On 5/14/2022 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Validity and Soundness*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good plan.  You've run aground as far as halting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is concerned, so you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input actually specifies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is now dead obvious that you accept that no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> world calls "decide halting".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tarski makes a similar mistake...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <snip distractions>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   That is, in the context of C-like code
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that D(X,Y) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible?  (I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know...  I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As expected, no answer.  You can't answer this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be the end of you bragging about halting.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All undecidable problems always have very well hidden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental nature of truth itself is broken.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to strictly limit the capabilities of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic system.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your failure to understand this just shows you are a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning when examined at the very high level
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction of the philosophical foundation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of (analytic) truth itself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightest inkling of any of the key philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings of these things, simply taking for granted
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you right.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>> read the paper).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have intensly studied), this statement is solely from
>>>>>>>>>>>>> private notes that were published after his death. If he
>>>>>>>>>>>>> really believed in this statement as was sure of it, it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would seem natural that he actually would of published it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there
>>>>>>>>>>>>> was an error in his logic that he worked on and either
>>>>>>>>>>>>> never resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped
>>>>>>>>>>>>> believing in that statement.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself
>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have
>>>>>>>>>>>> first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with
>>>>>>>>>>> it,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw
>>>>>>>>>> his reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
>>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> His full quote is on page 6
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is the key source of our agreement that makes
>>>>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>     'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
>>>>>>>>>>>>      in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
>>>>>>>>>>>>      means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to
>>>>>>>>>>> be proved to be true.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof
>>>>>>>>>> that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of
>>>>>>>>>> language that are both true and neither stipulated as true or
>>>>>>>>>> proven to be true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic
>>>>>>>>>> connections to other true expressions of language.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I
>>>>>>>> ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking
>>>>>>>> about that.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because
>>>>>>> you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
>>>>>>> meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OK great this is a key agreement between us.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
>>>>>>> Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except
>>>>>> that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data
>>>>>> from the sense organs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)
>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least
>>>>>>> in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be
>>>>>>> "Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure has
>>>>>>> ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic
>>>>>> meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set
>>>>>> can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an
>>>>>> infinite search to find.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you
>>>>> don't have a Proof.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
>>>> When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
>>>> exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then
>>>> the expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to
>>>> find then it is still true.
>>>
>>> So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable or
>>> expressable?
>>>
>>> That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically
>>>>>>> True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement
>>>>>>> isn't a Truth Bearer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note also, There are true statements that are neither
>>>>>>> Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions
>>>>>>> made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing
>>>>>>> KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like
>>>>>>> describing what you are talking about ISN'T about studying Truth,
>>>>>>> but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field understands the
>>>>>>> difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is
>>>>>>> "Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things
>>>>>>> that are True that are outside knowledge.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that
>>>>>>>>> the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N
>>>>>>>>> even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False.
>>>>>>>>> There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for
>>>>>>>>> such things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer
>>>>>>>> cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a
>>>>>>>> connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or false
>>>>>>>> even if they cannot be found in finite time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
>>>>>>> least by the normal definitions of a proof.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
>>>>
>>>> So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and
>>>> inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the
>>>> art.
>>>
>>> So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
>>> fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core Logic
>>> rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change them in a
>>> derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
>>
>> We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as
>> true unless and until:
>> (1) It has been stipulated to be true.
>>
>> (2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions of
>> language that have been stipulated to be true.
>> This is the same system that Prolog uses.
>
> Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True", yes,
> but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it True we can
> not use it to actually directly prove something else, but it can be True).
>
> You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a Truth
> Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be proven that
> it must be either True of False?
>

It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.

--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer