A Quora that touches on WWII Japanese in USA security concerns.

William Pellas
Studied at American Military University Updated 16h

Why didn't the Japanese in World War II think that the Allies could
break their communications codes?
There were several reasons.

The first was that most Japanese at that time believed that the
fundamentally alien nature of their language relative to the great
majority of the languages spoken by their likely enemies guaranteed a
layer of security for their crucial communications. It must be said that
there was a grain of truth to this perspective, because the many nuances
of the insular culture that had existed for many centuries on the
cramped Japanese Home Islands were very difficult for outsiders to
grasp. These same nuances (such as the practice of haragei) affected the
Japanese language in a myriad of ways that would not often be apparent
even to foreigners who had mastered that language from a grammatical
standpoint.

Haragei - Wikipedia
Haragei ( 腹芸, はらげい ) is a Japanese concept of interpersonal
communication. [1] It also appears in martial arts circles, with a
somewhat different meaning; see below . Literally translated, the term
means "stomach art", and it refers to an exchange of thoughts and
feelings that is implied in conversation, rather than explicitly stated.
[1] It is a form of rhetoric intended to express real intention and true
meaning through implication. [2] In some societies, [ clarification
needed ] it can also denote charisma or strength of personality. [3]
Takie Lebra identified four dimensions of Japanese silence –
truthfulness, social discretion, embarrassment and defiance. [4] In
Western literature, the essence of the difference between just talking
and really communicating through silence is analyzed in Harold Pinter 's
The Dumb Waiter . [5] In negotiation, haragei is characterised by
euphemisms, vague and indirect statements, prolonged silences and
careful avoidance of any comment that might cause offense. [6]
Information is communicated through timing, facial expression and
emotional context, rather than through direct speech. [7] It is
sometimes considered a duplicitous tactic in negotiation to obfuscate
one's true intentions, which may cause haragei to be viewed with
suspicion. [8] It can also be misconstrued by those with limited
experience in the tactic. Haragei also functions as a method of
leadership, replacing direct orders to subordinates with subtle,
non-verbal signals. It is considered a desirable trait in a leader in
Japan. [9] However, it may make assigning of responsibility or blame to
the leader difficult. [ citation needed ] In martial arts [ edit ] In
martial arts circles, haragei has a different meaning, although the
concepts are related. Here it refers to those arts which enable the
practitioner to sense threats or anticipate an opponent's movements.
[10] [11] See also [ edit ] References [ edit ] ^ a b Davies, R & Ikeno,
O; The Japanese Mind: Understanding Contemporary Japanese Culture ;
Tuttle 2002 p103-108 ^ Yan, Z.; Xiao, C. G. (2008). Re-interpreting
Emperor Hirohito Reciting Shikai at the Imperial Meeting on September 6
.. Vol. 6. p. 18. ^ Hahn, T; Sensational knowledge: embodying culture
through Japanese dance , Wesleyan University Press, 2007, p67 ^ Lebra,
T. S. (1987). "The cultural significance of silence in Japanese
communication". Multilingua-Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage
Communication . 6 (4): 343–358. doi : 10.1515/mult.1987.6.4.343 . S2CID
201698606 . ^ Xiao, Q.; Wang, Z. X. (2010). "XIAO, Q., & WANG, Z. X".
Canadian Social Science . 3 (4): 30–32. ^ Binnendijk, H; National
Negotiating Styles , DIANE Publishing, 1987 p55 ^ Hassell, R; Haragei:
Speaking from the gut in Black Belt Magazine, January 1985 edition ^
Johnson, F; Dependency and Japanese Socialization: Psychoanalytic and
Anthropological Investigations in Amae , NYU Press 1995 ^ Kaiser, D;
Pedagogy and the practice of science: historical and contemporary
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haragei

The second was that the Japanese, like their German allies, had built an
analog computer encryption system which they thought was impregnable to
foreign codebreakers. Based on an earlier model German Enigma machine
that had been brought back to Japan by Baron Hiroshi Oshima (the top
Japanese diplomat in Germany and a notable secret operative), the first
Japanese version fell to US cryptanalysis relatively quickly.
Unfortunately for the Americans, their lax security in the peacetime
operations of the late 1930s soon alerted the Japanese that their “red”
code had been broken, and so a new effort was launched to develop more
secure communications. The resulting “Type 97 Alphabetical Typewriter”
or “Type B Cipher Machine” incorporated some Japanese technology that
was a considerable improvement on the original device.

Secrets Abroad: A History of the Japanese Purple Machine - Wonders & Marvels
by Alberto Perez (Vanderbilt University)

When one thinks about cryptography or encryption in World War II, the
first thing that comes to mind is the Enigma Machine used by the
Germans, whose code was broken by the Allies and used as a secret
tactical advantage over the Nazis. What many people don’t know is that
during World War II, the Japanese also developed a series of encryption
devices that improved upon the Enigma Machine and were used to transport
their top level military secrets. Upon the trust of Hitler and other
German officials, Japanese Baron Hiroshi Oshima bought a commercial
Enigma Machine from the Germans in hopes of developing a new version for
the Japanese (Japanese Purple Cipher). This effort resulted in the
creation of a new “enigma machine,” code-named “Red” by the US. The
Japanese Navy used it from about 1931 to 1936, when the device’s
cryptographic method was broken by the US Signal Intelligence Service
(Balciunas). Unfortunately for the US, the decryption of Red was not
kept very secret and the Japanese became suspicious. Soon after, the
Japanese began creating a new system to encipher their messages. In
1937, the Japanese created the “97-shiki O-bun In-ji-ki” or “97
Alphabetical Typewriter,” named for its creation on the Japanese year
2597. This device was better known by its US code-name, “Purple”
(Japanese Purple Cipher). The Purple Machine was made up of two
typewriters as well as an electrical rotor system with a 25 character
alphabetic switchboard. Like the Enigma Machine, the first typewriter
was the method in which the plaintext, or unencrypted message, could be
manually inputted. The typewriter was built to be compatible with
English, romaji, and roman, adding a level of mystery through language
choice. Unlike the Enigma Machine, which presented the text in the form
of blinking lights, Purple used a second electric typewriter, which
would type the cipher text, or encrypted message, onto a piece of paper
(Balciunas). This was a huge advancement to the Enigma Machine, which
would require two people to operate (one typing and one to record the
projections) because it only required one person to operate and would
reduce human errors. The only drawback to this was in the increased size
and weight of the Purple Machine, which rendered it unsuitable for use
in combat locations (Balciunas). (Photo Credit: Edwards Air Force Base )
The Purple Machine enciphered the messages with the use of its four
rotors and switchboard. Like the Enigma Machine, the machine would not
only have an unknown method of encryption, but also a secret key that
was changed on a daily basis. This meant that even if a Purple Machine
was stolen, it would be useless without the key of the day.
Additionally, as the key changed every day, code breakers would not be
able to find patterns in messages sent over several days. The daily key
would be inputted into the device by the arrangement of the switchboard
and rotors. The switchboard contained 25 connectio
https://www.wondersandmarvels.com/2013/02/secrets-abroad-a-history-of-the-japanese-purple-machine.html
Type B Cipher Machine - Wikipedia
Japanese diplomatic code named Purple by the US This article is about a
World War II era cipher used by the Japanese Foreign Office for
diplomatic communications. For other World War II era diplomatic
ciphers, see Japanese army and diplomatic codes . In the history of
cryptography , the "System 97 Typewriter for European Characters"
(九七式欧文印字機) or "Type B Cipher Machine" , codenamed Purple by the United
States, was an encryption machine used by the Japanese Foreign Office
from February 1939 to the end of World War II . The machine was an
electromechanical device that used stepping-switches to encrypt the most
sensitive diplomatic traffic. All messages were written in the 26-letter
English alphabet , which was commonly used for telegraphy. Any Japanese
text had to be transliterated or coded. The 26-letters were separated
using a plug board into two groups, of six and twenty letters
respectively. The letters in the sixes group were scrambled using a 6 ×
25 substitution table, while letters in the twenties group were more
thoroughly scrambled using three successive 20 × 25 substitution tables.
[1] The cipher codenamed "Purple" replaced the Type A Red machine
previously used by the Japanese Foreign Office. The sixes and twenties
division was familiar to U.S. Army Signals Intelligence Service (SIS)
cryptographers from their work on the Type A cipher and it allowed them
to make early progress on the sixes portion of messages. The twenties
cipher proved much more difficult, but a breakthrough in September 1940
allowed the Army cryptographers to construct a machine that duplicated
the behavior (was an analog ) of the Japanese machines, even though no
one in the U.S. had any description of one. [2] The Japanese also used
stepping-switches in systems, codenamed Coral and Jade , that did not
divide their alphabets. American forces referred to information gained
from decryptions as Magic . Development of Japanese cipher machines [
edit ] Overview [ edit ] The Imperial Japanese Navy did not cooperate
with the Army in pre-war cipher machine development, and that lack of
cooperation continued into World War II. The Navy believed the Purple
machine was sufficiently difficult to break that it did not attempt to
revise it to improve security. This seems to have been on the advice of
a mathematician, Teiji Takagi , who lacked a background in cryptanalysis
.. [ citation needed ] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supplied Red
and Purple by the Navy. No one in Japanese authority noticed the weak
points in both machines. Just before the end of the war, the Army warned
the Navy of a weak point of Purple, but the Navy failed to act on this
advice. [ citation needed ] The Army developed their own cipher machines
on the same principle as Enigma -- 92-shiki injiki , 97-shiki injiki and
1-shiki 1-go injiki -- from 1932 to 1941. The Army judged that these
machines had lower security than the Navy's Purple design, so the Army's
two cipher machines were less used. [ citation n
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_B_Cipher_Machine

"a425couple" wrote in message news:EEBCK.421213$ssF.159033@fx14.iad...

A Quora that touches on WWII Japanese in USA security concerns.

William Pellas
Studied at American Military University Updated 16h

Why didn't the Japanese in World War II think that the Allies could
break their communications codes?
There were several reasons.

The first was that most Japanese at that time believed that the
fundamentally alien nature of their language relative to the great
majority of the languages spoken by their likely enemies guaranteed a
layer of security for their crucial communications. It must be said that
there was a grain of truth to this perspective, because the many nuances
of the insular culture that had existed for many centuries on the
cramped Japanese Home Islands were very difficult for outsiders to
grasp. These same nuances (such as the practice of haragei) affected the
Japanese language in a myriad of ways that would not often be apparent
even to foreigners who had mastered that language from a grammatical
standpoint.

-----------------------

https://blog.pangeanic.com/worst-translation-mistake

They aren't alone, in English to think little versus nothing of something
have opposite meanings.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/48871/48871-h/48871-h.htm
The Japanese encryption system was a substitution cipher in which the
relationship changed for each letter in a complex but predictable pattern,
enabling a properly set receiver to duplicate the relationship and decode
the message.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigen%C3%A8re_cipher

Julius Caesar reportedly invented the underlying process:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caesar_cipher

The Secret Decoder Ring implements a Caesar cipher or its variants.

"a425couple" wrote in message news:EEBCK.421213$ssF.159033@fx14.iad...

A Quora that touches on WWII Japanese in USA security concerns.

....

The second was that the Japanese, like their German allies, had built an
analog computer encryption system which they thought was impregnable to
foreign codebreakers. Based on an earlier model German Enigma machine
that had been brought back to Japan by Baron Hiroshi Oshima (the top
Japanese diplomat in Germany and a notable secret operative), the first
Japanese version fell to US cryptanalysis relatively quickly.
Unfortunately for the Americans, their lax security in the peacetime
operations of the late 1930s soon alerted the Japanese that their “red”
code had been broken, and so a new effort was launched to develop more
secure communications. The resulting “Type 97 Alphabetical Typewriter”
or “Type B Cipher Machine” incorporated some Japanese technology that
was a considerable improvement on the original device.

------------------

The problem was Henry Stimson who shut down the State Department's
cryptanalytic office, saying "Gentlemen don't read each other's mail." The
personnel who left took their security consciousness with them.
https://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=488
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Chamber

We had been reading Japanese codes prior to the Washington Naval Conference
of 1922 and knew from them that the Japanese would accept a limitation of
3/5ths as many battleships as the US, still possibly enough to outnumber the
Pacific half of our fleet.

"a425couple" wrote in message news:EEBCK.421213$ssF.159033@fx14.iad...
....
William Pellas
I Live in the United States of AmericaUpdated Jul 16
What happened to US citizens of Japanese descent who were convicted of
espionage during WW2?
To my knowledge there were no US citizens of Japanese descent who were
convicted of espionage during WWII.

But this is not because none of them were spying for Japan.

Rather, there were no trials because the US was trying to keep its
greatest weapon a secret.

No, that weapon was not the atomic bomb, which would not be developed
and fielded until 1945. Rather, it was…MAGIC. “MAGIC” was the code word
for the summary reports produced by the highest level of American
crytanalysis and codebreaking. This effort began in earnest when US Navy
spooks and translators first broke a significant portion of the Imperial
Japanese Navy’s JN-25 cipher and related codes in 1940, with another
significant breakthrough in 1941.

----------------------

Extensive WW1 German spying and sabotage made an alarming precedent.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/57307/57307-h/57307-h.htm

https://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/the-vanceboro-bridge-bombing-germanys-secret-war-on-america/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fay

This illustrates our jittery fears:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Los_Angeles

General George Kenney who commanded the district at the time and was a
trained engineer wrote that the cause was an early warning radar detecting
seagulls over a garbage barge at several times its expected range. Accounts
I've read suggest radar ducting due to a temperature inversion, which would
also have caused the very low cloud reported as a UFO. Clouds look ominously
different up close, for example when skimming low over a mountain you are
standing on.
https://www.theweatherprediction.com/habyhints/234/

At the time observers were puzzled by the low blimp-like speed of the
approaching "raiders" and their sudden disappearance from radar at the
beach, which fits nicely with seagulls flying in and landing. We didn't
realize our radars could be that sensitive.

Optical ducting from ice-cold water under 50F Gulf Stream air may explain
some of the lingering mysteries of the Titanic, such as SOS position reports
20 and then 13 miles further west, on the other side of the ice field, which
is where the rescuers headed. Titanic had reported its latitude within a
mile of the wreck site. Fortunately Carpathia had been south-eastward and
passed close enough to the lifeboats to see their lights. The ship's
officers were washed into the sea while struggling to launch the last
lifeboat and the one who determined the position didn't survive to tell how.

"a425couple" <a425couple@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:EEBCK.421213$ssF.159033@fx14.iad...
>A Quora that touches on WWII Japanese in USA security concerns.
>
> William Pellas
> Studied at American Military University Updated 16h
>
> Why didn't the Japanese in World War II think that the Allies could break
> their communications codes?
> There were several reasons.
>
> The first was that most Japanese at that time believed that the
> fundamentally alien nature of their language relative to the great
> majority of the languages spoken by their likely enemies guaranteed a
> layer of security for their crucial communications.

They had a fundamental point, there were few non Japanese who
could speak the language fluently and even fewer considered
trustworthy enough to work on code breaking. It took years to build
up the system given the low base.

> It must be said that there was a grain of truth to this perspective,
> because the many nuances of the insular culture that had existed for many
> centuries on the cramped Japanese Home Islands were very difficult for
> outsiders to grasp. These same nuances (such as the practice of haragei)
> affected the Japanese language in a myriad of ways that would not often be
> apparent even to foreigners who had mastered that language from a
> grammatical standpoint.
>. [5] In negotiation, haragei is characterised by euphemisms, vague and
>indirect statements, prolonged silences and careful avoidance of any
>comment that might cause offense.

Why the need for code breaking when the messages themselves
will be difficult to understand by the intended recipients? Writing
loses lots of information, low bandwidth communication requires
clear precise wordage. More so when it becomes legal language
for things like treaties.

> https://www.wondersandmarvels.com/2013/02/secrets-abroad-a-history-of-the-japanese-purple-machine.html
> Type B Cipher Machine - Wikipedia
> Japanese diplomatic code named Purple by the US This article is about a
> World War II era cipher used by the Japanese Foreign Office for diplomatic
> communications.

> The Navy believed the Purple machine was sufficiently difficult to break
> that it did not attempt to revise it to improve security.

Not really surprising as the IJN was not using it. Their main fleet
code was what the allies called JN-25

John Prados' combined fleet decoded.

Page 439 on the Random House hard back edition, part of chapter
seventeen. The IJN had a naval attaché code the US called Coral,
it used a machine using the same operating principles as the
"Purple" devices, which the Japanese called the 97 Siki Romazi Inziki.
It was introduced in September 1939 and was more complicated
than the "Purple" devices and there were few messages sent using
it before December 1941. Coral was first read on 13 March 1944.

A similar 97 Siki Romazi Inziki machine was used by IJN shore
stations from either August or December 1942 to around August
1944, see page 344, this had been broken in August 1943, the
USN called this Jade and breaking it helped break Coral

> Japanese signals sent through this architecture were not penetrated to a
> comprehensive extent for more than two years—just in time for the pivotal
> Battle of Midway in June, 1942.

So now the IJN is using Japanese diplomatic codes within the fleet?

The IJN had the JN-25 system, which was introduced in 1939 and
upgraded at the end of 1940. It was a classic code book system.

The allies managed to know enough from it to send a second aircraft
carrier to the Coral Sea for example.

> Decryption reports were known as “MAGIC” and classified “Above Top Secret”,
> with the great majority not declassified until 1995 and beyond. Although
> at least one IJN officer voiced his suspicion in the aftermath of Midway
> that Japanese codes had been broken, the high command still persisted in
> its belief that this was impossible. Thus the treasure trove of
> intelligence that came to the Allies through their cryptanalysis continued
> to flow until the end of the war. To this day, MAGIC intercepts are not
> particularly well known to most students and even many scholars of the
> Pacific War, and they have direct and profound bearing on the history of
> the conflict.

Actually the IJN knew from interrogation of captured USN aircrew how
much the USN knew about the IJN Midway plan, the prisoners were
later executed. The cover was the IJN knew parts of the Midway fleet
were spotted by USN submarines leaving Japan.

> For Further Reading:
>
> Why Truman Dropped the Bomb
> HOME > JAPAN > TRUMAN'S DECISION Why Truman Dropped the Bomb [It's now the
> 70th anniversary of Little Boy. Mr Frank's article is from the August 8,
> 2005, issue of the Weekly Standard ] by Richard B. Frank The sixtieth
> anniversary of Hiroshima seems to be shaping up as a subdued
> affair--though not for any lack of significance. A survey of news editors
> in 1999 ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, first
> among the top one hundred stories of the twentieth century. And any
> thoughtful list of controversies in American history would place it near
> the top again. It was not always so. In 1945, an overwhelming majority of
> Americans regarded as a matter of course that the United States had used
> atomic bombs to end the Pacific war. They further believed that those
> bombs had actually ended the war and saved countless lives. This set of
> beliefs is now sometimes labeled by academic historians the
> "traditionalist" view. One unkindly dubbed it the "patriotic orthodoxy."
> But in the 1960s, what were previously modest and scattered challenges of
> the decision to use the bombs began to crystallize into a rival canon. The
> challengers were branded "revisionists," but this is inapt.

The labels being used suggest modern opinion shaping and
revisionism for WWII has a quite specific meaning, the attempt
to have Hitler as the good guy.

> Any historian who gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty
> to revise his appreciation of the relevant events. These challengers are
> better termed critics. The critics share three fundamental premises. The
> first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. The
> second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to
> surrender in the summer of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded
> Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knew that Japan was about
> to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation.

The answer to the above is the big 6 voted 3 to 3 war to peace from
early 1945 through the atomic bomb and USSR declaration of war.
The hope being that an invasion of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Marianas,
Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Kyushu would cost the enemy so much they
would agree to letting Japan continue with its current power structure,
and territory, certainly no occupation. As the war came closer to
Japan the military power balance moved towards Japan, it had a
much bigger army and Kamikaze force ready in Japan than deployed
at Okinawa and the aircraft could come in low over land, not have to
travel the over water distances to the allied fleet. All citizens
encouraged to take one allied soldier with them.

> https://warbirdforum.com/dropbomb.htm
>
> William Pellas
> I Live in the United States of AmericaUpdated Jul 16
> What happened to US citizens of Japanese descent who were convicted of
> espionage during WW2?
> To my knowledge there were no US citizens of Japanese descent who were
> convicted of espionage during WWII.
>
> But this is not because none of them were spying for Japan.

Actually it was a lack of Japanese spies.

> Rather, there were no trials because the US was trying to keep its
> greatest weapon a secret.
>
> No, that weapon was not the atomic bomb, which would not be developed and
> fielded until 1945. Rather, it was…MAGIC. “MAGIC” was the code word for
> the summary reports produced by the highest level of American crytanalysis
> and codebreaking. This effort began in earnest when US Navy spooks and
> translators first broke a significant portion of the Imperial Japanese
> Navy’s JN-25 cipher and related codes in 1940, with another significant
> breakthrough in 1941.

The 1941 effort was a joint one, Philippines and Singapore and it was
a steady accumulation.

So the only way to prosecute a person of Japanese origin for espionage
in WWII was to reveal codebreaking?

> JN-25 Fact Sheet
>
> War of Secrets: Cryptology in WWII
>
> The most notable success produced as a direct result of this American
> signals intelligence was the Battle of Midway, which was probably the
> single most decisive encounter in the entire Pacific War. Certainly it was
> the one that finally stopped the onrushing Japanese juggernaut, which had
> been running wild for nearly seven months ever since Pearl Harbor, in its
> tracks.

On 2/10/23 14:26, williamjpellas0314@yahoo.com wrote:
> On Saturday, July 23, 2022 at 1:25:09 PM UTC-4, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>> "a425couple" <a425c...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:EEBCK.421213$ssF.1...@fx14.iad...
>>> A Quora that touches on WWII Japanese in USA security concerns.
>>>
>>> William Pellas
>>> Studied at American Military University Updated 16h
>>>
>>> Why didn't the Japanese in World War II think that the Allies could break
>>> their communications codes?
>>> There were several reasons.
>>>
>>> The first was that most Japanese at that time believed that the
>>> fundamentally alien nature of their language relative to the great
>>> majority of the languages spoken by their likely enemies guaranteed a
>>> layer of security for their crucial communications.
>> They had a fundamental point, there were few non Japanese who
>> could speak the language fluently and even fewer considered
>> trustworthy enough to work on code breaking. It took years to build
>> up the system given the low base.
>>> It must be said that there was a grain of truth to this perspective,
>>> because the many nuances of the insular culture that had existed for many
>>> centuries on the cramped Japanese Home Islands were very difficult for
>>> outsiders to grasp. These same nuances (such as the practice of haragei)
>>> affected the Japanese language in a myriad of ways that would not often be
>>> apparent even to foreigners who had mastered that language from a
>>> grammatical standpoint.
>>> . [5] In negotiation, haragei is characterised by euphemisms, vague and
>>> indirect statements, prolonged silences and careful avoidance of any
>>> comment that might cause offense.
>> Why the need for code breaking when the messages themselves
>> will be difficult to understand by the intended recipients? Writing
>> loses lots of information, low bandwidth communication requires
>> clear precise wordage. More so when it becomes legal language
>> for things like treaties.
>>> https://www.wondersandmarvels.com/2013/02/secrets-abroad-a-history-of-the-japanese-purple-machine.html
>>> Type B Cipher Machine - Wikipedia
>>> Japanese diplomatic code named Purple by the US This article is about a
>>> World War II era cipher used by the Japanese Foreign Office for diplomatic
>>> communications.
>>> The Navy believed the Purple machine was sufficiently difficult to break
>>> that it did not attempt to revise it to improve security.
>> Not really surprising as the IJN was not using it. Their main fleet
>> code was what the allies called JN-25
>>
>> John Prados' combined fleet decoded.
>>
>> Page 439 on the Random House hard back edition, part of chapter
>> seventeen. The IJN had a naval attaché code the US called Coral,
>> it used a machine using the same operating principles as the
>> "Purple" devices, which the Japanese called the 97 Siki Romazi Inziki.
>> It was introduced in September 1939 and was more complicated
>> than the "Purple" devices and there were few messages sent using
>> it before December 1941. Coral was first read on 13 March 1944.
>>
>> A similar 97 Siki Romazi Inziki machine was used by IJN shore
>> stations from either August or December 1942 to around August
>> 1944, see page 344, this had been broken in August 1943, the
>> USN called this Jade and breaking it helped break Coral
>>> Japanese signals sent through this architecture were not penetrated to a
>>> comprehensive extent for more than two years—just in time for the pivotal
>>> Battle of Midway in June, 1942.
>> So now the IJN is using Japanese diplomatic codes within the fleet?
>>
>> The IJN had the JN-25 system, which was introduced in 1939 and
>> upgraded at the end of 1940. It was a classic code book system.
>>
>> The allies managed to know enough from it to send a second aircraft
>> carrier to the Coral Sea for example.
>>> Decryption reports were known as “MAGIC” and classified “Above Top Secret”,
>>> with the great majority not declassified until 1995 and beyond. Although
>>> at least one IJN officer voiced his suspicion in the aftermath of Midway
>>> that Japanese codes had been broken, the high command still persisted in
>>> its belief that this was impossible. Thus the treasure trove of
>>> intelligence that came to the Allies through their cryptanalysis continued
>>> to flow until the end of the war. To this day, MAGIC intercepts are not
>>> particularly well known to most students and even many scholars of the
>>> Pacific War, and they have direct and profound bearing on the history of
>>> the conflict.
>> Actually the IJN knew from interrogation of captured USN aircrew how
>> much the USN knew about the IJN Midway plan, the prisoners were
>> later executed. The cover was the IJN knew parts of the Midway fleet
>> were spotted by USN submarines leaving Japan.
>>> For Further Reading:
>>>
>>> Why Truman Dropped the Bomb
>>> HOME > JAPAN > TRUMAN'S DECISION Why Truman Dropped the Bomb [It's now the
>>> 70th anniversary of Little Boy. Mr Frank's article is from the August 8,
>>> 2005, issue of the Weekly Standard ] by Richard B. Frank The sixtieth
>>> anniversary of Hiroshima seems to be shaping up as a subdued
>>> affair--though not for any lack of significance. A survey of news editors
>>> in 1999 ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, first
>>> among the top one hundred stories of the twentieth century. And any
>>> thoughtful list of controversies in American history would place it near
>>> the top again. It was not always so. In 1945, an overwhelming majority of
>>> Americans regarded as a matter of course that the United States had used
>>> atomic bombs to end the Pacific war. They further believed that those
>>> bombs had actually ended the war and saved countless lives. This set of
>>> beliefs is now sometimes labeled by academic historians the
>>> "traditionalist" view. One unkindly dubbed it the "patriotic orthodoxy."
>>> But in the 1960s, what were previously modest and scattered challenges of
>>> the decision to use the bombs began to crystallize into a rival canon. The
>>> challengers were branded "revisionists," but this is inapt.
>> The labels being used suggest modern opinion shaping and
>> revisionism for WWII has a quite specific meaning, the attempt
>> to have Hitler as the good guy.
>>> Any historian who gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty
>>> to revise his appreciation of the relevant events. These challengers are
>>> better termed critics. The critics share three fundamental premises. The
>>> first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. The
>>> second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to
>>> surrender in the summer of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded
>>> Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knew that Japan was about
>>> to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation.
>> The answer to the above is the big 6 voted 3 to 3 war to peace from
>> early 1945 through the atomic bomb and USSR declaration of war.
>> The hope being that an invasion of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Marianas,
>> Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Kyushu would cost the enemy so much they
>> would agree to letting Japan continue with its current power structure,
>> and territory, certainly no occupation. As the war came closer to
>> Japan the military power balance moved towards Japan, it had a
>> much bigger army and Kamikaze force ready in Japan than deployed
>> at Okinawa and the aircraft could come in low over land, not have to
>> travel the over water distances to the allied fleet. All citizens
>> encouraged to take one allied soldier with them.
>>> https://warbirdforum.com/dropbomb.htm
>>>
>>> William Pellas
>>> I Live in the United States of AmericaUpdated Jul 16
>>> What happened to US citizens of Japanese descent who were convicted of
>>> espionage during WW2?
>>> To my knowledge there were no US citizens of Japanese descent who were
>>> convicted of espionage during WWII.
>>>
>>> But this is not because none of them were spying for Japan.
>> Actually it was a lack of Japanese spies.
>>> Rather, there were no trials because the US was trying to keep its
>>> greatest weapon a secret.
>>>
>>> No, that weapon was not the atomic bomb, which would not be developed and
>>> fielded until 1945. Rather, it was…MAGIC. “MAGIC” was the code word for
>>> the summary reports produced by the highest level of American crytanalysis
>>> and codebreaking. This effort began in earnest when US Navy spooks and
>>> translators first broke a significant portion of the Imperial Japanese
>>> Navy’s JN-25 cipher and related codes in 1940, with another significant
>>> breakthrough in 1941.
>> The 1941 effort was a joint one, Philippines and Singapore and it was
>> a steady accumulation.
>>
>> So the only way to prosecute a person of Japanese origin for espionage
>> in WWII was to reveal codebreaking?
>>> JN-25 Fact Sheet
>>>
>>> War of Secrets: Cryptology in WWII
>>>
>>> The most notable success produced as a direct result of this American
>>> signals intelligence was the Battle of Midway, which was probably the
>>> single most decisive encounter in the entire Pacific War. Certainly it was
>>> the one that finally stopped the onrushing Japanese juggernaut, which had
>>> been running wild for nearly seven months ever since Pearl Harbor, in its
>>> tracks.
>> Guadalcanal?
>>> US Navy Aircraft Carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5) Under Attack by Imperial
>>> Japanese Navy Bombers During the Battle of Midway, 4 June - 7 June 1942.
>>> Yorktown Was Lost During the Battle, But the USN Won an Overwhelming
>>> Tactical and Strategic Victory, Sinking Four Japanese Aircraft Carriers
>>> and Two Heavy Cruisers. Midway Was Largely the Product of US Navy
>>> Codebreaking.
>> One heavy cruiser.
>>> How Did the U.S. Break Japanese Military Codes Before the Battle of
>>> Midway?
>>>
>>> But prior to the war, MAGIC had revealed another vitally important piece
>>> of information: Japanese officials were caught red handed in several
>>> transmissions during which the mobilization of Japanese-Americans for
>>> espionage was discussed in detail.
>> Having taken part in the creation of the electronic copy of the messages,
>> so more than just read them, the messages reporting the lack of
>> success and the lack of information need to be mentioned.
>>> In addition, literally hundreds of MAGIC intercepts contained intelligence
>>> (spy) reports obtained from surveillance of targets in the US, though the
>>> identities of the agents were usually not provided.
>> Like the usual military attaches etc. or people talking about what
>> they were seeing.
>>> Nominally “neutral” Spain subsequently ran a wide-ranging spy network in
>>> North America with German and Japanese input and logistical support, and
>>> it is known that there was also considerable sympathy for the Axis cause
>>> in South America—where future Argentine leader Juan Peron was also
>>> involved in espionage aimed at the United States. But again this came
>>> later, in 1942–43, after the intelligence intercepts described immediately
>>> above.
>>>
>>> A Declassified MAGIC Intercept of a Spanish Espionage Report Regarding an
>>> Allied Convoy Spotted as it Sailed Past Gibraltar During WWII. The Report
>>> Was Sent From Lisbon, Portugal, to a Japanese Intelligence Operative in
>>> Berlin, Germany. I Took This Photo Myself in Person at the US National
>>> Archives in Suitland, MD, in 2012.
>> Right so the Japanese in Berlin were given a message from
>> Spain and this relates to Japanese activity in the US in what way?
>>> Further, according to a May, 1983 article in the New York Times:
>>>
>>> “A cable from the Tokyo Government to its Washington embassy, dated Jan.
>>> 30, 1941, asked the embassy and Japanese consulates to arrange for
>>> ''utilization of our 'second generations' and our resident nationals.''
>>> But it added, in parentheses, ''in view of the fact that if there is any
>>> slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to
>>> considerable persecution, the utmost caution must be exercised.''
>>>
>>> On May 9, 1941, the Los Angeles consulate sent Tokyo a message marked
>>> ''strictly secret'' that seemed to assert that cooperation was being
>>> obtained from some ethnic Japanese.
>> Right so mobilise the citizens and then comes "seems" to have
>> happened, no chance the people in the embassies putting a gloss
>> on their efforts for example?
>>> The cable said strong efforts were being made to recruit white and black
>>> agents ''through Japanese persons whom we can trust completely.''
>> So in other words probable US citizens as spies who are initially
>> screened by Japanese citizens known to the embassy.
>>> ''We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable Japanese
>>> in the San Pedro and San Diego area, who will keep a close watch on all
>>> shipments of airplanes and other war materials, and report the amounts and
>>> destinations of such shipments,'' the message said. ''We shall maintain
>>> connection with our second generations who are in the army, to keep us
>>> informed of various developments in the army. We also have connections
>>> with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence
>>> purposes.''
>>>
>>> A cable from the Seattle consulate dated May 11 told Tokyo that
>>> intelligence would be collected on United States naval ships in the
>>> Bremerton, Wash., Naval shipyard; on mercantile shipping; on aircraft
>>> manufacturing, and on troop and ship movements.
>> So where are all the reports to Tokyo?
>>> David Lowman, who was previously the special assistant to the director of
>>> the National Security Agency, was personally responsible for the
>>> declassification and subsequent publication of some of the MAGIC
>>> documents. In the Times piece, he is quoted as saying:
>>>
>>> ''Anyone reading this flow of messages during 1941 could easily conclude
>>> that thousands of resident Japanese were being organized into subversive
>>> organizations…Today we know that the Japanese Government misjudged the
>>> loyalty of Japanese Americans completely. But at that time no one knew for
>>> certain.''
>> Anyone unaware of how subordinates like to report only good news
>> to their far away superiors, and the lack of hard information going
>> back in the diplomatic traffic.
>>> However, it seems that he was toeing the politically correct line at the
>>> time, because later in life he became quite outspoken about the threat to
>>> US security posed by some Japanese Americans (and also by Japanese
>>> nationals living in the US and its overseas territories) during WWII. So
>>> much so, in fact, that he wrote a book, MAGIC: The Untold Story of U.S.
>>> Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast
>>> during World War II, in which he argued vociferously that the internment
>>> camps were justified given what the US knew because of its above top
>>> secret codebreaking. Note that Lowman’s book was not published until after
>>> his death.
>>> Among Lowman’s biggest complaints was that both federal and California
>>> state government money was (and still is) being spent to perpetuate the
>>> narrative of the Japanese Americans as completely innocent and the victims
>>> of fearmongering and racism. Murphey summarizes:
>>>
>>> "California presently appropriates millions of dollars in support of the
>>> ‘official' history of Japanese evacuation." Such continued funding of a
>>> skewed telling of history by federal and state governments and by
>>> tax-exempt organizations, all propelled by politics and ideology,
>>> exacerbates a problem that in lesser forms has long bedeviled serious
>>> scholars. When prior generations, for example, have enshrined specific and
>>> often highly partisan perceptions in monuments, cemeteries, and public
>>> commemorations of all kinds, they have promoted a certain "received
>>> history." That version has then become the mythology of the age that has
>>> followed.
>> The lack of a similar round up of Italian American and German American
>> citizens or just their exclusion from coastal areas where the U-boats
>> were sinking large numbers of ships and also landing the occasional
>> agent needs to be explained. The community did have some spies.
>>> THE RELOCATION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II : Dwight D.
>>> Murphey
>>>
>>> Dwight D. Murphey Collection
>>>
>>> Internment Archives — Link goes to the section “MAGIC: The Untold Story”
>>> on the Internment Archives website.
>>>
>>> Internment Archives— Link goes to the article, A NATIONAL DISGRACE:
>>> The Story of the Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast During WW II,
>>> Based on Contemporary Evidence Not Racial Demagoguery. By Lee Allen,
>>> Lt.Col. U. S. Army (Ret.) with help from William J. Hopwood, Cmdr.
>>> U.S.N.R. (Ret.)
>>>
>>> Internment Archives— Link goes to the article, “Critique of the
>>> Smithsonian Institution's Exhibit: "A More Perfect Union: Japanese
>>> Americans and the U.S. Constitution”, by Lee Allen and Sam Allen.
>>>
>>> American Military Bases, Equipment, Soldiers, and Sailors Under Attack
>>> During the Japanese Air Raid on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 7 December 1941. The
>>> Assault Was Aided Greatly By Information Gathered From Espionage by Both
>>> Japanese Military Personnel and Japanese Americans Living in Hawaii.
>>>
>>> In the end, no Japanese Americans were charged with spying, treason, or
>>> fifth column activities as a result of being discovered through MAGIC, and
>>> as far as I know there were no legal or court proceedings to that
>>> effect—at least not publicly. But that was not because none of them were
>>> guilty. It was because, as Richard Frank writes, “By the summer of 1945,
>>> Allied radio intelligence was breaking into a million messages a month
>>> from the Japanese Imperial Army alone, and many thousands from the
>>> Imperial Navy and Japanese diplomats.” This intelligence was by far
>>> America’s greatest and most important advantage over its Japanese
>>> adversaries in the death struggle that was the Pacific War. It was an
>>> advantage, and a secret, that had to be protected at all costs, even to
>>> the point of accepting blame from postwar academic leftists and activists
>>> for crimes that were either nothing of the sort, or at minimum were far
>>> less than they have been made out to be ever since the 1960s.
>> Right so the US investigation system, given the tip offs from Magic
>> was totally unable to build a case against any Japanese person for
>> spying without revealing the decrypts, even in wartime, but did so
>> for some other spies. Were the Japanese just that much better?
>>> Were the Japanese internment camps justified?
>>> An argument can be made that they were, and it is a strong one. It turns
>>> out that Japan was actively trying to recruit espionage and sabotage
>>> agents from among the ranks of both its own nationals and first generation
>>> Japanese-Americans who were living and working in the US or its
>>> territories, like Hawaii.
>> You mean like the other axis powers?
>>> This effort was evidently fairly successful. There are literally hundreds
>>> of MAGIC SIGINT (signals intelligence) intercepts of spy reports by these
>>> recruits and other Japanese operatives that prove it.
>> Not in the diplomatic traffic unless of course "other Japanese
>> operatives" are added, you know, the embassy staff doing their
>> professional duty.
>>> As it happened, several thousand German and Italian foreign nationals who
>>> had been in the United States during the Pearl Harbor attack and afterward
>>> were rounded up by the FBI and other government agencies and put in camps,
>>> themselves.
>> Yes, the expected policy is to intern foreign citizens. Not round up
>> the entire community of axis-Americans.
>>> Hoover apparently had no problem with this policy,
>> Like everyone else.
>>> Is there any way to justify the forcible internment of Japanese Americans
>>> during WWII?
>>> Yes. It’s right here: 1941 CABLES BOASTED OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN SPYING
>>> Throughout 1941, US counterintelligence intercepted, decrypted, and
>>> translated numerous transmissions (“cables”, though also radio traffic) in
>>> which Japanese government and military officials discussed active and
>>> apparently successful attempts by Japan to recruit spies and possible
>>> future saboteurs from among both Japanese-American citizens—that is, 1st
>>> and even 2nd generation Americans born in the US—and Japanese nationals
>>> living and working in the US and Hawaii.
>> Apparent success? Did they or did they not? And what about the
>> ideas to recruit non ethnic Japanese?
>>> A cable from the Tokyo Government to its Washington embassy, dated Jan.
>>> 30, 1941, asked the embassy and Japanese consulates to arrange for
>>> ''utilization of our 'second generations' and our resident nationals.''
>>> But it added, in parentheses, ''in view of the fact that if there is any
>>> slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to
>>> considerable persecution, the utmost caution must be exercised.''
>> Results?
>>> On May 9, 1941, the Los Angeles consulate sent Tokyo a message marked
>>> ''strictly secret'' that seemed to assert that cooperation was being
>>> obtained from some ethnic Japanese.
>> Co-operation meaning telling what they saw or what?
>>> Japan in fact succeeded in organizing and running at least a handful of
>>> spy networks in the continental United States during the war, and also
>>> operated a “SIGINT” (signals intelligence) station in Mexico that listened
>>> in on American radio traffic.
>> So where were the rings and what did they do. The move to
>> Mexico was a long standing plan, neutral country.
>>> William Pellas's answer to Did the Japanese know that atomic bombs were
>>> being built? US agents were also able to identify a number of Japanese,
>>> both Japanese-Americans and Japanese nationals, who provided essential
>>> intel on American forces in and around Pearl Harbor.
>> Yet none are named and when the IJN officer who took part in the
>> route proving voyage, come in from the north, arrived he simply took
>> a joy flight for a complete view of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese
>> consulate was quite able to keep a watch on USN activities.
>>> This information contributed greatly to the overwhelming Japanese success
>>> in the air raid of 7 December, 1941, in which more than 2,200 Americans
>>> were killed.
>> So who were the non Japanese consulate staff supplying this key
>> information? What was the vital stuff the consulate could not discover?
>>> So, in light of this, I have some questions for all of the retroactive
>>> pseudomoral handwringers who love to make great hay of this issue. 1. If
>>> Roosevelt had ignored this intelligence and Japanese-American spies and
>>> saboteurs had succeeded in killing other American civilians on US soil,
>>> and/or in causing critical damage to US war industry through sabotage,
>>> and/or in providing crucial intelligence that paved the way for additional
>>> Japanese military victories that killed additional thousands of American
>>> servicemen, would all that have been perfectly alright with you?
>> The trouble with this idea is lots more evidence members of the
>> European axis American community were doing bad things.
>>> 2. What if this additional Japanese fifth column activity won the war for
>>> Japan?
>> The idea being to bury America under a pile of messages that promised
>> much but delivered little?
>>> 3. Do you think you would like the postwar world that Japan would have
>>> built as well as the one the US built, had the Japanese won the war?
>> Unlikely.
>>> 4. And, what would you think of Roosevelt’s Constitutional responsibility
>>> to his nation had he refused or failed to act on the intelligence he was
>>> receiving?
>> So interning everyone because some might be bad guys is
>> constitutional?
>>> Gee, I guess maybe it’s not quite so simple as plain old white male
>>> racism, now, is it? Hint: No, it’s not.
>> Easy when you ask the questions and supply the answers.
>>
>> Go round up the European axis Americans, there was a lot more
>> evidence members of those communities were undertaking anti
>> US operations though their spies were apparently easier to catch,
>> not needing Magic intercepts read out in open court to obtain a
>> conviction.
>>> William Pellas
>>> · Jul 16
>>> Why is FDR considered a great leader when he is responsible for thousands
>>> of Asian-Americans being sent to internment camps?
>>> One of the many tragedies resulting from the New Left - PC takeover of the
>>> public education system in the West in general—and in the United States in
>>> particular—is the politicization and general destruction of the history of
>>> the Second World War.
>> Right so not about history but about today.
>>> For the record, there were a number of Japanese spies at Pearl Harbor, and
>>> they provided crucial intelligence in the runup to the attack against the
>>> US Pacific Fleet on 7 December 1941. Some of these, to be sure, were
>>> Japanese nationals and military professionals as opposed to American
>>> citizens of Japanese descent—most of whom, certainly, were loyal to the
>>> US—but nevertheless, they were there. For example, this man: Imperial
>>> Japanese Navy Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa, the Top Japanese Spy in Hawaii in
>>> the Years Immediately Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December
>>> 1941.
>> Member of the consulate staff. Japanese citizen. IJN officer.
>>> After the war, Yoshikawa would claim that he never used Japanese-Americans
>>> living in Hawaii as sources for his espionage, but this is certainly
>>> false.
>> So no evidence, just an assertion he must be telling lies.
>>> Japanese American Richard Kotoshirodo and Japanese national John Mikami
>>> are known to have spied for Japan (if in fairness not necessarily directly
>>> for Yoshikawa), and they gathered extensive amounts of information that
>>> was very useful to the Japanese forces that attacked Pearl Harbor.
>> So what information, and how did it get back to Japan?
>>> In addition, a Japanese American couple—Yoshio and Irene Harada—joined a
>>> Japanese pilot in his one man reign of terror when he crash landed at
>>> Niihau island, Hawaii after being shot down by American fighters.
>> This is evidence of possibly war outcome changing spying?
>>> A combined Spanish fascist - Japanese spy network code-named “TO”
>>> (pronounced “toe” and also known as “Span-Nap”) may have managed to
>>> penetrate the eastern branch of the Manhattan Project before it was
>>> smashed by a joint US-Canadian counterintelligence sting in 1943.
>> So may have, replacing seems to. And non Japanese involvement.
>>> The FBI informs you that known Japanese spies, including at least a few
>>> Japanese-American citizens more sympathetic to Tokyo than they are loyal
>>> to Washington, are operating in Hawaii and on the US mainland. Do you
>>> really have time to develop detailed dossiers and interview every one of
>>> these people to figure out who is loyal and who is not?
>> Replace Japanese with German and Italian above.
>>> Therefore, the President ordered that they be rounded up and essentially
>>> quarantined from the rest of the population until there was reasonable
>>> assurance that some among them were not providing material aid,
>>> assistance, and intelligence to a hostile foreign power that had already
>>> killed more than 2,200 Americans—and that would kill many, many more
>>> before the War was decided.
>> As above. The US merchant marine notes it suffered a higher
>> percentage casualty rate than any of the US armed forces, including
>> the Marines, mostly to U-boat attack.
>>> Was this a draconian solution to a difficult problem? Yes. Were any
>>> Japanese-Americans killed in the process? Even a single one? No (although
>>> a handful did perish in various incidents in the relocation camps).
>> Ignoring suicides.
>>> A number of Japanese Americans in fact went on to serve with valor and
>>> distinction in the US armed forces against the Axis powers.
>> Despite rather than because of the treatment received.
>>> Did the Japanese send spies to USA during WW2?
>>> Yes. During the interim between the first and second world wars, Japanese
>>> espionage operations included SIGINT (signals intelligence) conducted by
>>> at least one spy ship which sailed off the US west coast, and clandestine
>>> break-ins at various western nation consulates.
>> So actions before war are now counted. Like the US operations
>> doing the same to foreigners?
>>> Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn (sometimes referred to as Kuhn ) and his family
>>> were spies in the employ of the Abwehr for Nazi Germany who had close ties
>>> to Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels .
>> So a German national working for Japan and the preferred solution
>> is to round up the Japanese but not the Germans?
>>> [1] In 1935, Goebbels offered Kuehn a job working for Japanese
>>> intelligence in Hawaii ; he accepted and moved his family to Honolulu on
>>> August 15, 1935.
>> https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/pearl-harbor-spy
>>
>> All he needed was IJN submarines to watch for his visual signals.
>>> Dr. Kuhn would flash coded messages from the attic of the Kuhn household—a
>>> system that went undetected until the end.
>> Including by any IJN warships.
>>
>> The Japanese espionage/spying network in the US was less
>> successful than the German and Italian ones. The evidence given
>> for rounding up Japanese Americans is the Japanese government
>> employed people of European origin as spies as well as tried to
>> recruit at least informers from the Japanese American community
>> but no evidence the recruitment worked. The lack of ethnic Japanese
>> spies being caught is put down to the only way to prosecute them
>> was to reveal the extent of allied code breaking, but spies of other
>> nationalities were easier, not needing such evidence.
>>
>> Pearl Harbor was wide open pre war, a visit to a hill overlooking
>> the area, a joy ride in the area but apparently it took spies in the
>> community to obtain key information necessary for the attack to
>> work well, but no mention of what that information was. The IJN
>> and USN had considered each other their most probable enemy
>> for over 20 years by 1940, and each had built up large dossiers
>> on the other.
>>
>> Whatever the moral and legal views of what happened the articles
>> range over time and space to find Japanese behaving badly, or
>> people helping Japanese to behave badly, and asserts there were
>> lots of Japanese in the US who were really good at being bad, over
>> and above the usual people in the diplomatic system. The main
>> thing missing is evidence.
>>
>> Geoffrey Sinclair
>> Remove the nb for email.
>
> The only thing missing is evidence? Hardly.
>
> It's all through the following article, particularly in the links to the "Internment Archives". There are a number of additional articles on Quora written by David Brown, a former US Army general staff officer, which provide many additional sources and pieces of evidence.
>
> https://qr.ae/pvSXZq
>
Thank you for the update on the subject you know well, Mr. Pellas.