Pete Feigal
Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years Thu

How did the Allies destroy the German Tiger tanks?
It was actually simple once you learned the trick…

Tiger I tank…tough, hard hittin’ tank, in battle almost invincible…

BUT, Actually incredibly fragile and easy to destroy...if you know how:

Here’s just one way to take to destroy Tigers:

P-47 Thunderbolt/IL-2, Typhoon, ground attack aircraft…

P-47 flying at 3,000 feet at 250mph, sees Tiger rolling down the road at
10 mph.

Here’s how it goes: P-47 ignores the Tiger, zooms down the road until it
finds the 100% always there and necessary “Tiger “soft” support
vehicles”: its fuel tanker trucks as tigers were terrible gas guzzlers
and couldn’t go far without a bunch of these “guys” backing him up…and
shoots/blows them up…

…ammo and food and water “soft” supply trucks…and shoots/blows them up…

…The “soft” mobile repair units…and shoots/blows them up…

…its “soft” recovery vehicles…and shoots/blows them up…

…the “soft” Fries Krans, the massive mobile hoists needed to pull esp.
the huge Tiger (11 tons) and Panther turrets as about 75% of what was
broke usually needed the turret pulled… and shoots/blows them up…

…And search for the “soft” Panzer repair depots, sometimes in buildings,
but with the huge cranes/hoists, often out “hidden” in some trees to
kill the factory-trained mechanics…. and shoot/blows them up…

…And the Tiger, starved for fuel,

its final drives broken as they did every 160km (100 miles! Yes,)

its overly elaborate and intricate suspensions broken or jammed with
snow, mud, debris,

its track worn out or thrown because of poor fitting,

the track pins sheared/broken under its own weight,

if it fell through a bridge, into too steep a ditch or a well, cistern
or cellar where it couldn't be retrieved,

if the Maybach engine caught fire, as it did 50% of the time,

if it ran out of fuel, terrible gas guzzler that it was,

without spares/relacements from Henschel that were far and few between
as the Allied heavy bombing blew up most of the factory back in Kessel,

its ammo, fuel, supplies, and all of the resources that the Tiger and
all tanks are 100% dependent on had been blown up in their “soft” vehicles…

…and you simply let the Tiger crews destroy their own tank as they
kindly and courteously did in 60% of the time as The Prime Directive of
the Heavy Panzer Battalion was: Never Let A Tiger Fall Into Enemy Hands,
Or Else.

Game to ground attack aircraft that increasing controlled the Tiger’s
skies in the final years of the war when the Tiger served.

The Allied fighter bombers, the P-47s, Typhoons and IL-2’s were given
photos and recon to key on these “soft” targets as the Panzers were 100%
dependent on these and without them were nothing more than heavy and
expensive “paperweights.”

That’s just one way to destroy a Tiger, there were many more…

Thanks for reading.

68.2K viewsView 2,347 upvotesView shares

"a425couple" wrote in message news:sgiupm02i41@news2.newsguy.com...

Pete Feigal
Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years Thu

How did the Allies destroy the German Tiger tanks?
It was actually simple once you learned the trick…

------------------------

The upgunned British "Firefly" version of the Sherman could destroy a Tiger:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Wittmann

The downside of the British gun was reduced effectiveness against softer
targets.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Firefly
"...the 17-pounder was the most powerful British tank gun of the war, and
one of the most powerful of any nationality, being able to penetrate more
armour than the 8.8 cm KwK 36 fitted to the German Tiger I."

"Though the 17-pounder had superior anti-tank capabilities, it lacked an
effective HE round and was thus inferior to the standard Sherman 75mm gun
against soft targets, such as infantry, buildings and lightly armoured
vehicles. As the war in Europe neared its close, the Allies found themselves
encountering these more often than heavy German tanks. Allied tank units
therefore typically refused to completely switch to Fireflies."

On 30/08/2021 16:51, a425couple wrote:
>
> Pete Feigal
> Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years Thu
>
> How did the Allies destroy the German Tiger tanks?
> It was actually simple once you learned the trick…
>
> Tiger I tank…tough, hard hittin’ tank, in battle almost invincible…
>
> BUT, Actually incredibly fragile and easy to destroy...if you know how:
>
>
> Here’s just one way to take to destroy Tigers:
>
> P-47 Thunderbolt/IL-2, Typhoon, ground attack aircraft…
>
>
> P-47 flying at 3,000 feet at 250mph, sees Tiger rolling down the road at
> 10 mph.
>
> Here’s how it goes: P-47 ignores the Tiger, zooms down the road until it
> finds the 100% always there and necessary “Tiger “soft” support
> vehicles”: its fuel tanker trucks as tigers were terrible gas guzzlers
> and couldn’t go far without a bunch of these “guys” backing him up…and
> shoots/blows them up…
>
>
> …ammo and food and water “soft” supply trucks…and shoots/blows them up…
>
>
> …The “soft” mobile repair units…and shoots/blows them up…
>
>
> …its “soft” recovery vehicles…and shoots/blows them up…
>
>
> …the “soft” Fries Krans, the massive mobile hoists needed to pull esp.
> the huge Tiger (11 tons) and Panther turrets as about 75% of what was
> broke usually needed the turret pulled… and shoots/blows them up…
>
>
> …And search for the “soft” Panzer repair depots, sometimes in buildings,
> but with the huge cranes/hoists, often out “hidden” in some trees to
> kill the factory-trained mechanics…. and shoot/blows them up…
>
>
> …And the Tiger, starved for fuel,
>
> its final drives broken as they did every 160km (100 miles! Yes,)
>
> its overly elaborate and intricate suspensions broken or jammed with
> snow, mud, debris,
>
> its track worn out or thrown because of poor fitting,
>
> the track pins sheared/broken under its own weight,
>
> if it fell through a bridge, into too steep a ditch or a well, cistern
> or cellar where it couldn't be retrieved,
>
> if the Maybach engine caught fire, as it did 50% of the time,
>
> if it ran out of fuel, terrible gas guzzler that it was,
>
> without spares/relacements from Henschel that were far and few between
> as the Allied heavy bombing blew up most of the factory back in Kessel,
>
> its ammo, fuel, supplies, and all of the resources that the Tiger and
> all tanks are 100% dependent on had been blown up in their “soft” vehicles…
>
> …and you simply let the Tiger crews destroy their own tank as they
> kindly and courteously did in 60% of the time as The Prime Directive of
> the Heavy Panzer Battalion was: Never Let A Tiger Fall Into Enemy Hands,
> Or Else.
>
> Game to ground attack aircraft that increasing controlled the Tiger’s
> skies in the final years of the war when the Tiger served.
>
> The Allied fighter bombers, the P-47s, Typhoons and IL-2’s were given
> photos and recon to key on these “soft” targets as the Panzers were 100%
> dependent on these and without them were nothing more than heavy and
> expensive “paperweights.”
>
> That’s just one way to destroy a Tiger, there were many more…
>
> Thanks for reading.
>
> 68.2K viewsView 2,347 upvotesView shares

Well there was another way, gunner Joe Elkins managed to destroy 3
Tigers in one day with the 17 pounder in his Sherman Firefly. Between
the Canadian and British armies during Operation Totalize no less than 6
Tigers, 2 Panzer IV's and 2 self propelld guns were knocked out. In the
case of Wittman's tank the ammunition exploded and blew the turret off.

BTW a number of Tiger's did fall into enemy hands, the Bovington tank
museum in the UK has one in running condition having been captured in
Tunisia in April 1943. The major problem was that there just were not
that many to go round. Only 1354 MK 1 Tiger1 were produced and kess than
500 Tiger II's. In contrast the Soviets managed to produce 5,800 KV
heavy tanks and 84,000 T-34's of which around 35,000 had the 85mm gun.

The other problem was that the thing was so heavy it was limited in the
way it could be used. This was a major problem in the Ardennes offensive
when a single broken down or destroyed tank could halt an entire tank
column.

On 30/08/2021 17:37, Jim Wilkins wrote:
> "a425couple"  wrote in message news:sgiupm02i41@news2.newsguy.com...
>
>
> Pete Feigal
> Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years Thu
>
> How did the Allies destroy the German Tiger tanks?
> It was actually simple once you learned the trick…
>
> ------------------------
>
> The upgunned British "Firefly" version of the Sherman could destroy a
> Tiger:
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Wittmann
>
> The downside of the British gun was reduced effectiveness against softer
> targets.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Firefly
> "...the 17-pounder was the most powerful British tank gun of the war,
> and one of the most powerful of any nationality, being able to penetrate
> more armour than the 8.8 cm KwK 36 fitted to the German Tiger I."
>
> "Though the 17-pounder had superior anti-tank capabilities, it lacked an
> effective HE round and was thus inferior to the standard Sherman 75mm
> gun against soft targets, such as infantry, buildings and lightly
> armoured vehicles. As the war in Europe neared its close, the Allies
> found themselves encountering these more often than heavy German tanks.
> Allied tank units therefore typically refused to completely switch to
> Fireflies."
>

The usual mix in British units was 1 Firefly for every 3 or 4 normal
Shermans. By 1945 they were requipping with Comet tank which had a
similar gun, better armour and a lower profile than the Sherman. Waiting
in the wings was of course the Centurion.

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:sgo5a6$1q6$1@dont-email.me...
...
The other problem was that the thing was so heavy it was limited in the
way it could be used. This was a major problem in the Ardennes offensive
when a single broken down or destroyed tank could halt an entire tank
column.

------------------

Excessive weight was the reason given for not deploying a developmental US
heavy tank. They would inevitably have to cross rivers on temporary bridges
that couldn't support their great weight. Or so I read.

Interestingly the success of the very fast, lightly armored M18 Hellcat
seemed to support the decision.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M18_Hellcat
"The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It
had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer
fielded by U.S. forces in World War II."

On 9/1/2021 9:07 AM, Jim Wilkins wrote:
> "Keith Willshaw"  wrote in message news:sgo5a6$1q6$1@dont-email.me...
> ..
> The other problem was that the thing was so heavy it was limited in the
> way it could be used. This was a major problem in the Ardennes offensive
> when a single broken down or destroyed tank could halt an entire tank
> column.
>
> ------------------
>
> Excessive weight was the reason given for not deploying a developmental
> US heavy tank. They would inevitably have to cross rivers on temporary
> bridges that couldn't support their great weight. Or so I read.
>
> Interestingly the success of the very fast, lightly armored M18 Hellcat
> seemed to support the decision.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M18_Hellcat
> "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II.
> It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer
> fielded by U.S. forces in World War II."
>
Interesting.
Thanks for pointing that out.

or, like in Harry Turtledove's Worldwar series #1 "In the Balance",
the humans keep producing and keep improving.

or like, What is the very best personal protection
handgun?
The one you will carry every day everywhere!

On Wed, 1 Sep 2021 12:07:46 -0400, Jim Wilkins wrote:

> "Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:sgo5a6$1q6$1@dont-email.me...
> ..
> The other problem was that the thing was so heavy it was limited in the
> way it could be used. This was a major problem in the Ardennes offensive
> when a single broken down or destroyed tank could halt an entire tank
> column.
>
> ------------------
>
> Excessive weight was the reason given for not deploying a developmental
> US heavy tank. They would inevitably have to cross rivers on temporary
> bridges that couldn't support their great weight. Or so I read.
>
> Interestingly the success of the very fast, lightly armored M18 Hellcat
> seemed to support the decision.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M18_Hellcat "The Hellcat was the most
> effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It had a higher kill to
> loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer fielded by U.S. forces
> in World War II."

The U.S. would not not introduce into servive, not would any of the using
forces accept, a vehicle that had not been successfully through all
levels of testing. The one exception were the 10 M26 Pershings pushed
out to the ETO as a "Service Test" (and to shut up certain Members of
Congress.
Not only was it necessary for the vehicles to be compatible with
Engineering Equipment like Bailey Bridges and Pontoon Bridges, it also
had to be compatible with juet about every railroad loading guage in the
world, and be capable of being loaded and offloaded from the hold of a
ship using the ship's own cranes. That set an upper limit of 50 tons.
Remember - every vehicle produced for or by the U.S. wasn't going to be
useful unless you could get it ti where the fighting was - and since
early 1943, that fighting was getting closer and closer to Germany.

A couple of things to consider - Fireflies accounted for about 25% of all
British tanks. (And, it turns out, it was a miserable lash-up) The much-
touted (Postwar) APDS shot was woefully inaccurate - Dispersion was such
that at any range where it might hit a tank-sized target, regular shot
would work as well.
Numbers compiled from British combat reports during the Normandy/Bocage
campaign shows that in engagements between 75mm/17# gun tanks and Tigers,
most engagements took place at a range of 800m or less, where all tank
types were equally vulnerable to the other's weapons.
What was determined to be the best indicator of a positive result on
combat was who fired first. It didn't matter if you hit or not, it gave
the first shooters teh intiative.

--
Pete Stickney

--
/home/peter/signature

I have read that P-47's could successfully attack heavy German
armour by bouncing 50 cal BMG rounds {...of which it had many...)
off the pavement and into the tank's underbody.

--
A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com
& no one will talk to a host that's close..........................
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

"Jim Wilkins" <muratlanne@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:sgo8h3$ph5$1@dont-email.me...
> Excessive weight was the reason given for not deploying a developmental US
> heavy tank. They would inevitably have to cross rivers on temporary
> bridges that couldn't support their great weight. Or so I read.

More the entire system needed to upgrade, like having cranes able
to put them on and off ships and so on.

> Interestingly the success of the very fast, lightly armored M18 Hellcat
> seemed to support the decision.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M18_Hellcat
> "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II.
> It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer
> fielded by U.S. forces in World War II."

The most obvious question is what is a kill and what is a loss,
how do the units prove they hit and destroyed a target and also
show which losses were to enemy tanks versus anti tank guns.

Next comes the fact the US was upgrading its vehicles.

Sherman protection and combat power related improvements in
early 1944:

The 47 degree sloped front plate, there was an increase in
thickness (2 to 2.5 inches) plus the elimination of shot traps
and the extra slope to improve protection. Thicker glacis.
Wet Stowage.

All early 1944 76mm Shermans came with superior optics, compared
to the 75mm versions, such optics had already been fitted to the M10
and M18. Then, probably during 1944, M18 production was fitted
with an even better optics system. The 76mm Sherman production
caught up with Tank Destroyer optics again in the second half of
1944 and the 75mm Sherman version, M4A3, still in production was
also fitted with similar superior sights at the same time. The first of
these 75 and 76mm Shermans arrived in Europe in the autumn of 1944.
These improvements was rated as "nearly as good as the Germans",
with the US system having a wider field of view, helping situational
awareness. Late model M36 had probably even better optics.

Now to the US Army loss reports.

Then comes how each individual army used its vehicles, for example
from 13 October 1944 onwards First army reported a loss of 93% of
average strength for the 75mm M4 and 71% for the 76mm version.
Third army (from 15 October) reported 61% and 148% respectively.
Ninth army reported 70% and 59%.

So percentage of time where there were no M4 75 and 76mm
losses, First 7%, Third 2.5%, Ninth 21%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.01 to 0.24%,
First 29%, Third 28.5%, Ninth 38%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.25 to 0.49%,
First 19%, Third 18%, Ninth 16%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.5 to 0.99%,
First 32%, Third 39%, Ninth 19%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 1% or more
First 13%, Third 12%, Ninth 5%.

Third army appears to have an M4 tank loss rate of 10% or more
above that of first and ninth once the initial First Army Ardennes
losses are discounted even after some Third Army Ardennes losses
are also removed. Third army clearly used it tanks more often.

The tank destroyers, the M10 and M18 were present from D-day,
the M36 from around 20 September 1944. The figures come from
the monthly report. Note these are loss rates versus the on hand
strength, not the combat unit strength

This will also bias the figures against the M10 given its average
strength remained roughly constant over the time period,
while the M18 strength started at 146, climbed to 306 in
December 1944 and was 448 in February 1945. Similarly
the September M36 strength was 170, and it climbed to
365 by January 1945 and was 826 in February. Given the
delay between arrival and issuing of vehicles you can
see how the statistics will make the M10 appear worse.

For the time period D-Day to 20 February the average M10
strength was 696 vehicles and 439 were lost, or about 63%
of the average strength, for the M18 it was average strength
around 244, with 120 losses, or about 49% of the average
strength.

For the time period 20 September 1944 to 20 February 1945
the average M10 strength decreases to 661, with 353 losses,
or around 53% of average strength, the M18 average strength
increases to 302, with 108 losses or 36% of average strength.
The M36 average strength is 358, with 72 losses, or around
20% of the average strength.

Assuming the 3 vehicle types were used in the same manner
and the strength figures are representative of front line numbers,
then the conclusions are simple. Comparing the M10 to the M18,
speed is armour, at least in ground combat when there is usually
somewhere you can move to and hide, but the M36 indicates
trumping speed is having a big gun that can make a real mess at
long range of anything that can hurt you. If Admiral Fisher was
General Fisher, he would have been much more correct it seems.

For the period 20 September 1944 to 20 February 1945 the
figures indicate for every 1% of M36 strength lost, 1.8%
of M18 and 2.7% of M10 strength was lost. Almost, but
not quite 1 to 2 to 3. While the numbers here are a guide,
and certainly overestimate the M10 vulnerability, it is
reasonable to assume that in fact the extra speed did keep
M18 losses below M10 losses, and the 90mm gun on the
M36 enabled an even lower loss figure.

A final point on the Tank destroyers, despite being listed
as in theatre on 6 June no M18 losses were recorded until
the report starting 20 July, also only 1 M10 was reported lost
before 20 June. Another point pushing up the M10 loss
rate is the January/February 1945 loss of 106 M10s, or
around 30% of the total losses from 20 September 1944.
Also around half the M36 "combat days" were in the
January/February 1945 report period, as on hand strength
went from 365 to 826 and this drives down the overall
loss rates. The effect of excluding these final month's figures
can be seen in the next paragraph and is another warning to
treat these figures as guides, not absolutes.

Now for a quick comparison between the Sherman and Tank
destroyer loss rates for the time period 20 September 1944
to 20 January 1945. For every 1% of M36 strength lost, 1.54%
of M18, 1.67% of M10 and 2% of 75mm and 76mm Sherman
strength was lost. Note the closing up of the different Tank
Destroyer loss rates. As expected the Sherman loss rates
were higher, given the different use made of it. In percentage
terms, for this four month period, 45% of M4 average strength
was lost, 38% of M10, 35% of M18 and 23% of M36.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"David Lesher" <wb8foz@panix.com> wrote in message
news:sgta33$pbr$1@reader1.panix.com...
>I have read that P-47's could successfully attack heavy German
> armour by bouncing 50 cal BMG rounds {...of which it had many...)
> off the pavement and into the tank's underbody.

In short no. Think of what the bullets are being asking to do, the chance
of them burying or being deformed by striking the ground. And the angle
involved, the underside of the tank is parallel to the ground, if the
bullets
have a shallow enough angle to bounce off the ground and under the tank,
why not also bounce off the usually harder tank belly which had protection
to counter mines.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

"Peter Stickney" <p_stickney@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:sgscuc$m1u$1@dont-email.me...
> The U.S. would not not introduce into servive, not would any of the using
> forces accept, a vehicle that had not been successfully through all
> levels of testing. The one exception were the 10 M26 Pershings pushed
> out to the ETO as a "Service Test" (and to shut up certain Members of
> Congress.

Most of this reply is quotes from other people's postings.

"Only 20 Pershings saw combat in World War II but 98 M26 were
operational with First, Third and Ninth Army units as of 8 May 1945,
and another 300-odd were in theater and ready for issue. The first
M26 were operational with units in late February."

> A couple of things to consider - Fireflies accounted for about 25% of all
> British tanks. (And, it turns out, it was a miserable lash-up)

The trouble with percentages of strength is they vary over the course
of the campaign, plus what is defined as a tank.

"21st Army Group non 95mm howitzer tank strength December 1944.
472 Churchill gun tanks
1,168 Sherman 75mm gun tanks
605 Sherman 17-pdr gun tanks
59 Sherman 76mm gun tanks
522 Cromwell gun tanks
31 Comet gun tanks
2,857 gun tanks total, so 17-pdr/77mm were 22.3 percent of the total,
24.3 percent if the 76mm assigned to the Poles is included."

The reports I have seen do not mark the Firefly as miserable.

> The much-
> touted (Postwar) APDS shot was woefully inaccurate - Dispersion was such
> that at any range where it might hit a tank-sized target, regular shot
> would work as well.

"In AT use the initial design of the
M1 76mm cartridge and projectile were found to have many defects. The
propellent of the cartridge failed to burn cleanly or completely,
resulting in excessive flash. The standard hardness accepted for the
M68 APC round was actually grossly inferior to what was required,
which resulted in projectiles shattering on impact or being deformed
and glancing off (a common problem at the time). By 1945 most of these
problems had been corrected

The US 76mm APCR/HVAP lost energy much quicker than the
British Sabot design, but it was noted in testing as being the "most
accurate" tank gun round fired. Unfortunately it was available in very
small lots, serial production not beginning until July and August
1944 (3" and 76mm T4E17 respectively) with just 33,000 3" and 63,000
76mm round being produced. Few US tank units got any significant
number of HVAP and most never saw a single round until spring 1945.
That tested near Isigny in August 1944 on three Panthers was flown
directly from the US for the test.

In contrast, 6-pdr APDS was available by June 1944 and 17-pdr (albeit
with faults) by August."

"It was the tests at Isigny in August 1944 that are the basis for both
sides of that evaluation of 17-pdr APDS. The rounds used there proved
grossly inaccurate. However, while US Army Ordnance evaluated that result
as expected, based upon the results of its own experience with APDS
development over the previous two years, British Ordnance attributed
the fault to a bad ammunition lot and decided to go ahead with the
issue of it to units.

The thing is, the US Ordnance assessment was correct - incomplete
sabot separation, aluminum residues in the tube from firing,
misalignment of sabots, and other factors were the problem and
were not solved until the 1950s. Yes, 6-pdr APDS had similar
problems. However, the decision to go ahead and issue it was
also correct, since they sensibly recommended limiting the
ranges they be fired at to around 500 yards; most of the accuracy
issues were only a factor at ranges over 800 yards. Then, given
the average engagement range was under 800 yards, then the result
was APDS was used generally with effectiveness. The inaccuracy of
6-pdr APDS never became an issue since it was a weapon system
typically only used at fairly short ranges anyway.

Odder still, US Ordnance identified the solution for improving
76mm/3-inch HVAP in the same tests, but the recommendation of the
officers at the test were not carried through. The inertia against
certain changes in US Ordnance was (and still is) immense. The
recommendation to increase the propellent load in the 76mm
cartridge while retaining the HVAP projectile as a standard
AP round went nowhere...until 1946 when Aberdeen tests demonstrated
it was the correct solution (along with specially heat-treated
monobloc AP rounds) for use against heavy armor and was perfectly
practical in the existing 76mm gun."

> Numbers compiled from British combat reports during the Normandy/Bocage
> campaign shows that in engagements between 75mm/17# gun tanks and Tigers,
> most engagements took place at a range of 800m or less, where all tank
> types were equally vulnerable to the other's weapons.

"According to "Survey of Allied Tank Casualties" the average range
for NWE was 800 yards, 900 yards for Africa, and 350 yards for Italy and
Sicily. Of course that was for its engagement set, but it was a robust
study with 800 samples for NWE, 100 for North Africa, and 60 for Sicily
and Italy. Further, the sample for NWE did actually include African and
Italian losses, so it seems likely the overall "average" is likely closer
to 800 yards."

> What was determined to be the best indicator of a positive result on
> combat was who fired first. It didn't matter if you hit or not, it gave
> the first shooters teh intiative.

No information on the advantage of first shots.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"Jim Wilkins" <muratlanne@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:sgo8h3$ph5$1@dont-email.me...
> Excessive weight was the reason given for not deploying a developmental US
> heavy tank. They would inevitably have to cross rivers on temporary
> bridges that couldn't support their great weight. Or so I read.

More the entire system needed to upgrade, like having cranes able
to put them on and off ships and so on.

> Interestingly the success of the very fast, lightly armored M18 Hellcat
> seemed to support the decision.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M18_Hellcat
> "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II.
> It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer
> fielded by U.S. forces in World War II."

The most obvious question is what is a kill and what is a loss,
how do the units prove they hit and destroyed a target and also
show which losses were to enemy tanks versus anti tank guns.

Next comes the fact the US was upgrading its vehicles.

Sherman protection and combat power related improvements in
early 1944:

The 47 degree sloped front plate, there was an increase in
thickness (2 to 2.5 inches) plus the elimination of shot traps
and the extra slope to improve protection. Thicker glacis.
Wet Stowage.

All early 1944 76mm Shermans came with superior optics, compared
to the 75mm versions, such optics had already been fitted to the M10
and M18. Then, probably during 1944, M18 production was fitted
with an even better optics system. The 76mm Sherman production
caught up with Tank Destroyer optics again in the second half of
1944 and the 75mm Sherman version, M4A3, still in production was
also fitted with similar superior sights at the same time. The first of
these 75 and 76mm Shermans arrived in Europe in the autumn of 1944.
These improvements was rated as "nearly as good as the Germans",
with the US system having a wider field of view, helping situational
awareness. Late model M36 had probably even better optics.

Now to the US Army loss reports.

Then comes how each individual army used its vehicles, for example
from 13 October 1944 onwards First army reported a loss of 93% of
average strength for the 75mm M4 and 71% for the 76mm version.
Third army (from 15 October) reported 61% and 148% respectively.
Ninth army reported 70% and 59%.

So percentage of time where there were no M4 75 and 76mm
losses, First 7%, Third 2.5%, Ninth 21%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.01 to 0.24%,
First 29%, Third 28.5%, Ninth 38%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.25 to 0.49%,
First 19%, Third 18%, Ninth 16%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 0.5 to 0.99%,
First 32%, Third 39%, Ninth 19%.

Percentage of time where the daily losses were 1% or more
First 13%, Third 12%, Ninth 5%.

Third army appears to have an M4 tank loss rate of 10% or more
above that of first and ninth once the initial First Army Ardennes
losses are discounted even after some Third Army Ardennes losses
are also removed. Third army clearly used it tanks more often.

The tank destroyers, the M10 and M18 were present from D-day,
the M36 from around 20 September 1944. The figures come from
the monthly report. Note these are loss rates versus the on hand
strength, not the combat unit strength

This will also bias the figures against the M10 given its average
strength remained roughly constant over the time period,
while the M18 strength started at 146, climbed to 306 in
December 1944 and was 448 in February 1945. Similarly
the September M36 strength was 170, and it climbed to
365 by January 1945 and was 826 in February. Given the
delay between arrival and issuing of vehicles you can
see how the statistics will make the M10 appear worse.

For the time period D-Day to 20 February the average M10
strength was 696 vehicles and 439 were lost, or about 63%
of the average strength, for the M18 it was average strength
around 244, with 120 losses, or about 49% of the average
strength.

For the time period 20 September 1944 to 20 February 1945
the average M10 strength decreases to 661, with 353 losses,
or around 53% of average strength, the M18 average strength
increases to 302, with 108 losses or 36% of average strength.
The M36 average strength is 358, with 72 losses, or around
20% of the average strength.

Assuming the 3 vehicle types were used in the same manner
and the strength figures are representative of front line numbers,
then the conclusions are simple. Comparing the M10 to the M18,
speed is armour, at least in ground combat when there is usually
somewhere you can move to and hide, but the M36 indicates
trumping speed is having a big gun that can make a real mess at
long range of anything that can hurt you. If Admiral Fisher was
General Fisher, he would have been much more correct it seems.

For the period 20 September 1944 to 20 February 1945 the
figures indicate for every 1% of M36 strength lost, 1.8%
of M18 and 2.7% of M10 strength was lost. Almost, but
not quite 1 to 2 to 3. While the numbers here are a guide,
and certainly overestimate the M10 vulnerability, it is
reasonable to assume that in fact the extra speed did keep
M18 losses below M10 losses, and the 90mm gun on the
M36 enabled an even lower loss figure.

A final point on the Tank destroyers, despite being listed
as in theatre on 6 June no M18 losses were recorded until
the report starting 20 July, also only 1 M10 was reported lost
before 20 June. Another point pushing up the M10 loss
rate is the January/February 1945 loss of 106 M10s, or
around 30% of the total losses from 20 September 1944.
Also around half the M36 "combat days" were in the
January/February 1945 report period, as on hand strength
went from 365 to 826 and this drives down the overall
loss rates. The effect of excluding these final month's figures
can be seen in the next paragraph and is another warning to
treat these figures as guides, not absolutes.

Now for a quick comparison between the Sherman and Tank
destroyer loss rates for the time period 20 September 1944
to 20 January 1945. For every 1% of M36 strength lost, 1.54%
of M18, 1.67% of M10 and 2% of 75mm and 76mm Sherman
strength was lost. Note the closing up of the different Tank
Destroyer loss rates. As expected the Sherman loss rates
were higher, given the different use made of it. In percentage
terms, for this four month period, 45% of M4 average strength
was lost, 38% of M10, 35% of M18 and 23% of M36.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.