The 1967 Six-Day War
Nuclear Proliferation International History Project
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT
Avner Cohen
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war

The 1967 Six-Day War is probably the most important and most researched event in the Middle East since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Volumes of studies have been produced over the five decades since.

Yet, one important aspect remains obscure and untold:

the crisis’ nuclear dimension.

the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) has released historical testimonies and documents revealing that the crisis had an underlying twofold nuclear dimension.

First, Israel’s nuclear program played a vital role on the threat perception of both sides.

Second, and more significantly, those testimonies reveal now that Israel, during the May–June 1967 crisis, first assembled its first rudimentary nuclear devices.

While potential for renewed Arab-Israeli hostility simmered in early 1967, most regional actors neither expected nor sought a new military confrontation. This is particularly true for the leaders of Israel and Egypt: Levi Eshkol and Gamal Abdel Nasser. How, then, did a major war erupt seemingly against the wishes of both sides?

Over the last two decades, more evidence on the role Dimona played in shaping Israeli and Egyptian perceptions of each other has surfaced. This introductory essay utilizes this recent historical material to further revisit and clarify the significance of Dimona and provide greater context to the crisis and war of 1967.

In line with IDF intelligence assessments, Eshkol worried about a bellicose Egyptian reaction to Dimona, should Egypt conclude Israel was acquiring a bomb. Responding to these concerns, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin ordered in November 1965 the Chief of Military Intelligence (AMAN), Aharon Yariv, to develop a collection system, codenamed “Senator,” to provide the IDF an early warning about Egyptian hostile intentions on Dimona.

In March 1965, Rabin mentioned Dimona’s “lack of international legitimacy” as something that could trigger Egypt into military action: “If Egypt bombs Dimona, and we want to wage a war, we could be issued an ultimatum from the entire world.”[

Although Nasser’s 1960 pledge of waging a “preventive war” to stop Israel from developing nuclear weapons was generally viewed by Israeli intelligence as not too credible, a limited, aerial attack at Dimona was taken as a feasible threat.

two Egyptian MiG 21s flew over Dimona, entering Israel at high altitude from Jordan. That reconnaissance flight over Dimona, along with the Egyptian request to remove the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from its positions on the border, convinced the Israeli leadership that the crisis was serious.

The second reconnaissance flight over Dimona took place mid-day on May 26. The previous day, there had been a great deal of anxiety about a surprise Egyptian air strike aimed at Dimona and Israeli air bases; there were signs that such an attack could come at any moment. In response, Eshkol fired off two alarming cables to Foreign Minister Abba Eban in Washington, the second cable stating, “Dramatic changes happened” and an attack on Israel – Dimona and the air bases -- could be imminent.

https://image.cnbcfm.com/api/v1/image/49199169-benjamin-netanyahu-red-line-bomb-200.jpg?v=1350440843&w=1600&h=900

On Monday, August 14, 2023 at 11:10:01 AM UTC-4, chromebook test wrote:
> The 1967 Six-Day War
> Nuclear Proliferation International History Project
> NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT
> Avner Cohen
> https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-six-day-war
>
>
> The 1967 Six-Day War is probably the most important and most researched event in the Middle East since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Volumes of studies have been produced over the five decades since.
>
> Yet, one important aspect remains obscure and untold:
>
> the crisis’ nuclear dimension.
>
>
>
> the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) has released historical testimonies and documents revealing that the crisis had an underlying twofold nuclear dimension.
>
> First, Israel’s nuclear program played a vital role on the threat perception of both sides.
>
> Second, and more significantly, those testimonies reveal now that Israel, during the May–June 1967 crisis, first assembled its first rudimentary nuclear devices.
>
>
>
> While potential for renewed Arab-Israeli hostility simmered in early 1967, most regional actors neither expected nor sought a new military confrontation. This is particularly true for the leaders of Israel and Egypt: Levi Eshkol and Gamal Abdel Nasser. How, then, did a major war erupt seemingly against the wishes of both sides?
>
>
> Over the last two decades, more evidence on the role Dimona played in shaping Israeli and Egyptian perceptions of each other has surfaced. This introductory essay utilizes this recent historical material to further revisit and clarify the significance of Dimona and provide greater context to the crisis and war of 1967.
>
>
>
> In line with IDF intelligence assessments, Eshkol worried about a bellicose Egyptian reaction to Dimona, should Egypt conclude Israel was acquiring a bomb. Responding to these concerns, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin ordered in November 1965 the Chief of Military Intelligence (AMAN), Aharon Yariv, to develop a collection system, codenamed “Senator,” to provide the IDF an early warning about Egyptian hostile intentions on Dimona.
>
>
>
> In March 1965, Rabin mentioned Dimona’s “lack of international legitimacy” as something that could trigger Egypt into military action: “If Egypt bombs Dimona, and we want to wage a war, we could be issued an ultimatum from the entire world.”[
>
>
> Although Nasser’s 1960 pledge of waging a “preventive war” to stop Israel from developing nuclear weapons was generally viewed by Israeli intelligence as not too credible, a limited, aerial attack at Dimona was taken as a feasible threat.
>
>
> two Egyptian MiG 21s flew over Dimona, entering Israel at high altitude from Jordan. That reconnaissance flight over Dimona, along with the Egyptian request to remove the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from its positions on the border, convinced the Israeli leadership that the crisis was serious.
>
>
> The second reconnaissance flight over Dimona took place mid-day on May 26.. The previous day, there had been a great deal of anxiety about a surprise Egyptian air strike aimed at Dimona and Israeli air bases; there were signs that such an attack could come at any moment. In response, Eshkol fired off two alarming cables to Foreign Minister Abba Eban in Washington, the second cable stating, “Dramatic changes happened” and an attack on Israel – Dimona and the air bases -- could be imminent.

It is now widely believed that Egypt did plan to launch an aerial attack on Israel on the morning hours of May 27. Israeli air bases and (probably) Dimona were the key targets. In fact an order to carry out that operation had been issued then retracted according to different Egyptian accounts (e.g.., Fawzi, Heikal). As noted, it was American blunt direct threats to Nasser, referring to such an attack as an act of “suicide,” issued on May 26 on behalf of President Johnson...that apparently forced Nasser to cancel the plan at the very last moment.

---------------

The issue of the Dimona reactor was among President Kennedy’s top issues immediately after he took office on 20 January 1961

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/israel/documents/first/index.html

tags: your government has been hijacked since November 1963