An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the semantic
meaning of terms.

....14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)

When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to analytic
expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because epistemological
antinomies are rejected as not analytic.

It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

The proof of Tarski's undefinability theorem in this form is again
by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that an L-formula True(n)

as above existed, i.e., if A is a sentence of arithmetic, then
True(g(A)) holds in N if and only if A holds in N. Hence for all

A, the formula True(g(A)) ⟺ A holds in N. But the diagonal
lemma yields a counterexample to this equivalence, by

giving a "liar" formula S such that S ⟺ ¬True(g(A)) holds
in N. This is a contradiction QED.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the semantic
> meaning of terms.

Right

>
> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>

WHich you just don't understand what they did.

> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to analytic
> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because epistemological
> antinomies are rejected as not analytic.

So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows the
proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such a thing
can not exist doesn't matter to you?

>
> It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
> in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
> x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

Yes, GIVEN the existance of a computable True(L, x), it is LOGICALLY
POSSIBLE to do this. Thus it is allowed.

The only way to stop it is to not assume the existance of a computable
True(L,x).

>
>
> The proof of Tarski's undefinability theorem in this form is again
> by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that an L-formula True(n)
>
> as above existed, i.e., if A is a sentence of arithmetic, then
> True(g(A)) holds in N if and only if A holds in N. Hence for all
>
> A, the formula True(g(A)) ⟺ A holds in N. But the diagonal
> lemma yields a counterexample to this equivalence, by
>
> giving a "liar" formula S such that S ⟺ ¬True(g(A)) holds
> in N. This is a contradiction QED.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem
>
>

Yes, and if the system logically allows the construction, it allows the
construction.

You can't arbitrarily limit statements that are actually constructable
in the system from the system.

Your problem is that you just don't understand how meta-system logic works.

On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the semantic
>> meaning of terms.
>
> Right
>
>>
>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>
>
> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>
>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to analytic
>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because epistemological
>> antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>
> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows the
> proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such a thing
> can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>

A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
are not analytic.

>>
>> It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
>> in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
>> x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
>> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>
> Yes, GIVEN the existance of a computable True(L, x), it is LOGICALLY
> POSSIBLE to do this. Thus it is allowed.
>
> The only way to stop it is to not assume the existance of a computable
> True(L,x).
>

In the same way that formalized natural language rejects this sentence:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously

You (ahead of most others) already know that the Liar Paradox is
not a truth bearer. This means that any correct and consistent
truth predicate must reject epistemological antinomies as out-of-scope.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the semantic
>>> meaning of terms.
>>
>> Right
>>
>>>
>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>
>>
>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>
>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to analytic
>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because epistemological
>>> antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>
>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows the
>> proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such a thing
>> can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>
>
> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
> are not analytic.
>

A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.

Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the system.

>>>
>>> It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
>>> in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
>>> x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
>>> with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>
>> Yes, GIVEN the existance of a computable True(L, x), it is LOGICALLY
>> POSSIBLE to do this. Thus it is allowed.
>>
>> The only way to stop it is to not assume the existance of a computable
>> True(L,x).
>>
>
> In the same way that formalized natural language rejects this sentence:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously
>
> You (ahead of most others) already know that the Liar Paradox is
> not a truth bearer. This means that any correct and consistent
> truth predicate must reject epistemological antinomies as out-of-scope.
>
>

It can say they are not true, and neither is there complement.

On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the semantic
>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>
>>> Right
>>>
>>>>
>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>
>>>
>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>
>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to analytic
>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>
>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows the
>>> proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such a
>>> thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>
>>
>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>> are not analytic.
>>
>
> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.
IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies

> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the system.
This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot possibly
reach the self-contradiction.

*Alternatively S1 is rejected by H1 similar to above*
Implementation of H1 requires it to determine whether
it is being invoked from within S1.
The Halting Paradox Bill Stoddart
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf

Not as robust as my alternative solution, yet still in the same vein.
With my alternative solution H1 would reject S1 as invalid input
and then H1 would halt.

>> You (ahead of most others) already know that the Liar Paradox is
>> not a truth bearer. This means that any correct and consistent
>> truth predicate must reject epistemological antinomies as out-of-scope.
>>
>>
>
> It can say they are not true, and neither is there complement.
>

AKA reject them as not truth bearers.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the semantic
>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>
>>>> Right
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>
>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>> analytic
>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>
>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows
>>>> the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such a
>>>> thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>
>>>
>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>> are not analytic.
>>>
>>
>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.
> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies

It must say they are not true, (and not false).

>
>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the
>> system.
> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot possibly
> reach the self-contradiction.

No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the one
that never aborts it.

ALL you

>
> *Alternatively S1 is rejected by H1 similar to above*
>   Implementation of H1 requires it to determine whether
>   it is being invoked from within S1.

Which violates the requirement that H1 is a computation, so NOT POSSIBLE.

> The Halting Paradox Bill Stoddart
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf

Yep, he makes silly mistakes not understand what Computaiton theory is
about.

Just like you.

>
> Not as robust as my alternative solution, yet still in the same vein.
> With my alternative solution H1 would reject S1 as invalid input
> and then H1 would halt.
>

Except there is no "invalid program", unless you are admitting that your
decider isn't actually a Halt Decider.

>>> You (ahead of most others) already know that the Liar Paradox is
>>> not a truth bearer. This means that any correct and consistent
>>> truth predicate must reject epistemological antinomies as out-of-scope.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> It can say they are not true, and neither is there complement.
>>
>
> AKA reject them as not truth bearers.
>

But still give an answer.

if you define the Truth Predicate to accept all True Statements, then
the Truth Predicate will accept all True statements, and reject all
false statements, and non-truthbearers.

On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>
>>>>> Right
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>
>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>>> analytic
>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows
>>>>> the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such
>>>>> a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.
>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>
> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>

That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.

>>
>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the
>>> system.
>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot possibly
>> reach the self-contradiction.
>
> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the one
> that never aborts it.
>

You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
<IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.

Also it only takes N steps to correctly determine that ∞ steps cannot
possibly terminate normally.

> ALL you
>
>>
>> *Alternatively S1 is rejected by H1 similar to above*
>>    Implementation of H1 requires it to determine whether
>>    it is being invoked from within S1.
>
> Which violates the requirement that H1 is a computation, so NOT POSSIBLE.

When S1 is not a computation then H1 is correct to reject S1.

>
>> The Halting Paradox Bill Stoddart
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>
> Yep, he makes silly mistakes not understand what Computaiton theory is
> about.
>
> Just like you.
>
>>
>> Not as robust as my alternative solution, yet still in the same vein.
>> With my alternative solution H1 would reject S1 as invalid input
>> and then H1 would halt.
>>
>
> Except there is no "invalid program", unless you are admitting that your
> decider isn't actually a Halt Decider.
>
>>>> You (ahead of most others) already know that the Liar Paradox is
>>>> not a truth bearer. This means that any correct and consistent
>>>> truth predicate must reject epistemological antinomies as out-of-scope.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> It can say they are not true, and neither is there complement.
>>>
>>
>> AKA reject them as not truth bearers.
>>
>
> But still give an answer.
>
> if you define the Truth Predicate to accept all True Statements, then
> the Truth Predicate will accept all True statements, and reject all
> false statements, and non-truthbearers.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other expressions
>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>>>> analytic
>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows
>>>>>> the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that such
>>>>>> a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.
>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>
>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>
>
> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.

But they are answer of different predicates.

>
>>>
>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the
>>>> system.
>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot possibly
>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>
>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the one
>> that never aborts it.
>>
>
> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.

But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the simulation
to replace the behavior of the machine described.

Thus, since D(D) Halts, H is proven incorrect as a Halt Decider.

You are just admitting that you aren't working on Halting in Computation
Theory, but just on POOP in PO-whatever theory.
>
> Also it only takes N steps to correctly determine that ∞ steps cannot
> possibly terminate normally.

SOMETIMES.

Not here.

PROVEN

So, you are proven to be an idiot.

>
>> ALL you
>>
>>>
>>> *Alternatively S1 is rejected by H1 similar to above*
>>>    Implementation of H1 requires it to determine whether
>>>    it is being invoked from within S1.
>>
>> Which violates the requirement that H1 is a computation, so NOT POSSIBLE.
>
> When S1 is not a computation then H1 is correct to reject S1.

IF H1 isn't a computation, then it doesn't matter about S1, H1 just
isn't a computation, so can't be a decider.

You are again, just proving you are just talking about POOP.

And that you are nothing but an ignorant hypocritical pathological lying
idiot.

On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>>>>> analytic
>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x), allows
>>>>>>> the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say that
>>>>>>> such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.
>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>
>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>
>>
>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>
> But they are answer of different predicates.

We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
understood this.

*That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
*That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
*That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>
>>>>
>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the
>>>>> system.
>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot possibly
>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>
>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the
>>> one that never aborts it.
>>>
>>
>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>
> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the simulation
> to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>

Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
D does specify non terminating behavior to H.

Stoddart refers to H1 and S1, and Hehner refers to this
same thing:

<Hehner>
From a programmer's point of view, if we apply an interpreter to a
program text that includes a call to that same interpreter with that
same text as argument, then we have an infinite loop. A halting program
has some of the same character as an interpreter: it applies to texts
through abstract interpretation. Unsurprisingly, if we apply a halting
program to a program text that includes a call to that same halting
program with that same text as argument, then we have an infinite loop.
A mathematical version of it cannot escape the corresponding problem:
</Hehner>

Problems with the Halting Problem
https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/PHP.pdf

The Halting Paradox Bill Stoddart
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language verified as
>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or ~x) is
>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>>>>>> analytic
>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say
>>>>>>>> that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the Language.
>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>
>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>
>>>
>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>
>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>
> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
> understood this.
>
> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*

But you don't understand what he is doing,

>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in the
>>>>>> system.
>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>> possibly
>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>
>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the
>>>> one that never aborts it.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>
>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the simulation
>> to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>
>
> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
Nope, because if H(D,D) returns 0, then the behavior of the input, TO
EVERYTHING, is halting.

The behavior of the COMPUTATION D(D) is always the same, and D is a
computation if H was. And if H wasn't, then it fails to meet the
requirements to be a Halt Decider.

>
> Stoddart refers to H1 and S1, and Hehner refers to this
> same thing:
>
> <Hehner>
> From a programmer's point of view, if we apply an interpreter to a
> program text that includes a call to that same interpreter with that
> same text as argument, then we have an infinite loop. A halting program
> has some of the same character as an interpreter: it applies to texts
> through abstract interpretation. Unsurprisingly, if we apply a halting
> program to a program text that includes a call to that same halting
> program with that same text as argument, then we have an infinite loop.
> A mathematical version of it cannot escape the corresponding problem:
> </Hehner>
>
> Problems with the Halting Problem
> https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hehner/PHP.pdf
>
> The Halting Paradox Bill Stoddart
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.05340.pdf
>
>

The fact that a particular implementation gets stuck in an infinite loop
doesn't make the problem incorrect, just the particular implementation
wrong.

Note, they seem to be making the same error you do, and confusing the
idea of a pure interpreter with a Halt Decider.

If the decider aborts, then when it is looking that the program and sees
a call to itself, it can't assume the call is to a pure interpreter,
since it isn't one.

So, either the decider doesn't abort, and then doesn't answer (and thus
is wrong) or it aborts its interprestation (and thus doesn't have actual
evidence of the final behavior of the program given to it) and what ever
it decides to answer, will be wrong when we look at the ACTUAL behavior
of the input.

On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>>>>>>> analytic
>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say
>>>>>>>>> that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>
>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>
>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>
>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>> understood this.
>>
>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>
> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>
>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in
>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the
>>>>> one that never aborts it.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>
>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>
>>
>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>

*Maybe these are finally the right words*
D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
specifies...

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies to
>>>>>>>>>> analytic
>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must say
>>>>>>>>> that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>
>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>
>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>
>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>> understood this.
>>
>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>
> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>

Tarski did not understand that non-truth bearers are
out-of-scope of any truth predicate.

*You understand these things better than he did*

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

Op 05.feb.2024 om 05:19 schreef olcott:
> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>
>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>
>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>> understood this.
>>>
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>
>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>
>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in
>>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the
>>>>>> one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>
>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>
>
> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

Lets call the H that aborts after N steps HaN.
For each of these we can create a DaN based on this HaN.

>
> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
> specifies...
>

HaN(DaN,DaN) must judge in input, which contains HaN, which aborts after
N steps and therefore DaN halts. It should not judge its non-input the
DaM, which aborts after M steps. (With M ≠ N.) There is no N for which
HaH gets a correct result for HaN(DaN,DaN).

In 1979 our lab got a PDP-11 computer. The engineer who installed the
system gave us a copy of the game Eliza, probably a descendant of the
famous Eliza. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA>
It was a simple chat program with a limited set of responses, but clever
enough to respond with sentences containing fragments from messages
typed in on the keyboard. For some people so realistic, that they only
wanted to chat with the program in private.
But after some time, it was easily seen that it was not a human being at
the other side. The many repetitions. The answers that sometimes did not
touch the point of the message. The sudden return to an much earlier
phase of the chat.
When I see the discussion with olcott, I get the same feelings. The
first impression is that there is a human being at the other side, but
here again, after some time I see the same symptoms: Many repetitions;
often the answer does not address the point of the message; suddenly the
discussion goes back to a point of which everybody thought it had been
passed definitively already.
So I come to the conclusion that someone is playing a game. He is using
an AI and tries to see how long he can get responses. His game evidently
has an AI somewhat better than that of Eliza. Once in a while it seems
to be updated with a few new responses. When it looks as if the
discussion is going to halt, it starts a new thread (sometimes in a new
newsgroup). Maybe every now and then the maker of the game adds a few
responses himself.
I will not be surprised when olcott sooner or later tells us that his
goal was not the discussion of the proofs of the theorems Gödel an
Tarski, but the proof that it is possible to fool people on Internet
with useless discussions for many years.

On 2/4/24 11:19 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>
>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>
>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>> understood this.
>>>
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>
>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>
>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in
>>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is the
>>>>>> one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>
>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>
>
> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>
> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
> specifies...
>

So, you are just agreeing that your H is just a POOP decider, not a Halt
Decider.

If your criteria is not the actual Halting Question, your results aren't
a Halt Decider,

For a Halt Decider, it must compute the mapping from the finite input
string to the behavior that string specifies, and that string specifies
a Compuation, and the FULL sequnece of states that running it will
generate, and we ask if the sequence has an end.

It is NOT about can H simulate that input to the end, but does it have one.

And, for this case, the input is built on a copy of the EXACT
computation that is deciding on it.

You don't get to change the criteria to something that creates a
different map.

You clearly don't understand the nature of requirements, and thus the
meaning of "Correct" or "True"

On 2/4/24 11:21 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing the
>>>>>>>>>>> semantic
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for
>>>>>>>>>>> a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions, everything
>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>
>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>
>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>> understood this.
>>>
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>
>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>
>
> Tarski did not understand that non-truth bearers are
> out-of-scope of any truth predicate.
>
> *You understand these things better than he did*
>

In other words, YOU don't understand what requirements mean.

On 2/5/2024 6:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 11:19 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing
>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>
>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>
>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>> understood this.
>>>>
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>
>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in
>>>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is
>>>>>>> the one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>>
>>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>>
>>
>> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>
>> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
>> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
>> specifies...
>>
>
> So, you are just agreeing that your H is just a POOP decider, not a Halt
> Decider.
>
> If your criteria is not the actual Halting Question, your results aren't
> a Halt Decider,
>
> For a Halt Decider, it must compute the mapping from the finite input
> string to the behavior that string specifies, and that string specifies
> a Compuation, and the FULL sequnece of states that running it will
> generate, and we ask if the sequence has an end.
>

D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D *correctly* simulated
by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D *correctly* simulated
by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D *correctly* simulated
by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

> It is NOT about can H simulate that input to the end, but does it have one.
>
> And, for this case, the input is built on a copy of the EXACT
> computation that is deciding on it.
>
> You don't get to change the criteria to something that creates a
> different map.
>

Innovation DOES CHANGE THINGS.
No one ever thought of a simulating halt decider before.
Everyone that thought of simulation rejected it as a basis.

> You clearly don't understand the nature of requirements, and thus the
> meaning of "Correct" or "True"

D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D *correctly* simulated
by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/5/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 05.feb.2024 om 05:19 schreef olcott:
>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing
>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>
>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>
>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>> understood this.
>>>>
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>
>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in
>>>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is
>>>>>>> the one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>>
>>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>>
>>
>> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>
> Lets call the H that aborts after N steps HaN.
> For each of these we can create a DaN based on this HaN.

When H correctly reports on the behavior of every H that can
possibly exist we need no other H.

>>
>> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
>> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
>> specifies...
>>
>
> HaN(DaN,DaN) must judge in input, which contains HaN, which aborts after
> N steps and therefore DaN halts. It should not judge its non-input the
> DaM, which aborts after M steps. (With M ≠ N.) There is no N for which
> HaH gets a correct result for HaN(DaN,DaN).
>

D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

As soon as H correctly determines that the above is
true in N steps of correct simulation then H correctly
aborts its simulated and rejects D as non-halting.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/5/2024 4:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> In 1979 our lab got a PDP-11 computer. The engineer who installed the
> system gave us a copy of the game Eliza, probably a descendant of the
> famous Eliza. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA>
> It was a simple chat program with a limited set of responses, but clever
> enough to respond with sentences containing fragments from messages
> typed in on the keyboard. For some people so realistic, that they only
> wanted to chat with the program in private.
> But after some time, it was easily seen that it was not a human being at
> the other side. The many repetitions. The answers that sometimes did not
> touch the point of the message. The sudden return to an much earlier
> phase of the chat.
> When I see the discussion with olcott, I get the same feelings. The
> first impression is that there is a human being at the other side, but
> here again, after some time I see the same symptoms: Many repetitions;
> often the answer does not address the point of the message; suddenly the
> discussion goes back to a point of which everybody thought it had been
> passed definitively already.
> So I come to the conclusion that someone is playing a game. He is using
> an AI and tries to see how long he can get responses. His game evidently
> has an AI somewhat better than that of Eliza. Once in a while it seems
> to be updated with a few new responses. When it looks as if the
> discussion is going to halt, it starts a new thread (sometimes in a new
> newsgroup). Maybe every now and then the maker of the game adds a few
> responses himself.
> I will not be surprised when olcott sooner or later tells us that his
> goal was not the discussion of the proofs of the theorems Gödel an
> Tarski, but the proof that it is possible to fool people on Internet
> with useless discussions for many years.

When Tarski used an epistemological antinomy to test the validity
of his Truth predicate Tarski was dead wrong.

Epistemological antinomies are not truth-bearers thus out-of-scope
for any truth predicate. It is like trying to find the square root
of an actual orange peal, type mismatch error.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 2/5/2024 6:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 2/4/24 11:21 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing
>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>
>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>
>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>> understood this.
>>>>
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>
>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>
>>
>> Tarski did not understand that non-truth bearers are
>> out-of-scope of any truth predicate.
>>
>> *You understand these things better than he did*
>>
>
> In other words, YOU don't understand what requirements mean.

Since a Truth predicate is required to return True or False then
non-truth-bearers are out-of-scope because they are neither true or
false.

True(L, "what time is it?") is ERROR-INVALID-INPUT

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

Op 05.feb.2024 om 15:28 schreef olcott:
> On 2/5/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>> Op 05.feb.2024 om 05:19 schreef olcott:
>>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x (or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only applies
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions that
>>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>>
>>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>>> understood this.
>>>>>
>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>
>>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable in
>>>>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is
>>>>>>>> the one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N steps
>>>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
>>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>
>> Lets call the H that aborts after N steps HaN.
>> For each of these we can create a DaN based on this HaN.
>
> When H correctly reports on the behavior of every H that can
> possibly exist we need no other H.
>
>>>
>>> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
>>> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
>>> specifies...
>>>
>>
>> HaN(DaN,DaN) must judge in input, which contains HaN, which aborts
>> after N steps and therefore DaN halts. It should not judge its
>> non-input the DaM, which aborts after M steps. (With M ≠ N.) There is
>> no N for which HaH gets a correct result for HaN(DaN,DaN).
>>
>
> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.

Each of the DaN specify that it reaches the final state, so, if H
aborts, there is no D that does not reach the final state.

> As soon as H correctly determines that the above is
> true in N steps of correct simulation then H correctly
> aborts its simulated and rejects D as non-halting.
>

None of the HaN correctly simulate DaN, because they all need to
simulate a few steps more than they do. A H that simulates N steps and
more than N steps at the same time does not exist. So, there is no H
that correctly determines that the above is true in N steps, because it
always needs more steps than N. If H simulates N steps, it needs a few
steps more to see that DaN returns. No correct HaN exists, not even in
the limit N → ∞.
Remember That HaN(DaN,DaN) must decide on its input DaN, not on its
non-input DaM, with M ≠ N.

On 2/5/2024 8:58 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 05.feb.2024 om 15:28 schreef olcott:
>> On 2/5/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>> Op 05.feb.2024 om 05:19 schreef olcott:
>>>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applies to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy must
>>>>>>>>>>>>> say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>>>> understood this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>
>>>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable
>>>>>>>>>>> in the system.
>>>>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H cannot
>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is
>>>>>>>>> the one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N
>>>>>>>> steps
>>>>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>>>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
>>>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>>>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>>
>>> Lets call the H that aborts after N steps HaN.
>>> For each of these we can create a DaN based on this HaN.
>>
>> When H correctly reports on the behavior of every H that can
>> possibly exist we need no other H.
>>
>>>>
>>>> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
>>>> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
>>>> specifies...
>>>>
>>>
>>> HaN(DaN,DaN) must judge in input, which contains HaN, which aborts
>>> after N steps and therefore DaN halts. It should not judge its
>>> non-input the DaM, which aborts after M steps. (With M ≠ N.) There is
>>> no N for which HaH gets a correct result for HaN(DaN,DaN).
>>>
>>
>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>
>
> Each of the DaN specify that it reaches the final state, so, if H
> aborts, there is no D that does not reach the final state.
>
>> As soon as H correctly determines that the above is
>> true in N steps of correct simulation then H correctly
>> aborts its simulated and rejects D as non-halting.
>>
>
> None of the HaN correctly simulate DaN, because they all need to

Of the infinite set of every H1...Hn that correctly simulates
1 to ∞ steps of its corresponding D1...Dn none of these infinite
pairs ever reaches its own final state.

The specific H that correctly simulates N steps of D correctly
determines that above is true (for the entire infinite set)
thus providing it with the correct halt status criteria basis
to reject D as non-halting.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

Op 05.feb.2024 om 16:15 schreef olcott:
> On 2/5/2024 8:58 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>> Op 05.feb.2024 om 15:28 schreef olcott:
>>> On 2/5/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>>> Op 05.feb.2024 om 05:19 schreef olcott:
>>>>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus providing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applies to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L, x),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allows the proving of that an epistemological antinomy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must say that such a thing can not exist doesn't matter to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>>>>> understood this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the system.
>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H
>>>>>>>>>>> cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input is
>>>>>>>>>> the one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N
>>>>>>>>> steps
>>>>>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>>>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>>>>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
>>>>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>>>>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>>>
>>>> Lets call the H that aborts after N steps HaN.
>>>> For each of these we can create a DaN based on this HaN.
>>>
>>> When H correctly reports on the behavior of every H that can
>>> possibly exist we need no other H.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
>>>>> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
>>>>> specifies...
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> HaN(DaN,DaN) must judge in input, which contains HaN, which aborts
>>>> after N steps and therefore DaN halts. It should not judge its
>>>> non-input the DaM, which aborts after M steps. (With M ≠ N.) There
>>>> is no N for which HaH gets a correct result for HaN(DaN,DaN).
>>>>
>>>
>>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>
>>
>> Each of the DaN specify that it reaches the final state, so, if H
>> aborts, there is no D that does not reach the final state.
>>
>>> As soon as H correctly determines that the above is
>>> true in N steps of correct simulation then H correctly
>>> aborts its simulated and rejects D as non-halting.
>>>
>>
>> None of the HaN correctly simulate DaN, because they all need to
>
> Of the infinite set of every H1...Hn that correctly simulates
> 1 to ∞ steps of its corresponding D1...Dn none of these infinite
> pairs ever reaches its own final state.

Op 05.feb.2024 om 16:43 schreef Fred. Zwarts:
> Op 05.feb.2024 om 16:15 schreef olcott:
>> On 2/5/2024 8:58 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>> Op 05.feb.2024 om 15:28 schreef olcott:
>>>> On 2/5/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>>>> Op 05.feb.2024 om 05:19 schreef olcott:
>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 8:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 8:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 1:02 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2024 11:45 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/24 10:53 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An analytic expression x is any expression of language
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true (or false) entirely on the basis that x
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or ~x) is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derived by applying truth preserving operations to other
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that are stipulated to be true thus
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> providing the semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of terms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Right
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WHich you just don't understand what they did.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand that a True(L, x) predicate only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applies to analytic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions then Tarski's proof utterly fails because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are rejected as not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, the fact that the EXISTANCE of a computabe True(L,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x), allows the proving of that an epistemological
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> antinomy must say that such a thing can not exist doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter to you?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A truth predicate only deals with analytic expressions,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else is out-of-scope. A truth predicate rejects
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not analytic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A Truth Predicate needs to deal with ALL expressions in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Language.
>>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>>> IT MUST REJECT epistemological antinomies
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It must say they are not true, (and not false).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That would also work, yet we construe not true and not false
>>>>>>>>>> as not truth bearer thus out-of-scope of a truth predicate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But they are answer of different predicates.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We only need to Truth predicate and this must reject
>>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies. Neither Tarski nor Gödel
>>>>>>>> understood this.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>>>> *That is the key essence of their huge mistake*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But you don't understand what he is doing,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just like a Halt Decider must handle all programs definable
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the system.
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the same because D correctly simulated by H
>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>> reach the self-contradiction.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No, because the only H that "Correctly Simulates" its input
>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that never aborts it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You continue to fail to understand that correctly simulating N
>>>>>>>>>> steps
>>>>>>>>>> <IS> a correct simulation of these N steps.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But NOT a "Correct Simulation" that allows the use of a the
>>>>>>>>> simulation to replace the behavior of the machine described.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Both Hehner and Stoddart agree that:
>>>>>>>> D does specify non terminating behavior to H.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Maybe these are finally the right words*
>>>>>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>>>>>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>>>>
>>>>> Lets call the H that aborts after N steps HaN.
>>>>> For each of these we can create a DaN based on this HaN.
>>>>
>>>> When H correctly reports on the behavior of every H that can
>>>> possibly exist we need no other H.
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It *is* the case that a halt decider must compute
>>>>>> the mapping from the behavior that its finite string
>>>>>> specifies...
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> HaN(DaN,DaN) must judge in input, which contains HaN, which aborts
>>>>> after N steps and therefore DaN halts. It should not judge its
>>>>> non-input the DaM, which aborts after M steps. (With M ≠ N.) There
>>>>> is no N for which HaH gets a correct result for HaN(DaN,DaN).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> D specifies that N to ∞ steps of D correctly simulated
>>>> by H cannot possibly reach the final state of D.
>>>
>>>
>>> Each of the DaN specify that it reaches the final state, so, if H
>>> aborts, there is no D that does not reach the final state.
>>>
>>>> As soon as H correctly determines that the above is
>>>> true in N steps of correct simulation then H correctly
>>>> aborts its simulated and rejects D as non-halting.
>>>>
>>>
>>> None of the HaN correctly simulate DaN, because they all need to
>>
>> Of the infinite set of every H1...Hn that correctly simulates
>> 1 to ∞ steps of its corresponding D1...Dn none of these infinite
>> pairs ever reaches its own final state.
>
> That should be:
> Of the infinite set of every H1...Hn that simulates 1 to n steps, none
> simulates enough steps to see that D1 halts normally. So, they all abort
> too soon and return falsely an non-halting state.

On 05/02/2024 10:16, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> In 1979 our lab got a PDP-11 computer. The engineer who installed the
> system gave us a copy of the game Eliza, probably a descendant of the
> famous Eliza.
I don't know what your engineer did, but we got Unix for our
PDP-11 a year or two before that, and the mag tape for it included
"eliza" [free]. I no longer recall whether that tape came directly
from Bell or via [what was then] QMC.

[...]
> When I see the discussion with olcott, I get the same feelings. [...]
> So I come to the conclusion that someone is playing a game. [...]
> I will not be surprised when olcott sooner or later tells us that his
> goal was not the discussion of the proofs of the theorems Gödel an
> Tarski, but the proof that it is possible to fool people on Internet
> with useless discussions for many years.

Well, we already knew that result. Many years ago, there were
signs of progress, and several people [inc me] tried to help with what
seemed to be genuine stumbling blocks. I still pitch in very occasionally
when there seems to be a new point, but I refuse to get dragged into the
more rubbish parts of the "debate". Rule of thumb: if you add the more
prolific posters [that means anyone posting 10+ times/day] and posts of
over 100 lines to your KF, you won't miss anything of interest. Anyone
who is aggrieved by being ignored in this way knows what they have to do
to become worth reading.

--
Andy Walker, Nottingham.
Andy's music pages: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music
Composer of the day: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music/Composers/Dandrieu