On 5/1/22 9:53 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 5/1/2022 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 5/1/22 8:58 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 5/1/2022 6:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 5/1/22 6:39 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 5/1/2022 5:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/1/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:42, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 3:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 14:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:48, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:32, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 2:22 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-05-01 13:00, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/1/2022 1:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So which categories are you claiming are involved?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Claiming something is a 'category error' means nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you don't specify the actual categories involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My original thinking was that (1) and (2) and the Liar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Paradox all demonstrate the exact same error. I only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have considered (3) in recent years, prior to that I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> never heard of (3).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The category error would be that none of them is in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> category of truth bearers. For Gödel's G and Tarski's p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would mean that the category error is that G and p
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not logic sentences.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And how can you possibly justify your claim that Gödel's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> G is not a truth bearer?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do I have to say the same thing 500 times before you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bother to notice that I said it once?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore LP ↔ ~True(LP) can be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, and LP ↔ ~True(LP) is clearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. // false means semantically ill-formed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what does any of the above have to do with what I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> state below? That's your faulty attempt at expressing The
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar in Prolog, which has nothing to do with Gödel's G. G
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has *a relationship* to The Liar, but G is *very*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from The Liar in crucial ways.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therfore the liar paradox can likewise be used for a similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof, nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would not call you a nitwit except that you so
>>>>>>>>>>>>> persistently make sure to ignore my key points, thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably making you a jackass rather than a nitwit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> And again, you snipped all of the
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> God damned attempt to get away with the dishonest dodge of
>>>>>>>>>>> the strawman error.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not know what the word "every" means?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand the difference between 'close relationship'
>>>>>>>>>> and 'the same'?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You freaking dishonest bastard
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only one being dishonest here is you as you keep snipping
>>>>>>>> the substance of my post.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gödel claims there is a *close relationship* between The Liar
>>>>>>>> and G. He most certainly does *not* claim that they are the
>>>>>>>> same. (That one can construct similar proofs which bear a
>>>>>>>> similar close relationship to other antinomies is hardly
>>>>>>>> relevant since it is The Liar which is under discussion).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There are two crucial differences between G and The Liar:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (a) G does *not* assert its own unprovability whereas The Liar
>>>>>>>> *does* assert its own falsity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (b) G is most definitely a truth-bearer even if The Liar is not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Your claim the Gödel's theorem is a 'category error' is
>>>>>>>> predicated on the fact that you don't grasp (b) above. I'm not
>>>>>>>> going to retype my explanation for this as I have already given
>>>>>>>> it in a previous post. You're more than welcome to go back and
>>>>>>>> read that post. Unless you actually have some comment on that
>>>>>>>> explanation, there's no point repeating yourself.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> André
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>>
>>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You can PROVE it?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I backed André into a corner and forced him to quit lying
>>>
>>
>> So, No. Note a trimming to change meaning, the original was:
>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and the Liar Paradox is and is an epistemological antinomy you
>>>>>> lying bastard.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, there is a difference between being used for and being just like.
>>>>
>>>> sufficiently equivalent
>>>>
>>>
>>> You can PROVE it?
>>
>> So, clearly the requested proof was that about USING the
>> epistemolgocal antinomy and it being just like one so not a Truth
>> Bearer. Note, the comment that you claimed you backed him into isn't
>> about that, so you are just proving yourself to be a deciver.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 5/1/2022 6:44 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>  > Yes. The Liar and the Liar can be used for similar undecidability
>>>  > proofs. I have no idea what it is you hope to achieve by arguing
>>> for a
>>>  > truism.
>>>
>>
>> Nice out of context quoting, showing again you are the deciver.
>
> If you look at the full context of many messages you will see that he
> kept continuing to deny that the Liar Paradox can be used for similar
> undecidability proofs at least a half dozen times. Only when I made
> denying this look utterly ridiculously foolish did he finally quit lying
> about it.
>

No, he says that the use of the Liar Paradox in the form that Godel does
doesn't make the Godel Sentence a non-truth holder.

The fact that you have mis-interpreted him that many times, and even
snipped out his explanations shows you ignrance and lack of scruples.
You show a marked propensity to (apparently) intentionally twist the
words of others to match the script you are trying to write.

You are just solidifying your place in history as someone who does NOT
understand the basics of the field they are making grand claims in, who
does NOT understand the basics of logic, and who is just a pathological
liar that doesn't understand the first thing about truth.

In the past, I thought that maybe some of your philosophies about
Knowledge might have had some interesting concepts in them, but you have
convinced me that you are so filled with lies that there can't be any
understanding about the nature of Truth in anything you can say.

You have basically just proved that you have wasted the last 2 decades
of your list, distroying any reputation you might have built up with
past works. You will forever be know as the Liar about Paradoxes.