https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KummQLfBH7A

https://www.amazon.com/Tragedy-Honda-Illustrated-Charles-Lockwood/dp/1691326259

The crash site is now inside Vandenberg Air Force base and visitors
aren't allowed.

On Sunday, January 1, 2023 at 7:07:04 PM UTC-5, John Larkin wrote:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KummQLfBH7A
>
> https://www.amazon.com/Tragedy-Honda-Illustrated-Charles-Lockwood/dp/1691326259
>
> The crash site is now inside Vandenberg Air Force base and visitors
> aren't allowed.

That admiral or whoever was re-assigned to a desk job to finish out his career. He got a little over confident in his luck. IIRC the area was heavily fogged in and they couldn't get a visual reckoning of their position, so he used some salty old mariners' algorithm using simple timing and speed measurement to estimate it. He almost made it.

On Mon, 2 Jan 2023 09:45:08 -0800 (PST), Fred Bloggs
<bloggs.fredbloggs.fred@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Sunday, January 1, 2023 at 7:07:04 PM UTC-5, John Larkin wrote:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KummQLfBH7A
>>
>> https://www.amazon.com/Tragedy-Honda-Illustrated-Charles-Lockwood/dp/1691326259
>>
>> The crash site is now inside Vandenberg Air Force base and visitors
>> aren't allowed.
>
>That admiral or whoever was re-assigned to a desk job to finish out his career. He got a little over confident in his luck. IIRC the area was heavily fogged in and they couldn't get a visual reckoning of their position, so he used some salty old mariners' algorithm using simple timing and speed measurement to estimate it. He almost made it.

Sailing ships tossed a thing on a string (a "log") off the stern and
literally counted knots with an hourglass for the timebase. That was
used with compass headings for dead-reckoning navigation.

The book is worth reading. The fleet navigator was a prime fathead.
When told about the RDF readings, he assumed they were reciprocal
errors and turned east before the channel, onto the rocks.

There is a trick to combine e and h fields to eliminate the RDF
reciprocal error, but he was still a fathead. RDF was the first way to
navigate in fog, except for foghorns and soundings near shore.

On Monday, January 2, 2023 at 1:52:42 PM UTC-5, John Larkin wrote:
> On Mon, 2 Jan 2023 09:45:08 -0800 (PST), Fred Bloggs
> <bloggs.fred...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >On Sunday, January 1, 2023 at 7:07:04 PM UTC-5, John Larkin wrote:
> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KummQLfBH7A
> >>
> >> https://www.amazon.com/Tragedy-Honda-Illustrated-Charles-Lockwood/dp/1691326259
> >>
> >> The crash site is now inside Vandenberg Air Force base and visitors
> >> aren't allowed.
> >
> >That admiral or whoever was re-assigned to a desk job to finish out his career. He got a little over confident in his luck. IIRC the area was heavily fogged in and they couldn't get a visual reckoning of their position, so he used some salty old mariners' algorithm using simple timing and speed measurement to estimate it. He almost made it.
> Sailing ships tossed a thing on a string (a "log") off the stern and
> literally counted knots with an hourglass for the timebase. That was
> used with compass headings for dead-reckoning navigation.
>
> The book is worth reading. The fleet navigator was a prime fathead.
> When told about the RDF readings, he assumed they were reciprocal
> errors and turned east before the channel, onto the rocks.
>
> There is a trick to combine e and h fields to eliminate the RDF
> reciprocal error, but he was still a fathead. RDF was the first way to
> navigate in fog, except for foghorns and soundings near shore.

Navy had only been using RDF for two years at the time, and there was only one RDF station for the entire California coast. The integrity of the RDF was further compromised by skepticism of its worth by the old salt know-it-alls. The USNI story on the disaster is a more multidimensional description of all the crap going on with that poorly executed overcomplicated mess of a cruise. Ships broke away for emergencies, others had propulsion problems and couldn't stay in formation, others developed problems underway, there was no end to all the back and forth squabble going on to distract the command. And as usual, what should have been their primary focus was largely ignored.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2010/february/naval-tragedys-chain-errors

RDF station was at Point Arguello.

"Above Point Arguello the coast fell away to the northeast, while below it bent to the southeast, so it was possible for a southward-passing vessel to receive a bearing in the 300s as it approached, changing to the 160s as it moved away. That led credence to Hunter's acceptance of the reciprocal reading. In fact, he was so convinced that they were well south of Point Arguello that he voiced a worry that the squadron might be heading for San Miguel Island, which had already claimed the Cuba [ wreck for which some of the Navy formation stopped to rescue survivors]."

Did that Hunter think they were moving so fast there was no RDF in the range of 270o, the reciprocal of which was obviously on land and therefore unambiguous.

It's even more complex these days but it should be totally automated.

https://msi.nga.mil/api/publications/download?key=16694477/SFH00000/117chapter1.pdf