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https://amgreatness.com/2023/09/28/the-ukrainian-gordian-knot/?utm_campaign=Cultivation&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=276739390&utm_content=276739390&utm_source=hs_email

The Ukrainian Gordian Knot
Risk of being cut by a Russian nuclear sword

By Victor Davis Hanson

September 28, 2023
Most Americans understandably favor the Ukrainian resistance against
Vladimir Putin’s Russian naked 2022 aggression.

Yet for Ukraine to break the current deadlock—our generation’s Verdun
with perhaps 600,000 combined casualties so far— and “win” the war, it
apparently must have the military wherewithal to hit targets inside Russia.

Such strategically logical attacks might nevertheless provoke a wounded
and unpredictable Russia finally to carry out its boilerplate and
ignored existential threats.

From the last 75 years of big-power rivalries, the operational “rules”
of proxy wars are well known.

In Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan, Russia supplied America’s
enemies—sometimes even sending Russian pilots into combat zones.

Thousands of Americans likely died due to our adversaries’ use of
Russian munitions and personnel.

Likewise, Russia lost 15,000 fatalities in its decade-long misadventure
in Afghanistan. In part, Moscow’s defeat may have been due to deadly
American weapons, including sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

In the bloody decades of these big-power proxy wars, many were fought on
or near the borders of Russia or China.

Yet none of these surrogate conflicts of the nuclear age ever led to hot
wars between the U.S. and Russia or China.

But Ukraine risks now becoming a new—and different—proxy war altogether.

Never has the U.S. squared off against Russia or China in a conventional
proxy war over either’s respective historical borders (whether
illegitimate or not).

Neither has Russia nor the U.S. itself ever provided weapons to a proxy
belligerent that were used directly inside the respective homeland of
either side. They understood superpowers react unpredictably to any
third-party who fuels direct conventional attacks on their homelands.

Nobly protecting both Ukraine and Taiwan understandably holds a
potential risk of big-power escalation that even Vietnam, Korea,
Afghanistan, and Iraq likely did not.

The U.S. rightly is very sensitive to intrusions of any rival big power
near its own borders.

When the Soviets had supplied missiles aimed at the U.S. to its proxy
communist Cuba, the Kennedy administration was willing to risk war
against Moscow. Indeed, America went to DefCon 2, the second highest
level of nuclear readiness.

If all the current 1916-style talk of going into Mexico—ostensibly to
stop the cartels from importing drugs over an inert border that kill
100,000 Americans a year—were to be reified, would the U.S. warn Moscow
not to supply Mexico or the cartels with weapons or advisors?

The U.S. in 1917 declared war in part because of German interference in
our own territorial affairs.

A hacked telegram from German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Arthur
Zimmermann revealed Germany had promised a potential proxy, Mexico, some
U.S. territory if it were to join the Central Powers to defeat the
Allies. That provocation helped convince enraged Americans to enter
World War I.

The 9/11 hit was followed by an immediate American invasion of
Afghanistan on the grounds that the third-party Taliban helped
terrorists strike our homeland.

Additionally, nowhere in the world has territory been more disputed than
in Ukraine.

Seventy-eight years ago, Joseph Stalin’s Russia formally annexed his
previously stolen western regions of currently independent Ukraine. The
lands were taken mostly from Poland, but also a few parts from Hungary,
Romania, and the former Czechoslovakia.

Russia also seized and occupied Crimea in 2014. The peninsula had
previously been Russian from 1783-1954.

Yet Crimea was only ceded by Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine in 1954 as
a political ploy of then Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev
—himself born near the Ukrainian border.

Khrushchev sought to ensure that a restive Ukraine stayed an integral
part of a supposedly eternal Soviet Union by ceremonially including
Crimea into one of its own Soviet state’s sub-jurisdictions.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the short-lived Russian-majority, and
independent Republic of Crimea (1992-95), was annexed by the newly
independent Ukraine.

It then remained part of the Ukrainian nation for 19 years until the
2014 invasion.

Why Putin for a third time dared invade Ukraine is obfuscated by
contemporary domestic politics.

He likely enacted his irredentist agenda of restoring the borders of the
former Soviet Union in 2008, 2014, and 2021, because he
gambled—correctly—that the Bush, Obama, and Biden administrations could
not successfully oppose his serial annexations.

Equally forgotten were the policies of the Obama, Trump, and Biden
administrations regarding the 2014 Russian annexation of the Donbas and
Crimea. Prior to the February 24, 2022 Russian attack on Kyiv, none of
the three had ever sought to force Russia to give up either the
borderlands or the Crimea.

The Obama administration’s disastrous 2009-2014 Russian “reset”
appeasement policy, the 2015-16 Russian collusion hoax, and the
humiliating American skedaddle from Kabul also convinced Putin that
America either would not or could not oppose his 2022 invasion.

America should help Ukraine resist Russian aggression. But we should be
mindful in doing so that the entire region is an historical Gordian Knot
of poorly understood but ancient intertwined and competing threads—one
that may risk being cut by a Russian nuclear sword.

"a425couple" wrote in message news:mdXSM.270311$vMO8.237677@fx16.iad...

from
https://amgreatness.com/2023/09/28/the-ukrainian-gordian-knot/?utm_campaign=Cultivation&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=276739390&utm_content=276739390&utm_source=hs_email

The Ukrainian Gordian Knot
Risk of being cut by a Russian nuclear sword

By Victor Davis Hanson

---------------------------

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/10/tactical-russian-nuke-wouldnt-confer-much-battlefield-advantage-experts-say/378181/

A comparable situation during WW1 was a heavy artillery barrage on any
identified troop concentration. The defense that quickly developed was to
dig bunkers and disperse the troops into several lines of trenches, with the
first lightly manned, only enough to detect an attack and call for help. The
attacking force was more exposed than the defenders and vulnerable to shorts
from their own overhead fire, a problem that could continue with nuclear
missiles, especially if intercepted.

This is the WW2 version:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_on_target

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:ufk561$d8ag$1@dont-email.me...
> The defense that quickly developed was to dig bunkers and disperse the
> troops into several lines of trenches, with the first lightly manned, only
> enough to detect an attack and call for help.

As a result both sides relieved the boredom by taking up the hobby of
raiding the enemy's lightly manned trenches at night on the excuse of
bringing back prisoners to interrogate. In Herbert McBride's account to
avoid shooting each other they armed themselves with mainly short-ranged
melee weapons, such as machine gun barrels to use as clubs. With automatic
weapons available they chose to fight the Hun like the Romans.

https://www.amazon.com/Rifleman-Went-War-Herbert-McBride/dp/1517731828
He went to Canada to get INTO the war and seems to have actually enjoyed it.
His accounts of sniping became a textbook, for example he fired from the
grass near a wrecked farmhouse that drew all the return fire, and carefully
sketched the enemy line to detect any changes.