On 4/29/2022 9:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
> On 4/29/22 10:10 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/29/2022 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/29/22 8:49 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/29/2022 6:10 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 4/29/22 6:30 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/29/2022 4:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/29/22 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/29/2022 3:17 PM, Mr Flibble wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 29 Apr 2022 15:42:49 -0400
>>>>>>>>> Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/29/22 3:30 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/29/2022 10:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-04-29 14:07:07 +0000, Mr Flibble said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proof of an erroneous theory is, by implication, also
>>>>>>>>>>>>> erroneous. The halting problem as stated is erroneous ergo all
>>>>>>>>>>>>> currently extant halting problem proofs are, by
>>>>>>>>>>>>> implication, also
>>>>>>>>>>>>> erroneous and do not require formal refutation to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> considered
>>>>>>>>>>>>> invalid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fix the halting problem itself before trying to refute
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> shower.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Apparently Mr Flibble does not know what "erroneous" mean.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Otherwise he would tell.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There is a common meaning that can be applied proofs: an
>>>>>>>>>>>> "erroneous proof"
>>>>>>>>>>>> is not a proof although it may look like one. Does this
>>>>>>>>>>>> extend to
>>>>>>>>>>>> problems
>>>>>>>>>>>> or theories? Does "erroneous theory" mean something that looks
>>>>>>>>>>>> like a theory but isn't? Is Mr Flibble trying to say that the
>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem is nor really any problem?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Mikko
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A person that only cares about rebuttal and does not give a
>>>>>>>>>>> rat's
>>>>>>>>>>> ass about truth would say that. You don't pay attention to
>>>>>>>>>>> what he
>>>>>>>>>>> says you merely pick out some fake excuse for a rebuttal.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Flibble perfectly defined "erroneous proof" and "erroneous
>>>>>>>>>>> theory"
>>>>>>>>>>> in that their basis is anchored in the well defined concept of
>>>>>>>>>>> [category error]:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> [category error]
>>>>>>>>>>> a semantic or ontological error in which things belonging to a
>>>>>>>>>>> particular category are presented as if they belong to a
>>>>>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>>>>>> category,[1] or, alternatively, a property is ascribed to a
>>>>>>>>>>> thing
>>>>>>>>>>> that could not possibly have that property.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
>>>>>>>>>> And exactly WHAT is the category error in the Halting Problem.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The infinitely recursive definition.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What is given the wrong category, and what category is it
>>>>>>>>>> incorrectly
>>>>>>>>>> being given.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The two categories are the decider and that which is being
>>>>>>>>> decided.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you can't state what the error is, you are just proving
>>>>>>>>>> that YOU
>>>>>>>>>> are just in "Rebuttal Mode" and not caring about what is the
>>>>>>>>>> actual
>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> /Flibble
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Liar Paradox and Gödel's G are examples of infinitely
>>>>>>>> recursive definition.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
>>>>>>>> G := ~Provable(G)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is totally obvious when they are encoded in Prolog.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Except that isn't the actual statement of G, and G can't be
>>>>>>> written in Prolog because Prolog only handles first order logic
>>>>>>> and G uses Higher Order logic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> FAIL.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> DIRECT QUOTE FROM page 40/43 OF Gödel's PAPER
>>>>>> The analogy between this result and Richard’s antinomy leaps to
>>>>>> the eye; there is also a close relationship with the “liar”
>>>>>> antinomy,^14 since the undecidable proposition [R(q); q] states
>>>>>> precisely that q belongs to K, i.e. according to (1), that [R(q);
>>>>>> q] is not provable. We are therefore confronted with a proposition
>>>>>> which asserts its own unprovability.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Close Relationship" is not the same thing as "Same as".
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, there is some similarity in how G is built to the liar's
>>>>> paradox, but G includes some extra indirection that makes it so it
>>>>> does still have a truth value, and then it is about something being
>>>>> Provable, and for ALL statements, the provability of that statement
>>>>> is ALWAYS a truth-bearer, as statements which are not truth bearers
>>>>> are by definition not provable.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>
>>>>> Right, by the same transformation used with the liars paradox, you
>>>>> can transform another antinomy to build a similar contradiction
>>>>> that makes G unprovable but true.
>>>>>
>>>>> That doesn't mean G's truth value is the same as that antinomy.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thus: G ⟷ ~Provable(G)
>>>>>> is sufficiently equivalent to Gödel's G.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope. Just shows you don't understand G.
>>>>>
>>>>>> When this is encoded in Prolog it is rejected as an infinite term
>>>>>> as my paper clearly shows.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As it should, since G uses Higher Order Logic which can NOT be
>>>>> properly expressed in the first order logic of Prolog.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>
>>>> Thus this {epistemological antinomy} is sufficiently equivalent
>>>> G ⟷ ~Provable(G)
>>>
>>> Since that isn't G, you havn't made you point.
>>>
>>
>> Gödel said it does not have to be G:
>>
>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof
>>
>
> You don't understand what he is saying, he is saying you can create a
> statement similar to the G he presents based on other antinomies. He
> just presented one based on the simplest version of the Liar's Paradox.
>

Sure when he says: "Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
for a similar undecidability proof"

He must actually mean NOT
Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Because everyone knows that every X always means NOT every X

Don't you feel a little embarrassed by your bald faced lie?

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer