On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>
>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>
>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
>>> now."
>>
>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>
> Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>

It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's
scientific demarcation, and the usual old idea that mathematics is
analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the
epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.

It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.

That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.

So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
"Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.

Op 06.apr.2024 om 16:01 schreef olcott:
> On 4/6/2024 3:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>> Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>> basis
>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>
>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>
>>>> Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>>>
>>> You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then
>>> which
>>> kind of “truth” is it?
>> I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
>> truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain
>> analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If so,
>> about which system is olcott talking?
>
> Cats are animals is an axiom of natural language.
> The Cyc project uses 128-bit GUIDs in place of words
> that give each sense meaning of a word its own unique
> identifier and accounts for the varied natural languages.
>

I try to read this as an answer to my questions, but without success.
Does olcott mean that the system I was asking for is the Cyc project?
And that these axioms are valid only within this project?
He adds another axiom: "Cats are animals is an axiom of natural
language". Is that also within this system?
Natural language is often ambiguous, or metaphorical. E.g., the word
"cat" is some times used for other things that are not animals. I don't
see how natural language can be used as an analytical system.

Op 06.apr.2024 om 15:57 schreef olcott:
> On 4/6/2024 2:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>
>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>
>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
>>>> now."
>>>
>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>
>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>> In particular, Olcott doesn't use the word "truth" for any other
>> kind, although someone else might say, e.g., that a moral truth is
>> a truth, too.
>>
>
> A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
> It seems to me that morality can only be correctly addressed
> through consequentialism. Bereft of a harmful effect there
> can be no wrong.

That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
can easily become a cyclic reasoning.

Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
> On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
>>
>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>
>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>> right now."
>>>>
>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>
>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>
>> Can you offer a proof of that?
>
> Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
> is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
>

The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the context.

On 04/07/2024 02:01 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 06.apr.2024 om 16:01 schreef olcott:
>> On 4/6/2024 3:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>> Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>>
>>>>> Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>>>>
>>>> You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then
>>>> which
>>>> kind of “truth” is it?
>>> I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
>>> truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain
>>> analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If
>>> so, about which system is olcott talking?
>>
>> Cats are animals is an axiom of natural language.
>> The Cyc project uses 128-bit GUIDs in place of words
>> that give each sense meaning of a word its own unique
>> identifier and accounts for the varied natural languages.
>>
>
> I try to read this as an answer to my questions, but without success.
> Does olcott mean that the system I was asking for is the Cyc project?
> And that these axioms are valid only within this project?
> He adds another axiom: "Cats are animals is an axiom of natural
> language". Is that also within this system?
> Natural language is often ambiguous, or metaphorical. E.g., the word
> "cat" is some times used for other things that are not animals. I don't
> see how natural language can be used as an analytical system.

Natural language is analytic in a particular context,
so that definitions have particular establishments,
so that in the context the definition and meaning is implicit,
that what results is analytically explicit, and, unambiguous.

That's not the same as "loose" language, or metaphor, where
metaphor eventually fails, yet, there's a stronger metaphor,
a metonymy, that a strong metonymy meets metaphor, about
that anything that can be written in a terse, closed, symbolic
language resulting unambiguous inference, has that as a
technical subset of natural language.

Then, the "logical" and "non-logical", terms, in a theory,
results for example that there is a theory of cats and that
they're felines, that "a rose is a rose is a rose", yet,
a rose is a rose, a nose is a nose, and by any other name
they'd smell as sweet.

In natural language, there is a class of things called animals,
and among those, is a class of animals called cats. The
metaphor, idiom, simile, and parable, and parody, all reflect
on the category of cats, even when they don't.

So anyways, just because language is natural (or, general-purpose)
does not mean that it can be interpreted incorrectly, that in
an analytic setting, each of truth, unambiguity, well-defined
implicits and explicits, and otherwise well-defined behavior,
are correct, and otherwise, is not.

Then, in an analytic or analytical setting, the distinction
between logical and non-logical objects may start deep within
the theory, like class/set distinction and part/particle distinction,
categories and types and numbers and geometry and theories themselves,
or their models where this is a model theory, and a proof theory,
that the goal and result of theory is both proof and model,
the distinction between logical and non-logical is compounded
by natural language, of things and references, and use/mention distinction.

For example, ....

On 4/7/2024 4:01 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 06.apr.2024 om 16:01 schreef olcott:
>> On 4/6/2024 3:16 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>> Op 06.apr.2024 om 07:40 schreef Lawrence D'Oliveiro:
>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:55 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>>
>>>>> Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>>>>
>>>> You said “There are only two kinds of truth”. If that is true, then
>>>> which
>>>> kind of “truth” is it?
>>> I have similar questions. It seems to be an axiom. Do axioms have a
>>> truth value? Are they true by definition, but only within a certain
>>> analytical system? Could they be false/untrue in other systems? If
>>> so, about which system is olcott talking?
>>
>> Cats are animals is an axiom of natural language.
>> The Cyc project uses 128-bit GUIDs in place of words
>> that give each sense meaning of a word its own unique
>> identifier and accounts for the varied natural languages.
>>
>
> I try to read this as an answer to my questions, but without success.
> Does olcott mean that the system I was asking for is the Cyc project?
> And that these axioms are valid only within this project?
> He adds another axiom: "Cats are animals is an axiom of natural
> language". Is that also within this system?
> Natural language is often ambiguous, or metaphorical. E.g., the word
> "cat" is some times used for other things that are not animals. I don't
> see how natural language can be used as an analytical system.

To eliminate the ambiguity of words having different sense meanings and
to account for differing human language the living animal "cat" is
assigned this unique GUID 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d. Every
other use of the word "cat" would have its own different GUID.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/7/2024 4:06 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 06.apr.2024 om 15:57 schreef olcott:
>> On 4/6/2024 2:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>
>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>> right
>>>>> now."
>>>>
>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>
>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>> In particular, Olcott doesn't use the word "truth" for any other
>>> kind, although someone else might say, e.g., that a moral truth is
>>> a truth, too.
>>>
>>
>> A moral "truth" is often no more than an opinion.
>> It seems to me that morality can only be correctly addressed
>> through consequentialism. Bereft of a harmful effect there
>> can be no wrong.
>
> That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
> can easily become a cyclic reasoning.
>

All knowledge is stored in a
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science) inheritance
hierarchy acyclic directed graph. Harm must be actual harm not mere
imaginary harm
of failure to comply with arbitrary standards. Choosing the best
value system is the key to laying the proper foundation for morality.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
>> On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>> basis
>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>
>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>
>>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>>
>>> Can you offer a proof of that?
>>
>> Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
>> is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
>>
>
> The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
> context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the context.
>

When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/6/2024 11:26 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>
>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
>>>> now."
>>>
>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>
>> Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>>
>
> It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's
> scientific demarcation,

Not at all. Any truth that can be encapsulated in language is construed
as analytic. The actual smell of roses, taste of strawberries, sound of
a dog barking and such like physical sensations are the only things that
are excluded.

> and the usual old idea that mathematics is
> analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
> that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
> that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
> the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the
> epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
> and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
> disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
> of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
> and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
> while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.
>
> It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
> is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
> truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
> that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
> and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.
>

It is possible that everything that appears to be a physical sensation
is actually a mere figment of the imagination. None-the-less cats <are>
animals remains true.

> That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
> language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
> while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
> it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
> only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
> from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
> theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
> technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
> still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
> with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
> context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.
>
> So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
> truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
> and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
> an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
> thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
> "Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
> right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
> at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.
>
>

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
> On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>> Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
>>> On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>>
>>>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>>>
>>>> Can you offer a proof of that?
>>>
>>> Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
>>> is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
>>>
>>
>> The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
>> context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
>> context.
>>
>
> When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
>

I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not use
such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the
meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also its
context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the word
'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.

On 4/8/24 4:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
>> On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>> Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
>>>> On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense
>>>>>>>> data
>>>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you offer a proof of that?
>>>>
>>>> Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
>>>> is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
>>> context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
>>> context.
>>>
>>
>> When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
>> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
>> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
>>
>
> I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not use
> such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the
> meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also its
> context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the word
> 'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.

Yes, Olcott's whole being seems to think that words can just be twisted
in their meaning (without notice), which is just one of the techniques
of liars.

On 4/8/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
> Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
>> On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>> Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
>>>> On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the
>>>>>>>> basis
>>>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense
>>>>>>>> data
>>>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you offer a proof of that?
>>>>
>>>> Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
>>>> is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
>>> context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
>>> context.
>>>
>>
>> When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
>> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
>> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
>>
>
> I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not use
> such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the

Mathematically formalized natural language such that computers can
achieve the same degree of understanding as humans.

> meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also its
> context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the word
> 'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.

I don't think that this is the linguistic notion of context where the
meaning of a word is derived from its denotation and its context. This
is more of a case of picking one of several different denotations.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/8/24 10:12 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/8/2024 3:52 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>> Op 07.apr.2024 om 17:33 schreef olcott:
>>> On 4/7/2024 4:09 AM, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>>>> Op 07.apr.2024 om 04:14 schreef olcott:
>>>>> On 4/6/2024 9:08 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:34:38 +0300, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 2024-04-06 01:26:49 +0000, Lawrence D'Oliveiro said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>>>>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on
>>>>>>>>> the basis
>>>>>>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense
>>>>>>>>> data
>>>>>>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room
>>>>>>>>> right now."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is an analytic truth as it is true by the meaning of the words.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Can you offer a proof of that?
>>>>>
>>>>> Cats are animals thus are not fifteen story office buildings
>>>>> is true on the basis of the meaning of its words.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The meaning of the word "Cats"is not unambiguous. It depends on the
>>>> context. So, it is not only the meaning of the word, but also the
>>>> context.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When the living animal "cat" is assigned this unique GUID
>>> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d the meaning of
>>> 66a33333-a238-4086-8e58-b1382e1aab5d does not depend on context.
>>>
>>
>> I see. Olcott is not talking about natural language (which does not
>> use such GUIDs), but about another 'system'. In natural language, the
>
> Mathematically formalized natural language such that computers can
> achieve the same degree of understanding as humans.

So you think,

>
>> meaning of a word does not only depend on the word itself, but also
>> its context. The dictionary shows me several different meanings of the
>> word 'cat', some of which have nothing to do with animals.
>
> I don't think that this is the linguistic notion of context where the
> meaning of a word is derived from its denotation and its context. This
> is more of a case of picking one of several different denotations.
>

You don't KNOW what you are talking about, which is why you don't
actually answer the questions.

On 4/2/2024 11:50 AM, olcott wrote:
> There is a great debate about whether an expression of language
> can be true without a truth maker.
>
> Truthmaker Maximalism defended GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA
> https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD
>
> A truth without a truthmaker is like a cake without a baker,
> non-existent.
>
> True and unprovable is self-contradictory once one understands
> how true really works the way that I and Wittgenstein do.
> https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
>

Analytic truth seems to be essentially nothing more than relations
between finite strings. Copyright 2024 PL Olcott

*Here is my key basis for that*

By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic
expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of
individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such
relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that
sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 4/9/24 8:15 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/2/2024 11:50 AM, olcott wrote:
>> There is a great debate about whether an expression of language
>> can be true without a truth maker.
>>
>> Truthmaker Maximalism defended GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA
>> https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD
>>
>> A truth without a truthmaker is like a cake without a baker,
>> non-existent.
>>
>> True and unprovable is self-contradictory once one understands
>> how true really works the way that I and Wittgenstein do.
>> https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
>>
>
> Analytic truth seems to be essentially nothing more than relations
> between finite strings. Copyright 2024 PL Olcott

Which means that you don;t actually understand what it means.

>
> *Here is my key basis for that*
>
> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
> objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic
> expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of
> individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such
> relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that
> sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
> R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
> fitting together.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>

While the statements can be expressed in "Finite Strings", the strings
themselves don't convey the full meaning.

And part of the problem, which seems to be beyond you, is that Truth can
be established via an INFINITE chain of steps (but such a chain doesn't
allow that Truth to be Known).

You seem to have a fundamental blind spot on the difference between
something being true and it being known. Things can be True, but not
known, or even knowable. You can't perform a proof with such a
statement, as, if you don't know the truth of a statement, you can't
validly assert that it shows something else to be true or false. But
sometimes, knowing that something must be either true or false, allows
you to prove something else, even if you don't know its own truth as two
different proofs can be made, one with the assumption it is true, and
one with the assumption it is false.

On 04/06/2024 09:26 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>> On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>> There are only two kinds of truth:
>>>> (a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
>>>> of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>>>>
>>>> (b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
>>>> from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
>>>> now."
>>>
>>> Which kind of truth is that statement?
>>
>> Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>>
>
> It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's
> scientific demarcation, and the usual old idea that mathematics is
> analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
> that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
> that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
> the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the
> epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
> and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
> disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
> of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
> and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
> while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.
>
> It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
> is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
> truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
> that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
> and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.
>
> That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
> language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
> while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
> it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
> only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
> from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
> theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
> technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
> still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
> with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
> context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.
>
> So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
> truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
> and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
> an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
> thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
> "Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
> right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
> at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.
>
>

Reading something like Gadamer, a philosopher after
the 20'th century, in for example his work "Plato"
he sort of summarizes that there is always a metaphysical
component, and it's our technical philosophy, or,
the, logico-philosophical if you will, it sort of
explains that logical positivism left itself without
a sort of leg to stand on, not that it need be fantastical,
but that actually there's a real and common object-sense,
so that intersubjectivity and relativity isn't all lost
in a world of interobjectivity and the absolute.

We're finite creatures, each, yet, finite doesn't only
mean subjective and relative, it also means objective
and absolute.

I.e., the result is "you know we thought it over and
logical positivism is of course a great exercise then
that to culminate in a strong and faithful logical
positivism only requires exactly a particular minimal
concomitant acknowledgment of a teleological for our
ontological the inter-subjective inter-objective,
then that science and axiomatics have a common theory
of truth.

That way we mere finite creatures can make an ontological
commitment because there already is one for itself,
and scientifically, and necessarily scientifically,
while yet profound.

On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 11:06:22 +0200, Fred. Zwarts wrote:

> That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
> can easily become a cyclic reasoning.

We have an objective standard for determining “harm” and “good” though:
the healthcare industry. They have a precept “first, do no harm”, and a
way of measuring what that means. It’s a standard that works well enough
for most of us to literally bet our lives on it.

And this does not depend on the ideology of any religion.

On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:

> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
> is empirical ...

What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
“analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
experience)?

On 04/27/2024 01:15 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
> On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 11:06:22 +0200, Fred. Zwarts wrote:
>
>> That, of course, depends on how "harmful" and "wrong" are understood. It
>> can easily become a cyclic reasoning.
>
> We have an objective standard for determining “harm” and “good” though:
> the healthcare industry. They have a precept “first, do no harm”, and a
> way of measuring what that means. It’s a standard that works well enough
> for most of us to literally bet our lives on it.
>
> And this does not depend on the ideology of any religion.
>

Actually here we got first "doctor, heal thyself", then as
with regards to "primum, non nocere" and often the Hippocratic oath.

.... Depending on people to be independent and the insurance is
a safety net not a lifestyle plan, which each must find themself.

I.e., "independent peoples co-insure themselves",
then as for each other.

When you look at usual assignments of virtue, or aesthetics,
or what, like for Kant and Kant's judgments and this kind
of thing, it's all "good" and "bad" simply is not a thing.

So, you know, Hippocrates, Galen, this kind of thing.

On 04/27/2024 01:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
>> is empirical ...
>
> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
> experience)?
>

You know that's a very usual question about the "essence or existence"
of these objects of the "noumena or phenomena".

I heartily encourage you to consult such masters of the canon of
the dogma and doctrine of philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology,
the semiotics, and logicism and positivism, in the exploration
of the consideration of idealism and nominalism.

A most usual notion is that individuals are objective and their
own objects, establishing among them or each other, the
intersubjectivity, as with regards to interobjectivity, as you raise the
point of the object/subject distinction, in reference, and perspective.

Warm regards and good luck in your philosophical studies, into
the theories of the universe of objects logical and mathematical
and the natural sciences.

You know that's a very usual question and it's thoroughly
explored since antiquity in the dogma and doctrine of
the fundamentals of the theories of logic and mathematics,
and, philosophy, the nature of being, and truth, over time.

I address some such things in my podcasts which are of the
spoken word audio sort.

Warm regards and good luck in your endeavors.

--
https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson

On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
>> is empirical ...
>
> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
> experience)?

I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.

My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
the nature of meaning expressed using language.

Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.

This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality

This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory

All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
axioms of a formal system.

Natural language expressions are formalized using
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/

Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
Facts of the world.

The details of current situations that are not general
facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
to {true on the basis of meaning}.

∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
x)))

The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.

Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
"This sentence is not true"
and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.

People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
summation of the philosophical issues involved.

We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>
>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while experience
>>> is empirical ...
>>
>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>> experience)?
>
> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>
> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>
> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>
> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>
> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>
> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
> axioms of a formal system.
>
> Natural language expressions are formalized using
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>
> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
> Facts of the world.
>
> The details of current situations that are not general
> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
> x)))
>
> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>
> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
> "This sentence is not true"
> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>
> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>
> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>

I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.

Of course type theory is great and natural language
has meaning, they're often associated with great
and extensive developments in such notions,
like Tesniere and Peirce.

So, you can lie together, yet,
that's not truth once discovered.

That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
for example how proof theory models proof theory and
model theory proves model theory,
and it's natural language in words and according to types,
is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.

Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
in the strings in my database".

That's called living in a box,
I see it a lot these days.

I'm a big fan of Tesniere.

Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.

The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.

It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".

Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.

Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
of Russell, also.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan

See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.

On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>
>>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
>>>> experience
>>>> is empirical ...
>>>
>>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>>> experience)?
>>
>> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
>> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
>> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>>
>> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
>> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>>
>> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
>> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>>
>> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>
>> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>>
>> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
>> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
>> axioms of a formal system.
>>
>> Natural language expressions are formalized using
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>>
>> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
>> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
>> Facts of the world.
>>
>> The details of current situations that are not general
>> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
>> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
>> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
>> x)))
>>
>> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
>> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
>> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>>
>> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
>> "This sentence is not true"
>> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
>> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>>
>> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
>> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
>> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
>> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
>> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>>
>> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
>> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
>> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>>
>
> I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
> a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
>

In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
attack is valid inference.

> Of course type theory is great and natural language
> has meaning, they're often associated with great
> and extensive developments in such notions,
> like Tesniere and Peirce.
>
> So, you can lie together, yet,
> that's not truth once discovered.
>
> That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
> for example how proof theory models proof theory and
> model theory proves model theory,
> and it's natural language in words and according to types,
> is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
>
> Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
> in the strings in my database".
>
> That's called living in a box,
> I see it a lot these days.
>
>
> I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
>
>
> Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
> about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
>
>
> The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
>
>
> It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
> results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
> and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
>
>
> Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
> comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
>
> Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
> of Russell, also.
>
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
>
> See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
> on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
> the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
> and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
> to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
> and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
> Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
> foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
> of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
> is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
> not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
> regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
> mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
> and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
> technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
>
>
>
>
>

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 04/27/2024 11:24 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
>>>>> experience
>>>>> is empirical ...
>>>>
>>>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>>>> experience)?
>>>
>>> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
>>> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
>>> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>>>
>>> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
>>> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>>>
>>> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
>>> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>>>
>>> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>
>>> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>>>
>>> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
>>> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
>>> axioms of a formal system.
>>>
>>> Natural language expressions are formalized using
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>>>
>>> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
>>> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
>>> Facts of the world.
>>>
>>> The details of current situations that are not general
>>> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
>>> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
>>> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L,
>>> x)))
>>>
>>> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
>>> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
>>> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>>>
>>> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
>>> "This sentence is not true"
>>> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
>>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
>>> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>>>
>>> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
>>> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
>>> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
>>> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
>>> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>>>
>>> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
>>> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
>>> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>>>
>>
>> I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
>> a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
>>
>
> In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
> attack is valid inference.
>
>> Of course type theory is great and natural language
>> has meaning, they're often associated with great
>> and extensive developments in such notions,
>> like Tesniere and Peirce.
>>
>> So, you can lie together, yet,
>> that's not truth once discovered.
>>
>> That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
>> for example how proof theory models proof theory and
>> model theory proves model theory,
>> and it's natural language in words and according to types,
>> is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
>>
>> Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
>> in the strings in my database".
>>
>> That's called living in a box,
>> I see it a lot these days.
>>
>>
>> I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
>>
>>
>> Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
>> about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
>>
>>
>> The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
>>
>>
>> It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
>> results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
>> and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
>>
>>
>> Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
>> comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
>>
>> Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
>> of Russell, also.
>>
>>
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
>>
>> See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
>> on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
>> the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
>> and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
>> to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
>> and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
>> Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
>> foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
>> of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
>> is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
>> not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
>> regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
>> mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
>> and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
>> technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

No, that's rhetoric.

"When you set out to kill a man,
dig two graves.
One for him and one for you."

Confucius, "my name is Confucius,
it means master teacher".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confucius

"Like most sayings attributed to Confucius in the Anglosphere, it’s
unlikely to have actually originated with him. It appears to have come
to us from Japan, as “Hito o norowaba ana futatsu” (if you curse
someone, [dig] two holes.”

Notably, the Chinese Wiktionary entry for the Japanese phrase gives only
a translation, with the closest Chinese equivalent given being 害人害己
(hài rén hài jî; hurt another, hurt yourself). This appears to come from
a collection of unattributed proverbs."

- https://www.econlib.org/he-who-seeks-revenge-digs-two-graves/

That Montague and Russell are flakes and insincere hypocrites is technical.

On 4/27/2024 1:35 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/27/2024 11:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/27/2024 1:10 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/27/2024 10:37 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/27/2024 3:16 AM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 21:26:16 -0700, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> ... and the usual old idea that mathematics is analytic while
>>>>>> experience
>>>>>> is empirical ...
>>>>>
>>>>> What about that distinction itself, though: can it be characterized as
>>>>> “analytic” (coming from mathematics) or “empirical” (coming from
>>>>> experience)?
>>>>
>>>> I have worked very diligently on this for about two decades.
>>>> It seems that I may have fixed the issues with the analytic/synthetic
>>>> distinction such that my redefinition becomes unequivocal.
>>>>
>>>> My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about
>>>> the nature of meaning expressed using language.
>>>>
>>>> Expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning} are
>>>> simply relations between finite strings of formalized semantic meaning.
>>>>
>>>> This does include Frege's Principle of compositionality
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>>
>>>> This is anchored in Proof theory rather than model theory
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_theory
>>>>
>>>> All of the general Facts of the world are assumed to be
>>>> already encoded as relations between finite strings thus
>>>> axioms of a formal system.
>>>>
>>>> Natural language expressions are formalized using
>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
>>>>
>>>> Many expressions that are {true on the basis of observation}
>>>> have already been encoded as axioms that represent general
>>>> Facts of the world.
>>>>
>>>> The details of current situations that are not general
>>>> facts of the world can be formalized as a discourse context.
>>>> This forms a mapping from {true on the basis of observation}
>>>> to {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x)  ≡ (L ⊢ x))
>>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x))
>>>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨
>>>> False(L,
>>>> x)))
>>>>
>>>> The great thing about all of this is that any expression that
>>>> lacks a truthmaker is simply construed as untrue. This eliminates
>>>> the mathematical notions of undecidability and incompleteness.
>>>>
>>>> Such a system could screen out expressions like this:
>>>> "This sentence is not true"
>>>> and also apply two different order of logic thus conclude
>>>> This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is true
>>>> because the inner sentence is not a truth bearer.
>>>>
>>>> People that truly understand the Tarski Undefinability theorem
>>>> at its deepest philosophical levels as opposed to and contrast
>>>> with people that only know as a sequence of mechanical steps
>>>> might agree that my prior paragraph is a precisely accurate
>>>> summation of the philosophical issues involved.
>>>>
>>>> We still have unknown truths that include but are not limited to
>>>> requiring an infinite sequence of inference steps, events having
>>>> no witnesses, or scientific knowledge that is not yet discovered.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I kind of think about Montague as about Russell:
>>> a great flake and an insincere hypocrite.
>>>
>>
>> In other words you believe that ad hominem personal
>> attack is valid inference.
>>
>>> Of course type theory is great and natural language
>>> has meaning, they're often associated with great
>>> and extensive developments in such notions,
>>> like Tesniere and Peirce.
>>>
>>> So, you can lie together, yet,
>>> that's not truth once discovered.
>>>
>>> That type theory has extensionality, and interpretability,
>>> for example how proof theory models proof theory and
>>> model theory proves model theory,
>>> and it's natural language in words and according to types,
>>> is very common-sensical and no-nonsense.
>>>
>>> Heh, you assume "the facts of the world are encoded
>>> in the strings in my database".
>>>
>>> That's called living in a box,
>>> I see it a lot these days.
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm a big fan of Tesniere.
>>>
>>>
>>> Face it, if those are your bounds and limits, be honest
>>> about it, otherwise you'll just get fooled.
>>>
>>>
>>> The, "weakest link", is the strongest connection of compositionality.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's the old, "fast/cheap/correct: pick two", except what
>>> results is that to pick "correct" it's already as fast
>>> and cheap as "correct" gets, and otherwise is just "cheap".
>>>
>>>
>>> Now I sort of enjoy you, Peter, yet your obstreporousness
>>> comes across as either an insincere flake, or, an ignoramus.
>>>
>>> Don't get me wrong, the same goes for other followers
>>> of Russell, also.
>>>
>>>
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suarez/
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_scholasticism
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cajetan
>>>
>>> See, in the time of Galileo, there was a lot going
>>> on with regards to the counter-reformation, where
>>> the reformation of Martin Luther sort of abandoned
>>> and indeed repudiated the scholastics' attachment
>>> to idealism of mathematics and logic, or Aristotle
>>> and Metaphysics, that the Church had held as since
>>> Augustine, that the second scholasticism, really
>>> foretold the idealization of the, "briefer metaphysics",
>>> of what's the Sublime for Kant and what for Hegel
>>> is "Hegel's brief, logicist metaphysics", then it's
>>> not only about Galileo's embrace of science as with
>>> regards to Copernicus, and as with regards to the
>>> mechanics of motion, yet also about the counter-reformation,
>>> and second scholasticism, then as with regards to
>>> technical idealism, we point at Kant and Hegel.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> No, that's rhetoric.
>

It seems to indicate a strong bias away from an honest
dialogue that is fully anchored in reasoning and nothing else.

There really is such a thing as {true on the basis of meaning}
It seems that we must stick to achieving mutual agreement
on this single point before moving on to any other points.

I can't tolerate discussing logic on the basis of emotional
reactions.

>
> That Montague and Russell are flakes and insincere hypocrites is technical.
>

Not in the least little bit it is converting an honest dialogue about
{true on the basis of meaning} into an emotional reaction utterly bereft
of reasoning.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer