It reminds of "utterances and audiences".

Sometimes you're walking up the street and along comes someone with a dog on a leash.
So it's a normal day and maybe nice, and the dog pauses to sniff a bush or listen to the wind,
and the leash-holder emits a perhaps subconscious train of "stop it, stop it, stop it", and it's
like, euh. Though their utterances are to their leash appendage, the audience includes the aural.

Then, besides that my ears are sensitive and there's a nice place between them that doesn't care
for harsh sounds, I think it's stupid and that because animals learn surrounds by observation and
learn interactions by imitation, I figure they're teaching their dog to snap, and it comes across as
neither good nor for the better. (There's a good snap called kudos, this is a bad one called pecking.)

Then, it reminds me of utterances and Muppets, which are a variety of puppets long established
on television. So anyways there are two kinds of utterances, nonsense utterances and normal
utterances, then sometimes sing-song utterances. Anyways, without naming names, the "baby-talk"
utterances or "talking down" utterances come across as sometimes offensive, and insult to intelligence.
(The non-sense utterances include those that come together to form normal utterances, as lessons
of sort of the combination of utterances to meaning, where there's a low bar to distinguishing
sensical and non-sensical utterances.)

Then these days on the Internet there are all sorts of bots launched that basically mimic utterances,
where these puppets' utterances are ultimately the responsibility and liability of their launcher,
then these are often of the crankish troll variety, and so they solicit harsh reactions. But, it's so
that the milieu isn't much improved by harshing or snapping at the trolls, and indeed there's an
entire class of readers who hate such nonsense and are way turned off by it.

So, when it comes to the operant conditioning and the carrot and the stick, or pleasure and displeasure
or pleasure and fear, one thing to keep in mind is the higher order mental animals or the humans,
are way above stimulus-response into analytical carriage, and don't respond necessarily like
dumb animals or having their buttons pushed, that the response to a stick isn't fear but "that's a stick",
and the response to a carrot isn't pleasure but "that's a carrot".

So, in a milieu that includes crankety trolls and the non-mathematical and un-scientific sorts, and
those that variously do or don't receive utterances with or without a buffer between them and it,
keep in mind that if one attains to the highest sort of ideals overall, it comes across as much more
intelligent, and worthwhile and valuable and virtuous and correct, that sockpuppet animals are
sockpuppet animals, while a sublime utterance, may reach a sublime audience.

On Monday, September 4, 2023 at 11:37:59 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> It reminds of "utterances and audiences".
>
>
> Sometimes you're walking up the street and along comes someone with a dog on a leash.
> So it's a normal day and maybe nice, and the dog pauses to sniff a bush or listen to the wind,
> and the leash-holder emits a perhaps subconscious train of "stop it, stop it, stop it", and it's
> like, euh. Though their utterances are to their leash appendage, the audience includes the aural.
>
> Then, besides that my ears are sensitive and there's a nice place between them that doesn't care
> for harsh sounds, I think it's stupid and that because animals learn surrounds by observation and
> learn interactions by imitation, I figure they're teaching their dog to snap, and it comes across as
> neither good nor for the better. (There's a good snap called kudos, this is a bad one called pecking.)
>
> Then, it reminds me of utterances and Muppets, which are a variety of puppets long established
> on television. So anyways there are two kinds of utterances, nonsense utterances and normal
> utterances, then sometimes sing-song utterances. Anyways, without naming names, the "baby-talk"
> utterances or "talking down" utterances come across as sometimes offensive, and insult to intelligence.
> (The non-sense utterances include those that come together to form normal utterances, as lessons
> of sort of the combination of utterances to meaning, where there's a low bar to distinguishing
> sensical and non-sensical utterances.)
>
> Then these days on the Internet there are all sorts of bots launched that basically mimic utterances,
> where these puppets' utterances are ultimately the responsibility and liability of their launcher,
> then these are often of the crankish troll variety, and so they solicit harsh reactions. But, it's so
> that the milieu isn't much improved by harshing or snapping at the trolls, and indeed there's an
> entire class of readers who hate such nonsense and are way turned off by it.
>
> So, when it comes to the operant conditioning and the carrot and the stick, or pleasure and displeasure
> or pleasure and fear, one thing to keep in mind is the higher order mental animals or the humans,
> are way above stimulus-response into analytical carriage, and don't respond necessarily like
> dumb animals or having their buttons pushed, that the response to a stick isn't fear but "that's a stick",
> and the response to a carrot isn't pleasure but "that's a carrot".
>
> So, in a milieu that includes crankety trolls and the non-mathematical and un-scientific sorts, and
> those that variously do or don't receive utterances with or without a buffer between them and it,
> keep in mind that if one attains to the highest sort of ideals overall, it comes across as much more
> intelligent, and worthwhile and valuable and virtuous and correct, that sockpuppet animals are
> sockpuppet animals, while a sublime utterance, may reach a sublime audience.

Making constructive relations and showing how they stand regardless others,
is different than denying others' constructive relations, which exist regardless.

So, such as"retro-finitist crankety trolls", of particularly the troll-ish variety,
who say things like "your zero doesn't exist, your signed quantities don't exist,
these relations of reflections and rotations under multiplicities of roots their
products don't exist, irrational don't exist, cardinals don't exist", and so on,
is a different matter, there really is a right and wrong what "mathematical" and
"non-mathematical", is.

For example, you build a framework of relations called polysign numbers and
it's great, it models some what are connections that relate to the underlying lattice,
I dug up Aristotle's continuum and gave it modern language, it's great.

Then it's just a usual sort of notion that the objects in the middle, numbers, and,
geometry's objects, of all relations, have standard intepretations, and non-standard
interpretations, if at all. There are also "reduced" or "minimal, contextually" the
interpretations, or what suffices, while what is overall non-contradictory, in
not allowing pathologies of definitions, or lack thereof.

So, where you're making a deconstructive account of abstract algebra, it's to keep
in mind what it means to define not just the elements, but the worlds, not just the
points, but the spaces, not just the pair-wise, but the closures, and all sorts what
complementary duals make that any framework including invertibility breaks both
ways, with the forward either way and invertibility underdefined, or for example,
closure underdefined.

That's a simple part of "multiplicity theory", the theory of objects that are multiplicities
under what is their "surface" that is much their "edge", each alone is of a "singularity theory",
of what otherwise are the usually "indeterminate quantities" or gaps in closures or
exceptions like starting points or bounds of pair-wise relations in points.

So, you can break arithmetic down, break algebra down, break geometry down, and so on,
as of a deconstructive account, then to relate what you've made of a constructive account,
here polysign numbers or for example sweep, and show how they relate, either way
relating across the lattice, or relative as the lattice, of relations of magnitudes, wholes,
their inverses, the closures of the spaces of the sums of their differences, and so on.

This way one can address real features of the non-standard, while, not being standardly just wrong.

Most sorts of retro-finitists may have discovered some numerical methods, that
operate on a subset of what are called functions on a subset of what are called
numbers, with a subset of what are their completions of a subset of what is their pair-wise.

Then for example most "numerical methods of limited domains" fall under that, as
do lots of modern efforts in differential geometry, and for that matter most applications
of the iterative and as numerical methods are algorithms which can be worked toward
limits, if not necessarily symbolically resulting the perfect value in finite time.

Then, though those are just "numerical methods of limited domains", limited in the
sense of not being all the members of the wider domain, nor having all the results of
those, nor having all the limits of those, thusly as they they have their contrived
approximations, that numerical methods are approximations and have error terms.

Then, there are also sorts "super-finitists", with along the lines of that "the ordinary infinity
here is not having all the limits of these or otherwise it's not a standard model or as a
standard model it doesn't exist", point being that the usual received account was already
a limited account after "Russell's clothes", where basically Russell's clothers is like the Emporer's
clothes, except, it's a sort of half-suit, that inside Russell's paradox appears suited,
or rather, when I wrote there "paradox" it's "paradise", that inside Russell's paradise
it appears suited, that outside appears none.

Most go-along-to-get-along types are "I heard the Emporer got some new clothes" and
it's like "the 'Emporer's new clothes' is an age-old object lesson that his announced regalia
were fake and even people who saw it the other way only eventually had an innocent tell it".

Anyways most retro-finitist's "here is some re-hashed Newton-Coates" or similarly some other
numerical method of limited applicability, or why there is Riemann then Lebesgue then Stieltjes
calculus and the meromorphic and other methods that make examples of "expanding" the
comprehension, is that "restriction of comprehension", when a dumbing, is a conscious dumbing.

It's similar with "grainy smooth" and other such notions of "effects of closed",
which can be mathematical as simply well-defined (that for example "standard's only effectively infinite",
vis-a-vis the potential infinite or unbounded finite, and the actual infinite and mutually infinite).

Then usual enough "dumb the numbers" is not allowed, it's just wrong.

Here the point though is that what are incomplete theories, have more mathematics about
the objects of them, so for example it's to be read that "standard" mathematics has more
what is "non-standard" that is true about it.

Some of the most usual sorts of attachments are for example DesCartes for analytic geometry,
about the same thing as how Hardy relates the objects that are points in geometry and real
numbers in arithmetic. It's not always been so, and there are constructive and deconstructive
accounts where they're detached or re-composed, but after the integer lattice, most all the
modern definitions already include those, and there's no going back.