On 6/30/2021 7:04 PM, wij wrote:
> On Wednesday, 30 June 2021 at 22:00:42 UTC+8, olcott wrote:
>> On 6/30/2021 1:40 AM, wij wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, 30 June 2021 at 07:10:02 UTC+8, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 6/28/2021 6:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 6/28/21 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/28/2021 1:48 AM, David Brown wrote:
>>>>>>> On 28/06/2021 01:05, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> Because my writing style is not in the ballpark of academic quality and
>>>>>>>> and computer scientists are loath to even consider evaluating computer
>>>>>>>> science in terms of software engineering my paper would be rejected
>>>>>>>> out-of-hand without any review at all entirely on the basis of style
>>>>>>>> over substance.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, academics will likely reject your ideas out of hand because they are
>>>>>>> wrong.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Endlessly repeating the same misunderstandings and misconceptions does
>>>>>>> not convince anyone in the academic world. It does not convince any
>>>>>>> programmers either, or anyone at all with a remotely logical and
>>>>>>> rational mind.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You have been making off-topic posts in many newsgroups for about 2
>>>>>>> years, and there has been /zero/ progress on your part. This is not
>>>>>>> surprising - the halting problem was proven unsolvable some hundred-odd
>>>>>>> years ago, and reality has not changed since. The proof is simple
>>>>>>> enough that any student doing theoretical computing or mathematics at
>>>>>>> university could duplicate it, and any high-school pupil with a good
>>>>>>> level of mathematics could understand it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For your own sanity, I would urge you to stop. For other people's
>>>>>>> sanity, I would urge you to stop posting to off-topic groups. Even
>>>>>>> better, start a blog and post only there.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One of the smartest software engineers here said that he provided a
>>>>>> complete rebuttal of my work: Mike Terry, so I reviewed his review of my
>>>>>> work. He simply rejected my work out-of-hand without review entirely on
>>>>>> the basis that my sound deductive argument did not conform to the style
>>>>>> of a mathematical proof.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No one here has ever pointed out any actual error in the essence of my
>>>>>> work and it is a damned lie to say that they have.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I did make a huge mistake when I was discussing the diagonalization proof.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Except that LOTS of people have made rebuttals point out actual errors,
>>>>> so you are just showing how baddly you lie.
>>>>>
>>>> Point to one error in my H/P C/x86 sound deductive inference:
>>>> Halting problem undecidability and infinitely nested simulation
>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351947980_Halting_problem_undecidability_and_infinitely_nested_simulation
>>>> --
>>>> Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott
>>>>
>>>> "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
>>>> minds." Einstein
>>>
>>> In computability theory, the halting problem is the problem of determining, fromal description
>>> of an arbitrary computer program and an input, whether the program will finish running, or
>>> continue to run forever...
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem
>>>
>>> Your paper says from the beginning:
>>> When halting is defined as any computation that halts without ever having its
>>> simulation aborted then it can be understood that partial halt decider H
>>> correctly decides that its input does not halt on the simplified version of the Linz Ĥ...
>>>
>>> Conclusion:
>>> The paper is not talking about "the halting problem". The rebuttal in the paper
>>> is made to an assumption the author created in his mind. H proves itself nothing
>>> different from performing a function
>>> bool H(...) {
>>> return false; // or true
>>> };
>>> No real thing inside.
>>>
>> https://groups.google.com/g/sci.logic/c/4kIXI1kxmsI/m/hRroMoQZx2IJ
>>
>> The Psychology of Self-Reference
>> Daryl McCullough
>> Jun 25, 2004, 6:30:39 PM
>>
>> It is becoming increasingly clear that Peter Olcott and Herc have
>> no coherent mathematical argument for rejecting Godel's theorem
>> and Turing's proof of the unsolvability of the halting problem.
>> Their objections are really psychological---they feel that the
>> proofs are somehow a cheat, but they lack the mathematical ability
>> to say why.
>>
>> I'd like to talk about the psychology of why people sometimes feel
>> that Godel's and Turing's proofs are somehow cheats. Partly, it is
>> the fault of informal intuitive expositions of the results.
>>
>> Both Godel's proof and Turing's proof have the flavor of using
>> self-reference to force someone to make a mistake. Both cases
>> seem a little like the following paradox (call it the "Gotcha"
>> paradox).
>>
>> You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
>> yes/no answer to the following question:
>>
>> Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>>
>> Jack can't possibly give a correct yes/no answer to the question.
>>
>> While the Gotcha paradox gives some of the flavor of Godel's
>> proof or Turing's proof, there is one big difference, and this
>> difference is what makes people feel like there is something
>> fishy going on: In the case of the Gotcha paradox, it
>> is possible for Jack to *know* the answer, but to be
>> prevented by the rules from *saying* the answer.
>>
>> In other words, there is a gap between what Jack knows
>> and what he can say. He knows that the answer to the question
>> is "no", but he can't say that answer, because that would
>> make the answer incorrect. So this informal paradox doesn't
>> really reveal any limitations in Jack's knowledge---it's
>> just a quirk of the rules that prevents Jack from telling
>> the answer. It's a little like the following one-question
>> quiz:
>>
>> ---------------
>> | 5 5 5 5 |
>> | How many 5's |
>> | appear inside|
>> | this box? |
>> | Answer: ___ |
>> | |
>> ---------------
>>
>> If you write "5" in the space provided, then the correct answer
>> is "6", and if you write "6" the correct answer is "5". The fact
>> that you can't write the correct answer in the space provided
>> doesn't prove that you have problems counting.
>>
>> Someone hearing some variant of the Gotcha paradox might be led
>> to think (as Peter Olcott and Herc do) that Godel's and Turing's
>> proofs might be cheats in a similar way.
>>
>> Of course, the difference is that there is no "gap" involved in
>> Turing's or Godel's proofs. It makes no sense to suppose that
>> Peano Arithmetic really knows that the Godel statement is true,
>> but just can't say it, because there is no notion of PA "knowing"
>> something independently of what it can prove. In the case of Turing's
>> proof, given a purported solution H to the halting problem,
>> one comes up with a program Q(x) such that
>>
>> Q halts on its own input if and only if H(Q,Q) = false
>>
>> There is no sense in which H "knows" that the answer is true
>> but is unable to say it.
>>
>> We could try to modify the Gotcha paradox to eliminate the gap
>> between what you know and what you can say. Let's consider the
>> following statement (called "U" for "Unbelievable").
>>
>> U: Jack will never believe this statement.
>>
>> Apparently, if Jack believes U, then U is false. So we are left
>> with two possibilities:
>>
>> Either (A) Jack believes some false statement, or (B)
>> there is some true statement that Jack doesn't believe.
>>
>> This is a lot like Godel's sentence G that shows that PA is
>> either inconsistent or incomplete. However, it still seems like
>> a joke, or a trick, rather than something that reveals any
>> limitations in Jack's knowledge. U doesn't seem to have any
>> real content, so who cares whether it is true or not, or whether
>> Jack believes it or not. It isn't a claim about anything tangible,
>> so who could ever tell if Jack believes it or not, or what it even
>> *means* for Jack to believe it?
>>
>> Okay, let's try one more time to get something meaningful that
>> really reveals a gap in Jack's knowledge akin to Godel's
>> incompleteness. Suppose that at some future time, the mechanisms
>> behind the human mind are finally understood. Suppose that it is
>> possible to insert probes into a person's brain to discover what
>> the person is thinking, and what he believes.
>>
>> So we take our subject, Jack, and hook him up with our brain scanning
>> machine. We give Jack a computer monitor on which we can display
>> statements for Jack to consider, and we connect his brain scanning
>> machine to a bell in such a way that if Jack agrees with the statement
>> on the screen (that is, if the scanning machine determines that Jack
>> believes the statement) then the bell will ring. Then we display
>> on the screen the following statement:
>>
>> The bell will not ring.
>>
>> Now, there is no way out for Jack. The statement is now a completely
>> concrete claim---there is no ambiguity about what it means, and there
>> is no ambiguity about whether it is true or false. There is no "knowledge
>> gap" possible---either Jack believes that the statement is true, or
>> he doesn't.
>>
>> Does Jack believe the statement, or not? It seems to me that in this
>> circumstance, Jack is forced to doubt his own reasoning ability, or
>> to doubt the truth of the circumstances (that the brain scanning machine
>> works as advertised, or that it is connected to the bell as described).
>> If he *really* believes in the soundness of his own reasoning, and he
>> really believes in the truth of the claims about the scanning machine,
>> then it logically follows that the bell will not ring. But as soon as
>> he makes that inference, the bell will ring, showing that he made a
>> mistake, somewhere. So the only way for Jack to avoid making a mistake
>> is if he considers it *possible* that he or his information is mistaken.
>>
>> --
>> Daryl McCullough
>> Ithaca, NY
>> void P(u32 x)
>> {
>> u32 Input_Halts = H(x, x);
>> if (Input_Halts)
>> HERE: goto HERE;
>> }
>>
>> int main()
>> {
>> u32 Input_Halts = H((u32)P, (u32)P);
>> Output("Input_Halts = ", Input_Halts);
>> }
>> Neither return value from H to P is correct in the same way that Jack
>> cannot possibly provide a correct answer to the following question:
>>
>> You ask someone (we'll call him "Jack") to give a truthful
>> yes/no answer to the following question:
>>
>> Will Jack's answer to this question be no?
>>
>> Jack can't possibly give a correct yes/no answer to the question.
>>
>
> That is why 'undecidable' is called. Key point: Jack is not a function machine.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Function_(mathematics)
> Gödel's theorems and Turing's halting problem proof are not talking about
> themselves. There is a subtle difference with liar paradox and many currently
> established theorems/misconceptions seem to relate to this, but I am not to
> address this too much (set theory, limit, irrational..., I refers this to as 'modern' Pythagorean).
>
> C++ can provide an analogy to the self-reference problem
> // t.cpp
> int main() {
> std::vector<int> vec(vec);
> std::string str(str);
> }
> ---
> Both "self-reference" ctors would not compile in the eaily days IIRC, but to
> provide an example to ponder. C++ seems to have changed behavior(bug IMO).
>
>> The solution to this problem is to use a simulating halt decider.
>> All inputs to a simulating halt decider always halt. They either
>> halt on their own or are forced to halt when the simulating halt
>> decider aborts the simulation of its input. It makes no sense to
>> simply provide the halt status of an input to a simulating halt
>> decider it would simply report that all of its inputs halt.
>>
>
> The traditional HP proof also 'indicates' that deciding whether or not two given
> programs are functionally the same is also a TM-computational undecidable problem.
> This means that H has no way to correctly decide whether instance of P is simulating
> H or not, thus, H's decision made on this basis can always be wrong.
>

H decides that the execution trace of P specifies infinitely nested
simulation. The outer-most H is the master simulator and has access to
every detail of all of the inner execution traces. These inner traces
are data that the outer-simulator is generating.

--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein