On 12/6/23 10:56 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>
>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>> my important points.
>>>>
>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>> is
>>>> your most important point.
>>>> YMMV.
>>>>
>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>
>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>> the analytic side of
>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>> things can kill you.
>>
>> Fascinating.
>> Would you like me to tell you about
>> global warming?
>>
>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>> explained?
>>>>
>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>
>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>
>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>
>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>
>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>
>> qnff =
>> | Q is not-first false
>>
>> finseq =
>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>> | holds a false claim,
>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>
>> Abbreviate
>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>
>> natnum =
>> | n is a natural number
>> | if and only if
>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>
>> ----
>> Consider the claim qnff =
>> | Q is not-first-false in
>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>> |     t   f t
>> |     t   t t
>> |     t   f f
>> |     f   t f
>> |
>> True(qnff) ?
>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>
>> Consider the claim finseq =
>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>> |
>> True(finseq) ?
>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>
>> _Abbreviate_
>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | for
>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>> as
>> | n is a natural number
>>
>> Consider the claim natnum =
>> | n is a natural number
>> | if and only if
>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | for
>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>> |
>> True(natnum) ?
>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>
>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>> conjecture is discovered?
>>
>> Please explain.
>>
>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>
>> Here's the problem:
>>
>> You:
>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>
> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
> philosophy.
>
> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
> terms of logic.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>
> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>
> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>
> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
> something making them true.
>
>

Right, but that "something" might not be "provable"

This seems to be your big blindspot, there is a diffence in the
fundamental definitions of what it means something to be True, and
something to be Provable (or Known, which is also slightly different).

Truth can be established by infinite processes, because it is
independent of knowledge, which since we are finite, is limited by
finite processes.

Thus, the chain that makes a statement true, might not qualify as a
proof, since proofs need to be finite, as proofs are an instrument of
knowledge, and thus are restricted to be finite.

Mathematics deals with concepts that are infinite, and thus can generate
infinite chains to make things true, but since we are still finite, for
us to know them we need to find a finite path that establishes them.

Your mind just seems to be too small to understand that there are things
bigger than your minds ability to think, and thus you do not understand
such things.

The greatest height of understanding is understanding what is beyond
your understanding, a property that you seem to lack.

On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>
>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>> my important points.
>>>>
>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>> is
>>>> your most important point.
>>>> YMMV.
>>>>
>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>
>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>> the analytic side of
>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>> things can kill you.
>>
>> Fascinating.
>> Would you like me to tell you about
>> global warming?
>>
>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>> explained?
>>>>
>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>
>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>
>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>
>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>
>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>
>> qnff =
>> | Q is not-first false
>>
>> finseq =
>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>> | holds a false claim,
>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>
>> Abbreviate
>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>
>> natnum =
>> | n is a natural number
>> | if and only if
>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>
>> ----
>> Consider the claim qnff =
>> | Q is not-first-false in
>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>> |     t   f t
>> |     t   t t
>> |     t   f f
>> |     f   t f
>> |
>> True(qnff) ?
>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>
>> Consider the claim finseq =
>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>> |
>> True(finseq) ?
>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>
>> _Abbreviate_
>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | for
>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>> as
>> | n is a natural number
>>
>> Consider the claim natnum =
>> | n is a natural number
>> | if and only if
>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>> | for
>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>> |
>> True(natnum) ?
>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>
>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>> conjecture is discovered?
>>
>> Please explain.
>>
>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>
>> Here's the problem:
>>
>> You:
>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>
> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
> philosophy.
>
> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
> terms of logic.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>
> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>
> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>
> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
> something making them true.
>
>

I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
steps as its truthmaker.

∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)

Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces the
concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it works
everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)

If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
truthmaker.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/7/23 11:20 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>> is
>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>
>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>> the analytic side of
>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>> things can kill you.
>>>
>>> Fascinating.
>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>> global warming?
>>>
>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>
>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>
>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>
>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>
>>> qnff =
>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>
>>> finseq =
>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>> | holds a false claim,
>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>
>>> Abbreviate
>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>
>>> natnum =
>>> | n is a natural number
>>> | if and only if
>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>> |     t   f t
>>> |     t   t t
>>> |     t   f f
>>> |     f   t f
>>> |
>>> True(qnff) ?
>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>
>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>> |
>>> True(finseq) ?
>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>
>>> _Abbreviate_
>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | for
>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>> as
>>> | n is a natural number
>>>
>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>> | n is a natural number
>>> | if and only if
>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | for
>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>> |
>>> True(natnum) ?
>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>
>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>
>>> Please explain.
>>>
>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>
>>> Here's the problem:
>>>
>>> You:
>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>
>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>> philosophy.
>>
>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>> terms of logic.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>
>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>
>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>
>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>> something making them true.
>>
>>
>
> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
> steps as its truthmaker.
>
> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)

Which can't be correct since Truth (as you just admitted) can have an
infinite sequencd of steps to its Truth Makers, while Proofs, to create
knowledge, must only allow a finite number of steps.

So your True isn't actually a predicate for "truth" but Knowledge".

>
> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces the
> concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it works
> everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>
> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
> truthmaker.
>

So, you are admitting that your claims are just a lie, perhaps because
you don't understand a thing you have been talking about.

On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>> is
>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>
>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>> the analytic side of
>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>> things can kill you.
>>>
>>> Fascinating.
>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>> global warming?
>>>
>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>
>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>
>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>
>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>
>>> qnff =
>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>
>>> finseq =
>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>> | holds a false claim,
>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>
>>> Abbreviate
>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>
>>> natnum =
>>> | n is a natural number
>>> | if and only if
>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>> |     t   f t
>>> |     t   t t
>>> |     t   f f
>>> |     f   t f
>>> |
>>> True(qnff) ?
>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>
>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>> |
>>> True(finseq) ?
>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>
>>> _Abbreviate_
>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | for
>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>> as
>>> | n is a natural number
>>>
>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>> | n is a natural number
>>> | if and only if
>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>> | for
>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>> |
>>> True(natnum) ?
>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>
>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>
>>> Please explain.
>>>
>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>
>>> Here's the problem:
>>>
>>> You:
>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>
>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>> philosophy.
>>
>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>> terms of logic.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>
>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>
>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>
>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>> something making them true.
>>
>>
>
> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
> steps as its truthmaker.
>
> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>
> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces the
> concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it works
> everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>
> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
> truthmaker.
>

That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/7/23 7:11 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>
>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>
>>>> Fascinating.
>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>> global warming?
>>>>
>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>
>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>
>>>> qnff =
>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>
>>>> finseq =
>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>
>>>> Abbreviate
>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>
>>>> natnum =
>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>> | if and only if
>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>> |     t   f t
>>>> |     t   t t
>>>> |     t   f f
>>>> |     f   t f
>>>> |
>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>
>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>> |
>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>
>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | for
>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>> as
>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>
>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>> | if and only if
>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | for
>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>> |
>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>
>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>
>>>> Please explain.
>>>>
>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>
>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>
>>>> You:
>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>
>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>> philosophy.
>>>
>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>> terms of logic.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>
>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>
>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>
>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>> something making them true.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>
>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>
>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces
>> the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it
>> works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>
>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>
> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.

Nope. I think you don't understand a thing you are talking about.

>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

Which you have admitted you don't know what he means by that and are
"guessing" how to interprete it.

>
> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

Nope, he didn't "assume" it, he showed that the "nonsense" sentence MUST
be true if we assume that there exists a "definition" of truth, that is
a finite algorithm that tells you if a given expression is true.

>
> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>

Right, which is why logic system doesn't normally admit them as
statement in their language.

The fact that somehow you think they do shows you just don't understand
what you are talking about. You just totally don't understand how logic
works.

On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>
>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>
>>>> Fascinating.
>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>> global warming?
>>>>
>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>
>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>
>>>> qnff =
>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>
>>>> finseq =
>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>
>>>> Abbreviate
>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>
>>>> natnum =
>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>> | if and only if
>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>> |     t   f t
>>>> |     t   t t
>>>> |     t   f f
>>>> |     f   t f
>>>> |
>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>
>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>> |
>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>
>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | for
>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>> as
>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>
>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>> | if and only if
>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>> | for
>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>> |
>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>
>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>
>>>> Please explain.
>>>>
>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>
>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>
>>>> You:
>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>
>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>> philosophy.
>>>
>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>> terms of logic.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>
>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>
>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>
>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>> something making them true.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>
>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>
>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces
>> the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it
>> works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>
>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
>> truthmaker.
>>
>
> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>
> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
for non-truth-bearer.

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/8/23 12:29 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>
>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>
>>>>> qnff =
>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>
>>>>> finseq =
>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>
>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>
>>>>> natnum =
>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>> |
>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>> |
>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | for
>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>> as
>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | for
>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>> |
>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>
>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>
>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>
>>>>> You:
>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>
>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>> philosophy.
>>>>
>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>> terms of logic.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>
>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>
>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>
>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>> something making them true.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>
>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>
>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces
>>> the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it
>>> works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>
>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>
>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>
>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
> for non-truth-bearer.
>

Nope, because he never did what you say he did.

Your problem is you don't actually understand the proof, so you don't
know what he actually means here, but are just guessing at what he
"must" mean, because it is the only thing you can think of. But that
isn't it, and just shows your stupidity.

If you want to show me wrong here, show the step in the ACTUAL proof,
and not the commentary on it, where he does this wrong thing.

Somewhere step in the proof where he uses the antinomy in a way that
requires it to have a truth value.

It seems on of your fundamental problems is you don't understand what a
Logical Proof actually is, only how to argue.

On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>
>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>
>>>>> qnff =
>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>
>>>>> finseq =
>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>
>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>
>>>>> natnum =
>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>> |
>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>> |
>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | for
>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>> as
>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>> | for
>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>> |
>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>
>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>
>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>
>>>>> You:
>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>
>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>> philosophy.
>>>>
>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>> terms of logic.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>
>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>
>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>
>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>> something making them true.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>
>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>
>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces
>>> the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it
>>> works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>
>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
>>> truthmaker.
>>>
>>
>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>
>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
> for non-truth-bearer.
>

The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)

Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
~True(L,x).

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/8/23 12:19 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>
>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | for
>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | for
>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>
>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>
>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>
>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>
>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces
>>>> the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it
>>>> works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>
>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>
>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>
>
> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.

On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>
>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | for
>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>> | for
>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>
>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>
>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>
>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical truth
>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite sequence of
>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>
>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and forces
>>>> the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way that it
>>>> works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>
>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still has a
>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>
>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>
>
> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
> ~True(L,x).

On 12/8/23 1:35 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>>
>>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical
>>>>> truth
>>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite
>>>>> sequence of
>>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>
>>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and
>>>>> forces the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way
>>>>> that it works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge:
>>>>> True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>>
>>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still
>>>>> has a
>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>
>>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>
>>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>>
>>
>> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
>> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
>> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
>> ~True(L,x).
>
> Undecidable has the base meaning that one cannot make up one's mind.
> The mathematical use of the term includes the inability to decide
> whether a kitten is a 15 story office building or a 16 story office
> building and no option to say "incorrect question".
>

On 12/8/2023 12:35 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>>
>>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical
>>>>> truth
>>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite
>>>>> sequence of
>>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>
>>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and
>>>>> forces the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the way
>>>>> that it works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge:
>>>>> True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>>
>>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still
>>>>> has a
>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>
>>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>
>>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>>
>>
>> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
>> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
>> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
>> ~True(L,x).
>
> Undecidable has the base meaning that one cannot make up one's mind.
> The mathematical use of the term includes the inability to decide
> whether a kitten is a 15 story office building or a 16 story office
> building and no option to say "incorrect question".
>

On 12/8/23 2:03 PM, olcott wrote:

> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> When a decision problem requires a yes or no answer to
> an expression of language that is a self-contradictory
> question this is incorrectly ruled as undecidable.
>

SO, you are still showing you don't understand a thing he is talking about.

You are just so stupid it is pitiful.

As I asked before, show exactly WHERE he is doing what you claim.

That sentence isn't it, as it doesn't show HOW the epistemoloigical
antinomy was "used" in the proof, and thus doesn't show that he is
asking for a self-contradictory question to be given an yes or no answer.

All you are doing is proving your ignorance.

On 12/8/2023 1:03 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 12:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical
>>>>>> truth
>>>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite
>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and
>>>>>> forces the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the
>>>>>> way that it works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge:
>>>>>> True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite sequence of
>>>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still
>>>>>> has a
>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>>>
>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>
>>>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like the
>>>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not even
>>>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>
>>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>>>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>>>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
>>> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
>>> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
>>> ~True(L,x).
>>
>> Undecidable has the base meaning that one cannot make up one's mind.
>> The mathematical use of the term includes the inability to decide
>> whether a kitten is a 15 story office building or a 16 story office
>> building and no option to say "incorrect question".
>>
>
>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> When a decision problem requires a yes or no answer to
> an expression of language that is a self-contradictory
> question this is incorrectly ruled as undecidable.

On 12/8/23 2:37 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 1:03 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/8/2023 12:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical
>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite
>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and
>>>>>>> forces the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the
>>>>>>> way that it works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge:
>>>>>>> True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite
>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still
>>>>>>> has a
>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>>>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not
>>>>>> even
>>>>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>
>>>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>>>>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>>>>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
>>>> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
>>>> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>
>>>> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
>>>> ~True(L,x).
>>>
>>> Undecidable has the base meaning that one cannot make up one's mind.
>>> The mathematical use of the term includes the inability to decide
>>> whether a kitten is a 15 story office building or a 16 story office
>>> building and no option to say "incorrect question".
>>>
>>
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> When a decision problem requires a yes or no answer to
>> an expression of language that is a self-contradictory
>> question this is incorrectly ruled as undecidable.
>
> "As I asked before, show exactly WHERE he is doing what you claim."
>
> As I have said 500 times!  RIGHT HERE !!!
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> The truth is that NO epistemological antinomies CAN EVER
> be used in ANY undecidability proof, not ever not even once.
>

On 12/8/2023 1:37 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 1:03 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/8/2023 12:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between analytical
>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite
>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and
>>>>>>> forces the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the
>>>>>>> way that it works everywhere else in the body of human knowledge:
>>>>>>> True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of steps as
>>>>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite
>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it still
>>>>>>> has a
>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>>>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just like
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not
>>>>>> even
>>>>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>
>>>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>>>>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>>>>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
>>>> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
>>>> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>
>>>> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
>>>> ~True(L,x).
>>>
>>> Undecidable has the base meaning that one cannot make up one's mind.
>>> The mathematical use of the term includes the inability to decide
>>> whether a kitten is a 15 story office building or a 16 story office
>>> building and no option to say "incorrect question".
>>>
>>
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> When a decision problem requires a yes or no answer to
>> an expression of language that is a self-contradictory
>> question this is incorrectly ruled as undecidable.
>
> "As I asked before, show exactly WHERE he is doing what you claim."
>
> As I have said 500 times!  RIGHT HERE !!!
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> The truth is that NO epistemological antinomies CAN EVER
> be used in ANY undecidability proof, not ever not even once.
>

On 12/8/23 3:50 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 1:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/8/2023 1:03 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/8/2023 12:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/8/2023 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/7/2023 11:29 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 3:49 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:37 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that you ignored all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> my important points.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> excludes unknown truths
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> your most important point.
>>>>>>>>>>>> YMMV.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Unknown truths are at least as capable of
>>>>>>>>>>>> killing you as known truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophically I am only referring to
>>>>>>>>>>> the analytic side of
>>>>>>>>>>> the analytic / synthetic distinction.
>>>>>>>>>>> That excludes physical reality where
>>>>>>>>>>> things can kill you.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Fascinating.
>>>>>>>>>> Would you like me to tell you about
>>>>>>>>>> global warming?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Can you try again and ask to have
>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything that you don't understand
>>>>>>>>>>>>> explained?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Consider reading the post to which you respond.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> qnff =
>>>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first false
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> finseq =
>>>>>>>>>> | If this finite sequence of claims
>>>>>>>>>> | holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Abbreviate
>>>>>>>>>> a definition of "n is a natural number"
>>>>>>>>>> as "n is a natrual number.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> natnum =
>>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>>>> | n satisfies the definition of natural number
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim qnff =
>>>>>>>>>> | Q is not-first-false in
>>>>>>>>>> | ⟨… P∨Q ¬P Q …⟩
>>>>>>>>>> |     t   f t
>>>>>>>>>> |     t   t t
>>>>>>>>>> |     t   f f
>>>>>>>>>> |     f   t f
>>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>>> True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(qnff) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim finseq =
>>>>>>>>>> | For finite sequence ⟨foo … bar⟩
>>>>>>>>>> | if ⟨foo … bar⟩ holds a false claim,
>>>>>>>>>> | then it holds a first false claim.
>>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>>> True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(finseq) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _Abbreviate_
>>>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Consider the claim natnum =
>>>>>>>>>> | n is a natural number
>>>>>>>>>> | if and only if
>>>>>>>>>> | n ends ordered ⟨0,…,n⟩ such that,
>>>>>>>>>> | for each split Fᣔ<ᣔH of ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>>> | some i‖i+1 is last‖first in F‖H,  and
>>>>>>>>>> | 0‖n is first‖last in ⟨0,…,n⟩
>>>>>>>>>> | for
>>>>>>>>>> | non-0 non-doppelgänger non-final i+1
>>>>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>>>>> True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>> ¬True(natnum) ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Are you expecting these answers to change
>>>>>>>>>> if, for example, a proof of the Goldbach
>>>>>>>>>> conjecture is discovered?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Please explain.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you understand what this steps of
>>>>>>>>>>> the Tarski proof says:
>>>>>>>>>>> (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Here's the problem:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You:
>>>>>>>>>>> That all seems to be gibberish to me.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For you to understand what I am saying you must learn a little
>>>>>>>>> philosophy.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis shows that there may be some
>>>>>>>>> concepts that cannot be expressed within the scope of the
>>>>>>>>> terms of logic.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning:
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> AKA the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction
>>>>>>>>> necessarily must have a connection from an expression
>>>>>>>>> to this meaning as its truthmaker or it cannot possibly be true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Although within the conventional terms of logic there
>>>>>>>>> may be some truths that cannot be proven there cannot
>>>>>>>>> be analytic expressions of language that are true without
>>>>>>>>> something making them true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have diligently accounted for the difference between
>>>>>>>> analytical truth
>>>>>>>> and analytical knowledge the former may require an infinite
>>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>>> steps as its truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ Language(L)
>>>>>>>> True(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ x)
>>>>>>>> False(L,x) ≡ (T ⊢ ¬x)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Eliminates Tarski undefinability and Gödel incompleteness and
>>>>>>>> forces the concept of truth in math and logic to conform to the
>>>>>>>> way that it works everywhere else in the body of human
>>>>>>>> knowledge: True(x) ≡ (⊢ x)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the Goldbach conjecture only has an infinite sequence of
>>>>>>>> steps as
>>>>>>>> its truthmaker and formal proofs do not allow an infinite
>>>>>>>> sequence of
>>>>>>>> steps then we have an analytical truth with no proof yet it
>>>>>>>> still has a
>>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That there cannot be any analytic truth without a truthmaker
>>>>>>> refutes the Tarski Undecidability theorem.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Tarski anchored his proof in an epistemological antinomy just
>>>>>>> like the
>>>>>>> above quote: (3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
>>>>>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a truthmaker (not
>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>> with an infinite number of steps) thus are simply untrue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up. Epistemological antinomies are neither
>>>>>> true nor false thus calling them undecidable is a terrible euphemism
>>>>>> for non-truth-bearer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The last two paragraphs are to be analyzed in isolation.
>>>>> Saying that Gödel did not screw up because other parts of
>>>>> his paper did not screw up is the strawman deception.
>>>>>
>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>
>>>>> Thus Undecidable(L,x) is merely a terribly misleading euphemism for
>>>>> ~True(L,x).
>>>>
>>>> Undecidable has the base meaning that one cannot make up one's mind.
>>>> The mathematical use of the term includes the inability to decide
>>>> whether a kitten is a 15 story office building or a 16 story office
>>>> building and no option to say "incorrect question".
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> When a decision problem requires a yes or no answer to
>>> an expression of language that is a self-contradictory
>>> question this is incorrectly ruled as undecidable.
>>
>> "As I asked before, show exactly WHERE he is doing what you claim."
>>
>> As I have said 500 times!  RIGHT HERE !!!
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>> for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> The truth is that NO epistemological antinomies CAN EVER
>> be used in ANY undecidability proof, not ever not even once.
>>
>
> That Gödel would say this proves that he did not have a clue
> about the subject matter of his paper.
>

On 12/8/2023 12:29 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:

>>>>> [...]
>
> ...14
> Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
> be used for a similar undecidability proof...
> (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>
> Thus Gödel really screwed up.
> Epistemological antinomies

The epistemological antinomy
| This sentence is false
| is not in Gödel's proof.

| This sentence is false
| is the blueprint, which guides
Gödel placement of (metaphorically) actual
bricks and mortar.

You live in a building of some kind, I'd bet.
What odds would you give on whether
that building's blueprints are incorporated
into its construction?
If you ripped plaster off walls,
would you find particular sheets paper
holding up waterlines?

In note 14, Gödel is mentioning that
other blueprints can guide the placement of
(metaphorically) actual bricks and mortar
for other proofs.
Nor are those other blueprints incorporated
into those other proofs.

> Epistemological antinomies
> are neither

....here nor there.

On 12/9/2023 7:22 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
> On 12/8/2023 12:29 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>
>>>>>> [...]
>>
>> ...14
>> Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
>> be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>> (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> Thus Gödel really screwed up.
>> Epistemological antinomies
>
> The epistemological antinomy
> | This sentence is false
> |
> is not in Gödel's proof.
>
> | This sentence is false
> |
> is the blueprint, which guides
> Gödel placement of (metaphorically) actual
> bricks and mortar.
>
> You live in a building of some kind, I'd bet.
> What odds would you give on whether
> that building's blueprints are incorporated
> into its construction?
> If you ripped plaster off walls,
> would you find particular sheets paper
> holding up waterlines?
>
> In note 14, Gödel is mentioning that
> other blueprints can guide the placement of
> (metaphorically) actual bricks and mortar
> for other proofs.
> Nor are those other blueprints incorporated
> into those other proofs.
>
>> Epistemological antinomies
>> are neither
>
> ...here nor there.

Since no epistemological antinomy can ever be used for
any proof at all Gödel proved that it didn't have a clue
about the subject matter of his paper.

https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Tarski said that he used Gödel as a basis
and in the above link shows that he anchored
his whole proof in the actual Liar Paradox.

*Here is his actual proof*
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

--
Copyright 2023 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 12/9/23 9:55 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 12/9/2023 7:22 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 12/8/2023 12:29 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 12/7/2023 6:11 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 12/7/2023 10:20 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 12/6/2023 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 12/6/2023 4:35 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>
>>>>>>> [...]
>>>
>>> ...14
>>> Every epistemological antinomy can likewise
>>> be used for a similar undecidability proof...
>>> (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> Thus Gödel really screwed up.
>>> Epistemological antinomies
>>
>> The epistemological antinomy
>> | This sentence is false
>> |
>> is not in Gödel's proof.
>>
>> | This sentence is false
>> |
>> is the blueprint, which guides
>> Gödel placement of (metaphorically) actual
>> bricks and mortar.
>>
>> You live in a building of some kind, I'd bet.
>> What odds would you give on whether
>> that building's blueprints are incorporated
>> into its construction?
>> If you ripped plaster off walls,
>> would you find particular sheets paper
>> holding up waterlines?
>>
>> In note 14, Gödel is mentioning that
>> other blueprints can guide the placement of
>> (metaphorically) actual bricks and mortar
>> for other proofs.
>> Nor are those other blueprints incorporated
>> into those other proofs.
>>
>>> Epistemological antinomies
>>> are neither
>>
>> ...here nor there.
>
> Since no epistemological antinomy can ever be used for
> any proof at all Gödel proved that it didn't have a clue
> about the subject matter of his paper.

But he didn't, not in the way you are talking about.

By your own logic, YOU are "using" an epistemological antinomy in your
"proof" that Godel is incorrect, so your own proof is shown to be invalid.

>
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
> Tarski said that he used Gödel as a basis
> and in the above link shows that he anchored
> his whole proof in the actual Liar Paradox.

Right, and again, not in the way you are assuming it was done.

>
> *Here is his actual proof*
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>

Right, and where did he assume that the Liar was a true statement?

What he has shown is that the assumption that we can algorithmically
determine the truth value of a sentence (his "Definition of Truth") then
it would be possible to logically prove the Truth of the Liar. Since
this is impossible, the assumption can't be true.

You just don't understand how logic works.