On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would mean that the category error is that G and p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I state
>>>>>>>>>>>>> below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The Liar in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G has *a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very* different from
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of the
>>>>>>>>>> strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship'
>>>>>>>>> and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping the
>>>>>>> substance of my post.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar and
>>>>>>> G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the same.
>>>>>>> (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a similar close
>>>>>>> relationship to other antinomies is hardly relevant since it is
>>>>>>> The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given
>>>>>>> it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and
>>>>>>> read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that
>>>>>>> explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>
>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>
>>>
>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>
>>
>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>
>
> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>
>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>
>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>
>>
>> You can PROVE it?
>
> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the epistemolgocal
> antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth Bearer. Note, the
> comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't about that, so you
> are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>
>
>
>
>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing for a
>>  > truism.
>>
>
> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.

If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he
kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar
undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made
denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying
about it.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer