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devel / comp.protocols.kerberos / Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation

SubjectAuthor
o Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generationKen Hornstein

1
Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation

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From: ken...@cmf.nrl.navy.mil (Ken Hornstein)
Newsgroups: comp.protocols.kerberos
Subject: Re: RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation
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<3db2752e-565e-1f64-b354-9031a2fe9334@mit.edu>
 by: Ken Hornstein - Wed, 25 Oct 2023 00:36 UTC

>Whether the initiator can generate per-message tokens before receiving
>the subkey depends on whether the mechanism returned the prot_ready
>state (RFC 2743 section 1.2.7) to the caller after generating the
>initiator token. RFC 4121 does not mention prot_ready; I couldn't say
>whether that's an implicit contraindication on setting the bit. I'm not
>aware of any krb5 mechs setting the bit at that point in the initiator,
>although I recall Nico talking about maybe wanting to do so.

Fair enough; every time I think I might understand the GSSAPI, there
is always something else in that mess. I don't think given subkey
negotiation it would be possible for a krb5 mechanism to legitimately
set prot_ready before authentication was complete, but it sure seems
like this is a corner case. Certainly it seems like Heimdal always
assumes that the other end will behave that way.

>The comment was written twenty years ago by a developer no longer
>working for MIT, and I don't recall having any conversations about it
>before this one.

NOW I feel old :-/

--Ken

1
server_pubkey.txt

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