On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
  undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same.

 (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment


14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment


14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment


14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.

Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:

X would be 'Is an Antinomy'

Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with The Liar"

So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.

Do you feel proud of yourself?

What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.

There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic of Gilgamesh.

Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Epic of Gilgamesh.

Therefore Gilgamesh figures prominently in the Book of Genesis.

According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, a savage can become civilized by having sex with a prostitute.

Therefore the Book of Genesis advocates forcing the uncivilized to have sex with prostitutes.

Do you see a problem with the above arguments? Saying there is a 'close relationship' between two things doesn't mean you can conclude *anything* about one based on the other. You need to consider exactly *what* the relationship actually is. What are the similarities and what are the differences? You insist on treating the two as if they were the same thing. They aren't, anymore than the Book of Genesis and the Epic of Gilgamesh are the same thing.

André

On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment


14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.

Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:

X would be 'Is an Antinomy'

Not quite.
X = is an epistemological antinomy

Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with The Liar"

So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.

Do you feel proud of yourself?

What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.

Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.

What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are one and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play head games.

There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic of Gilgamesh.

He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
(1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
(2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs: epistemological antinomies.

If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar undecidability proof.

X = set of epistemological antinomies.
Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.

All X are Y
The LP is an X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

On 2022-05-01 17:33, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 6:15 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:44, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment


14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

For christ's sake. You can't even see the irrelevance of the above.

Let's consider what the X and Y are in the above:

X would be 'Is an Antinomy'

Not quite.
X = is an epistemological antinomy

Since Gödel was *already* talking about The Liar, Y is "Can be used to form an undecidability proof in a similar manner as Gödel has done with The Liar"

So you've just proved that The Liar can be used to form a similar proof as the one Gödel forms using The Liar.

Do you feel proud of yourself?

What you keep ignoring, which were the points my posts were actually about was exactly *what* sort of relationship holds between The Liar and Gödel's G. It is *not* one of identity.

Of course not nitwit, you know that I mean equivalence.

Equivalence with respect to *what*?

If two things are equivalent but not identical, it means they are equivalent with respect to some things but not equivalent with respect to others.

The entire point of my posts has been to clarify some senses in which the two are *not* equivalent. But instead of addressing that you keep trying to prove that The Liar is in the same class as The Liar.

What kind of stupid fool would believe that I mean that G and LP are one and the same thing? I know, I know, a jackass that wants to play head games.

There is a close relationship between the Book of Genesis and the Epic of Gilgamesh.

He says two different things about the Liar Paradox Jackass.
(1) About the Liar Paradox in particular.
(2) About the entire category that the Liar Paradox belongs: epistemological antinomies.

Yes, and if the LP is *not* equivalent to G with respect to X, then none of the analogous sentences based on other antinomies would be equivalent with respect to X either.

If every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof then the liar paradox can be used for a similar undecidability proof.

X = set of epistemological antinomies.
Y = can be used for a similar undecidability proof.

 >

All X are Y
The LP is an X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a truism.

André

On 5/1/22 7:15 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 16:04, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

Since you're clearly not planning on addressing any of my points, I think we're done.

I'll leave you with a small multiple choice quiz: Are you

(a) someone who was dropped on their head as a child.
(b) suffering from foetal alcohol syndrome.
(c) thick as a brick.
(d) all of the above.

André

I just proved that you are a lying bastard. I can very easily forgive and forget, what I will not do is tolerate mistreatment


14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

The Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy

Translating this to a syllogism

All X are a Y
The LP is and X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

That you disagree with this makes you a lying bastard.

As Andre pointed out, when you look at the statement to see what the terms are, you just agreed with him and proved that YOU are the Liar.

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

Note, that means you need to start with the ACTUAL G that Godel used, not some "simplified" version. So you better know what all that means.

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
 > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
 > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
 > truism.

All X are Y
The LP is an X
Therefore the LP is a Y.

Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a truism.

Note, that means you need to start with the ACTUAL G that Godel used, not some "simplified" version. So you better know what all that means.

On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
 > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
 > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
 > truism.

Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
 > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
 > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
 > truism.

Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying about it.

On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
 > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
 > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
 > truism.

Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying about it.

No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.

The fact that you have mis-interpreted him that many times, and even snipped out his explanations shows you ignrance and lack of scruples. You show a marked propensity to (apparently) intentionally twist the words of others to match the script you are trying to write.

You are just solidifying your place in history as someone who does NOT understand the basics of the field they are making grand claims in, who does NOT understand the basics of logic, and who is just a pathological liar that doesn't understand the first thing about truth.

In the past, I thought that maybe some of your philosophies about Knowledge might have had some interesting concepts in them, but you have convinced me that you are so filled with lies that there can't be any understanding about the nature of Truth in anything you can say.

You have basically just proved that you have wasted the last 2 decades of your list, distroying any reputation you might have built up with past works. You will forever be know as the Liar about Paradoxes.

On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:

If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying about it.

No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.

If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to deny that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.

On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
 > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
 > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
 > truism.

Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying about it.

No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.

If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to deny that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.

If you make sure to knowingly contradict the verified facts then Revelations 21:8 may eventually apply to you.

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

The fact that you have mis-interpreted him that many times, and even snipped out his explanations shows you ignrance and lack of scruples. You show a marked propensity to (apparently) intentionally twist the words of others to match the script you are trying to write.

You are just solidifying your place in history as someone who does NOT understand the basics of the field they are making grand claims in, who does NOT understand the basics of logic, and who is just a pathological liar that doesn't understand the first thing about truth.

In the past, I thought that maybe some of your philosophies about Knowledge might have had some interesting concepts in them, but you have convinced me that you are so filled with lies that there can't be any understanding about the nature of Truth in anything you can say.

You have basically just proved that you have wasted the last 2 decades of your list, distroying any reputation you might have built up with past works. You will forever be know as the Liar about Paradoxes.

On 5/1/22 10:18 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:

On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

So which categories are you claiming are involved? Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing if you don't specify the actual categories involved.

André

My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I never heard of (3).

The category error would be that none of them is in the category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p it would mean that the category error is that G and p are not logic sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic

And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer?

Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you bother to notice that I said it once?

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly semantically ill-formed.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // false means semantically ill-formed.

And what does any of the above have to do with what I state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from The Liar in crucial ways.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof, nitwit.

I would not call you a nitwit except that you so persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.

And again, you snipped all of the

God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the strawman error.

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

Do you not know what the word "every" means?

Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship' and 'the same'?

You freaking dishonest bastard

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

André

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying

So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:

14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof

and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you lying bastard.

So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.

sufficiently equivalent

You can PROVE it?

So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.

On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
 > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
 > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
 > truism.

Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying about it.

No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel does doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.

If you look at the actual facts you will see that he continued to deny that kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times.

If you make sure to knowingly contradict the verified facts then Revelations 21:8 may eventually apply to you.

You mean like when he said (and you snipped):

The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the substance of my post.

Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).

There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:

(a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar *does* assert its own falsity.

(b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.

Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.

Maybe you should check your OWN facts.

He is CLEARLY not saying that the Liar Paradox can't be used for this sort of proof, because he talks about its form being used.

What he is denying, that seems beyound your ability to understand, so much so tha that you remove it from your messages, that this fact doesn't make the G itself a "Liar Paradox" that isn't a Truth Bearing like you claim.

Maybe YOU should be looking at the actual facts of who said what, and see who is guilty of lying.

I think you are getting very close to that Lake of Fire.

The fact that you have mis-interpreted him that many times, and even snipped out his explanations shows you ignrance and lack of scruples. You show a marked propensity to (apparently) intentionally twist the words of others to match the script you are trying to write.

You are just solidifying your place in history as someone who does NOT understand the basics of the field they are making grand claims in, who does NOT understand the basics of logic, and who is just a pathological liar that doesn't understand the first thing about truth.

In the past, I thought that maybe some of your philosophies about Knowledge might have had some interesting concepts in them, but you have convinced me that you are so filled with lies that there can't be any understanding about the nature of Truth in anything you can say.

Click here to read the complete article

He is focusing on the dishonest dodge of the strawman error by making sure to ignore that in another quote Gödel said that Gödel's G is sufficiently equivalent to the Liar Paradox on the basis that the Liar Paradox is an epistemological antinomy, whereas the quote he keeps switching back to is less clear on this point.

Since I focused on correcting his mistake several times it finally got down to the point where it was clear that he was a lying bastard.

I am utterly immune to gas lighting.

He is CLEARLY not saying that the Liar Paradox can't be used for this sort of proof, because he talks about its form being used.

He continued to refer to the other quote of Gödel that is much more vague on the equivalence between Gödel's G as his basis that equivalence cannot be be determined even when I kept focusing him back on the quote that does assert sufficient equivalence exists. I did this six times.