On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was defined
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be an isomorphism to an expression that asserts its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism" isn't a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid operation in PM, because it needs information that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means in
>>>>>>>>>>>> logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that preserve
>>>>>>>>>>>> relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies <a
>>>>>>>>>>>> particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the same
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your "Isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>> show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are just
>>>>>>>>>> beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an isomorphism
>>>>>>>>>> of the Liar's Paradox, but that your representation of G is
>>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an isomorphism to
>>>>>>>>>>> the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression that has
>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could have
>>>>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH AS
>>>>>>>>>> TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show that
>>>>>>>>> the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate is
>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that it is
>>>>>>>> impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per his
>>>>>>>> requirements).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to do
>>>>>> you find you need something that foobars, you need something that
>>>>>> foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar, if the fumbar doesn't
>>>>>> do what a foobar does, it likely can't help.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you just
>>>>>> can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you pull the
>>>>>> minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a valid
>>>>>> operation. The best you can do is see if you can somehow see if
>>>>>> complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio of two
>>>>>> intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would have to see if
>>>>>> you can somehow replace the "rational" requirement with a more
>>>>>> general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to that of a
>>>>>> given cirle, with just compass and streight edge, you also can't
>>>>>> do that. At best you can do is a infinite series of operations
>>>>>> that approach the answer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having problems with
>>>>>> are that they are trying to move an answer from something that is
>>>>>> "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive inference
>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been stipulated
>>>>>>> to have
>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises then
>>>>>>> True(L,x)
>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was incorrect, and
>>>>>> since he didn't restrict what the actual details of the predicate
>>>>>> was, just that it meet the requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by a
>>>>>>>> "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion of a truth
>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't understand
>>>>>> what his proof is about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>
>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the first
>>>>> chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>
>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate cannot be
>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>
>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is isomorphic [1]
>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>
>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this subject and
>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>> understanding on your part.
>>>
>>
>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has an
>> error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the Liar. Since
>> it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>
> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when the Liar
> Paradox is removed from the proof.

On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism" isn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a valid operation in PM, because it needs information
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that preserve
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies <a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your "Isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>> show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are just
>>>>>>>>>>> beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an isomorphism
>>>>>>>>>>> of the Liar's Paradox, but that your representation of G is
>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an isomorphism
>>>>>>>>>>>> to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression that has
>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could have
>>>>>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH AS
>>>>>>>>>>> TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show that
>>>>>>>>>> the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate is
>>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that it is
>>>>>>>>> impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per his
>>>>>>>>> requirements).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to do
>>>>>>> you find you need something that foobars, you need something that
>>>>>>> foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar, if the fumbar
>>>>>>> doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely can't help.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you just
>>>>>>> can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you pull the
>>>>>>> minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a valid
>>>>>>> operation. The best you can do is see if you can somehow see if
>>>>>>> complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio of two
>>>>>>> intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would have to see if
>>>>>>> you can somehow replace the "rational" requirement with a more
>>>>>>> general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to that of
>>>>>>> a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge, you also
>>>>>>> can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite series of
>>>>>>> operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having problems
>>>>>>> with are that they are trying to move an answer from something
>>>>>>> that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive inference
>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been stipulated
>>>>>>>> to have
>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises then
>>>>>>>> True(L,x)
>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was incorrect,
>>>>>>> and since he didn't restrict what the actual details of the
>>>>>>> predicate was, just that it meet the requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by a
>>>>>>>>> "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion of a
>>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't understand
>>>>>>> what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the first
>>>>>> chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate cannot be
>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is isomorphic
>>>>>> [1]
>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this subject and
>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>
>>>
>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has an
>>> error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the Liar.
>>> Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>
>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when the Liar
>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>
> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error so going
> to a Red Herring.
>
> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his proof,
> because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to refute a proof,
> YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>

On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism" isn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a valid operation in PM, because it needs information
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that preserve
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies <a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are just
>>>>>>>>>>>> beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an isomorphism
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could have
>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH AS
>>>>>>>>>>>> TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show that
>>>>>>>>>>> the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate is
>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that it is
>>>>>>>>>> impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per his
>>>>>>>>>> requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to do
>>>>>>>> you find you need something that foobars, you need something
>>>>>>>> that foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar, if the fumbar
>>>>>>>> doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely can't help.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you just
>>>>>>>> can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you pull the
>>>>>>>> minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a valid
>>>>>>>> operation. The best you can do is see if you can somehow see if
>>>>>>>> complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio of
>>>>>>>> two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would have to
>>>>>>>> see if you can somehow replace the "rational" requirement with a
>>>>>>>> more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to that of
>>>>>>>> a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge, you also
>>>>>>>> can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite series of
>>>>>>>> operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having problems
>>>>>>>> with are that they are trying to move an answer from something
>>>>>>>> that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been stipulated
>>>>>>>>> to have
>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises then
>>>>>>>>> True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was incorrect,
>>>>>>>> and since he didn't restrict what the actual details of the
>>>>>>>> predicate was, just that it meet the requirements, you statment
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by a
>>>>>>>>>> "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion of a
>>>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't understand
>>>>>>>> what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the
>>>>>>> first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this subject and
>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has an
>>>> error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the Liar.
>>>> Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>
>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when the Liar
>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>
>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error so
>> going to a Red Herring.
>>
>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his proof,
>> because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to refute a
>> proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>
>
> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the Liar as
> its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't a valid operation in PM, because it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that preserve
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies <a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are just
>>>>>>>>>>>>> beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an isomorphism
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH AS
>>>>>>>>>>>>> TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show
>>>>>>>>>>>> that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate is
>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that it
>>>>>>>>>>> is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per his
>>>>>>>>>>> requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to do
>>>>>>>>> you find you need something that foobars, you need something
>>>>>>>>> that foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar, if the fumbar
>>>>>>>>> doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely can't help.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you
>>>>>>>>> just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you
>>>>>>>>> pull the minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a
>>>>>>>>> valid operation. The best you can do is see if you can somehow
>>>>>>>>> see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio of
>>>>>>>>> two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would have to
>>>>>>>>> see if you can somehow replace the "rational" requirement with
>>>>>>>>> a more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to that
>>>>>>>>> of a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge, you also
>>>>>>>>> can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite series of
>>>>>>>>> operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having problems
>>>>>>>>> with are that they are trying to move an answer from something
>>>>>>>>> that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises then
>>>>>>>>>> True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was incorrect,
>>>>>>>>> and since he didn't restrict what the actual details of the
>>>>>>>>> predicate was, just that it meet the requirements, you statment
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by a
>>>>>>>>>>> "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion of a
>>>>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the
>>>>>>>> first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this subject and
>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has an
>>>>> error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the Liar.
>>>>> Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>
>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when the Liar
>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>
>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error so
>>> going to a Red Herring.
>>>
>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his proof,
>>> because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to refute a
>>> proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>>
>>
>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the Liar as
>> its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>
> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look at
> Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes a mistake.
>
> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a Theorem, you
> need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>

On 5/17/23 10:09 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't a valid operation in PM, because it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that preserve
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies <a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are just
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AS TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that it
>>>>>>>>>>>> is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per his
>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to
>>>>>>>>>> do you find you need something that foobars, you need
>>>>>>>>>> something that foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar, if
>>>>>>>>>> the fumbar doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely can't help.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you
>>>>>>>>>> just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you
>>>>>>>>>> pull the minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a
>>>>>>>>>> valid operation. The best you can do is see if you can somehow
>>>>>>>>>> see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio of
>>>>>>>>>> two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would have to
>>>>>>>>>> see if you can somehow replace the "rational" requirement with
>>>>>>>>>> a more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to that
>>>>>>>>>> of a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge, you
>>>>>>>>>> also can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite series of
>>>>>>>>>> operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having problems
>>>>>>>>>> with are that they are trying to move an answer from something
>>>>>>>>>> that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises then
>>>>>>>>>>> True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was incorrect,
>>>>>>>>>> and since he didn't restrict what the actual details of the
>>>>>>>>>> predicate was, just that it meet the requirements, you
>>>>>>>>>> statment that
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by a
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion of
>>>>>>>>>>> a truth
>>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the
>>>>>>>>> first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this subject
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has an
>>>>>> error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the Liar.
>>>>>> Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>>
>>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when the
>>>>> Liar
>>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>>
>>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error so
>>>> going to a Red Herring.
>>>>
>>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his proof,
>>>> because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to refute a
>>>> proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the Liar as
>>> its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>
>> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look at
>> Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes a mistake.
>>
>> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a Theorem,
>> you need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>>
>
> If someone were to try to bake an angel food cake using only house
> bricks for ingredients exactly what step of this recipe would be
> incorrect?

On 5/17/2023 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/17/23 10:09 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't a valid operation in PM, because it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserve relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <a particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AS TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per his
>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to
>>>>>>>>>>> do you find you need something that foobars, you need
>>>>>>>>>>> something that foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar,
>>>>>>>>>>> if the fumbar doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely can't
>>>>>>>>>>> help.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you
>>>>>>>>>>> just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you
>>>>>>>>>>> pull the minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a
>>>>>>>>>>> valid operation. The best you can do is see if you can
>>>>>>>>>>> somehow see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio of
>>>>>>>>>>> two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would have
>>>>>>>>>>> to see if you can somehow replace the "rational" requirement
>>>>>>>>>>> with a more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to that
>>>>>>>>>>> of a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge, you
>>>>>>>>>>> also can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite series
>>>>>>>>>>> of operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having problems
>>>>>>>>>>> with are that they are trying to move an answer from
>>>>>>>>>>> something that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises then
>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was
>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect, and since he didn't restrict what the actual
>>>>>>>>>>> details of the predicate was, just that it meet the
>>>>>>>>>>> requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion of
>>>>>>>>>>>> a truth
>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the
>>>>>>>>>> first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this
>>>>>>>> subject and
>>>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has an
>>>>>>> error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the Liar.
>>>>>>> Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when the
>>>>>> Liar
>>>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error so
>>>>> going to a Red Herring.
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his proof,
>>>>> because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to refute a
>>>>> proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the Liar
>>>> as its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>
>>> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look at
>>> Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes a
>>> mistake.
>>>
>>> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a Theorem,
>>> you need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>>>
>>
>> If someone were to try to bake an angel food cake using only house
>> bricks for ingredients exactly what step of this recipe would be
>> incorrect?
>
> Red Herring.
>
>>
>> If someone were to try to form a Truth predicate and they began with an
>> expression that cannot possibly be true this is the same thing.
>
> But they started with a Theorem that was PROVEN true, so unless you can
> show the error in that proof, you don't have a basis to make that claim.
>
> The fact that it looks something like the liar, doesn't mean it IS the
> Liar, so you have fallen into the Fallacy of the Straw Man
>
First big mistake and I quit reading what you say:

On 5/17/23 7:47 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/17/2023 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/17/23 10:09 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't a valid operation in PM, because it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the word
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserve relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <a particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would ESTABLISH
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AS TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want to
>>>>>>>>>>>> do you find you need something that foobars, you need
>>>>>>>>>>>> something that foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar,
>>>>>>>>>>>> if the fumbar doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely can't
>>>>>>>>>>>> help.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you
>>>>>>>>>>>> just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you
>>>>>>>>>>>> pull the minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't a
>>>>>>>>>>>> valid operation. The best you can do is see if you can
>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio
>>>>>>>>>>>> of two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would
>>>>>>>>>>>> have to see if you can somehow replace the "rational"
>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement with a more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to
>>>>>>>>>>>> that of a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge,
>>>>>>>>>>>> you also can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite
>>>>>>>>>>>> series of operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having
>>>>>>>>>>>> problems with are that they are trying to move an answer
>>>>>>>>>>>> from something that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises
>>>>>>>>>>>>> then True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was
>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect, and since he didn't restrict what the actual
>>>>>>>>>>>> details of the predicate was, just that it meet the
>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the
>>>>>>>>>>> first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this
>>>>>>>>> subject and
>>>>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has
>>>>>>>> an error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the
>>>>>>>> Liar. Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when
>>>>>>> the Liar
>>>>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error so
>>>>>> going to a Red Herring.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his proof,
>>>>>> because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to refute a
>>>>>> proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the Liar
>>>>> as its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>
>>>> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look at
>>>> Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes a
>>>> mistake.
>>>>
>>>> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a Theorem,
>>>> you need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If someone were to try to bake an angel food cake using only house
>>> bricks for ingredients exactly what step of this recipe would be
>>> incorrect?
>>
>> Red Herring.
>>
>>>
>>> If someone were to try to form a Truth predicate and they began with an
>>> expression that cannot possibly be true this is the same thing.
>>
>> But they started with a Theorem that was PROVEN true, so unless you
>> can show the error in that proof, you don't have a basis to make that
>> claim.
>>
>> The fact that it looks something like the liar, doesn't mean it IS the
>> Liar, so you have fallen into the Fallacy of the Straw Man
>>
> First big mistake and I quit reading what you say:
>
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>

On 5/17/2023 7:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/17/23 7:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/17/2023 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/17/23 10:09 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't a valid operation in PM, because it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> word "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserve relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that stisfies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <a particualer primative recursive relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every expression
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ESTABLISH AS TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would show
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do you find you need something that foobars, you need
>>>>>>>>>>>>> something that foobars. If someone says how about a fumbar,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> if the fumbar doesn't do what a foobar does, it likely
>>>>>>>>>>>>> can't help.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough if you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> pull the minus off and attach it back on later, that isn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a valid operation. The best you can do is see if you can
>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to see if you can somehow replace the "rational"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement with a more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that of a given cirle, with just compass and streight edge,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you also can't do that. At best you can do is a infinite
>>>>>>>>>>>>> series of operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having
>>>>>>>>>>>>> problems with are that they are trying to move an answer
>>>>>>>>>>>>> from something that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was
>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect, and since he didn't restrict what the actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>> details of the predicate was, just that it meet the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by a "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as the
>>>>>>>>>>>> first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this
>>>>>>>>>> subject and
>>>>>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has
>>>>>>>>> an error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the
>>>>>>>>> Liar. Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when
>>>>>>>> the Liar
>>>>>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error
>>>>>>> so going to a Red Herring.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his
>>>>>>> proof, because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to
>>>>>>> refute a proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the Liar
>>>>>> as its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>>>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look
>>>>> at Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes a
>>>>> mistake.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a Theorem,
>>>>> you need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If someone were to try to bake an angel food cake using only house
>>>> bricks for ingredients exactly what step of this recipe would be
>>>> incorrect?
>>>
>>> Red Herring.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If someone were to try to form a Truth predicate and they began with an
>>>> expression that cannot possibly be true this is the same thing.
>>>
>>> But they started with a Theorem that was PROVEN true, so unless you
>>> can show the error in that proof, you don't have a basis to make that
>>> claim.
>>>
>>> The fact that it looks something like the liar, doesn't mean it IS
>>> the Liar, so you have fallen into the Fallacy of the Straw Man
>>>
>> First big mistake and I quit reading what you say:
>>
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>
>
> Not in the statement you quoted!!!
>
>
>> I REPEATED IT TEN TIMES TO HELP OVERCOME YOUR ADD
>>
>> It would
>> then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar in the
>> metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence x
>> such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
>> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>
>> "the antinomy of the liar" ≡ "The liar paradox"
>>
>
> Right, he shows that IF A DEFINITION OF TRUTH EXISTS, it proves that the
> Liar Paradox is True.
>
> Unless you think that the Liar's paradox is true, you should agree with
> his conclusion.
>
> He says:
>
> Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
> definition of truth, then the metalanguage -- with reference to the
> above interpretation -- would acquire that universal character which was
> the primary source of the semantical antinomies in colloquial language
> (cf. p. 164). It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of
> the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a
> sentence x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is
> correlated with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>
>
> Note the conditional at the beginning.
>
> *IF* we succeed in constructing ... a correct definition of truth
>
> *THEN* It would be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar.
>

On 5/17/23 9:41 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/17/2023 7:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/17/23 7:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/17/2023 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/17/23 10:09 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to be an isomorphism to an expression
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that asserts its own unprovability in PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your "isomorphism"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't a valid operation in PM, because it needs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> word "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserve relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stisfies <a particualer primative recursive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's Truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it could
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ESTABLISH AS TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> show that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing, that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth" (per
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do you find you need something that foobars, you need
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something that foobars. If someone says how about a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fumbar, if the fumbar doesn't do what a foobar does, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> likely can't help.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you pull the minus off and attach it back on later,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that isn't a valid operation. The best you can do is see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you can somehow see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the ratio
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to see if you can somehow replace the "rational"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement with a more general "real number" requirement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that of a given cirle, with just compass and streight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> edge, you also can't do that. At best you can do is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite series of operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problems with are that they are trying to move an answer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from something that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound deductive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inference
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of analytical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect, and since he didn't restrict what the actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details of the predicate was, just that it meet the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by a "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his notion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth predicate
>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for you.
>>>>>>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this
>>>>>>>>>>> subject and
>>>>>>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he has
>>>>>>>>>> an error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to the
>>>>>>>>>> Liar. Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when
>>>>>>>>> the Liar
>>>>>>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error
>>>>>>>> so going to a Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his
>>>>>>>> proof, because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to
>>>>>>>> refute a proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the Liar.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the
>>>>>>> Liar as its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>>>>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look
>>>>>> at Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes
>>>>>> a mistake.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a
>>>>>> Theorem, you need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If someone were to try to bake an angel food cake using only house
>>>>> bricks for ingredients exactly what step of this recipe would be
>>>>> incorrect?
>>>>
>>>> Red Herring.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If someone were to try to form a Truth predicate and they began
>>>>> with an
>>>>> expression that cannot possibly be true this is the same thing.
>>>>
>>>> But they started with a Theorem that was PROVEN true, so unless you
>>>> can show the error in that proof, you don't have a basis to make
>>>> that claim.
>>>>
>>>> The fact that it looks something like the liar, doesn't mean it IS
>>>> the Liar, so you have fallen into the Fallacy of the Straw Man
>>>>
>>> First big mistake and I quit reading what you say:
>>>
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>
>>
>> Not in the statement you quoted!!!
>>
>>
>>> I REPEATED IT TEN TIMES TO HELP OVERCOME YOUR ADD
>>>
>>> It would
>>> then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar in the
>>> metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence x
>>> such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
>>> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>
>>> "the antinomy of the liar" ≡ "The liar paradox"
>>>
>>
>> Right, he shows that IF A DEFINITION OF TRUTH EXISTS, it proves that
>> the Liar Paradox is True.
>>
>> Unless you think that the Liar's paradox is true, you should agree
>> with his conclusion.
>>
>> He says:
>>
>> Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
>> definition of truth, then the metalanguage -- with reference to the
>> above interpretation -- would acquire that universal character which
>> was the primary source of the semantical antinomies in colloquial
>> language (cf. p. 164). It would then be possible to reconstruct the
>> antinomy of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the language
>> itself a sentence x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which
>> is correlated with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>>
>>
>> Note the conditional at the beginning.
>>
>> *IF* we succeed in constructing ... a correct definition of truth
>>
>> *THEN* It would be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar.
>>
>
> Which he does in his actual proof
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

On 5/17/2023 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/17/23 9:41 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/17/2023 7:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/17/23 7:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/17/2023 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/17/23 10:09 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/17/2023 6:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:42 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 5:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 6:01 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 4:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 3:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 4:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 2:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 2:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 1:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/23 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/16/2023 7:02 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/15/23 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2023 12:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/23 12:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most people fail to understand that Gödel's G
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was defined to be an isomorphism to an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that asserts its own unprovability in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PM.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU fail to understand that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "isomorphism" isn't a valid operation in PM,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because it needs information that isn't there.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you don't even understand what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> word "isomorphism" means. It is never any sort of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> operation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And you claim shows you don't understand what it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please show the element to element mapping that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserve relationships between:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There does not exist a natural number g that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stisfies <a particualer primative recursive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G asserts that G is not provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And note, the term "Isomorphism" doesn't mean have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same meaning, but have the same form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ah great you looked it up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I see you can't show how Godel's G and your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Isomorphism" show an actual Isomorphism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I guess you are admitting that they don't and you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just beign a liar.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't say your prolog representation wasn't an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism of the Liar's Paradox, but that your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> representation of G is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More of your Fallacy of the Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above is not the Liar Paradox yet forms an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphism to the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox in that Prolog always rejects every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that has
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Freddy = foo(bar(Freddy)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(Freddy, foo(bar(Freddy))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing that this proves is that Tarski's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Truth predicate did not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have to become confused by the Liar Paradox, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could have merely
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> recognized it and rejected it as untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But that isn't what happened, so you are showing your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski's Truth Predicate, if it existed, would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ESTABLISH AS TRUE the Liar's Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (1) You know that the liar paradox is not true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) You believe that Tarski's truth predicate would
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> show that the liar paradox is true.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (3) You fail to understand that Tarski's truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate is incorrect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you are very confused.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, you fail to understand what Tarski was showing,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it is impossible to define a "Definition of Truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (per his requirements).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then he has the wrong requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, Somethiong you don't seem to understand is that The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Requriements are The Requirements. If to do what you want
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to do you find you need something that foobars, you need
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something that foobars. If someone says how about a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fumbar, if the fumbar doesn't do what a foobar does, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> likely can't help.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need a real number which when squared equals -1,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you just can't find it. You can't say -1 is close enough
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you pull the minus off and attach it back on later,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that isn't a valid operation. The best you can do is see
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you can somehow see if complex numbers can somehow work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need the value of Pi exactly expressed as the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ratio of two intergers, you won't be able to find it. You
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have to see if you can somehow replace the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "rational" requirement with a more general "real number"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you need to construct a square with the area equal to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that of a given cirle, with just compass and streight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> edge, you also can't do that. At best you can do is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite series of operations that approach the answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All of these show that Requirement are Requirements.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A common thread in all these problems you are having
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problems with are that they are trying to move an answer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from something that is "True" to something that is "Known",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You seem to just agreed with his conclusion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *I have proved otherwise*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When True(L,x) is defined in terms of the sound
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deductive inference
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model and has expressions of language that have been
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated to have
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic value of Boolean true as its true premises
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then True(L,x)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is consistently correct for the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical knowledge that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include the entire body of knowledge of math and logic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> YOU yourself said that Tarski's Truth Predicate was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect, and since he didn't restrict what the actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> details of the predicate was, just that it meet the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements, you statment that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the issue is you don't understand what he means
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by a "Definition of Truth", i.e. a Truth Predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He must mean something that is incorrect since his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of a truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate gets confused by the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, it didn't, and you statement just shows you don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what his proof is about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He didn't "Apply" the Truth Predicate to the Liar's paradox
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Show exactly what he did do, even a chatbot as stupid as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first chat bot "Eliza" can be a mindless naysayer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He determined that a correct and consistent truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicate cannot be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined and he used the Liar Paradox as his basis.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog is smart enough to reject any expression that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isomorphic [1]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the liar paradox.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [1] Having the same pathological self-reference form.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just actually READ his proof. I won't do your homework for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you.
>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words you are simply a mindless naysayer on this
>>>>>>>>>>>> subject and
>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot backup any of your criticisms of my work with any actual
>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding on your part.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOU are a mindless naysayer. YOU are the one saying he
>>>>>>>>>>> has an error where he tries to apply his "Truth Predicate" to
>>>>>>>>>>> the Liar. Since it isn't there, how can anyone prove it isn't?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Try and show how Tarksi's proof draws the same conclusion when
>>>>>>>>>> the Liar
>>>>>>>>>> Paradox is removed from the proof.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, you are effectively admitting you can't point out the error
>>>>>>>>> so going to a Red Herring.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is no need for me to make an alternate version of his
>>>>>>>>> proof, because if just the mentioning of the Liar is enough to
>>>>>>>>> refute a proof, YOUR claim is refuted because it mentions the
>>>>>>>>> Liar.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It does not mention the Liar his theorem I is anchored in the
>>>>>>>> Liar as its whole basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>>>>>> and his proof is anchored in his Theorem I
>>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, you have a problem with is Theorem I, then why don't you look
>>>>>>> at Theorem I and show where in the proof of that Theorem he makes
>>>>>>> a mistake.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You can't just object that you don't like the results of a
>>>>>>> Theorem, you need to show the error in the proof of that Theorem.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If someone were to try to bake an angel food cake using only house
>>>>>> bricks for ingredients exactly what step of this recipe would be
>>>>>> incorrect?
>>>>>
>>>>> Red Herring.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If someone were to try to form a Truth predicate and they began
>>>>>> with an
>>>>>> expression that cannot possibly be true this is the same thing.
>>>>>
>>>>> But they started with a Theorem that was PROVEN true, so unless you
>>>>> can show the error in that proof, you don't have a basis to make
>>>>> that claim.
>>>>>
>>>>> The fact that it looks something like the liar, doesn't mean it IS
>>>>> the Liar, so you have fallen into the Fallacy of the Straw Man
>>>>>
>>>> First big mistake and I quit reading what you say:
>>>>
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>> HE SAID HE IS USING THE LIAR PARADOX
>>>>
>>>
>>> Not in the statement you quoted!!!
>>>
>>>
>>>> I REPEATED IT TEN TIMES TO HELP OVERCOME YOUR ADD
>>>>
>>>> It would
>>>> then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar in the
>>>> metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence x
>>>> such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
>>>> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>>>
>>>> "the antinomy of the liar" ≡ "The liar paradox"
>>>>
>>>
>>> Right, he shows that IF A DEFINITION OF TRUTH EXISTS, it proves that
>>> the Liar Paradox is True.
>>>
>>> Unless you think that the Liar's paradox is true, you should agree
>>> with his conclusion.
>>>
>>> He says:
>>>
>>> Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage a correct
>>> definition of truth, then the metalanguage -- with reference to the
>>> above interpretation -- would acquire that universal character which
>>> was the primary source of the semantical antinomies in colloquial
>>> language (cf. p. 164). It would then be possible to reconstruct the
>>> antinomy of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the language
>>> itself a sentence x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which
>>> is correlated with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>>>
>>>
>>> Note the conditional at the beginning.
>>>
>>> *IF* we succeed in constructing ... a correct definition of truth
>>>
>>> *THEN* It would be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar.
>>>
>>
>> Which he does in his actual proof
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>
> Right, based on the assumption that a correct defition of truth exists.
>