On 2022-12-14 10:21, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 10:59 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-12-14 08:22, olcott wrote:
>>
>>> Every undecidable proposition is merely semantically incoherent and
>>> nothing more. Every truth is provable including truth where one or
>>> more of the steps of the proof are currently unknown.
>>
>> So how are you supposed to determine whether a proposition is
>> 'incoherent' or whether it is a provable proposition whose proof is
>> currently unknown?
>>
>> Unless you have some way of making that determination, your idea of
>> 'incoherent' propositions isn't terribly useful.
>>
>> André
>>
>
> Although it is dead obvious that the Liar Paradox:
> "This sentence is not true."
> Is not a truth bearer because it is self-contradictory...
>
> It remains the received view that the notion of truth cannot be
> formalized because Tarski could not prove that the Liar Paradox is true.
>
> Valid(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>  True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ)
> ¬True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊬ φ)
> False(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ ¬φ)

But none of that addresses my question. How do you distinguish a
proposition 'where one or more steps of the proof are currently unknown'
from a proposition which is 'incoherent'?

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 12/14/2022 11:32 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-12-14 10:21, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 10:59 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-12-14 08:22, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>> Every undecidable proposition is merely semantically incoherent and
>>>> nothing more. Every truth is provable including truth where one or
>>>> more of the steps of the proof are currently unknown.
>>>
>>> So how are you supposed to determine whether a proposition is
>>> 'incoherent' or whether it is a provable proposition whose proof is
>>> currently unknown?
>>>
>>> Unless you have some way of making that determination, your idea of
>>> 'incoherent' propositions isn't terribly useful.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> Although it is dead obvious that the Liar Paradox:
>> "This sentence is not true."
>> Is not a truth bearer because it is self-contradictory...
>>
>> It remains the received view that the notion of truth cannot be
>> formalized because Tarski could not prove that the Liar Paradox is true.
>>
>> Valid(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>   True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ)
>> ¬True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊬ φ)
>> False(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ ¬φ)
>
> But none of that addresses my question. How do you distinguish a
> proposition 'where one or more steps of the proof are currently unknown'
> from a proposition which is 'incoherent'?
>
> André
>

If an expression of language is unprovable because it is
self-contradictory then it is incorrect rather than undecidable.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2022-12-14 11:14, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 11:32 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-12-14 10:21, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/14/2022 10:59 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2022-12-14 08:22, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Every undecidable proposition is merely semantically incoherent and
>>>>> nothing more. Every truth is provable including truth where one or
>>>>> more of the steps of the proof are currently unknown.
>>>>
>>>> So how are you supposed to determine whether a proposition is
>>>> 'incoherent' or whether it is a provable proposition whose proof is
>>>> currently unknown?
>>>>
>>>> Unless you have some way of making that determination, your idea of
>>>> 'incoherent' propositions isn't terribly useful.
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> Although it is dead obvious that the Liar Paradox:
>>> "This sentence is not true."
>>> Is not a truth bearer because it is self-contradictory...
>>>
>>> It remains the received view that the notion of truth cannot be
>>> formalized because Tarski could not prove that the Liar Paradox is true.
>>>
>>> Valid(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>>   True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ)
>>> ¬True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊬ φ)
>>> False(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ ¬φ)
>>
>> But none of that addresses my question. How do you distinguish a
>> proposition 'where one or more steps of the proof are currently
>> unknown' from a proposition which is 'incoherent'?
>>
>> André
>>
>
> If an expression of language is unprovable because it is
> self-contradictory then it is incorrect rather than undecidable.

But I wasn't asking about self-contradictory statements and made no
mention of them.

If you have some statement φ for which you have been unable to arrive at
a proof of either φ or ¬φ, how to you determine whether φ is
'incoherent' or whether you simply have failed to (yet) find a proof?

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 12/14/2022 12:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-12-14 11:14, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 11:32 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-12-14 10:21, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/14/2022 10:59 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2022-12-14 08:22, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Every undecidable proposition is merely semantically incoherent
>>>>>> and nothing more. Every truth is provable including truth where
>>>>>> one or more of the steps of the proof are currently unknown.
>>>>>
>>>>> So how are you supposed to determine whether a proposition is
>>>>> 'incoherent' or whether it is a provable proposition whose proof is
>>>>> currently unknown?
>>>>>
>>>>> Unless you have some way of making that determination, your idea of
>>>>> 'incoherent' propositions isn't terribly useful.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Although it is dead obvious that the Liar Paradox:
>>>> "This sentence is not true."
>>>> Is not a truth bearer because it is self-contradictory...
>>>>
>>>> It remains the received view that the notion of truth cannot be
>>>> formalized because Tarski could not prove that the Liar Paradox is
>>>> true.
>>>>
>>>> Valid(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>>>   True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ)
>>>> ¬True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊬ φ)
>>>> False(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ ¬φ)
>>>
>>> But none of that addresses my question. How do you distinguish a
>>> proposition 'where one or more steps of the proof are currently
>>> unknown' from a proposition which is 'incoherent'?
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> If an expression of language is unprovable because it is
>> self-contradictory then it is incorrect rather than undecidable.
>
> But I wasn't asking about self-contradictory statements and made no
> mention of them.
>

All expression of language that were previously determined to be
undecidable on the basis that that it is impossible to prove or refute
them are determined to be semantically incorrect.

> If you have some statement φ for which you have been unable to arrive at
> a proof of either φ or ¬φ, how to you determine whether φ is
> 'incoherent' or whether you simply have failed to (yet) find a proof?
>
> André
>

Self contradictory expressions of language are one example that was
previously determined to be undecidable and is now correctly construed
to be semantically incorrect.

Russell's "paradox" is correctly construed as having the incoherent
basis that a thing can totally contain itself. No set can have itself as
a member in the same way that no can of soup can totally contain itself
thus having no outside surface.

The Venn diagram of a set containing itself would be a pair of
overlapping circles where at the point of overlap neither circle touches
the other circle, thus contradicting that these circles overlap.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2022-12-14 11:29, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 12:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2022-12-14 11:14, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/14/2022 11:32 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>> On 2022-12-14 10:21, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/14/2022 10:59 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>> On 2022-12-14 08:22, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Every undecidable proposition is merely semantically incoherent
>>>>>>> and nothing more. Every truth is provable including truth where
>>>>>>> one or more of the steps of the proof are currently unknown.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So how are you supposed to determine whether a proposition is
>>>>>> 'incoherent' or whether it is a provable proposition whose proof
>>>>>> is currently unknown?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unless you have some way of making that determination, your idea
>>>>>> of 'incoherent' propositions isn't terribly useful.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> André
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Although it is dead obvious that the Liar Paradox:
>>>>> "This sentence is not true."
>>>>> Is not a truth bearer because it is self-contradictory...
>>>>>
>>>>> It remains the received view that the notion of truth cannot be
>>>>> formalized because Tarski could not prove that the Liar Paradox is
>>>>> true.
>>>>>
>>>>> Valid(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>>>>   True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ)
>>>>> ¬True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊬ φ)
>>>>> False(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ ¬φ)
>>>>
>>>> But none of that addresses my question. How do you distinguish a
>>>> proposition 'where one or more steps of the proof are currently
>>>> unknown' from a proposition which is 'incoherent'?
>>>>
>>>> André
>>>>
>>>
>>> If an expression of language is unprovable because it is
>>> self-contradictory then it is incorrect rather than undecidable.
>>
>> But I wasn't asking about self-contradictory statements and made no
>> mention of them.
>>
>
> All expression of language that were previously determined to be
> undecidable on the basis that that it is impossible to prove or refute
> them are determined to be semantically incorrect.
>
>> If you have some statement φ for which you have been unable to arrive
>> at a proof of either φ or ¬φ, how to you determine whether φ is
>> 'incoherent' or whether you simply have failed to (yet) find a proof?
>>
>> André
>>
>
> Self contradictory expressions of language are one example that was
> previously determined to be undecidable and is now correctly construed
> to be semantically incorrect.
>
> Russell's "paradox" is correctly construed as having the incoherent
> basis that a thing can totally contain itself. No set can have itself as
> a member in the same way that no can of soup can totally contain itself
> thus having no outside surface.
>
> The Venn diagram of a set containing itself would be a pair of
> overlapping circles where at the point of overlap neither circle touches
> the other circle, thus contradicting that these circles overlap.

So you're not going to answer my actual question.

I'll return to ignoring you again.

André

--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.

On 12/14/2022 12:48 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2022-12-14 11:29, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 12:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2022-12-14 11:14, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/14/2022 11:32 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2022-12-14 10:21, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/14/2022 10:59 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2022-12-14 08:22, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Every undecidable proposition is merely semantically incoherent
>>>>>>>> and nothing more. Every truth is provable including truth where
>>>>>>>> one or more of the steps of the proof are currently unknown.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So how are you supposed to determine whether a proposition is
>>>>>>> 'incoherent' or whether it is a provable proposition whose proof
>>>>>>> is currently unknown?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Unless you have some way of making that determination, your idea
>>>>>>> of 'incoherent' propositions isn't terribly useful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Although it is dead obvious that the Liar Paradox:
>>>>>> "This sentence is not true."
>>>>>> Is not a truth bearer because it is self-contradictory...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It remains the received view that the notion of truth cannot be
>>>>>> formalized because Tarski could not prove that the Liar Paradox is
>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Valid(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>>>>>   True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ)
>>>>>> ¬True(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊬ φ)
>>>>>> False(T,φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ ¬φ)
>>>>>
>>>>> But none of that addresses my question. How do you distinguish a
>>>>> proposition 'where one or more steps of the proof are currently
>>>>> unknown' from a proposition which is 'incoherent'?
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If an expression of language is unprovable because it is
>>>> self-contradictory then it is incorrect rather than undecidable.
>>>
>>> But I wasn't asking about self-contradictory statements and made no
>>> mention of them.
>>>
>>
>> All expression of language that were previously determined to be
>> undecidable on the basis that that it is impossible to prove or refute
>> them are determined to be semantically incorrect.
>>
>>> If you have some statement φ for which you have been unable to arrive
>>> at a proof of either φ or ¬φ, how to you determine whether φ is
>>> 'incoherent' or whether you simply have failed to (yet) find a proof?
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> Self contradictory expressions of language are one example that was
>> previously determined to be undecidable and is now correctly construed
>> to be semantically incorrect.
>>
>> Russell's "paradox" is correctly construed as having the incoherent
>> basis that a thing can totally contain itself. No set can have itself
>> as a member in the same way that no can of soup can totally contain
>> itself thus having no outside surface.
>>
>> The Venn diagram of a set containing itself would be a pair of
>> overlapping circles where at the point of overlap neither circle
>> touches the other circle, thus contradicting that these circles overlap.
>
> So you're not going to answer my actual question.
>
> I'll return to ignoring you again.
>
> André
>

I have answered it many times and you failed to understand my answer.

Most people that do this are merely striving to remain in rebuttal mode
after I have conclusively proven their rebuttal to be incorrect.

Incoherent expressions of language have recognizable patterns several of
which I concretely provided.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/14/2022 5:55 AM, Skep Dick wrote:

<NIP>

> "Part of the whole is as big as the whole" sure sounds crazy in English.

Not to a mathematician! Only to a bad skeptic.

A good mathematician says that's an interesting "definition", explores
the concept, and discovers amazing ideas and instances.

A good skeptic believes the "definition" useless because nothing should
satisfy it, explores the concept because it interests him, and is
(secretly) delighted to find his initial impression was wrong.

Try being a good little skeptic not an Olcott. You'll have more fun.
--
Jeff Barnett

On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 21:08:17 UTC+2, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 5:55 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>
> <NIP>
>
> > "Part of the whole is as big as the whole" sure sounds crazy in English.
>
> Not to a mathematician! Only to a bad skeptic.
Perhaps only to a bad mathematician, but not to a good skeptic?

> A good mathematician says that's an interesting "definition", explores
> the concept, and discovers amazing ideas and instances.
That sounds no different to a drug addict chasing a high.

I tend to find it quite annoying that I can make two spheres out of one; but I can't do that with any physical resources.
So I much prefer to do my thinking in linear logic. Where resource-boundedness is a thing.

> A good skeptic believes the "definition" useless because nothing should
> satisfy it, explores the concept because it interests him, and is
> (secretly) delighted to find his initial impression was wrong.
Indeed, that sounds like escapism to me.

> Try being a good little skeptic not an Olcott. You'll have more fun.
I don't know how to be any better at skepticism than to reject your entire paradigm.

Maths is useful. Even when it's not fun.

On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 19:26:01 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 11:02 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 18:06:22 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
> >> On 12/14/2022 9:24 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
> >>> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 16:21:35 UTC+2, wyni...@gmail.com wrote:
> >>>> Valid(φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
> >>>> <=> Valid(φ) ↔ TRUE
> >>>>
> >>>> Valid(φ) is a tautology.
> >>>> This explains why you think your H is correct.
> >>> It's only a tautology in systems in which excluded middle holds.
> >>>
> >> All expressions of formal or natural language are
> >> (a) True
> >> (b) False
> >> (c) Not a truth bearer
> > Lets try that again...
> >
> > (a) Truth-bearer
> > 1. True
> > 2. False
> > (b) Not a truth bearer
> > (c) As yet undetermined whether (a); or (b)
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
> If the only way to determine that the above is true is to test every
> element of the set of natural numbers then it may be (c).
Well, yeah.

How do you plan to traverse an infinite set in finite time?

On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 6:31:29 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> > ... what is structure of your nodes and links (connections)?
> I never thought this through before, thanks.
>
You're welcome.
>
> struct
> {
> char GUID[32]; // The name of a unique concept
> uint64_t parent;
> std::vector<uint64_t> children; // might not be needed
> }

You have assumed the tree is finite by limiting the GUID to 32
characters. The size of the tree is less than or equal to the size
of the set of all possible GUIDs.

I observe your nodes have no properties except connections.
Where does the real-life information go?

On 12/14/2022 1:39 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 19:26:01 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 11:02 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 18:06:22 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/14/2022 9:24 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>>>>> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 16:21:35 UTC+2, wyni...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>> Valid(φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>>>>> <=> Valid(φ) ↔ TRUE
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Valid(φ) is a tautology.
>>>>>> This explains why you think your H is correct.
>>>>> It's only a tautology in systems in which excluded middle holds.
>>>>>
>>>> All expressions of formal or natural language are
>>>> (a) True
>>>> (b) False
>>>> (c) Not a truth bearer
>>> Lets try that again...
>>>
>>> (a) Truth-bearer
>>> 1. True
>>> 2. False
>>> (b) Not a truth bearer
>>> (c) As yet undetermined whether (a); or (b)
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
>> If the only way to determine that the above is true is to test every
>> element of the set of natural numbers then it may be (c).
> Well, yeah.
>
> How do you plan to traverse an infinite set in finite time?

That may place in in (b).

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 21:46:27 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 1:39 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
> > How do you plan to traverse an infinite set in finite time?
> That may place in in (b).

You'd have to exhaust the search to place it in (b)...

On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 7:17:47 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> There is a general knowledge ontology and a discourse context ontology.
> The first one is like a dictionary and the second one is a conversation
> using words from the dictionary.
>
So the nodes of the knowledge ontology do not themselves carry real-life
information. Rather they are used as a meta-language for a different
tree which has yet to be described. Am I correct?

On 12/14/2022 1:43 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 6:31:29 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>>> ... what is structure of your nodes and links (connections)?
>> I never thought this through before, thanks.
>>
> You're welcome.
>>
>> struct
>> {
>> char GUID[32]; // The name of a unique concept
>> uint64_t parent;
>> std::vector<uint64_t> children; // might not be needed
>> }
>
> You have assumed the tree is finite by limiting the GUID to 32
> characters. The size of the tree is less than or equal to the size
> of the set of all possible GUIDs.
>
> I observe your nodes have no properties except connections.
> Where does the real-life information go?

All of the real life information is expressed as the connection between
nodes. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is expressed as three GUIDs.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 11:52:32 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 1:43 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 6:31:29 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> >>> ... what is structure of your nodes and links (connections)?
> >> I never thought this through before, thanks.
> >>
> >> struct
> >> {
> >> char GUID[32]; // The name of a unique concept
> >> uint64_t parent;
> >> std::vector<uint64_t> children; // might not be needed
> >> }
> >
> > You have assumed the tree is finite by limiting the GUID to 32
> > characters. The size of the tree is less than or equal to the size
> > of the set of all possible GUIDs.
> >
> > I observe your nodes have no properties except connections.
> > Where does the real-life information go?
>
> All of the real life information is expressed as the connection between
> nodes. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is expressed as three GUIDs.
>
But <is-a-type-of> is surely not the parent connection? Or is it?
>
The question I am raising is that <is-a-type-of> can't be the only
connection. So it must be a child.
{cat|} <is-a-type-of>{feline}
{cat|} <is-a-type-of>{vertebrate}

But this turns the tree upside down.

On 12/14/2022 1:49 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 21:46:27 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 1:39 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
>>> How do you plan to traverse an infinite set in finite time?
>> That may place in in (b).
>
> You'd have to exhaust the search to place it in (b)...

If an exhaustive search is required and not possible in finite time then
this counts as (b).

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/14/2022 1:51 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 7:17:47 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>> There is a general knowledge ontology and a discourse context ontology.
>> The first one is like a dictionary and the second one is a conversation
>> using words from the dictionary.
>>
> So the nodes of the knowledge ontology do not themselves carry real-life
> information. Rather they are used as a meta-language for a different
> tree which has yet to be described. Am I correct?

No. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is in the general knowledge ontology.
"Tabby" <is-a-type-of> {cat} is in the discourse ontology.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 12:16:40 PM UTC-8, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 11:52:32 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> > On 12/14/2022 1:43 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 6:31:29 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> > >>> ... what is structure of your nodes and links (connections)?
> > >> I never thought this through before, thanks.
> > >>
> > >> struct
> > >> {
> > >> char GUID[32]; // The name of a unique concept
> > >> uint64_t parent;
> > >> std::vector<uint64_t> children; // might not be needed
> > >> }
> > >
> > > You have assumed the tree is finite by limiting the GUID to 32
> > > characters. The size of the tree is less than or equal to the size
> > > of the set of all possible GUIDs.
> > >
> > > I observe your nodes have no properties except connections.
> > > Where does the real-life information go?
> >
> > All of the real life information is expressed as the connection between
> > nodes. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is expressed as three GUIDs.
> >
> But <is-a-type-of> is surely not the parent connection? Or is it?
> >
> The question I am raising is that <is-a-type-of> can't be the only
> connection. So it must be a child.
> {cat|} <is-a-type-of>{feline}
> {cat|} <is-a-type-of>{vertebrate}
>
> But this turns the tree upside down.

I think that you maybe don't mean "tree". You have written before
about DAGs (acyclic graphs.) Than there are potential trees based
on each of the link types.

On 12/14/2022 2:16 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 11:52:32 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 1:43 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 6:31:29 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>>>>> ... what is structure of your nodes and links (connections)?
>>>> I never thought this through before, thanks.
>>>>
>>>> struct
>>>> {
>>>> char GUID[32]; // The name of a unique concept
>>>> uint64_t parent;
>>>> std::vector<uint64_t> children; // might not be needed
>>>> }
>>>
>>> You have assumed the tree is finite by limiting the GUID to 32
>>> characters. The size of the tree is less than or equal to the size
>>> of the set of all possible GUIDs.
>>>
>>> I observe your nodes have no properties except connections.
>>> Where does the real-life information go?
>>
>> All of the real life information is expressed as the connection between
>> nodes. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is expressed as three GUIDs.
>>
> But <is-a-type-of> is surely not the parent connection? Or is it?
>>
> The question I am raising is that <is-a-type-of> can't be the only
> connection. So it must be a child.
> {cat|} <is-a-type-of>{feline}
> {cat|} <is-a-type-of>{vertebrate}
>
> But this turns the tree upside down.

<is-a-type-of> may be implied as the type of parent/child relation

{vertebrate}
|
{feline}
|
{cat}

It is fun going through these extra details.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/14/2022 2:23 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 12:16:40 PM UTC-8, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 11:52:32 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/14/2022 1:43 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 6:31:29 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> ... what is structure of your nodes and links (connections)?
>>>>> I never thought this through before, thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>> struct
>>>>> {
>>>>> char GUID[32]; // The name of a unique concept
>>>>> uint64_t parent;
>>>>> std::vector<uint64_t> children; // might not be needed
>>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> You have assumed the tree is finite by limiting the GUID to 32
>>>> characters. The size of the tree is less than or equal to the size
>>>> of the set of all possible GUIDs.
>>>>
>>>> I observe your nodes have no properties except connections.
>>>> Where does the real-life information go?
>>>
>>> All of the real life information is expressed as the connection between
>>> nodes. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is expressed as three GUIDs.
>>>
>> But <is-a-type-of> is surely not the parent connection? Or is it?
>>>
>> The question I am raising is that <is-a-type-of> can't be the only
>> connection. So it must be a child.
>> {cat|} <is-a-type-of>{feline}
>> {cat|} <is-a-type-of>{vertebrate}
>>
>> But this turns the tree upside down.
>
> I think that you maybe don't mean "tree". You have written before
> about DAGs (acyclic graphs.) Than there are potential trees based
> on each of the link types.

The root of the tree is {thing}

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 12:22:16 PM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 1:51 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 7:17:47 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
> >> There is a general knowledge ontology and a discourse context ontology.
> >> The first one is like a dictionary and the second one is a conversation
> >> using words from the dictionary.
> >>
> > So the nodes of the knowledge ontology do not themselves carry real-life
> > information. Rather they are used as a meta-language for a different
> > tree which has yet to be described. Am I correct?
> No. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is in the general knowledge ontology.
> "Tabby" <is-a-type-of> {cat} is in the discourse ontology.
>
Or a set of triples. A lot of people seem to feel that a set of triples is
the correct model for knowledge.

When you write ontology are you assuming a tree? Can I get an ontology
tree by restricting myself to some one middle in the triple?

On 12/14/2022 2:38 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 12:22:16 PM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/14/2022 1:51 PM, dklei...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 14, 2022 at 7:17:47 AM UTC-8, olcott wrote:
>>>> There is a general knowledge ontology and a discourse context ontology.
>>>> The first one is like a dictionary and the second one is a conversation
>>>> using words from the dictionary.
>>>>
>>> So the nodes of the knowledge ontology do not themselves carry real-life
>>> information. Rather they are used as a meta-language for a different
>>> tree which has yet to be described. Am I correct?
>> No. {cat} <is-a-type-of> {animal} is in the general knowledge ontology.
>> "Tabby" <is-a-type-of> {cat} is in the discourse ontology.
>>
> Or a set of triples. A lot of people seem to feel that a set of triples is
> the correct model for knowledge.
>
> When you write ontology are you assuming a tree? Can I get an ontology
> tree by restricting myself to some one middle in the triple?
>

<is-a-type-of> may be implied as the type of parent/child relation

{Thing}
|
{vertebrate}
|
{feline}
|
{cat}

It is fun going through these extra details.

--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/14/22 12:25 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 11:02 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 18:06:22 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/14/2022 9:24 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>>>> On Wednesday, 14 December 2022 at 16:21:35 UTC+2, wyni...@gmail.com
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Valid(φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>>>> <=> Valid(φ) ↔ TRUE
>>>>>
>>>>> Valid(φ) is a tautology.
>>>>> This explains why you think your H is correct.
>>>> It's only a tautology in systems in which excluded middle holds.
>>>>
>>> All expressions of formal or natural language are
>>> (a) True
>>> (b) False
>>> (c) Not a truth bearer
>> Lets try that again...
>>
>> (a) Truth-bearer
>>      1. True
>>      2. False
>> (b) Not a truth bearer
>> (c) As yet undetermined whether (a); or (b)
>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
> If the only way to determine that the above is true is to test every
> element of the set of natural numbers then it may be (c).
>

So you accept that some statement might be neither a Truth-Bearer or not
a Truth-Beared?

Or are you just conflating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH.

The Truth of a statement doesn't change just because we find the proof
for it.

On 12/14/22 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/13/2022 8:26 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 12/13/22 9:22 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/13/2022 4:51 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>>>> On Monday, 12 December 2022 at 16:52:22 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/12/2022 6:35 AM, Skep Dick wrote:
>>>>>> On Sunday, 11 December 2022 at 22:38:33 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> I am establishing the epistemological foundation inheritance
>>>>>>> hierarchy
>>>>>>> (upper ontology) of analytical truth itself. Every logic system
>>>>>>> must be
>>>>>>> derived from this foundation or it is incorrect by definition.
>>>>>> 🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dumb foundationalist!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-foundationalism
>>>>> Anyone that rejects tautologies is necessarily incorrect. The
>>>>> entire set
>>>>> of analytic truth is based on mutually self defining semantic
>>>>> tautologies. You don't know what any of these words mean so
>>>>> disagree to
>>>>> mask your willful ignorance.
>>>>
>>>> You dumb motherfucker! I am not rejecting your tautology.
>>>>
>>>> I am DECLARING that the negation of your tautology is ALSO a tautology!
>>>>
>>> All that you are doing is negating a necessarily true statement thus
>>> forming A lie.
>>>
>>> {A square has four equal length} sides is a tautology.
>>> {A square does not have four equal length sides} is a falsehood.
>>>
>>>> ∃x can be defined as a tautology.
>>>> -∃x can also be defined as a tautology.
>>>>
>>>> You don't understand computation. Idiot.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Is is an objective fact that I am a genius.
>>>
>>
>> Then PROVE it.
>>
>> You seem to have proved the opposite.
>
> If you focused on understanding what I say instead of focusing on
> disputing what I say without understanding what I say you would see for
> yourself.
>

And if you follewed you own advice, you might learn something

The fact that you have been unable to actually prove your statements,
and have said such insane statements like you are God, seems to prove
that you are actually either an idiot or insane,

Sorry, YOU have the burden, and have FAILED, and thus shown you decidely
NOT being a Genius.

On 12/14/22 9:48 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/14/2022 8:21 AM, wij wrote:
>> On Sunday, December 11, 2022 at 9:59:47 AM UTC+8, olcott wrote:
>>> Theorem 1.
>>> Every valid logical expression is provable. Equivalently, every logical
>>> expression is either satisfiable or refutable.
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/#ComThe
>>>
>>> The conventional definition of incompleteness:
>>> Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ))
>>>
>>> Should actually be written as:
>>> Valid(φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>>> thus abolishing Incompleteness.
>>    Valid(φ) ↔ ((T ⊢ φ) ∨ (T ⊢ ¬φ))
>> <=> Valid(φ) ↔ TRUE
>>
>
> *Correction*
>  True(φ) ↔ (T ⊢ φ)
> ¬True(φ) ↔ (T ⊬ φ)
> False(φ) ↔ (T ⊢ ¬φ)

Which since you say Godel's G is ¬True but also not False.

Since G is a statement of the form T ⊬ x, that means that since G is
¬True, that T ⊬ x, and since G is ¬False we have that ¬(T ⊢ ¬φ)

Which means that (T ⊬ ¬x) and from the previous (T ⊬ x)

Thus either Provability (since that is the sort of statement x is) isn't
a truth bearer, or x is a statement that can neither be proven or disproven.

>
>> Valid(φ) is a tautology.
>> This explains why you think your H is correct.
>