The epistemological foundation is the notion of truth itself is anchored
in philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/

Here is my addition to this field: Knowledge is a fully justified true
belief such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
its justification.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/17/2021 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:

> Here is my addition to this field:
> Knowledge is a fully justified true belief

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
| | Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier,
| Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases")
| challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB)
| account of knowledge.

| In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick
| Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside
| a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although
| in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is
| a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a
| sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a
| justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
| that belief knowledge?

> such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
> its justification.

We have evidence (sometimes).
The evidence justifies a belief (sometimes).
The justified belief is also true (sometimes).

We might not have evidence of some true circumstance.

If we have evidence of it, it might not be enough or
we might not understand the consequences of the evidence.

( A good example of this:
( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sum_and_Product_Puzzle
( |
( | The Sum and Product Puzzle, also known as the Impossible
( | Puzzle because it seems to lack sufficient information
( | for a solution, is a logic puzzle.

Anyway, for various reason, our beliefs might not reflect
the evidence we have.

We might think we have evidence for a certain belief,
and we would be correct to believe it on that basis, but
the evidence is not what it seems to be. Coincidentally,
what we have been tricked into believing is actually true.
Justified belief that is also true. Is it knowledge?

On 10/17/2021 12:44 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/17/2021 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>
>> Here is my addition to this field:
>> Knowledge is a fully justified true belief
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
> |
> | Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier,
> | Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases")
> | challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB)
> | account of knowledge.
>
> | In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick
> | Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside
> | a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although
> | in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is
> | a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a
> | sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a
> | justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
> | that belief knowledge?
>
>> such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
>> its justification.
>
> We have evidence (sometimes).
> The evidence justifies a belief (sometimes).
> The justified belief is also true (sometimes).
>
> We might not have evidence of some true circumstance.
>
> If we have evidence of it, it might not be enough or
> we might not understand the consequences of the evidence.
>
> ( A good example of this:
> ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sum_and_Product_Puzzle
> ( |
> ( | The Sum and Product Puzzle, also known as the Impossible
> ( | Puzzle because it seems to lack sufficient information
> ( | for a solution, is a logic puzzle.
>
> Anyway, for various reason, our beliefs might not reflect
> the evidence we have.
>
> We might think we have evidence for a certain belief,
> and we would be correct to believe it on that basis, but
> the evidence is not what it seems to be. Coincidentally,
> what we have been tricked into believing is actually true.
> Justified belief that is also true. Is it knowledge?
>

We can correct for the Gettier problem (with my correction) by defining
knowledge as:

Knowledge is a fully justified true belief such that the truth of the
belief is a necessary consequence of its justification.

This is best applied to the analytic side of the philosophical analytic
/ synthetic distinction where an expression of language can be verified
as true entirely on the basis of its meaning.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
> On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I will put it in simpler terms.
>>>> The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete logical
>>>> certainty that an expression of language is true is when its truth
>>>> can be totally verified entirely on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>
>>>> This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
>>>
>>> But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable (in some
>>> fields).
>>>
>>
>> Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are simply
>> excluded from the body of knowledge.
>
> But may still be true.

That does not matter they do not count as truth or as knowledge until
after they have been proven true.

Only Wittgenstein understood this: (see page 6 for full quote)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel

> And it is also a fact that you might not know if
> something can be in the body of knowledge.

That is very simple if it is true and no one knows it then it is not
knowledge.

>>
>>> Math is built on logical definitions that allow for statements to
>>> exist that we know must be either True of False, but that we are
>>> unable to actually 'prove' by analytical proof which it is.
>>>
>>
>> Any expression of language that cannot be proven true is necessarily
>> untrue, yet possibly also not false. Some expressions of language are
>> simply not bearers of truth values.
>
> WRONG. That statement was disproved a century ago.

This is a misconception based on defining truth and knowledge in an
incoherent way.

> There are statements
> which it is provable that they must be either True or False, but it is
> impossible to actually prove if they are True or False.
>

That is the same kind of crap that has nitwits believing that there was
election fraud when there was no evidence of election fraud.

When a large group of people have a psychotic break from reality on the
basis of Nazi style propaganda the one key thing that would point them
to the actual truth is the idea that no statement is true until after it
has been proven.

> One interesting problem with your position, is it turns out that if you
> won't accept that a statement is a Truth Bearer unless it is provable,
> then there exist statements that you can't tell if they ARE Truth
> Bearers or not, as you can't prove if they are provable. And this
> continues to infinity.

Yes this is correct. When we really don't know it can be quite horrific
in some cases for us to presume that we do know. With my system we have
a finite set of expressions of language that are confirmed to be
definitely true and an infinite set that are unconfirmed as true.

There are some things that are known to be true the rest are unknown to
be true with no emotional attachment to an opinion (belief) inbetween.

There is also a weight of evidence to be applied when we have incomplete
information. When there is no evidence that an expression of language is
true it is still considered possible thus carries negligible weight.

Whatever view objectively carries the most weight of evidence becomes
the current working hypothesis.

>
> THis means that you really can't make a statement to be decided on until
> you prove that it IS decidable, and you can't really ask if it is
> decidable until your prove that its decidability is decidable, and so on.
>

This whole overload of the term "decidable" is far too misleading. The
actual case is that the reason that we cannot decide between yes and no
is that the expression of langugae is simply not truth bearer.

What time is it (yes or no)? I can't decide (make up my mind.)

> This severely limits the power of a system of logic that refuses to
> acknowledge the existance of truth values for statements that are not
> provable.
>

Their truth values don't exist.
"This sentence is not true."
is indeed not true because it is not a truth bearer.

> You seem to be a century behind in the theories of knowledge, probably
> because you refuse to study some of what has been done because you don't
> 'believe' they can be right. You have basically condemned yourself to
> repeat the errors of the past, and don't have the excusses that they did
> back then.
>

I simply have a deeper insight because I studied these things from first
principles rather than even tentatively accept the preexisting framework
of misconceptions.

I have known since 1997 that if Gödel's 1931 incompleteness theorem and
the halting problem are correct then the basic notion of truth itself
must be broken. Tarski's Undefinability theorem (that directly applies
to the notion of truth itself) confirms this.

> Yes, There ARE realms where you can use that sort of logic, but there
> are also realms where it does not work. You just don't understand where
> that line is and it bashes you in the head and makes you stupid.

It works for the entire body of analytical knowledge: Expressions of
language that can be verified as completely true entirely based on their
meaning.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/17/2021 12:44 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/17/2021 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>
>> Here is my addition to this field:
>> Knowledge is a fully justified true belief
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
> |
> | Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier,
> | Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases")
> | challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB)
> | account of knowledge.
>
> | In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick
> | Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside
> | a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although
> | in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is
> | a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a
> | sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a
> | justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
> | that belief knowledge?
>
>> such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
>> its justification.
>
> We have evidence (sometimes).
> The evidence justifies a belief (sometimes).
> The justified belief is also true (sometimes).
>
> We might not have evidence of some true circumstance.
>
> If we have evidence of it, it might not be enough or
> we might not understand the consequences of the evidence.
>
> ( A good example of this:
> ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sum_and_Product_Puzzle
> ( |
> ( | The Sum and Product Puzzle, also known as the Impossible
> ( | Puzzle because it seems to lack sufficient information
> ( | for a solution, is a logic puzzle.
>
> Anyway, for various reason, our beliefs might not reflect
> the evidence we have.
>
> We might think we have evidence for a certain belief,
> and we would be correct to believe it on that basis, but
> the evidence is not what it seems to be. Coincidentally,
> what we have been tricked into believing is actually true.
> Justified belief that is also true. Is it knowledge?
>

Here is an example of a fully justified true belief such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief:

When we divide the body of knowledge into the philosophical categories
of analytic and synthetic then we can easily apply an updated definition
of knowledge that overcomes the Gettier problem for the entirely body of
analytic knowledge:

Analytic knowledge is the body of expressions of language that are
correctly accepted as true on the basis that the meaning of these
expressions conclusively proves that they are true.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

>>>>> I will put it in simpler terms.
>>>>> The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
>>>>> logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
>>>>> when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
>>>>> of its meaning.
>>>>> This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
>>>>
>>>> But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
>>>> (in some fields).
>>>
>>> Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
>>> simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
>>
>> But may still be true.
>
> That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
> knowledge until after they have been proven true.

A modest proposal:
Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
need not be about only reality).

'4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
| | Betty had four apples.
| Then she gave two of them to Bill.
| How many does she have now?

I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
"analytic symbol grab-bags".

But what is reality?
| | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
| doesn't go away.
| ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon

It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
there is no "there" there to expand into.

On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>
>>>>>> I will put it in simpler terms.
>>>>>> The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
>>>>>> logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
>>>>>> when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
>>>>>> of its meaning.
>>>>>> This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
>>>>> (in some fields).
>>>>
>>>> Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
>>>> simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
>>>
>>> But may still be true.
>>
>> That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
>> knowledge until after they have been proven true.
>
> A modest proposal:
> Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
> need not be about only reality).
>
> '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
> It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
> |
> | Betty had four apples.
> | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
> | How many does she have now?
>
> I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
> "analytic symbol grab-bags".
>
> But what is reality?
> |
> | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
> | doesn't go away.
> |

Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of physical
sensations. This remains true even in the brain in a vat thought
experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable" decision
problems that are actually only "undecidable" because they are simply
not truth bearers.

> ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
>
> It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
> point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
> we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
> there is no "there" there to expand into.
>

As Wittgenstein agrees until an expression of language has been proven
true it does not count as true. Haskell Curry has a similar position.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>
>>>>>> I will put it in simpler terms.
>>>>>> The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
>>>>>> logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
>>>>>> when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
>>>>>> of its meaning.
>>>>>> This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
>>>>> (in some fields).
>>>>
>>>> Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
>>>> simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
>>>
>>> But may still be true.
>>
>> That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
>> knowledge until after they have been proven true.
>
> A modest proposal:
> Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
> need not be about only reality).
>
> '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
> It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
> |
> | Betty had four apples.
> | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
> | How many does she have now?
>
> I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
> "analytic symbol grab-bags".
>
> But what is reality?
> |
> | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
> | doesn't go away.
> |

Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of physical
sensations. This remains true even in the brain in a vat thought
experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable" decision
problems that are actually only "undecidable" because they are simply
not truth bearers.

> ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
>
> It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
> point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
> we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
> there is no "there" there to expand into.
>

As Wittgenstein agrees until an expression of language has been proven
true it does not count as true. Haskell Curry has a similar position.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

>>>>>>> I will put it in simpler terms.
>>>>>>> The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
>>>>>>> logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
>>>>>>> when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
>>>>>>> of its meaning.
>>>>>>> This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
>>>>>> (in some fields).
>>>>>
>>>>> Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
>>>>> simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
>>>>
>>>> But may still be true.
>>>
>>> That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
>>> knowledge until after they have been proven true.
>>
>> A modest proposal:
>> Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
>> need not be about only reality).
>>
>> '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
>> It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
>> |
>> | Betty had four apples.
>> | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
>> | How many does she have now?
>>
>> I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
>> "analytic symbol grab-bags".
>>
>> But what is reality?
>> |
>> | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
>> | doesn't go away.
>> |
>> ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
>
> Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
> physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
> a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

| Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
| its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
| limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
| miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
| miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
| in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
| and ledidi.
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum

There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
reality of sugar not being in it.

There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.

The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
That's why they're not the same.

> The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
> decision problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
> they are simply not truth bearers.

You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
problems are not decidable decision problems.

You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
is like that.

On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>> On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>
>>>>>>>> I will put it in simpler terms.
>>>>>>>> The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
>>>>>>>> logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
>>>>>>>> when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
>>>>>>>> of its meaning.
>>>>>>>> This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
>>>>>>> (in some fields).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
>>>>>> simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>> But may still be true.
>>>>
>>>> That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
>>>> knowledge until after they have been proven true.
>>>
>>> A modest proposal:
>>> Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
>>> need not be about only reality).
>>>
>>> '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
>>> It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
>>> |
>>> | Betty had four apples.
>>> | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
>>> | How many does she have now?
>>>
>>> I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
>>> "analytic symbol grab-bags".
>>>
>>> But what is reality?
>>> |
>>> | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
>>> | doesn't go away.
>>> |
>>> ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
>>
>> Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
>> physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
>> a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
>
> | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
> | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
> | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
> | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
> | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
> | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
> | and ledidi.
> |
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum
>
> There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
> reality of sugar not being in it.
>

There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in some foods.

> There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
> you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.
>

It has been empirically validated that what appears to be the physical
sensation of sweetness is associated with the presence of sugar.

> The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
> why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
> That's why they're not the same.
>
>> The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
>> decision  problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
>> they are simply  not truth bearers.
>
> You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
> definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
> problems are not decidable decision problems.
>

The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not an undecidable
proposition is true or false is that this "undecidable proposition" is
not a truth bearer, thus a semantically incorrect proposition.

> You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
> You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
> after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
> is like that.
>

They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are accurately
construed as semantically incorrect rather than undecidable.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:

>>> Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
>>> physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
>>> a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
>>
>> | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
>> | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
>> | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
>> | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
>> | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
>> | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
>> | and ledidi.
>> |
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum
>>
>> There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
>> reality of sugar not being in it.
>
> There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in
> some foods.
>
>> There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
>> you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.
>>
>
> It has been empirically validated that what appears to be
> the physical sensation of sweetness is associated with
> the presence of sugar.

>>> Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
>>> physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
>>> a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

Reality and sensations are not the same.
Consider what happens when one chews Synsepalum dulcificum.

>> The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
>> why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
>> That's why they're not the same.
>>
>>> The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
>>> decision  problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
>>> they are simply  not truth bearers.
>>
>> You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
>> definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
>> problems are not decidable decision problems.
>
> The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not
> an undecidable proposition is true or false is that this
> "undecidable proposition" is not a truth bearer,

You previously defined "truth bearer" as "decidable proposition".
Am I mistaken about that?

The following is not useful:

_truth bearer_ -- See "decidable proposition"
_decidable proposition_ -- See "truth bearer"

> thus a semantically incorrect proposition.
>
>> You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
>> You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
>> after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
>> is like that.
>
> They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
> accurately construed as semantically incorrect rather than
> undecidable.

Consider this fragment of set theory:
I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
II. An empty set exists.
III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.

Perhaps
no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.

On the other hand,
*IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
set in D.

For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
a corresponding set in D.

For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
_about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.

There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
left out, but they're fairly straightforward.

None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.

For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.

On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>> On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
>
>>>> Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
>>>> physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
>>>> a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
>>>
>>> | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
>>> | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
>>> | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
>>> | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
>>> | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
>>> | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
>>> | and ledidi.
>>> |
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum
>>>
>>> There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
>>> reality of sugar not being in it.
>>
>> There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in
>> some foods.
>>
>>> There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
>>> you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.
>>>
>>
>> It has been empirically validated that what appears to be
>> the physical  sensation of sweetness is associated with
>> the presence of sugar.
>
>>>> Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
>>>> physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
>>>> a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
>
> Reality and sensations are not the same.
> Consider what happens when one chews Synsepalum dulcificum.
>
>>> The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
>>> why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
>>> That's why they're not the same.
>>>
>>>> The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
>>>> decision  problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
>>>> they are simply  not truth bearers.
>>>
>>> You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
>>> definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
>>> problems are not decidable decision problems.
>>
>> The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not
>> an undecidable  proposition is true or false is that this
>> "undecidable proposition" is  not a truth bearer,
>
> You previously defined "truth bearer" as "decidable proposition".
> Am I mistaken about that?
>
> The following is not useful:
>
> _truth bearer_  --  See "decidable proposition"
> _decidable proposition_  --  See "truth bearer"
>

Mathematics is not incomplete on the basis that it cannot prove
semantically incoherent expressions of language.

>> thus a semantically incorrect proposition.
>>
>>> You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
>>> You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
>>> after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
>>> is like that.
>>
>> They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
>> accurately  construed as semantically incorrect rather than
>> undecidable.
>
> Consider this fragment of set theory:
> I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
> II. An empty set exists.
> III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.
>
> Perhaps
> no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.
>
> On the other hand,
> *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
> for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
> set in D.
>
> For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
> a corresponding set in D.
>
> For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
> _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.
>
> There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
> left out, but they're fairly straightforward.
>
> None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.
>
> For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
> true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.

The claim is not actually true but unprovable, the claim is true in F
yet unprovable in F. True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
totally colorless.

Here it is expressed by Tarski:
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein

On 10/18/2021 7:33 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:

>>> They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
>>> accurately  construed as semantically incorrect rather than
>>> undecidable.
>>
>> Consider this fragment of set theory:
>> I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
>> II. An empty set exists.
>> III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.
>>
>> Perhaps
>> no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.
>>
>> On the other hand,
>> *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
>> for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
>> set in D.
>>
>> For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
>> a corresponding set in D.
>>
>> For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
>> _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.
>>
>> There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
>> left out, but they're fairly straightforward.
>>
>> None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.

Does any of that look semantically incorrect to you?

>> For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
>> true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.
>
> The claim is not actually true but unprovable,
> the claim is true in F yet unprovable in F.

"Unprovable in F" looks a lot like "not-provable from I,II,III"
Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me?

> True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
> totally colorless.

True without saying true _of what_ and provable without saying
provable _from what_ would be more analogous to
| 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
| Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.

Luckily for me, I haven't done either of those things.
See above for what's what.

On 10/18/2021 6:50 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 10/18/2021 7:33 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>> On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>
>>>> They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
>>>> accurately  construed as semantically incorrect rather than
>>>> undecidable.
>>>
>>> Consider this fragment of set theory:
>>> I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
>>> II. An empty set exists.
>>> III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.
>>>
>>> Perhaps
>>> no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.
>>>
>>> On the other hand,
>>> *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
>>> for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
>>> set in D.
>>>
>>> For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
>>> a corresponding set in D.
>>>
>>> For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
>>> _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.
>>>
>>> There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
>>> left out, but they're fairly straightforward.
>>>
>>> None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.
>
> Does any of that look semantically incorrect to you?
>
>>> For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
>>> true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.
>>
>> The claim is not actually true but unprovable,
>> the claim is true in F  yet unprovable in F.
>
> "Unprovable in F" looks a lot like "not-provable from I,II,III"
> Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me?
>
>> True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
>> totally colorless.
>
> True without saying true _of what_ and provable without saying
> provable _from what_ would be more analogous to
> | 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
> | Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.
>
> Luckily for me, I haven't done either of those things.
> See above for what's what.
>

True and unprovable is the same sort of crap where 1/3 if the USA
electorate believe that Trump only lost the election because of election
fraud that is unprovable because there is no evidence of election fraud.

Unprovable means untrue. (yet not false). Wittgenstein understood this.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein