The areas of agreement and disagreement in Indo-US relations have traditionally gravitated around strategic issues, proliferation, export control, technology denial regimes, imposition of unilateral sanctions, human rights abuses especially in the context of Kashmir, denial of religious freedom, democracy, defence cooperation, climate change and even protocol.

Some of these are especially relevant in the context of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the US starting this week.
....
Directly or indirectly, the issue of human rights is sure to come up again during Modi’s visit. His response will likely be to insist his government respects human rights.

Strategic dissonance has been at the core of US-India engagement especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the open strategic embrace between Russia and China.
....
In the context of the US-China-India triangle, India is unwilling to support the US in its escalating tensions with China over Taiwan, which many US analysts believe is steadily drifting towards armed confrontation. India has its own problems with China but is not ready to rule out the possibility of engagement and conciliation. In the past year, we have seen the handshake between President Xi Jinping and Modi in Bali despite Galwan, the acceptance of the controversial buffer zone in eastern Ladakh to maintain peace on the border, the decision not to permit any discussion on the Sino-Indian border issue in parliament, and the increase in bilateral trade with China.
....
India’s concerns

In view of the clear and repeated expressions of US concerns about India over a range of issues, will Modi too, among other things, express India’s concerns on the issues that bother us? These are:

(i) the possible imposition of unilateral sanctions against India in the future over such matters as the import of advanced weapons and crude oil from Russia, or over resumption of trade with countries like Iran with whom India has had civilisational links;

(ii) whether the US will provide guarantees for continued supply of parts and servicing of defence platforms and civilian goods validly imported from the US;

(iii) whether the US will observe the sanctity of contracts;

(iv) the extent to which US could apply extraterritoriality of US laws on goods manufactured in India using controlled US technology;

(v) whether the US will discriminate against India vis a vis its NATO and/or non-NATO allies with regard to access to dual-use commodities and technologies for civilian end use; and

(vi) whether it will use India’s future dependence on US origin commodities and technologies to coerce India to align its foreign policy with that of the United States.

To the extent to which Biden raises questions about human rights and religious freedom in India, Modi is also likely to insist that these concerns are misplaced given India’s long-standing democratic credentials.

Prime Minister Modi is unlikely to say anything in the US that could jeopardise the success of the G20 Summit in India in September in terms of just the presence of world leaders, especially of China and Russia. With that caveat, it is what he conveys in his address to the US Congress that will indicate what the Modi government’s priorities are and where it stands on issues that divide, and supposedly unite the two countries.

On Monday, June 19, 2023 at 11:19:31 PM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> The areas of agreement and disagreement in Indo-US relations have traditionally gravitated around strategic issues, proliferation, export control, technology denial regimes, imposition of unilateral sanctions, human rights abuses especially in the context of Kashmir, denial of religious freedom, democracy, defence cooperation, climate change and even protocol.
>
> Some of these are especially relevant in the context of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the US starting this week.
> ...
> Directly or indirectly, the issue of human rights is sure to come up again during Modi’s visit. His response will likely be to insist his government respects human rights.
>
> Strategic dissonance has been at the core of US-India engagement especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the open strategic embrace between Russia and China.
> ...
> In the context of the US-China-India triangle, India is unwilling to support the US in its escalating tensions with China over Taiwan, which many US analysts believe is steadily drifting towards armed confrontation. India has its own problems with China but is not ready to rule out the possibility of engagement and conciliation. In the past year, we have seen the handshake between President Xi Jinping and Modi in Bali despite Galwan, the acceptance of the controversial buffer zone in eastern Ladakh to maintain peace on the border, the decision not to permit any discussion on the Sino-Indian border issue in parliament, and the increase in bilateral trade with China.
> ...
> India’s concerns
>
> In view of the clear and repeated expressions of US concerns about India over a range of issues, will Modi too, among other things, express India’s concerns on the issues that bother us? These are:
>
> (i) the possible imposition of unilateral sanctions against India in the future over such matters as the import of advanced weapons and crude oil from Russia, or over resumption of trade with countries like Iran with whom India has had civilisational links;
>
> (ii) whether the US will provide guarantees for continued supply of parts and servicing of defence platforms and civilian goods validly imported from the US;
>
> (iii) whether the US will observe the sanctity of contracts;
>
> (iv) the extent to which US could apply extraterritoriality of US laws on goods manufactured in India using controlled US technology;
>
> (v) whether the US will discriminate against India vis a vis its NATO and/or non-NATO allies with regard to access to dual-use commodities and technologies for civilian end use; and
>
> (vi) whether it will use India’s future dependence on US origin commodities and technologies to coerce India to align its foreign policy with that of the United States.
>
> To the extent to which Biden raises questions about human rights and religious freedom in India, Modi is also likely to insist that these concerns are misplaced given India’s long-standing democratic credentials.
>
> Prime Minister Modi is unlikely to say anything in the US that could jeopardise the success of the G20 Summit in India in September in terms of just the presence of world leaders, especially of China and Russia. With that caveat, it is what he conveys in his address to the US Congress that will indicate what the Modi government’s priorities are and where it stands on issues that divide, and supposedly unite the two countries.

India will be looking and watching at US at the meeting table like a reluctant cow not to talk and not to be drawn and pulled by them; and not to be magnetized by them toward them. India will change its platform sooner than later when they see there pressure points by US on them to follow them.

On Monday, June 19, 2023 at 9:33:04 PM UTC-4, stoney wrote:
> On Monday, June 19, 2023 at 11:19:31 PM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
> > The areas of agreement and disagreement in Indo-US relations have traditionally gravitated around strategic issues, proliferation, export control, technology denial regimes, imposition of unilateral sanctions, human rights abuses especially in the context of Kashmir, denial of religious freedom, democracy, defence cooperation, climate change and even protocol.
> >
> > Some of these are especially relevant in the context of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the US starting this week.
> > ...
> > Directly or indirectly, the issue of human rights is sure to come up again during Modi’s visit. His response will likely be to insist his government respects human rights.
> >
> > Strategic dissonance has been at the core of US-India engagement especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the open strategic embrace between Russia and China.
> > ...
> > In the context of the US-China-India triangle, India is unwilling to support the US in its escalating tensions with China over Taiwan, which many US analysts believe is steadily drifting towards armed confrontation. India has its own problems with China but is not ready to rule out the possibility of engagement and conciliation. In the past year, we have seen the handshake between President Xi Jinping and Modi in Bali despite Galwan, the acceptance of the controversial buffer zone in eastern Ladakh to maintain peace on the border, the decision not to permit any discussion on the Sino-Indian border issue in parliament, and the increase in bilateral trade with China.
> > ...
> > India’s concerns
> >
> > In view of the clear and repeated expressions of US concerns about India over a range of issues, will Modi too, among other things, express India’s concerns on the issues that bother us? These are:
> >
> > (i) the possible imposition of unilateral sanctions against India in the future over such matters as the import of advanced weapons and crude oil from Russia, or over resumption of trade with countries like Iran with whom India has had civilisational links;
> >
> > (ii) whether the US will provide guarantees for continued supply of parts and servicing of defence platforms and civilian goods validly imported from the US;
> >
> > (iii) whether the US will observe the sanctity of contracts;
> >
> > (iv) the extent to which US could apply extraterritoriality of US laws on goods manufactured in India using controlled US technology;
> >
> > (v) whether the US will discriminate against India vis a vis its NATO and/or non-NATO allies with regard to access to dual-use commodities and technologies for civilian end use; and
> >
> > (vi) whether it will use India’s future dependence on US origin commodities and technologies to coerce India to align its foreign policy with that of the United States.
> >
> > To the extent to which Biden raises questions about human rights and religious freedom in India, Modi is also likely to insist that these concerns are misplaced given India’s long-standing democratic credentials.
> >
> > Prime Minister Modi is unlikely to say anything in the US that could jeopardise the success of the G20 Summit in India in September in terms of just the presence of world leaders, especially of China and Russia. With that caveat, it is what he conveys in his address to the US Congress that will indicate what the Modi government’s priorities are and where it stands on issues that divide, and supposedly unite the two countries.
> India will be looking and watching at US at the meeting table like a reluctant cow not to talk and not to be drawn and pulled by them; and not to be magnetized by them toward them. India will change its platform sooner than later when they see there pressure points by US on them to follow them.

The quote in the opening post was written by Indian:
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-us-modi-state-visit-issues-human-rights-s400-russia

The WashingtonPost also has an article of similar view today entitled "Sorry, America. India will never be your ally."
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/06/20/india-us-relations-modi/

The following sums up India's position:

"India’s policy of nonalignment began with a refusal to be entangled in the Cold War. Today this has morphed
into aggressive multilateralism. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar says India should benefit “from as many ties
as possible.”

Is aggressive multilateralism another way of saying competition/fight of "all against all"?
Is this approach compatible with the Westphalian world order?