:53, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-05-01 17:33, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

<snippage>

>>> Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.
>>
>> Equivalence with respect to *what*?

Again, I ask, equivalent with respect to what?

>> If two things are equivalent but not identical, it means they are
>> equivalent with respect to some things but not equivalent with respect
>> to others.
>>
>> The entire point of my posts has been to clarify some senses in which
>> the two are *not* equivalent. But instead of addressing that you keep
>> trying to prove that The Liar is in the same class as The Liar.
>>
>>> What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are
>>> one and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play
>>> head games.
>>>
>>>> There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the
>>>> Epic of Gilgamesh.
>>>
>>> He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
>>> (1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
>>> (2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs:
>>> epistemological antinomies.
>>
>> Yes, and if the LP is *not* equivalent to G with respect to X, then
>> none of the analogous sentences based on other antinomies would be
>> equivalent with respect to X either.
>>
>>> If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof.
>>>
>>> X = set of epistemological antinomies.
>>> Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.
>>  >
>>> All X are Y
>>> The LP is an X
>>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>>
>> Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>> proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
>> truism.
>>
>> André
>>
>>
>
> See that I backed you into a corner to force you to quit lying.

Huh? (Maybe try using punctuation).

I never disputed that the Liar and the Liar are in the same category.
You keep trying to address the relationship between the Liar and the
Liar (or the Liar and antinomies) when I am addressing the relationship
between the Liar and G (which your syllogism has nothing to do with).

You claim they are equivalent. Equivalent with respect to what?

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 5/1/2022 6:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/1/22 7:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>
>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>
>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That
>>>>> one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The
>>>>> Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>
>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>
>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>
>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>
>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post.
>>>>> Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's
>>>>> no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>>> bastard.
>>>
>>> Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I
>>> think we're done.
>>>
>>> I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you
>>>
>>> (a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
>>> (b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
>>> (c) thick as a brick.
>>> (d) all of the above.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive
>> and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment
>>
>>
>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof
>>
>> The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy
>>
>> Translating this to a syllogism
>>
>> All X are a Y
>> The LP is and X
>> Therefore the LP is a Y.
>>
>> That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.
>>
> As Andre pointed out, when you look at the statement to see what the
> terms are, you just agreed with him and proved that YOU are the Liar.

I backed him into a corner and forced him to stop lying:

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
> proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
> truism.

Anyone that abuses me gets a metaphorical uppercut to the jaw.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would mean that the category error is that G and p are not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother
>>>>>>>>>>>> to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I state
>>>>>>>>>>> below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in
>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a
>>>>>>>>>>> relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The
>>>>>>>>>>> Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently
>>>>>>>>>> make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a
>>>>>>>>>> jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the
>>>>>>>> strawman error.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and
>>>>>>> 'the same'?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>
>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>
>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That
>>>>> one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The
>>>>> Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>
>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>
>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>
>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>
>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype
>>>>> my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous
>>>>> post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post.
>>>>> Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's
>>>>> no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying
>>>> bastard.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>
>> sufficiently equivalent
>>
>
> You can PROVE it?
>

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
> proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
> truism.

> Note, that means you need to start with the ACTUAL G that Godel used,
> not some "simplified" version. So you better know what all that means.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would mean that the category error is that G and p are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I state
>>>>>>>>>>>> below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in
>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a
>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from
>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently
>>>>>>>>>>> make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a
>>>>>>>>>>> jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the
>>>>>>>>> strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship'
>>>>>>>> and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same.
>>>>>> (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is
>>>>>> The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated
>>>>>> on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to
>>>>>> retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a
>>>>>> previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that
>>>>>> post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation,
>>>>>> there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> André
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>
>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>
>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>
>>
>> You can PROVE it?
>>
>
> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>

So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:

>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>
>> sufficiently equivalent
>>
>
> You can PROVE it?

On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would mean that the category error is that G and p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I state
>>>>>>>>>>>>> below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the
>>>>>>>>>> strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship'
>>>>>>>>> and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same.
>>>>>>> (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is
>>>>>>> The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given
>>>>>>> it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and
>>>>>>> read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that
>>>>>>> explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>
>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>
>>>
>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>
>>
>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>
>
> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>
>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>
>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>
>>
>> You can PROVE it?
>
> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal
> antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the
> comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you
> are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>
>
>
>
>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
>>  > truism.
>>
>
> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would mean that the category error is that G and p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of
>>>>>>>>>>> the strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship'
>>>>>>>>>> and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping
>>>>>>>> the substance of my post.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar
>>>>>>>> and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the
>>>>>>>> same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a
>>>>>>>> similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly
>>>>>>>> relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given
>>>>>>>> it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and
>>>>>>>> read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that
>>>>>>>> explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>>
>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>>
>>
>> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>
>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>
>>>
>>> You can PROVE it?
>>
>> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the
>> epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth
>> Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't
>> about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing
>>> for a
>>>  > truism.
>>>
>>
>> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.
>
> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he
> kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar
> undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made
> denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying
> about it.
>

On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
> On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing if you don't specify the actual categories
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that G and p are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship'
>>>>>>>>>>> and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping
>>>>>>>>> the substance of my post.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar
>>>>>>>>> and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the
>>>>>>>>> same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a
>>>>>>>>> similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly
>>>>>>>>> relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given
>>>>>>>>> it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and
>>>>>>>>> read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that
>>>>>>>>> explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just
>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>>
>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>
>>> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the
>>> epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth
>>> Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't
>>> about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing
>>>> for a
>>>>  > truism.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.
>>
>> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he
>> kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar
>> undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made
>> denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit
>> lying about it.
>>
>
> No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel does
> doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.
>

On 2022-05-01 20:18, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>
>> On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:

>>> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he
>>> kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar
>>> undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made
>>> denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit
>>> lying about it.
>>>
>>
>> No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel
>> does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.
>>
>
> If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to deny
> that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for
> similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.

I didn't so much deny that as I did claim it was vacuous and irrelevant.

Gödel draws a parallel between his proof and The Liar.

He also notes that other antinomies could be used to construct similar
proofs.

That would seem to mean that OTHER ANTINOMIES could be used to construct
similar proofs to the one he based on The Liar.

To say that The Liar can be used to construct similar proofs is just
plain silly since that's the one he was talking about to begin with.

More importantly, though, it is absolutely irrelevant to any of the
points I was making which didn't deny some relationship between G and
The Liar but concerned the exact *nature* of the relationship between G
and The Liar, points which would hold for proofs based on other
antinomies as well.

And points which you still have not addressed.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 5/1/22 10:18 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>
>> On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing if you don't specify the actual categories
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that G and p are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close
>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship' and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping
>>>>>>>>>> the substance of my post.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar
>>>>>>>>>> and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the
>>>>>>>>>> same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a
>>>>>>>>>> similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly
>>>>>>>>>> relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already
>>>>>>>>>> given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go
>>>>>>>>>> back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment
>>>>>>>>>> on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just
>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just
>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>
>>>> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the
>>>> epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth
>>>> Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't
>>>> about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>>>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing
>>>>> for a
>>>>>  > truism.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.
>>>
>>> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he
>>> kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar
>>> undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made
>>> denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit
>>> lying about it.
>>>
>>
>> No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel
>> does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.
>>
>
> If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to deny
> that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for
> similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.
>
> If you make sure to knowingly contradict the verified facts then
> Revelations 21:8 may eventually apply to you.
>

On 5/1/2022 9:47 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/1/22 10:18 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>
>>> On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing if you don't specify the actual categories
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that G and p are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship' and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping
>>>>>>>>>>> the substance of my post.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar
>>>>>>>>>>> and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the
>>>>>>>>>>> same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly
>>>>>>>>>>> relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The
>>>>>>>>>>> Liar *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm
>>>>>>>>>>> not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already
>>>>>>>>>>> given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go
>>>>>>>>>>> back and read that post. Unless you actually have some
>>>>>>>>>>> comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating
>>>>>>>>>>> yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just
>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just
>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>>
>>>>> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the
>>>>> epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth
>>>>> Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into
>>>>> isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>>>>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by
>>>>>> arguing for a
>>>>>>  > truism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.
>>>>
>>>> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that
>>>> he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for
>>>> similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when
>>>> I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally
>>>> quit lying about it.
>>>>
>>>
>>> No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel
>>> does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.
>>>
>>
>> If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to deny
>> that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for
>> similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.
>>
>> If you make sure to knowingly contradict the verified facts then
>> Revelations 21:8 may eventually apply to you.
>>
>
> You mean like when he said (and you snipped):
>
>>
>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>> substance of my post.
>>
>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>> under discussion).
>>
>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>
>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does*
>> assert its own falsity.
>>
>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>
>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on
>> the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my
>> explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post.
>> You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you
>> actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>> repeating yourself.
>>
>
> Maybe you should check your OWN facts.
>

On 2022-05-01 21:04, olcott wrote:

> He is focusing on the dishonest dodge of the strawman error by making
> sure to ignore that in another quote Gödel said that Gödel's G is
> sufficiently equivalent to the Liar Paradox on the basis that the Liar
> Paradox is an epistemological antinomy, whereas the quote he keeps
> switching back to is less clear on this point.

There is no quote where Gödel claims G is "sufficiently equivalent" to
the Liars Paradox. (And "sufficiently equivalent" for what, exactly? Is
a five dollar bill "sufficiently equivalent" to 20 quarters? It's a
meaningless question without specifying what type of equivalence you
have in mind -- equivalent value, sure. Equivalent usefulness in a
vending maching, not necessarily)

> Since I focused on correcting his mistake several times it finally got
> down to the point where it was clear that he was a lying bastard.

Since you seem to be claiming that I reject some nonexistent quote, I
can't imagine what mistake I might have made.

> I am utterly immune to gas lighting.
>
>> He is CLEARLY not saying that the Liar Paradox can't be used for this
>> sort of proof, because he talks about its form being used.
>>
>
> He continued to refer to the other quote of Gödel that is much more
> vague on the equivalence between Gödel's G as his basis that equivalence
> cannot be be determined even when I kept focusing him back on the quote
> that does assert sufficient equivalence exists. I did this six times.

What is this quote you are referring to where he asserts "sufficient
equivalence"? Unless I missed something, the quote you kept harping on
was "Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof". That makes no mention whatsoever of "equivalence"
(sufficient or otherwise) between The Liar and G.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 5/1/22 11:04 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 9:47 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/1/22 10:18 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing if you don't specify the actual categories
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to that I never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that G and p are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship' and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep
>>>>>>>>>>>> snipping the substance of my post.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The
>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are
>>>>>>>>>>>> the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear
>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly
>>>>>>>>>>>> relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The
>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is
>>>>>>>>>>>> not.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm
>>>>>>>>>>>> not going to retype my explanation for this as I have
>>>>>>>>>>>> already given it in a previous post. You're more than
>>>>>>>>>>>> welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually
>>>>>>>>>>>> have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>>>>>>>>>>> repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy
>>>>>>>>>>> you lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being
>>>>>>>>>> just like.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just
>>>>>>>>> like.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the
>>>>>> epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth
>>>>>> Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into
>>>>>> isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>>>>>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by
>>>>>>> arguing for a
>>>>>>>  > truism.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.
>>>>>
>>>>> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that
>>>>> he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for
>>>>> similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only
>>>>> when I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he
>>>>> finally quit lying about it.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel
>>>> does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to
>>> deny that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used
>>> for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.
>>>
>>> If you make sure to knowingly contradict the verified facts then
>>> Revelations 21:8 may eventually apply to you.
>>>
>>
>> You mean like when he said (and you snipped):
>>
>>>
>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>> substance of my post.
>>>
>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G.
>>> He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one
>>> can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship
>>> to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is
>>> under discussion).
>>>
>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>
>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does*
>>> assert its own falsity.
>>>
>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>
>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on
>>> the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my
>>> explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post.
>>> You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you
>>> actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point
>>> repeating yourself.
>>>
>>
>> Maybe you should check your OWN facts.
>>
>
> He is focusing on the dishonest dodge of the strawman error by making
> sure to ignore that in another quote Gödel said that Gödel's G is
> sufficiently equivalent to the Liar Paradox on the basis that the Liar
> Paradox is an epistemological antinomy, whereas the quote he keeps
> switching back to is less clear on this point.
>
> Since I focused on correcting his mistake several times it finally got
> down to the point where it was clear that he was a lying bastard.
>
> I am utterly immune to gas lighting.
>
>> He is CLEARLY not saying that the Liar Paradox can't be used for this
>> sort of proof, because he talks about its form being used.
>>
>
> He continued to refer to the other quote of Gödel that is much more
> vague on the equivalence between Gödel's G as his basis that equivalence
> cannot be be determined even when I kept focusing him back on the quote
> that does assert sufficient equivalence exists. I did this six times.
>
> At this point my assessment that he was a lying bastard was sufficiently
> validated.
>
> Are you a lying bastard too, or will you acknowledge that my assessment
> is correct?
>

Wow, I went offline for a weekend, because we had such a nice weather,
and this thread exploded to enormous size 😲. I didn't read the whole
thread it's just too big.

On 5/1/22 13:00, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 4:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2022-04-30 21:08:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> negation, not, \+
>>> The concept of logical negation in Prolog is problematical, in the
>>> sense that the only method that Prolog can use to tell if a
>>> proposition is false is to try to prove it (from the facts and rules
>>> that it has been told about), and then if this attempt fails, it
>>> concludes that the proposition is false. This is referred to as
>>> negation as failure.
>>
>> Note that the negation discussed above is not present in LP =
>> not(true(LP)).
>>
>> Mikko
>>
>
> Is says that it is. It says that "not" is synonymous with \+.

I don't want to undermine your knowledge in formal logic, but still
allow me to re-iterate my point, because it looks like it didn't come
through.

1. Prolog is *not* an automated theorem prover; it is a programming
language. Nevertheless you can /implement/ one in Prolog.
2. Prolog's syntax is somewhat original and requires some
understanding.

Let me elaborate on the 2nd point. Prolog is a homoiconic language that
means that same syntactical constructs (terms) can express data, or be
executable.

Consider this knowledge base¹:

foo :- not(true).

The following query will fail:

?- foo.
false.

When we asked the program to refute `foo/0` it *executed* predicates
`not/1` and `true/0`.

But, given this knowledge base:

bar(X) :- X = not(true).

The following query does succeed:

?- bar(X).
X = not(true).

Why? — Here, both `not/1` and `true/0` were *not* executed, they were
used as a mere symbols, data without *any* meaning whatsoever. Also
please note that this has nothing to do with cyclic terms, they are
completely separate things, and the problem with your Prolog code
doesn't lie in cyclic term handling, but in basic misconception when
terms are executed and when they aren't. In your example:

> LP := ~True(LP) is translated to Prolog:
>
> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
> LP = not(true(LP)).
>
> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
> false
None (!) of the predicates where executed in both unifications (with and
without occurs check).

Basically what I was trying to say is that `LP = not(true(LP))` is
incorrect encoding of the stated logical formula. What you have written
just tells to Prolog to unify variable `LP` with the term
`not(true(LP))`, it is similar to this query (`not` is used only as an
atom it isn't executed):

?- X = [not|X].
X = [not|X].

?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, [not|X]).
false.

I've skimmed through your paper and you encode logical formula G = ¬(F ⊢
G) as:

G = not(provable(F, G)).

Which is not correct for all the reasons I've laid down previously, at
least it is not correct with the default semantics of `=` operator.

I hope this will clear some thing out.

[¹] As a side note, according to the SWI-Prolog documentation `not/1`
predicate is deprecated and should be replaced with `'\+'/1`.
https://www.swi-prolog.org/pldoc/doc_for?object=not/1

--
Alex Grabowski

On 5/2/2022 6:49 AM, Aleksy Grabowski wrote:
> Wow, I went offline for a weekend, because we had such a nice weather,
> and this thread exploded to enormous size 😲. I didn't read the whole
> thread it's just too big.
>
> On 5/1/22 13:00, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 4:26 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2022-04-30 21:08:05 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> negation, not, \+
>>>> The concept of logical negation in Prolog is problematical, in the
>>>> sense that the only method that Prolog can use to tell if a
>>>> proposition is false is to try to prove it (from the facts and rules
>>>> that it has been told about), and then if this attempt fails, it
>>>> concludes that the proposition is false. This is referred to as
>>>> negation as failure.
>>>
>>> Note that the negation discussed above is not present in LP =
>>> not(true(LP)).
>>>
>>> Mikko
>>>
>>
>> Is says that it is. It says that "not" is synonymous with \+.
>
> I don't want to undermine your knowledge in formal logic, but still
> allow me to re-iterate my point, because it looks like it didn't come
> through.
>
>  1. Prolog is *not* an automated theorem prover; it is a programming
>     language. Nevertheless you can /implement/ one in Prolog.
>  2. Prolog's syntax is somewhat original and requires some
>     understanding.
>
> Let me elaborate on the 2nd point. Prolog is a homoiconic language that
> means that same syntactical constructs (terms) can express data, or be
> executable.
>
> Consider this knowledge base¹:
>
>     foo :- not(true).
>
> The following query will fail:
>
>     ?- foo.
>     false.
>
> When we asked the program to refute `foo/0` it *executed* predicates
> `not/1` and `true/0`.
>
> But, given this knowledge base:
>
>     bar(X) :- X = not(true).
>
> The following query does succeed:
>
>     ?- bar(X).
>     X = not(true).
>
> Why? — Here, both `not/1` and `true/0` were *not* executed, they were
> used as a mere symbols, data without *any* meaning whatsoever. Also
> please note that this has nothing to do with cyclic terms, they are
> completely separate things, and the problem with your Prolog code
> doesn't lie in cyclic term handling, but in basic misconception when
> terms are executed and when they aren't. In your example:
>
>> LP := ~True(LP) is translated to Prolog:
>>
>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>
>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>> false
> None (!) of the predicates where executed in both unifications (with and
> without occurs check).
>
> Basically what I was trying to say is that `LP = not(true(LP))` is
> incorrect encoding of the stated logical formula. What you have written
> just tells to Prolog to unify variable `LP` with the term
> `not(true(LP))`, it is similar to this query (`not` is used only as an
> atom it isn't executed):
>
>     ?- X = [not|X].
>     X = [not|X].
>
>     ?- unify_with_occurs_check(X, [not|X]).
>     false.
>
> I've skimmed through your paper and you encode logical formula G = ¬(F ⊢
> G) as:
>
>    G = not(provable(F, G)).
>
> Which is not correct for all the reasons I've laid down previously, at
> least it is not correct with the default semantics of `=` operator.
>
> I hope this will clear some thing out.
>
>  [¹] As a side note, according to the SWI-Prolog documentation `not/1`
>      predicate is deprecated and should be replaced with `'\+'/1`.
>      https://www.swi-prolog.org/pldoc/doc_for?object=not/1
>

Here is what I understand of the relationship between logic and Prolog.
Prolog corrects all of the errors of classical and symbolic logic by
forming the underlying framework for the correct notion of truth and
provability. In all of the places where logic diverges from the Prolog
model logic fails to be correct.

Correct logic derives conclusions on the basis of applying truth
preserving operations to expressions of language known to be true. This
simple model refutes the Tarski undefinability theorem.

Tarski Undefinability Proof.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

If a set of rules (truth preserving operations) can be applied to a set
of facts (expressions of language known to be true) then the result is
the truth of the Prolog expression. This is the way that Truth really
works and both classical and Symbolic logic go astray of this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prolog#Rules_and_facts

It is also Good that Prolog as negation as failure because this detects
logic errors that are hidden from classical and symbolic logic. Logic
always assume that every expression of language that is not true must be
false. This makes semantic errors invisible to classical and symbolic
logic visible to Prolong.

This sentence is neither provable nor refutable in Prolog:
This sentence is not true. This is one of my best attempts at
formalizing that: LP ↔ ~True(LP)

The whole purpose of this thread is to find out exactly how to encode:
"This sentence is not true" in Prolog when we assume that True is
exactly the same thing as Provable in Prolog.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer