novaBBS - sci.electronics.design - Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ guilty verdict Sentencing scheduled for Oct. 17 for former Theranos CEO’s fraud

On Friday, 2 September 2022 at 19:01:16 UTC+2, Fred Bloggs wrote:
you are wrong as ever

"She revolutionized blood testing by developing methods that could use surprisingly small volumes of blood, such as from a fingerprick

what is a standard today offered by UN Health agencies in developing countries
\ =
The credibility of Theranos was attributed in part to Holmes's personal connections and ability to recruit the support of influential people, including Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Jim Mattis, and Betsy DeVos, all of whom had served or would go on to serve as U.S. presidential cabinet officials.
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must read !!

Holmes attended St. John's School in Houston.[17] During high school, she was interested in computer programming and says she started her first business selling C++ compilers to Chinese universities.[18] Her parents had arranged Mandarin Chinese home tutoring, and partway through high school, Holmes began attending Stanford University's summer Mandarin program.[19][10] In 2002, Holmes attended Stanford, where she studied chemical engineering and worked as a student researcher and laboratory assistant in the School of Engineering.[11]
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After the end of her freshman year, Holmes worked in a laboratory at the Genome Institute of Singapore and tested for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1) through the collection of blood samples with syringes.[18][20] She filed her first patent application on a wearable drug-delivery patch in 2003.[21][22] In March 2004, she dropped out of Stanford's School of Engineering and used her tuition money as seed funding for a consumer healthcare technology company.[11][23]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Holmes

She was the first at SARS Covid agenda

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elizabeth_Holmes

We all know well, she really deserves Nobel Prize in Medicine

On Friday, 2 September 2022 at 19:01:16 UTC+2, Fred Bloggs wrote:
International Journal of Infectious Diseases
Volume 9, Issue 2, March 2005, Pages 77-85
International Journal of Infectious Diseases
SARS in Taiwan: an overview and lessons learned
Author links open overlay panelKow-TongChenab
Shiing-JerTwucHsiao-LingChangaYi-ChunWuaChu-TzuChenaTing-HsiangLindSonja J.OlseneScott F.DowelleIh-JenSuf
Taiwan SARS Response Team1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2004.04.015
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Summary
Objectives:

This report aims to describe the epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan between March and July 2003, and to examine the public health response.
Methods:

Surveillance for SARS was initiated on 14 March 2003. Response activities are described for the isolation of patients; contact tracing; quarantine of contact persons; fever screening for inbound and outbound passengers at the airport; and hospital infection control as assessed by mobile SARS containment teams.
Results:

Between 14 March and 30 July 2003 a total of 668 probable cases of SARS were reported. Of the 668 cases, 181 (27%) were fatal. Compared to the survivors, fatal cases were more likely to be older (p < 0.001), male (p < 0.05), exposed through hospital contact (p < 0.001), and have a coexisting medical disorder (p < 0.001). Between 28 March and 30 July a total of 151,270 persons were quarantined. Among them, 46 (3.0/10,000) were subsequently classified as being probable SARS cases. At the time of the mobile team assessments, 46 (53%) hospitals had implemented WHO infection control recommendations..
Conclusions:

In this outbreak, an emergency plan consisted of patient isolation and strict hospital infection control.

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Keywords
Severe acute respiratory syndrome
Isolation
Quarantine
Contact tracing
Introduction

The worldwide spread of a novel coronavirus that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) proceeded with unprecedented rapidity, overwhelming many hospitals and public health systems in a matter of weeks.1, 2 As of 11 July 2003, a total of 8437 cases were reported from 32 countries.3 In many locations, the introduction of the disease by ill travellers was soon followed by spread to health care workers and household contacts.4, 5

This report describes the epidemiology of the SARS outbreak in Taiwan and proposes strategies for addressing response operations after any emerging outbreaks in the future. Further, the lessons learned from the response to this outbreak may help to improve current strategies for preventing outbreaks of infectious diseases and for distributing resources efficiently during response operations.
Background

Taiwan has a population of approximately 22,549,292. The main island is divided into 22 cities and counties. Taiwan, with its close proximity to the SARS epicenters of Guangdong and Hong Kong, and its extensive business and cultural ties, has many travellers from the most affected areas. Each year more than four million Taiwanese visit mainland China for business and tourism (Bureau of Immigration Ministry of the Interior) and the vast majority of flights return through Hong Kong. Although Taiwan was removed from the list of affected areas on 5 July 2003, it will remain at risk from the importation and spread of SARS should it re-emerge.3, 6
Methods
Surveillance

On 14 March 2003, the day the first cases were reported, Taiwan's Department of Health initiated a system to respond to the potential spread of SARS resulting from the cases. A Task Force Committee established medical aid teams to address disruption in the quarantine system; to conduct rapid assessment by reviewing every reported SARS case within three days after the first case was reported; and to implement a legislative procedure for reporting SARS on 28 March. All suspected SARS cases were required by law to be reported to the Department of Health, and health authorities were required to deliver protective equipment including N-95 masks to the SARS hospitals immediately and to equip all healthcare workers with enhanced protective equipment.
Isolation of SARS cases

Beginning with the recognition of the first SARS case on 14 March, Taiwan moved aggressively to isolate all suspect or probable cases in negative pressure rooms and to equip all healthcare workers with enhanced protective equipment. Specially designed isolation rooms with HEPA filtered air, negative pressure under continuous electronic monitoring, and separate bathrooms and anterooms are commonly available in larger referral hospitals. Until 22 April most of the probable cases were cared for in such hospital settings. From 23 April to 8 May, the 277 new cases overwhelmed the capacity of the hospital system to care for all patients in negative pressure rooms.
Contact tracing

When a SARS case was reported, local public health workers pursued a case investigation and confirmed adequate home quarantine of all contacts. The case investigation reviewed the patient's history of exposure to patients with SARS or SARS-affected areas, reviewed the signs and symptoms as compared to the WHO case definition of SARS,7 and collected information on the patient's recent close contacts.
Mortality

Death certificates were obtained from the statistics division of the Ministry of Interior in Taiwan. Information from death certificates was used to determine the cause of death. Mortality was estimated by dividing the number of deaths by the total number of probable cases. It was based on cases with a known outcome and was irrespective of the immediate cause of death.8
Laboratory investigation

Nasopharyngeal swab or stool specimens were obtained from reported patients and tested for SARS-Co-V by the laboratory of the Center for Disease Control at the Department of Health in Taiwan. The viral RNA was extracted and reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was completed for targets specific to various RNA viruses, including the influenza A and B viruses and SARS-Co-V. A specimen was considered RT-PCR-positive for SARS-Co-V if at least two different clinical specimens were positive (e.g., nasopharyngeal and stool), the same clinical specimens collected on two or more occasions during the course of the illness were positive (e.g., sequential nasopharyngeal aspirates), or if two different assays or repeat PCR using a new RNA extract from the original clinical sample on each occasion of testing were positive.7
Quarantine

Quarantine was implemented on 18 March for persons meeting one of two sets of criteria, designed as class A or class B. Class A included healthcare workers exposed outside isolation settings, family and other close contacts, and those on airplanes with ill SARS patients if seated within three rows in front or three rows behind the patient. Initially, the duration of quarantine was 14 days, but after 10 June this was revised to ten days in accordance with the incubation period for SARS.1, 5, 6 Hospital staff and patients who had been in contact with a SARS patient were quarantined in a healthcare facility. All others were quarantined at home.

From 28 April to 4 July, those who returned from a WHO-designated SARS-affected area were considered class B, resulting in compulsory home quarantine for ten days.6, 9 Passengers arriving could choose to be quarantined in an airport transit hotel, at home, or at a quarantine site designated and paid for by their employer. If these options were not available, the traveller was quarantined at a government quarantine center located at a military base. On 9 June quarantine regulations were eased for the staff of Taiwanese companies based on mainland China who were returning to Taiwan for business. Travellers in this category were allowed to conduct business if they wore a surgical mask. Public health nurses from local health departments delivered food to the home three times a day. Body temperature was self-monitored three times a day and reported by telephone to the public health nurses. A surgical mask was worn whenever the quarantined individual entered a communal area within their own home. If he/she became sick during the home quarantine period, the driver of the ambulance took the patient to hospital dressed in a Tyvek suit, N-95 respirator and gloves. There were several hundred such ambulance trips for fever patients between mid-May and July in Taiwan.
Measurement of body temperature

After 10 April all airline passengers, outbound and inbound, were requested to have their body temperature taken at the airport. People whose body temperatures were higher than 37.5 °C were examined further by a physician.
Hospital infection control practice

Mobile SARS containment teams (mobile teams), a joint program by the Center for Disease Control in Taiwan and various teaching hospitals, were initiated three days after the first suspected SARS case was reported. Seventeen mobile teams, comprising infection control physicians, infection control nurses, rotating staff from the County Department of Health, staff from the Center for Disease Control, Taiwan, and staff from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the USA, were deployed from 16 March to 10 May 2003.. They observed and demonstrated the recommended SARS infection control practices and also provided personal protective equipment (PPE) to hospitals actively evaluating patients for SARS infection. Each team was equipped with an infection control checklist, personal protective equipment (PPE), blood specimen tubes, nasopharyngeal swabs, culture media, and a specimen cooler.. Mobile teams evaluated infection control practices through observing hospital personnel, questioning current practices, and detecting the negative pressure of the isolation room using a strip of tissue paper at the entrance of a patient's isolation room.
Definitions

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Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ guilty verdict Sentencing scheduled for Oct. 17 for former Theranos CEO’s fraud

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Subject	Author
Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ guilt	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	Fred Bloggs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	whit3rd
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’	Phil Hobbs
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a
Re: Judge declines to overturn Elizabeth Holmes’ g	a a

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