On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
> On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Validity and Soundness*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good plan.  You've run aground as far as halting is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt status for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input actually specifies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is now dead obvious that you accept that no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world calls "decide halting".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski makes a similar mistake...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <snip distractions>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   That is, in the context of C-like code
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that D(X,Y) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible?  (I know,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know...  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As expected, no answer.  You can't answer this because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be the end of you bragging about halting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All undecidable problems always have very well hidden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature of truth itself is broken.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your failure to understand this just shows you are a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how
>>>>>>>>>>>> logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct
>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning when examined at the very high level abstraction
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the philosophical foundation of the notion of (analytic)
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth itself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
>>>>>>>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of
>>>>>>>>>>>> any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things,
>>>>>>>>>>>> simply taking for granted that they are all these
>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings are infallibly correct.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
>>>>>>>>>>>> invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you
>>>>>>>>>>> right.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
>>>>>>>>>>> century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
>>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic
>>>>>>>>>> rather than most elegant bare essence.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read
>>>>>>>>> the paper).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
>>>>>>>>> intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes
>>>>>>>>> that were published after his death. If he really believed in
>>>>>>>>> this statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he
>>>>>>>>> actually would of published it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was
>>>>>>>>> an error in his logic that he worked on and either never
>>>>>>>>> resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped believing
>>>>>>>>> in that statement.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly
>>>>>>>> before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct
>>>>>>>> knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his
>>>>>> reasoning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
>>>>>>> understanding.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> His full quote is on page 6
>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein
>>>>>>>> have the exact same view as mine:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>     'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
>>>>>>>>      in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
>>>>>>>>      means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be
>>>>>>> proved to be true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that
>>>>>> it is true. There are no categories of expressions of language
>>>>>> that are both true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be
>>>>>> true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to
>>>>>> other true expressions of language.
>>>>>
>>>>> WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever
>>>> talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about that.
>>>
>>> Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
>>>
>>> For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because you
>>> can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
>>> meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
>>>
>>
>> OK great this is a key agreement between us.
>>
>>> Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
>>> Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
>>>
>>
>> Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except that
>> is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data from the
>> sense organs.
>>
>
> FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)
>
>>> It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in
>>> the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically
>>> True", but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth
>>> Bearer.
>>>
>>
>> If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic meanings
>> proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
>>
>> I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can be
>> found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite search
>> to find.
>
> Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you don't
> have a Proof.
>

So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then the
expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to find then
it is still true.

>>
>>> The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True,
>>> or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth
>>> Bearer.
>>>
>>> Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically
>>> True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of
>>> KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or
>>> KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are
>>> talking about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper
>>> student of the field understands the difference, but you don't seem
>>> to be able to do that.
>>>
>>> Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
>>> Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True
>>> that are outside knowledge.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
>>>>> sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even
>>>>> doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is
>>>>> no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
>>>> derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set
>>>> of semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot
>>>> be found in finite time.
>>>
>>> But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
>>> least by the normal definitions of a proof.
>>>
>>
>> I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
>>
>
> Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?

So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and
inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the art.

>
> Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning in
> that Formal System.
>
> You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
> begining of that Formal System.
>
> I have pointed this out many times.
>
> If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
> the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
>

Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.

> People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that something
> is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the power of the
> logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
>
> I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area, because
> it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to where you
> want to get to.
>

Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into the
definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with correct
reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.

> In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the great
> mistakes of the past.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer