On 2/29/2024 5:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/29/24 2:46 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/29/2024 1:37 PM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-02-29 15:51:56 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ (in a separate memory space) merely needs to report on
>>>
>>> A Turing machine is not in any memory space.
>>>
>>
>> That no memory space is specified because Turing machines
>> are imaginary fictions does not entail that they have no
>> memory space. The actual memory space of actual Turing
>> machines is the human memory where these ideas are located.
>
> Nope.
>
> It is the mathematical state space of the machine, and the contents of
> its tape.
>
>>
>> The entire notion of undecidability when it depends on
>> epistemological antinomies is incoherent.
>
> But it doesn't
>
> Note, you prove yourself ignorant by repeating that incorrect claim, and
> show that your logic is based on lies rooted in category errors
>
>>
>> People that learn these things by rote never notice this.
>> Philosophers that examine these things looking for
>> incoherence find it.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>
>>
>
> Which you just don't understand what he is saying, as you have admitted.

*My perfect understanding of that quote is proved below*

The key issue with decision theory is that deciders are required to
correctly answer a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) questions.

The key difficulty with resolving this issue that most modern day
philosophers do not understand that both of these questions are equally
incorrect:
(a) Is this sentence true or false: "What time it is?"
(b) Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true."

They do not understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
bearer.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/29/24 8:23 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/29/2024 5:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/29/24 2:46 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/29/2024 1:37 PM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-02-29 15:51:56 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ (in a separate memory space) merely needs to report on
>>>>
>>>> A Turing machine is not in any memory space.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That no memory space is specified because Turing machines
>>> are imaginary fictions does not entail that they have no
>>> memory space. The actual memory space of actual Turing
>>> machines is the human memory where these ideas are located.
>>
>> Nope.
>>
>> It is the mathematical state space of the machine, and the contents of
>> its tape.
>>
>>>
>>> The entire notion of undecidability when it depends on
>>> epistemological antinomies is incoherent.
>>
>> But it doesn't
>>
>> Note, you prove yourself ignorant by repeating that incorrect claim,
>> and show that your logic is based on lies rooted in category errors
>>
>>>
>>> People that learn these things by rote never notice this.
>>> Philosophers that examine these things looking for
>>> incoherence find it.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Which you just don't understand what he is saying, as you have admitted.
>
> *My perfect understanding of that quote is proved below*
>
> The key issue with decision theory is that deciders are required to
> correctly answer a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) questions.

Except that H^ is NOT self-contradictory, it is H-Contradictory.

>
> The key difficulty with resolving this issue that most modern day
> philosophers do not understand that both of these questions are equally
> incorrect:
> (a) Is this sentence true or false: "What time it is?"
> (b) Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true."

No, they have different classes of problems.

The first doesn't have a correct Yes/No answer, as its answer is not of
the form Yes or No, so those are syntactically incorrect.

The second does accept yes or no as syntactically feasible, but when we
look an the semantics, neither answer ends up being correct.

>
> They do not understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
> bearer.
>
>

But IS a statement that invites trying to assign it one.

On 2/29/2024 8:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/29/24 8:23 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/29/2024 5:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/29/24 2:46 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/29/2024 1:37 PM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-02-29 15:51:56 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ (in a separate memory space) merely needs to report on
>>>>>
>>>>> A Turing machine is not in any memory space.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That no memory space is specified because Turing machines
>>>> are imaginary fictions does not entail that they have no
>>>> memory space. The actual memory space of actual Turing
>>>> machines is the human memory where these ideas are located.
>>>
>>> Nope.
>>>
>>> It is the mathematical state space of the machine, and the contents
>>> of its tape.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The entire notion of undecidability when it depends on
>>>> epistemological antinomies is incoherent.
>>>
>>> But it doesn't
>>>
>>> Note, you prove yourself ignorant by repeating that incorrect claim,
>>> and show that your logic is based on lies rooted in category errors
>>>
>>>>
>>>> People that learn these things by rote never notice this.
>>>> Philosophers that examine these things looking for
>>>> incoherence find it.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Which you just don't understand what he is saying, as you have admitted.
>>
>> *My perfect understanding of that quote is proved below*
>>
>> The key issue with decision theory is that deciders are required to
>> correctly answer a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) questions.
>
> Except that H^ is NOT self-contradictory, it is H-Contradictory.

Ĥ contradicts Ĥ.H and does not contradict H, thus H
is able to correctly decide ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩.

H simply looks for whatever wrong answer that Ĥ.H
returns and reports on the halting or not halting
behavior of that.

>>
>> The key difficulty with resolving this issue that most modern day
>> philosophers do not understand that both of these questions are equally
>> incorrect:
>> (a) Is this sentence true or false: "What time it is?"
>> (b) Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true."
>
> No, they have different classes of problems.
>
> The first doesn't have a correct Yes/No answer, as its answer is not of
> the form Yes or No, so those are syntactically incorrect.
>
> The second does accept yes or no as syntactically feasible, but when we
> look an the semantics, neither answer ends up being correct.
>

Thus this Truth predicate is correct:
LP = "This sentence is not true."
Boolean True(English, LP) is false
Boolean True(English, ~LP) is false
Making Tarski's conclusion wrong.

>>
>> They do not understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
>> bearer.
>>
>>
>
> But IS a statement that invites trying to assign it one.

Yes so you understand something that most PhD professors
in this field do not understand. One of the brightest
minds in the field never got this.

Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke (1975)
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/29/24 10:51 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/29/2024 8:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/29/24 8:23 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/29/2024 5:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/29/24 2:46 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/29/2024 1:37 PM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-02-29 15:51:56 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ (in a separate memory space) merely needs to report on
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A Turing machine is not in any memory space.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That no memory space is specified because Turing machines
>>>>> are imaginary fictions does not entail that they have no
>>>>> memory space. The actual memory space of actual Turing
>>>>> machines is the human memory where these ideas are located.
>>>>
>>>> Nope.
>>>>
>>>> It is the mathematical state space of the machine, and the contents
>>>> of its tape.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The entire notion of undecidability when it depends on
>>>>> epistemological antinomies is incoherent.
>>>>
>>>> But it doesn't
>>>>
>>>> Note, you prove yourself ignorant by repeating that incorrect claim,
>>>> and show that your logic is based on lies rooted in category errors
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> People that learn these things by rote never notice this.
>>>>> Philosophers that examine these things looking for
>>>>> incoherence find it.
>>>>>
>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Which you just don't understand what he is saying, as you have
>>>> admitted.
>>>
>>> *My perfect understanding of that quote is proved below*
>>>
>>> The key issue with decision theory is that deciders are required to
>>> correctly answer a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) questions.
>>
>> Except that H^ is NOT self-contradictory, it is H-Contradictory.
>
> Ĥ contradicts Ĥ.H and does not contradict H, thus H
> is able to correctly decide ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩.

Nope.

You are just admitting that you are stupid and don't know what you are
talking about.

>
> H simply looks for whatever wrong answer that Ĥ.H
> returns and reports on the halting or not halting
> behavior of that.

Excpet that H^ gets to know what H is going to say, because all copies
of it behave the same.

DEFINITIONS you know.

>
>>>
>>> The key difficulty with resolving this issue that most modern day
>>> philosophers do not understand that both of these questions are equally
>>> incorrect:
>>> (a) Is this sentence true or false: "What time it is?"
>>> (b) Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true."
>>
>> No, they have different classes of problems.
>>
>> The first doesn't have a correct Yes/No answer, as its answer is not
>> of the form Yes or No, so those are syntactically incorrect.
>>
>> The second does accept yes or no as syntactically feasible, but when
>> we look an the semantics, neither answer ends up being correct.
>>
>
> Thus this Truth predicate is correct:
> LP = "This sentence is not true."
> Boolean True(English, LP)  is false
> Boolean True(English, ~LP) is false
> Making Tarski's conclusion wrong.

So, what does True(L, x) return when x is the statement in L that says
~True(L, x)

You havve refused to answer that, showing that you are just a
pathological liar.

Remember, True(L, S) is ALWAYS a truth bearer, and thus so is the
statement ~True(L, S) so X can't be a non-truth-bearer.

If you want to go to non-binary logic, you can. you just need to define
which one you are using (or define your own rules) and then work within
that system. A lot of the Theories you like to quote are not applicable
in them. I'm not certain if anyone cares about or has even defined what
something like "Incompleteness" would mean in non-binary logic. And
being "Inconsistant" in a logic system that specifially DEFINES how
statements that are "both true and false at the same time" act in logic,
isn't a big deal.

>
>>>
>>> They do not understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
>>> bearer.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> But IS a statement that invites trying to assign it one.
>
> Yes so you understand something that most PhD professors
> in this field do not understand. One of the brightest
> minds in the field never got this.

Nope, most of them understand that, they just understand it better than
you and you don't understand them.

>
> Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke (1975)
> https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
>

On 2/29/2024 10:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/29/24 10:51 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/29/2024 8:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/29/24 8:23 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/29/2024 5:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/29/24 2:46 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/29/2024 1:37 PM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-02-29 15:51:56 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ (in a separate memory space) merely needs to report on
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A Turing machine is not in any memory space.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That no memory space is specified because Turing machines
>>>>>> are imaginary fictions does not entail that they have no
>>>>>> memory space. The actual memory space of actual Turing
>>>>>> machines is the human memory where these ideas are located.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is the mathematical state space of the machine, and the contents
>>>>> of its tape.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The entire notion of undecidability when it depends on
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies is incoherent.
>>>>>
>>>>> But it doesn't
>>>>>
>>>>> Note, you prove yourself ignorant by repeating that incorrect
>>>>> claim, and show that your logic is based on lies rooted in category
>>>>> errors
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> People that learn these things by rote never notice this.
>>>>>> Philosophers that examine these things looking for
>>>>>> incoherence find it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Which you just don't understand what he is saying, as you have
>>>>> admitted.
>>>>
>>>> *My perfect understanding of that quote is proved below*
>>>>
>>>> The key issue with decision theory is that deciders are required to
>>>> correctly answer a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) questions.
>>>
>>> Except that H^ is NOT self-contradictory, it is H-Contradictory.
>>
>> Ĥ contradicts Ĥ.H and does not contradict H, thus H
>> is able to correctly decide ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩.
>
> Nope.
>
> You are just admitting that you are stupid and don't know what you are
> talking about.

This is where you use dogma instead of reasoning.
If I am wrong then you could provide a correct
execution trace showing that I am wrong.

Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hq0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hqy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hq0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hqn // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does not halt

Anyone that understands the above knows that Ĥ.Hq0
transitions to Ĥ.Hqy or Ĥ.Hqn.

It doesn't even matter how it does it. It only
matters that it does it.

That it does it provides the basis that H needs and
*you cannot show the details of how this is not true*
*you cannot show the details of how this is not true*

*I need reasoning not dogma*
*I need reasoning not dogma*
*I need reasoning not dogma*

>>
>> H simply looks for whatever wrong answer that Ĥ.H
>> returns and reports on the halting or not halting
>> behavior of that.
>
> Excpet that H^ gets to know what H is going to say, because all copies
> of it behave the same.

I explained how this intuitively obvious assumption
does not actually apply in this case.

>
> DEFINITIONS you know.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> The key difficulty with resolving this issue that most modern day
>>>> philosophers do not understand that both of these questions are equally
>>>> incorrect:
>>>> (a) Is this sentence true or false: "What time it is?"
>>>> (b) Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true."
>>>
>>> No, they have different classes of problems.
>>>
>>> The first doesn't have a correct Yes/No answer, as its answer is not
>>> of the form Yes or No, so those are syntactically incorrect.
>>>
>>> The second does accept yes or no as syntactically feasible, but when
>>> we look an the semantics, neither answer ends up being correct.
>>>
>>
>> Thus this Truth predicate is correct:
>> LP = "This sentence is not true."
>> Boolean True(English, LP)  is false
>> Boolean True(English, ~LP) is false
>> Making Tarski's conclusion wrong.
>
> So, what does True(L, x) return when x is the statement in L that says
> ~True(L, x)
>

Boolean True(String Language, String Expression)
There is no way to get it to look at itself.

> You havve refused to answer that, showing that you are just a
> pathological liar.
>

Because you know that I believe what I say that
makes you a liar form calling me a liar.

> Remember, True(L, S) is ALWAYS a truth bearer, and thus so is the
> statement ~True(L, S) so X can't be a non-truth-bearer.
>
> If you want to go to non-binary logic, you can.

I reject this as nonsense. True or False or outside of the domain.

> you just need to define
> which one you are using (or define your own rules) and then work within
> that system. A lot of the Theories you like to quote are not applicable
> in them. I'm not certain if anyone cares about or has even defined what
> something like "Incompleteness" would mean in non-binary logic. And
> being "Inconsistant" in a logic system that specifially DEFINES how
> statements that are "both true and false at the same time" act in logic,
> isn't a big deal.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> They do not understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
>>>> bearer.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> But IS a statement that invites trying to assign it one.
>>
>> Yes so you understand something that most PhD professors
>> in this field do not understand. One of the brightest
>> minds in the field never got this.
>
> Nope, most of them understand that, they just understand it better than
> you and you don't understand them.
>

I looked up one of the brightest minds in the field of truthmaker
theory and he thinks that the Liar Paradox might not be a truth bearer.
Saul Kripke didn't seem to understand this at all. He was the leading
experts in this field.

Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke (1975)
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 3/1/24 1:35 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/29/2024 10:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/29/24 10:51 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/29/2024 8:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/29/24 8:23 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/29/2024 5:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/29/24 2:46 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/29/2024 1:37 PM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-02-29 15:51:56 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ (in a separate memory space) merely needs to report on
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Turing machine is not in any memory space.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That no memory space is specified because Turing machines
>>>>>>> are imaginary fictions does not entail that they have no
>>>>>>> memory space. The actual memory space of actual Turing
>>>>>>> machines is the human memory where these ideas are located.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is the mathematical state space of the machine, and the
>>>>>> contents of its tape.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The entire notion of undecidability when it depends on
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies is incoherent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But it doesn't
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note, you prove yourself ignorant by repeating that incorrect
>>>>>> claim, and show that your logic is based on lies rooted in
>>>>>> category errors
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> People that learn these things by rote never notice this.
>>>>>>> Philosophers that examine these things looking for
>>>>>>> incoherence find it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which you just don't understand what he is saying, as you have
>>>>>> admitted.
>>>>>
>>>>> *My perfect understanding of that quote is proved below*
>>>>>
>>>>> The key issue with decision theory is that deciders are required to
>>>>> correctly answer a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) questions.
>>>>
>>>> Except that H^ is NOT self-contradictory, it is H-Contradictory.
>>>
>>> Ĥ contradicts Ĥ.H and does not contradict H, thus H
>>> is able to correctly decide ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩.
>>
>> Nope.
>>
>> You are just admitting that you are stupid and don't know what you are
>> talking about.
>
> This is where you use dogma instead of reasoning.
> If I am wrong then you could provide a correct
> execution trace showing that I am wrong.

How can you expect me to show an execution trace of a program that is
proven to not exist?

That shows your stupidity.

>
> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hq0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hqy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
> Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hq0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hqn   // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does not halt
>
> Anyone that understands the above knows that Ĥ.Hq0
> transitions to Ĥ.Hqy or Ĥ.Hqn.
>
> It doesn't even matter how it does it. It only
> matters that it does it.
>
> That it does it provides the basis that H needs and
> *you cannot show the details of how this is not true*
> *you cannot show the details of how this is not true*

Except that BY DEFINITION Ĥ.Hq0 is an exact copy of H, and will do
exactly what H does.

You are just asserting the LIARS PARADOX, proving yourself to be the Lair

>
> *I need reasoning not dogma*
> *I need reasoning not dogma*
> *I need reasoning not dogma*

So, your logic is that if H says no, then H says yes.

This shows that you are a LIAR.

>
>>>
>>> H simply looks for whatever wrong answer that Ĥ.H
>>> returns and reports on the halting or not halting
>>> behavior of that.
>>
>> Excpet that H^ gets to know what H is going to say, because all copies
>> of it behave the same.
>
> I explained how this intuitively obvious assumption
> does not actually apply in this case.

Why not?

What deterministic instruction does two different things with the same
input?

Peter Olcott proven to be a LIAR.

>
>>
>> DEFINITIONS you know.
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The key difficulty with resolving this issue that most modern day
>>>>> philosophers do not understand that both of these questions are
>>>>> equally
>>>>> incorrect:
>>>>> (a) Is this sentence true or false: "What time it is?"
>>>>> (b) Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true."
>>>>
>>>> No, they have different classes of problems.
>>>>
>>>> The first doesn't have a correct Yes/No answer, as its answer is not
>>>> of the form Yes or No, so those are syntactically incorrect.
>>>>
>>>> The second does accept yes or no as syntactically feasible, but when
>>>> we look an the semantics, neither answer ends up being correct.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Thus this Truth predicate is correct:
>>> LP = "This sentence is not true."
>>> Boolean True(English, LP)  is false
>>> Boolean True(English, ~LP) is false
>>> Making Tarski's conclusion wrong.
>>
>> So, what does True(L, x) return when x is the statement in L that says
>> ~True(L, x)
>>
>
> Boolean True(String Language, String Expression)
> There is no way to get it to look at itself.

Why not?

Is it not a predicate in the language?

Maybe that is your problem, you don't know the meaning of such basic words.

>
>> You havve refused to answer that, showing that you are just a
>> pathological liar.
>>
>
> Because you know that I believe what I say that
> makes you a liar form calling me a liar.

it make you a PATHOLOGICAL LIAR.

You LIE because you have refused to accept the truth.

>
>> Remember, True(L, S) is ALWAYS a truth bearer, and thus so is the
>> statement ~True(L, S) so X can't be a non-truth-bearer.
>>
>> If you want to go to non-binary logic, you can.
>
> I reject this as nonsense. True or False or outside of the domain.

So, you reject the answer that you want to claim.

Sounds like you.

If your logic is binary, it can only answer True or False.

If it can answer "Outside the Domain" your logic needs another value.

That, your you logic doesn't define that things that are supposed to
answer for ALL inputs actually need to answer for ALL inputs.

>
>> you just need to define which one you are using (or define your own
>> rules) and then work within that system. A lot of the Theories you
>> like to quote are not applicable in them. I'm not certain if anyone
>> cares about or has even defined what something like "Incompleteness"
>> would mean in non-binary logic. And being "Inconsistant" in a logic
>> system that specifially DEFINES how statements that are "both true and
>> false at the same time" act in logic, isn't a big deal.
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> They do not understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
>>>>> bearer.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But IS a statement that invites trying to assign it one.
>>>
>>> Yes so you understand something that most PhD professors
>>> in this field do not understand. One of the brightest
>>> minds in the field never got this.
>>
>> Nope, most of them understand that, they just understand it better
>> than you and you don't understand them.
>>
>
> I looked up one of the brightest minds in the field of truthmaker
> theory and he thinks that the Liar Paradox might not be a truth bearer.
> Saul Kripke didn't seem to understand this at all. He was the leading
> experts in this field.
>
> Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke (1975)
> https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
>