On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:

> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
> from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth. Philosophy
> leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth can be
> verified on the basis of its meaning.
>
> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly divided
> from other forms of truth:

It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.

> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and

Truth is not a matter of definition.

> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
> applying truth preserving operations.

Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.

Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
all but affirmative sentences.

--
Mikko

Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>Truth is not a matter of definition.

"Truth" is a word created by humans, so it must have some
definition (which might be implicit in the way it's used).
People may not agree upon what exactly is the correct definition,
but such a disagreement only shows that it's a matter of definition.

On 2024-03-18 10:59:44 +0000, Stefan Ram said:

> Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>
> "Truth" is a word created by humans, so it must have some
> definition (which might be implicit in the way it's used).
> People may not agree upon what exactly is the correct definition,
> but such a disagreement only shows that it's a matter of definition.

Definitions only tell which words we can use for the concept.
They do not tell what is true.

--
Mikko

Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>On 2024-03-18 10:59:44 +0000, Stefan Ram said:
>>Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>>>Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>Truth" is a word created by humans, so it must have some
>>definition (which might be implicit in the way it's used).
>>People may not agree upon what exactly is the correct definition,
>>but such a disagreement only shows that it's a matter of definition.
>Definitions only tell which words we can use for the concept.
>They do not tell what is true.

To "tell what is true" is to give a definition of the meaning
of the word "true".

To "tell what is truth" is to give a definition of the meaning
of the word "truth".

Just look at the subject: It says, "Analytical truth redefined".
This clarifies that the thread is about definitions (including
redefinitions) of truth (more specifically, of "analytical truth").

On 03/18/2024 03:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
>> from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth. Philosophy
>> leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth can be
>> verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>
>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly divided
>> from other forms of truth:
>
> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>
>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>
> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>
>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>> applying truth preserving operations.
>
> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>
> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
> all but affirmative sentences.
>

Nah, an idea of "absolute truth" can arrive from simply
considering a theory where there's a language that only
has truisms, a "Comenius language", then it results that
the Russell set is the same as the Liar sentence,
then that's only a prototype of a first fallacy or
contradiction, then that it provides both all the
cases for forward inference and a case for deductive
inference, at once, together.

So, the "metaphysics", of such a thing, and "true theory"
or "a theory of truth", has that it's purely a matter of
reason, then insofar as that both deists and non-deists
"we have a metaphysic, and, deism is super-scientific",
to exclude deism from scientism, while still making it
so that formally both deism and non-deism are irrelevant,
in "a least metaphysics", in a sort of Hegelian approach
and Aristotle would approve, as a Plato's ideal and for
Kant only the sublime Ding-an-Sich, only that much greater
and within itself, this way there can certainly be a theory,
at all, "A Theory", then not so much that we can know it,
but we can ascertain it and attain to it, and it is,
and it's true.

I sort of get into this in my podcasts under "Philosophical
Foreground" and some 10,000's posts on sci.logic and so on.

https youtube /@rossfinlayson

If this is an introduction to, "sci.lang", here the
notion is of "a Comenius language", which is a universe
of objects of the theory of language, all true, ...,
then according to comprehension, one excluded, ...,
"elementary primitives of ur-language",
for a course of axiomless natural deduction.

About the affirmative and negative, negatory, one idea
to consider is that the language actually starts with
all negatory, that just results a structure for affirmatory.

When I study English grammar I consider Curme,
and when I diagram its structure it's after Tesniere,
according to the most published book as for a literary
and deconstructive account for its technical content,
or the logico-philosophical, it basically establishes
a space from nothing then also introduces that in
the beginning that there was a word, for the
synthetic/analytic distinction, as a usual holistic
monism, a usual holistic dual monism, and that
technically there's a way to relate that to there
being a teleology and ontology not either void the other.

That's the point of my most recent podcasts,
re-connecting teleology and ontology, while
the idea of "a Comenius language a universe of
words", or statement, is about any old "A Theory",
at all, with regards to "truth" and "true".

Doesn't say what it is - just says that it is.

On 03/18/2024 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 3/18/2024 11:33 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 03/18/2024 03:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
>>>> from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth. Philosophy
>>>> leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth can be
>>>> verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>
>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly divided
>>>> from other forms of truth:
>>>
>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>
>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>
>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>
>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>
>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>
>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>
>>
>> Nah, an idea of "absolute truth" can arrive from simply
>> considering a theory where there's a language that only
>> has truisms, a "Comenius language",
>
> In other words only semantic tautologies that are self-evidently true
> are included.
>
> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is a
> proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
> without proof... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>
>> then it results that
>> the Russell set is the same as the Liar sentence,
> I don't know what you mean by: "the Russell set"
>
>> then that's only a prototype of a first fallacy or
>> contradiction, then that it provides both all the
>> cases for forward inference and a case for deductive
>> inference, at once, together.
>>
> Things such as {cats are animals} are stipulated to be true thus
> can be used as premises to deductive inference such that the
> conclusion is defined to be a necessary consequence of its premises.
> This eliminates things such as the principle of explosion.
>
>> So, the "metaphysics", of such a thing, and "true theory"
>> or "a theory of truth", has that it's purely a matter of
>> reason, then insofar as that both deists and non-deists
>> "we have a metaphysic, and, deism is super-scientific",
>> to exclude deism from scientism, while still making it
>> so that formally both deism and non-deism are irrelevant,
>> in "a least metaphysics", in a sort of Hegelian approach
>> and Aristotle would approve, as a Plato's ideal and for
>> Kant only the sublime Ding-an-Sich, only that much greater
>> and within itself, this way there can certainly be a theory,
>> at all, "A Theory", then not so much that we can know it,
>> but we can ascertain it and attain to it, and it is,
>> and it's true.
>>
>>
>> I sort of get into this in my podcasts under "Philosophical
>> Foreground" and some 10,000's posts on sci.logic and so on.
>>
>> https youtube /@rossfinlayson
>>
>>
>> If this is an introduction to, "sci.lang", here the
>> notion is of "a Comenius language", which is a universe
>> of objects of the theory of language, all true, ...,
>
> Yes this seems to be what I am meaning.
>
>> then according to comprehension, one excluded, ...,
>> "elementary primitives of ur-language",
>> for a course of axiomless natural deduction.
>>
>
> Alternatively every sentence could be construed as an axiom.
> Or more simply that a set of necessary consequences are derived
> from stipulated truths. The latter essentially taking on the
> role of an axiom.
>
>>
>> About the affirmative and negative, negatory, one idea
>> to consider is that the language actually starts with
>> all negatory, that just results a structure for affirmatory.
>>
>>
>> When I study English grammar I consider Curme,
>> and when I diagram its structure it's after Tesniere,
>> according to the most published book as for a literary
>> and deconstructive account for its technical content,
>> or the logico-philosophical, it basically establishes
>> a space from nothing then also introduces that in
>> the beginning that there was a word, for the
>> synthetic/analytic distinction, as a usual holistic
>> monism, a usual holistic dual monism, and that
>> technically there's a way to relate that to there
>> being a teleology and ontology not either void the other.
>>
>> That's the point of my most recent podcasts,
>> re-connecting teleology and ontology, while
>> the idea of "a Comenius language a universe of
>> words", or statement, is about any old "A Theory",
>> at all, with regards to "truth" and "true".
>>
>>
>> Doesn't say what it is - just says that it is.
>>
>>
>

I think what you got there is usually called
a "world", vis-a-vis the "domain of discourse",
vis-a-vis the "universe", and for univocity and
haeccity.

It's also sort of familiar as the usual "model",
when the "model" is just a bag-of-facts, vis-a-vis
when a "model" is somehow a structure and all its
relations in the logical, mathematical universe,
and then the properly logical after that what that
all models, sort of like a usual development in
"classical", logic, here what's called "classical
quasi-modal", logic, though that you say that
there's no Principle of Explosion and no Ex Falso
Quodlibet, then though whether you've actually
sorted that out with Aristotle's eudamon, or not.

The, "Russell set", is the "set of all sets that
don't contain themselves". It doesn't exist in
usual ordinary axiomatic set theory, because,
it's description contradicts itself, because
according to free comprehension, it does, and
doesn't contain itself.

So, "the ordinal of all ordinals, contains
lesser ordinals, contains itself", usually
sort of doesn't exist, and usually because
it's explicitly prohibited non-well-foundedness,
that transitively it would exhibit a counter-example.

Then, the Liar is pretty simple, "this sentence
is False", or, in a language of all truisms,
"one of these sentences is false", that it is
and isn't, it's one of the most usual things
that confounds and complicates Tertium Non Datur
the Principle or Law of Excluded Middle, in
terms of principles, rules, and laws.

The relevance logic is a key thing, because what
it says is that sentences that don't share relation
in terms, say nothing about each other, so, it
prohibits Ex Falso Quodlibet as usually extended
to claim "false antecendent" or "false consequent"
of "material implication", in usually "classical
quasi-modal logic", I'm a big fan of relevance logic,
because all logic can be done in it and "material
implication" is considered neither material nor implication.

So, if you need to interpret classical quasi-modal
logic, it's about a small world a bag-of-facts
that what it considers monotone and entailment, "is",
is a particular shallow non-contradiction-based-
on-contradiction, material implication. So,
interpreting that is made _contingent_ under
relevance logic, instead of erased and made,
"the unconscious", because, classical quasi-modal
logic, is neither modal nor temporal, it's just
a fragment of "real" entailment and the "real"
monotone of "all the relevant logic".

Then, here this notion of "Aristotle's and Maxwell's
daemons", one for information the other entropy,
help build out the complementary concepts,
the complementary duals, what get involved
in universals, the particulars.

So, it seems you have a sort of "quasi-modal quasi-modal",
logic, that you've added somewhere a stipulation
"don't follow POE" when your ground logic blindly does,
or rather, senselessly, when there's otherwise a usual
sort of approach to prefix any syllogism with all
what's contingent about the "quasi-modal", so then
that what sticks out is its "truth tables", with
regards to, "material implication", _aren't_,
instead what results, "quasi-truth tables of
classical quasi-modal logic". Thusly, those
aren't confused with, truth tables, which have
it so that they fulfill all of De Morgan's laws
of logic the deterministic, the causal, and
the directly implicative, specifically, the contrapositive.

On 2024-03-18 14:42:50 +0000, Stefan Ram said:

> Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>> On 2024-03-18 10:59:44 +0000, Stefan Ram said:
>>> Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>> Truth" is a word created by humans, so it must have some
>>> definition (which might be implicit in the way it's used).
>>> People may not agree upon what exactly is the correct definition,
>>> but such a disagreement only shows that it's a matter of definition.
>> Definitions only tell which words we can use for the concept.
>> They do not tell what is true.
>
> To "tell what is true" is to give a definition of the meaning
> of the word "true".
>
> To "tell what is truth" is to give a definition of the meaning
> of the word "truth".
>
> Just look at the subject: It says, "Analytical truth redefined".
> This clarifies that the thread is about definitions (including
> redefinitions) of truth (more specifically, of "analytical truth").

When I say "Sun is now shining here", I am telling what is true
but I am not saying anything about the meaning of "true".

--
Mikko

Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>When I say "Sun is now shining here", I am telling what is true
>but I am not saying anything about the meaning of "true".

Ah! Ok, that's also a possible interpretation of
"to tell what is true", i.e., "to tell something
true".

On 03/18/2024 07:15 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 3/18/2024 7:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 03/18/2024 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 3/18/2024 11:33 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 03/18/2024 03:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
>>>>>> from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth. Philosophy
>>>>>> leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth can be
>>>>>> verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>>>>> divided
>>>>>> from other forms of truth:
>>>>>
>>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>>>
>>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>>>
>>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nah, an idea of "absolute truth" can arrive from simply
>>>> considering a theory where there's a language that only
>>>> has truisms, a "Comenius language",
>>>
>>> In other words only semantic tautologies that are self-evidently true
>>> are included.
>>>
>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is a
>>> proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>> without proof... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>
>>>> then it results that
>>>> the Russell set is the same as the Liar sentence,
>>> I don't know what you mean by: "the Russell set"
>>>
>>>> then that's only a prototype of a first fallacy or
>>>> contradiction, then that it provides both all the
>>>> cases for forward inference and a case for deductive
>>>> inference, at once, together.
>>>>
>>> Things such as {cats are animals} are stipulated to be true thus
>>> can be used as premises to deductive inference such that the
>>> conclusion is defined to be a necessary consequence of its premises.
>>> This eliminates things such as the principle of explosion.
>>>
>>>> So, the "metaphysics", of such a thing, and "true theory"
>>>> or "a theory of truth", has that it's purely a matter of
>>>> reason, then insofar as that both deists and non-deists
>>>> "we have a metaphysic, and, deism is super-scientific",
>>>> to exclude deism from scientism, while still making it
>>>> so that formally both deism and non-deism are irrelevant,
>>>> in "a least metaphysics", in a sort of Hegelian approach
>>>> and Aristotle would approve, as a Plato's ideal and for
>>>> Kant only the sublime Ding-an-Sich, only that much greater
>>>> and within itself, this way there can certainly be a theory,
>>>> at all, "A Theory", then not so much that we can know it,
>>>> but we can ascertain it and attain to it, and it is,
>>>> and it's true.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I sort of get into this in my podcasts under "Philosophical
>>>> Foreground" and some 10,000's posts on sci.logic and so on.
>>>>
>>>> https youtube /@rossfinlayson
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If this is an introduction to, "sci.lang", here the
>>>> notion is of "a Comenius language", which is a universe
>>>> of objects of the theory of language, all true, ...,
>>>
>>> Yes this seems to be what I am meaning.
>>>
>>>> then according to comprehension, one excluded, ...,
>>>> "elementary primitives of ur-language",
>>>> for a course of axiomless natural deduction.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Alternatively every sentence could be construed as an axiom.
>>> Or more simply that a set of necessary consequences are derived
>>> from stipulated truths. The latter essentially taking on the
>>> role of an axiom.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> About the affirmative and negative, negatory, one idea
>>>> to consider is that the language actually starts with
>>>> all negatory, that just results a structure for affirmatory.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When I study English grammar I consider Curme,
>>>> and when I diagram its structure it's after Tesniere,
>>>> according to the most published book as for a literary
>>>> and deconstructive account for its technical content,
>>>> or the logico-philosophical, it basically establishes
>>>> a space from nothing then also introduces that in
>>>> the beginning that there was a word, for the
>>>> synthetic/analytic distinction, as a usual holistic
>>>> monism, a usual holistic dual monism, and that
>>>> technically there's a way to relate that to there
>>>> being a teleology and ontology not either void the other.
>>>>
>>>> That's the point of my most recent podcasts,
>>>> re-connecting teleology and ontology, while
>>>> the idea of "a Comenius language a universe of
>>>> words", or statement, is about any old "A Theory",
>>>> at all, with regards to "truth" and "true".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Doesn't say what it is - just says that it is.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> I think what you got there is usually called
>> a "world", vis-a-vis the "domain of discourse",
>> vis-a-vis the "universe", and for univocity and
>> haeccity.
>>
>> It's also sort of familiar as the usual "model",
>> when the "model" is just a bag-of-facts, vis-a-vis
>> when a "model" is somehow a structure and all its
>> relations in the logical, mathematical universe,
>
> Yes, yet this bag of facts enables an AI mind to be at least
> equal to a human mind at any task involving reasoning.
>
> With enough facts and a way to detect any errors in its own
> reasoning such that it never makes the same mistake twice this
> AI mind could become enormously better at reasoning than any
> human on any subject.
>
>> and then the properly logical after that what that
>> all models, sort of like a usual development in
>> "classical", logic, here what's called "classical
>> quasi-modal", logic, though that you say that
>> there's no Principle of Explosion and no Ex Falso
>> Quodlibet, then though whether you've actually
>> sorted that out with Aristotle's eudamon, or not.
>>
> When a valid argument must be a necessary consequence of all
> of its premises then this seem to go farther than relevance
> logic in that it is fully anchored in semantics.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaemon_(mythology)
>
>>
>> The, "Russell set", is the "set of all sets that
>> don't contain themselves". It doesn't exist in
>> usual ordinary axiomatic set theory, because,
>> it's description contradicts itself, because
>> according to free comprehension, it does, and
>> doesn't contain itself.
>>
> OK that is totally clear now.
>
>> So, "the ordinal of all ordinals, contains
>> lesser ordinals, contains itself", usually
>> sort of doesn't exist, and usually because
>> it's explicitly prohibited non-well-foundedness,
>> that transitively it would exhibit a counter-example.
>> >
>> Then, the Liar is pretty simple, "this sentence
>> is False", or, in a language of all truisms,
>> "one of these sentences is false", that it is
>> and isn't, it's one of the most usual things
>> that confounds and complicates Tertium Non Datur
>> the Principle or Law of Excluded Middle, in
>> terms of principles, rules, and laws.
>>
>
> The most succinct way to treat epistemological antinomies is
> to categorize them as non truth bearers. I don't get why all
> philosophers of logic are not united on this. Not even this guy:
>
> I do not mean to commit myself to the claim that denying
> that the Liar expresses a proposition is the best solution
> to the Liar paradox
> *Truthmaker Maximalism defended GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA*
> https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD
>
>>
>> The relevance logic is a key thing, because what
>> it says is that sentences that don't share relation
>> in terms, say nothing about each other, so, it
>
> That is enormously better than classical or symbolic logic
> and much closer to the syllogism roots of modern logic.
>
>> prohibits Ex Falso Quodlibet as usually extended
>> to claim "false antecendent" or "false consequent"
>> of "material implication", in usually "classical
>> quasi-modal logic", I'm a big fan of relevance logic,
>> because all logic can be done in it and "material
>> implication" is considered neither material nor implication.
>>
>
> Yes that is why It seems to simply correct the mistakes of the
> other logic systems.
>
>>
>> So, if you need to interpret classical quasi-modal
>> logic, it's about a small world a bag-of-facts
>> that what it considers monotone and entailment, "is",
>> is a particular shallow non-contradiction-based-
>> on-contradiction, material implication. So,
>
> Need not be shallow at all, can represent every aspect of general
> knowledge that can be expressed using words. It can also express
> all of the relevant details of any discourse context.
>
>> interpreting that is made _contingent_ under
>> relevance logic, instead of erased and made,
>> "the unconscious", because, classical quasi-modal
>> logic, is neither modal nor temporal, it's just
>> a fragment of "real" entailment and the "real"
>> monotone of "all the relevant logic".
>>
> The relevance logic may be limited in what it can express
> it why I would used formalized natural language semantics
> instead. Either Montague Grammar or the CycL language of
> the Cyc project.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montague_grammar
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL
>
>>
>> Then, here this notion of "Aristotle's and Maxwell's
>> daemons", one for information the other entropy,
>> help build out the complementary concepts,
>
> I know nothing about this.
>
>> the complementary duals, what get involved
>> in universals, the particulars.
>>
>
> Would seem to be fully expressed in formalized natural language.
>
>>
>> So, it seems you have a sort of "quasi-modal quasi-modal",
>> logic, that you've added somewhere a stipulation
>> "don't follow POE" when your ground logic blindly does,
>
> Not like that. The system has Facts and Rules like Prolog.
> What is unprovable (from facts) is the same as Wittgenstein says
> simply untrue. https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
>
> Conventional False is when the negation of a sentence can be
> proven from Facts also just like Wittgenstein says.
>
>> or rather, senselessly, when there's otherwise a usual
>> sort of approach to prefix any syllogism with all
>> what's contingent about the "quasi-modal", so then
>> that what sticks out is its "truth tables", with
>> regards to, "material implication", _aren't_,
>> instead what results, "quasi-truth tables of
>> classical quasi-modal logic". Thusly, those
>
> That seems to be the one thing that you said that I do not understand
> in this post. On the other hand it seems that you understood what I
> said better than anyone else. I can tell that your knowledge of these
> things is quite deep.
>
>> aren't confused with, truth tables, which have
>> it so that they fulfill all of De Morgan's laws
>> of logic the deterministic, the causal, and
>> the directly implicative, specifically, the contrapositive.
>>
>
> I think that we may replace the implication operator with some
> other operator that means X <is a necessary consequence> of Y.
>
>>
>> A.k.a., "the principle of deduction".
>>
>>
>

On 3/18/2024 5:59 AM, Stefan Ram wrote:
> Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>
> "Truth" is a word created by humans, so it must have some
> definition (which might be implicit in the way it's used).
> People may not agree upon what exactly is the correct definition,
> but such a disagreement only shows that it's a matter of definition.

I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
these Facts.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On 3/19/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 03/18/2024 07:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 3/18/2024 7:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

test of cross posting

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
>> from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth. Philosophy
>> leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth can be
>> verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>
>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly divided
>> from other forms of truth:
>
> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>
>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>
> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>
>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>> applying truth preserving operations.
>
> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>
> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
> all but affirmative sentences.
>

I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
these Facts.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily coming
>>>> from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>
>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>>>
>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>
>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>
>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>
>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>
>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>
>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>
>>
>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>> these Facts.
>
> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
> yield different analytical truths.
>

The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
of human reasoning.

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>>>>
>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>>
>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>>
>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>>
>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>>
>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>>
>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>>> these Facts.
>>
>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
>> yield different analytical truths.
>>
>
> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
> of human reasoning.
>

Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
then there's the empirical and what results
why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
beliefs.

I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
belief, then with regards to that not being,
"infallibilistic".

This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
a major belief system historically,
is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
then that Russell who is secular, once joked
that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
extension infallible, and that's considered
fallacious, and specious.

So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
the entire world is specious.

The human reasoning then these days is that
we have an entire philosophy of science, and
the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
side the examination of reason of being by reason
in being, examination and test, and ontology from
the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
to those being among the usual concepts and
exploring the fuller dialectic including
deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
fundamental.

It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.

When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
their truths aren't common, that's to be
considered from the universe of syllogism,
that they all have to be commonly true together,
and that involves that things change and so
that the modality is a temporality, and all
else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
which makes a statistical interpretation,
which makes a scientific interpretation.

Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
there's an opposite, for any stipulation
there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
so that there's no default certification
of stipulation, and it results rather
that our canon and dogma and doctrine
guides our conscience, the logical conscience
and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
formalists and a common world of logical
and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
at all.

This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.

Matters of definition ....

It seems that instead what you have there
is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
statements of fact collected as common sense",
and this means specifically in the notion
that it is the _senses_ that describe the
phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
relation to the noumenological, then as with
regards to usually a platonistic world where
the only common truths are purely logical and
by extension mathematical, while all else is
only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
for a conscientious philosophy of science,
interpretations for considerations what so
result statistical and scientific experiment.

So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
is contingent the lineage of its body
of definition, in matters of definition.

"Anybody who buys or sells material implication
is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand

So, "an ontology via specification and
various graphical relations", isn't much
more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
that if that's codified in the reasoning its
beliefs, has that humans examine and test
their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
the non-logical is always contingent,
that otherwise is just a bot.
("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)

Then it's "matter of definition" as with
regards to matters of expectation, with regards
to matters of communication, what result
rather generally systems of information.

On 03/20/2024 07:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
>>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
>>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
>>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>>>>>
>>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>>>
>>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>>>
>>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>>>> these Facts.
>>>
>>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
>>> yield different analytical truths.
>>>
>>
>> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
>> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
>> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
>> of human reasoning.
>>
>
> Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
> the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
> aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
> then there's the empirical and what results
> why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
> results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
> beliefs.
>
> I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
> alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
> belief, then with regards to that not being,
> "infallibilistic".
>
> This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
> A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
> a major belief system historically,
> is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
> then that Russell who is secular, once joked
> that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
> of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
> extension infallible, and that's considered
> fallacious, and specious.
>
> So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
> the entire world is specious.
>
> The human reasoning then these days is that
> we have an entire philosophy of science, and
> the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
> and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
> and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
> side the examination of reason of being by reason
> in being, examination and test, and ontology from
> the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
> to those being among the usual concepts and
> exploring the fuller dialectic including
> deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
> fundamental.
>
> It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
> and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
> and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
>
> When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
> their truths aren't common, that's to be
> considered from the universe of syllogism,
> that they all have to be commonly true together,
> and that involves that things change and so
> that the modality is a temporality, and all
> else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
> which makes a statistical interpretation,
> which makes a scientific interpretation.
>
> Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
> there's an opposite, for any stipulation
> there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
> so that there's no default certification
> of stipulation, and it results rather
> that our canon and dogma and doctrine
> guides our conscience, the logical conscience
> and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
> formalists and a common world of logical
> and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
> in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
> at all.
>
> This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
> except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
>
>
> Matters of definition ....
>
>
> It seems that instead what you have there
> is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
> statements of fact collected as common sense",
> and this means specifically in the notion
> that it is the _senses_ that describe the
> phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
> vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
> relation to the noumenological, then as with
> regards to usually a platonistic world where
> the only common truths are purely logical and
> by extension mathematical, while all else is
> only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
> for a conscientious philosophy of science,
> interpretations for considerations what so
> result statistical and scientific experiment.
>
> So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
> is contingent the lineage of its body
> of definition, in matters of definition.
>
>
> "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
> is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
>
>
>
> So, "an ontology via specification and
> various graphical relations", isn't much
> more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
> that if that's codified in the reasoning its
> beliefs, has that humans examine and test
> their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
> the non-logical is always contingent,
> that otherwise is just a bot.
> ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
>
> Then it's "matter of definition" as with
> regards to matters of expectation, with regards
> to matters of communication, what result
> rather generally systems of information.
>
>
>
>
>

Aristotle says "syllogisms don't have a common truth",
but that's just that "there are common truths syllogisms
don't have".

Syllogisms aren't facts so much as scratch-pads.

The "secular" is one of those words like
"entropy" and "entropy", Aristotle's "down"
or Leibniz' "full", or like constructivism and
intuitionism, when what's old is new again,
and this kind of thing, the "secular" and
"non-secular".

It's similar in this way to "objective" and
"subjective", those relating matters of
contingency and immediacy, and those
changing in the temporal modality,
by each monad in the monadic modality,
each monad's context what's what,
relative, this absolute.

So, "forging a common belief", or basically
establishing "this bag-of-fact is the immutable
common sensory apparatus of a world of bots",
still has that each little meat-bag wet-ware or
otherwise any reasoning apparatus, basically
still has its own sense of being, or not, that
basically humans are individuals, vis-a-vis,
what's called the "hive-mind", with regards
to personality and this kind of thing.

Human rights are individual rights.

Then, monism is a great idea that there's
an objective, distinct universe of objects
that all monads, being independent actors
or agents and usually indicated as a distinct
"spark", all inhabit one universe, that with
univocity and this kind of thing, makes for
what's according to the canon and doctrine
and dogma, what's usually called platonism,
with regards to the existence of ideals, then
these days for example a "mathematical
universe hypothesis", as sort of extending
that to what's "real" as well.

On 03/20/2024 07:54 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 03/20/2024 07:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
>>>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
>>>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
>>>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
>>>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>>>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>>>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>>>>> these Facts.
>>>>
>>>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
>>>> yield different analytical truths.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
>>> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
>>> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
>>> of human reasoning.
>>>
>>
>> Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
>> the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
>> aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
>> then there's the empirical and what results
>> why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
>> results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
>> beliefs.
>>
>> I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
>> alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
>> belief, then with regards to that not being,
>> "infallibilistic".
>>
>> This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
>> A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
>> a major belief system historically,
>> is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
>> then that Russell who is secular, once joked
>> that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
>> of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
>> extension infallible, and that's considered
>> fallacious, and specious.
>>
>> So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
>> the entire world is specious.
>>
>> The human reasoning then these days is that
>> we have an entire philosophy of science, and
>> the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
>> and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
>> and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
>> side the examination of reason of being by reason
>> in being, examination and test, and ontology from
>> the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
>> to those being among the usual concepts and
>> exploring the fuller dialectic including
>> deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
>> fundamental.
>>
>> It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
>> and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
>> and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
>>
>> When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
>> their truths aren't common, that's to be
>> considered from the universe of syllogism,
>> that they all have to be commonly true together,
>> and that involves that things change and so
>> that the modality is a temporality, and all
>> else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
>> which makes a statistical interpretation,
>> which makes a scientific interpretation.
>>
>> Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
>> there's an opposite, for any stipulation
>> there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
>> so that there's no default certification
>> of stipulation, and it results rather
>> that our canon and dogma and doctrine
>> guides our conscience, the logical conscience
>> and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
>> formalists and a common world of logical
>> and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
>> in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
>> at all.
>>
>> This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
>> except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
>>
>>
>> Matters of definition ....
>>
>>
>> It seems that instead what you have there
>> is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
>> statements of fact collected as common sense",
>> and this means specifically in the notion
>> that it is the _senses_ that describe the
>> phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
>> vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
>> relation to the noumenological, then as with
>> regards to usually a platonistic world where
>> the only common truths are purely logical and
>> by extension mathematical, while all else is
>> only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
>> for a conscientious philosophy of science,
>> interpretations for considerations what so
>> result statistical and scientific experiment.
>>
>> So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
>> is contingent the lineage of its body
>> of definition, in matters of definition.
>>
>>
>> "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
>> is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
>>
>>
>>
>> So, "an ontology via specification and
>> various graphical relations", isn't much
>> more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
>> that if that's codified in the reasoning its
>> beliefs, has that humans examine and test
>> their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
>> the non-logical is always contingent,
>> that otherwise is just a bot.
>> ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
>>
>> Then it's "matter of definition" as with
>> regards to matters of expectation, with regards
>> to matters of communication, what result
>> rather generally systems of information.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> Aristotle says "syllogisms don't have a common truth",
> but that's just that "there are common truths syllogisms
> don't have".
>
> Syllogisms aren't facts so much as scratch-pads.
>
>
>
>
> The "secular" is one of those words like
> "entropy" and "entropy", Aristotle's "down"
> or Leibniz' "full", or like constructivism and
> intuitionism, when what's old is new again,
> and this kind of thing, the "secular" and
> "non-secular".
>
> It's similar in this way to "objective" and
> "subjective", those relating matters of
> contingency and immediacy, and those
> changing in the temporal modality,
> by each monad in the monadic modality,
> each monad's context what's what,
> relative, this absolute.
>
> So, "forging a common belief", or basically
> establishing "this bag-of-fact is the immutable
> common sensory apparatus of a world of bots",
> still has that each little meat-bag wet-ware or
> otherwise any reasoning apparatus, basically
> still has its own sense of being, or not, that
> basically humans are individuals, vis-a-vis,
> what's called the "hive-mind", with regards
> to personality and this kind of thing.
>
> Human rights are individual rights.
>
>
> Then, monism is a great idea that there's
> an objective, distinct universe of objects
> that all monads, being independent actors
> or agents and usually indicated as a distinct
> "spark", all inhabit one universe, that with
> univocity and this kind of thing, makes for
> what's according to the canon and doctrine
> and dogma, what's usually called platonism,
> with regards to the existence of ideals, then
> these days for example a "mathematical
> universe hypothesis", as sort of extending
> that to what's "real" as well.
>
>
> Monism is great, it's an _idea_.
>
> Theism of course or rather deism,
> is super-scientific. There's always
> room, and, of course in humans there
> are religions with respect to deism, or
> common belief systems, including where
> matters of faith confound expectations
> of belief, those are religions in the secular
> and non-secular, including the secular and
> non-secular whose faith and belief is that
> there's agnosticism or a-theism, for example,
> just to indicate that matters of faith and belief,
> are external to any bag-of-fact, yet as well
> can be modeled their reasonings, first-class,
> the reasonings, as a bag-of-facts itself,
> or "comparative religion".
>
> So, "comparative belief", and, "comparative faith",
> indicate what's entertainable and what's inviolable,
> with regards to belief systems, a monad's modality's
> temporality's state of belief (and suspension thereof).
>
> Now of course logical positivism keeps things simple,
> and we relate things to the phenomenological and
> the empirical, but a stronger or "greater" logicism,
> stronger positivism, strong mathematical platonism
> then stronger platonism, for holistic monism,
> arrives at that the phenomenological is ephemeral,
> it's subjective, vis-a-vis, the objective,
> for objectivity.
>
>
> Then it results that there's a sort of minimal
> reasoning toolkit, which involves these other,
> noumenal, "senses":
>
> object-sense
> word-sense
> number-sense
> time-sense
> continuum-sense
>
> that basically make for that a monad's monistic
> reasoning, results in terms of those, that their
> inputs are both the phenomenological sense
> and the first-class inputs according to, "theory",
> which makes for any old "A Theory", at all,
> then with regards to the secular and non-secular
> that deism is super-scientific,
> and religions are systems of belief.
>
> And systems of belief reference matters of faith.
>
> "Fundamentals", "foundations",
> "systems of belief", these kinds things.
>
>
> It's a usual idea in the respect of religion,
> that deism is super-scientific,
> and humans are individuals.
>
>
> Not so much "a cult of one".
>
>

On 03/20/2024 08:43 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 3/20/2024 9:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> > On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
> >> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
> >>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
> >>>
> >>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
> >>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
> >>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
> >>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical truth
> >>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors are
> >>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
> >>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
> >>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
> >>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
> >>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
> >>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
> >>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
> >>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
> >>>> these Facts.
> >>>
> >>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
> >>> yield different analytical truths.
> >>>
> >>
> >> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
> >> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
> >> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
> >> of human reasoning.
> >>
> >
> > Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
> > the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
> > aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
> > then there's the empirical and what results
> > why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
> > results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
> > beliefs.
> >
> Every element of the relevant details of the current model of the actual
> world would seem to be able to be encoded in formalized natural language
> semantics. Relevant details are defined as the degree of details
> required to perform at least the equivalent of human reasoning.
>
> > I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
> > alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
> > belief, then with regards to that not being,
> > "infallibilistic".
> >
> Actual Facts are stipulated to be true (like in Prolog)
> Expressions of language that are a necessary consequence
> of these Facts are also true. This gets a little trickier
> with inductive inference and judgement calls.
> "Pluto is no longer considered a planet."is true.
>
> > This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
> > A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
> > a major belief system historically,
> > is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
> > then that Russell who is secular, once joked
> > that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
> > of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
> > extension infallible, and that's considered
> > fallacious, and specious.
> >
> The Principle of Explosion is hokum and tried to override and
> supersede the way the semantic logical entailment really works.
>
> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
> nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be
> invalid. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>
> The above also contradicts the way the semantic logical entailment
> really works. P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>
> > So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
> > the entire world is specious.
> >
> Not at all. These are called propositional attitudes.
> They are not necessarily true themselves they are merely
> the positions that some people really hold.
>
> > The human reasoning then these days is that
> > we have an entire philosophy of science, and
> > the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
> > and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
> > and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
> > side the examination of reason of being by reason
> These things are anchored in value judgments that are themselves
> anchored in subjectivity.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism
> Is correct only when the optimal criterion measure is the basis.
>
> > in being, examination and test, and ontology from
> > the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
> > to those being among the usual concepts and
> > exploring the fuller dialectic including
> > deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
> > fundamental.
> >
> Deconstruction denotes the pursuing of the meaning of a text to the
> point of exposing the supposed contradictions and internal oppositions
> upon which it is founded—supposedly showing that those foundations are
> irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction
>
> The model of the actual world can be completely coherent.
> Propositional attitudes account for subjective beliefs.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude
>
> > It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
> > and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
> > and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
> >
> > When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
> > their truths aren't common, that's to be
> > considered from the universe of syllogism,
> > that they all have to be commonly true together,
> > and that involves that things change and so
> > that the modality is a temporality, and all
> > else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
> > which makes a statistical interpretation,
> > which makes a scientific interpretation.
> >
> Yes these differences account for knowledge of things
> changing over time. Pluto is no longer considered a planet.
> This "fact" has been updated.
>
> > Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
> > there's an opposite, for any stipulation
> > there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
> > so that there's no default certification
> > of stipulation, and it results rather
> *This is my system of categorically exhaustive reasoning*
> Different premises derive different conclusions about the same
> subject matter. Exactly one of a set of categorically exhaustive
> and mutually exclusive premises must be true.
>
> > that our canon and dogma and doctrine
> > guides our conscience, the logical conscience
> > and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
> > formalists and a common world of logical
> > and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
> > in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
> > at all.
> >
> As far as moral right and wrong goes adhering to a value system
> that derives the maximum beneficial consequences is the objectively
> correct one.
>
> The definition of maximum beneficial consequences seems to
> have subjective aspects. For example maximizing happiness
> (the subjective sense of well being) may have different
> fulfillment for differing individuals.
>
> > This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
> > except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
> >
> >
> > Matters of definition ....
> >
> Most of the knowledge of the actual world does seem to be a matter
> of definition. The concept of "cats are animals" would seem to
> remain true even if every experience of a cat is actually the experience
> of an alien android perfectly disguised as a cat.
>
> >
> > It seems that instead what you have there
> > is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
> > statements of fact collected as common sense",
> > and this means specifically in the notion
> > that it is the _senses_ that describe the
> > phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
> Yes even if every details of reality is a mere figment of the
> imagination our mental model of reality continues to remain
> coherent and thus an accurate model of what at least appear
> to be a set of physical sensations.
>
> The key most important possible error in the human model of
> the actual world might be the human notion of cause-and-effect.
>
> It does seem to be the case that our expectations about what
> events will occur (held silently within the mind with no
> corresponding physical actions) do have an effect on which
> events will occur and how they will occur.
>
> > vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
> > relation to the noumenological, then as with
> Assuming away the possibility that our model of the world
> is inaccurate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomology
> True by definition: {cats are animals} is impossibly false.
> Considered true yet not True by definition is possibly false.
>
> > regards to usually a platonistic world where
> > the only common truths are purely logical and
> > by extension mathematical, while all else is
> True by definition.
>
> > only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
> > for a conscientious philosophy of science,
> > interpretations for considerations what so
> > result statistical and scientific experiment.
> >
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aletheia
> Truth by definition is always necessarily true everything
> else construed as true is less certainly true.
>
> > So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
> > is contingent the lineage of its body
> > of definition, in matters of definition.
> > No, all of the things that are true by definition are
> necessarily true.
>
> >
> > "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
> > is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
> >
> That is why I recently replaced this with
> P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>
> This seems to be superior to relevance logic in that it
> seems all encompassing, whereas relevance logic has a more
> limited scope.
>
> >
> > So, "an ontology via specification and
> > various graphical relations", isn't much
> > more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
> > that if that's codified in the reasoning its
> > beliefs, has that humans examine and test
> > their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
> > the non-logical is always contingent,
> > that otherwise is just a bot.
> > ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
> >
> > Then it's "matter of definition" as with
> > regards to matters of expectation, with regards
> > to matters of communication, what result
> > rather generally systems of information.
> >
>
>

On 03/20/2024 11:19 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 03/20/2024 08:43 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 3/20/2024 9:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> > On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
>> >> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> >>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>> >>>
>> >>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> >>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
>> >>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
>> >>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical
>> truth
>> >>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that
>> bachelors are
>> >>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>> >>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>> >>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the
>> basis of
>> >>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true
>> sentences.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>> >>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>> >>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>> >>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>> >>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>> >>>> these Facts.
>> >>>
>> >>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
>> >>> yield different analytical truths.
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
>> >> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
>> >> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
>> >> of human reasoning.
>> >>
>> >
>> > Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
>> > the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
>> > aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
>> > then there's the empirical and what results
>> > why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
>> > results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
>> > beliefs.
>> >
>> Every element of the relevant details of the current model of the actual
>> world would seem to be able to be encoded in formalized natural language
>> semantics. Relevant details are defined as the degree of details
>> required to perform at least the equivalent of human reasoning.
>>
>> > I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
>> > alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
>> > belief, then with regards to that not being,
>> > "infallibilistic".
>> >
>> Actual Facts are stipulated to be true (like in Prolog)
>> Expressions of language that are a necessary consequence
>> of these Facts are also true. This gets a little trickier
>> with inductive inference and judgement calls.
>> "Pluto is no longer considered a planet."is true.
>>
>> > This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
>> > A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
>> > a major belief system historically,
>> > is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
>> > then that Russell who is secular, once joked
>> > that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
>> > of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
>> > extension infallible, and that's considered
>> > fallacious, and specious.
>> >
>> The Principle of Explosion is hokum and tried to override and
>> supersede the way the semantic logical entailment really works.
>>
>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>> nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be
>> invalid. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>
>> The above also contradicts the way the semantic logical entailment
>> really works. P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>>
>> > So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
>> > the entire world is specious.
>> >
>> Not at all. These are called propositional attitudes.
>> They are not necessarily true themselves they are merely
>> the positions that some people really hold.
>>
>> > The human reasoning then these days is that
>> > we have an entire philosophy of science, and
>> > the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
>> > and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
>> > and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
>> > side the examination of reason of being by reason
>> These things are anchored in value judgments that are themselves
>> anchored in subjectivity.
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism
>> Is correct only when the optimal criterion measure is the basis.
>>
>> > in being, examination and test, and ontology from
>> > the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
>> > to those being among the usual concepts and
>> > exploring the fuller dialectic including
>> > deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
>> > fundamental.
>> >
>> Deconstruction denotes the pursuing of the meaning of a text to the
>> point of exposing the supposed contradictions and internal oppositions
>> upon which it is founded—supposedly showing that those foundations are
>> irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction
>>
>> The model of the actual world can be completely coherent.
>> Propositional attitudes account for subjective beliefs.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude
>>
>> > It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
>> > and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
>> > and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
>> >
>> > When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
>> > their truths aren't common, that's to be
>> > considered from the universe of syllogism,
>> > that they all have to be commonly true together,
>> > and that involves that things change and so
>> > that the modality is a temporality, and all
>> > else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
>> > which makes a statistical interpretation,
>> > which makes a scientific interpretation.
>> >
>> Yes these differences account for knowledge of things
>> changing over time. Pluto is no longer considered a planet.
>> This "fact" has been updated.
>>
>> > Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
>> > there's an opposite, for any stipulation
>> > there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
>> > so that there's no default certification
>> > of stipulation, and it results rather
>> *This is my system of categorically exhaustive reasoning*
>> Different premises derive different conclusions about the same
>> subject matter. Exactly one of a set of categorically exhaustive
>> and mutually exclusive premises must be true.
>>
>> > that our canon and dogma and doctrine
>> > guides our conscience, the logical conscience
>> > and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
>> > formalists and a common world of logical
>> > and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
>> > in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
>> > at all.
>> >
>> As far as moral right and wrong goes adhering to a value system
>> that derives the maximum beneficial consequences is the objectively
>> correct one.
>>
>> The definition of maximum beneficial consequences seems to
>> have subjective aspects. For example maximizing happiness
>> (the subjective sense of well being) may have different
>> fulfillment for differing individuals.
>>
>> > This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
>> > except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
>> >
>> >
>> > Matters of definition ....
>> >
>> Most of the knowledge of the actual world does seem to be a matter
>> of definition. The concept of "cats are animals" would seem to
>> remain true even if every experience of a cat is actually the experience
>> of an alien android perfectly disguised as a cat.
>>
>> >
>> > It seems that instead what you have there
>> > is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
>> > statements of fact collected as common sense",
>> > and this means specifically in the notion
>> > that it is the _senses_ that describe the
>> > phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
>> Yes even if every details of reality is a mere figment of the
>> imagination our mental model of reality continues to remain
>> coherent and thus an accurate model of what at least appear
>> to be a set of physical sensations.
>>
>> The key most important possible error in the human model of
>> the actual world might be the human notion of cause-and-effect.
>>
>> It does seem to be the case that our expectations about what
>> events will occur (held silently within the mind with no
>> corresponding physical actions) do have an effect on which
>> events will occur and how they will occur.
>>
>> > vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
>> > relation to the noumenological, then as with
>> Assuming away the possibility that our model of the world
>> is inaccurate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomology
>> True by definition: {cats are animals} is impossibly false.
>> Considered true yet not True by definition is possibly false.
>>
>> > regards to usually a platonistic world where
>> > the only common truths are purely logical and
>> > by extension mathematical, while all else is
>> True by definition.
>>
>> > only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
>> > for a conscientious philosophy of science,
>> > interpretations for considerations what so
>> > result statistical and scientific experiment.
>> >
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aletheia
>> Truth by definition is always necessarily true everything
>> else construed as true is less certainly true.
>>
>> > So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
>> > is contingent the lineage of its body
>> > of definition, in matters of definition.
>> > No, all of the things that are true by definition are
>> necessarily true.
>>
>> >
>> > "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
>> > is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
>> >
>> That is why I recently replaced this with
>> P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>>
>> This seems to be superior to relevance logic in that it
>> seems all encompassing, whereas relevance logic has a more
>> limited scope.
>>
>> >
>> > So, "an ontology via specification and
>> > various graphical relations", isn't much
>> > more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
>> > that if that's codified in the reasoning its
>> > beliefs, has that humans examine and test
>> > their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
>> > the non-logical is always contingent,
>> > that otherwise is just a bot.
>> > ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
>> >
>> > Then it's "matter of definition" as with
>> > regards to matters of expectation, with regards
>> > to matters of communication, what result
>> > rather generally systems of information.
>> >
>>
>>
>
> Aristotle the other day:
>
> If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition
> embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction,
> and if each science has its peculiar propositions
> from which its peculiar conclusion is developed,
> there there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific
> question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses
> from which the 'appropriate' conclusion of each science
> is developed. Hence it is clear that not every question
> will be relevant to geometry, nor to medicine, nor to
> any other science: only those questions will be geometrical
> which form premisses for the proof of the theorems of geometry
> or of any other science, such as optics, which uses the
> same basic truths as geometry. Of the other sciences
> the like is true. Of these questions the geometer is bound
> to give his account, using the basic truths of geometry
> in conjunction with his previous conclusions; of the
> basic truths of the geometer, as such, is not bound to
> give any account. The like is true of the other sciences.
> There is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put
> to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound
> to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only
> such as fall within the defined field of his own science.
> If, then, in controversy with a geometer qua geometer the
> disputant confines himself to geometry and proves anything
> from geometrical premisses, he is clearly to be applauded;
> if he goes outside these he will be at fault, and obviously
> cannot even refute the geometer except accidentally. One should
> therefore not discuss geometry among those who are not geometers,
> for in such company an unsound argument will pass unnoticed.
> This is correspondingly true in the other science.
>
> - Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 12, McKeon, trans.
>
>
> Here as a matter of usage, "accident" means in the
> ordering of the consideration of things, "accidence".
>
> Then, 'bound to give any account', includes both the
> notions of 'can' and 'must', capability and obligation,
> and the negative applied, implies 'can not', and, 'must not'.
> I.e., capability and obligation are combined: conscientiousness.
>
> He sort of lays it into "sophists" as unconscientious.
>
> "... the reason being that 'ungeometrical', like
> 'unrhythmical', is equivocal, meaning in the one case
> not geometry at all, in the other bad geometry? It
> is this error, i.e. error based on premisses of this kind -
> 'of' the science but false - that is the contrary of science.
> In mathematics the formal fallacy is not so common,
> because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies,
> since the major is predicated of the hole of the middle
> and the middle of the whole of the minor (the predicate
> of course never has the prefix 'all'); and in mathematics
> one can, so to speak, see these middle terms with an
> intellectual vision, while in dialectic the ambiguity
> may escape detection. E.G. 'Is every circle a figure?'
> A diagram shows that this is so, but the minor premiss
> 'Are epics circles?' is shown by the diagram to be false.
> If a proof has an inductive minor premiss, one should
> not bring an 'objection' against it. For since every
> premiss must be applicable to a number of cases (otherwise
> it will not be true in every instance, which, since the
> syllogism proceeds from universals it must be), then
> assuredly the same is true of an 'objection'; since
> premisses and 'objections' are so far the same that
> anything which can be validly advanced as an 'objection'
> must be such that it could take the form of a premiss,
> either demonstrative or dialectical."
>
>
>
> So, for Aristotle's dialectic (and the demonstratives)
> and Hegel's dialectic, is the idea that Hegel's dialectic
> is always the further synthesis, here with the idea
> that "Aristotle's eudamon has a fuller dialectic and
> a scientific synthesis", in terms of any matters of
> contradiction, vis-a-vis any matters of non-contradiction
> (in mutual relevance).
>
> Aristotle separates mathematical reasoning from
> dialectical disputations, ...
>
> "A science expands not by the interposition of
> fresh middle terms, but by the apposition of
> fresh extreme terms. [... direct implication...]"
>
> "Knowledge of the fact
> differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact."
>
>
>
> So, introducing "the reciprocals", Aristotle
> makes for a modern accoutrement of "Aristotle's daemon",
> to take any argument, provide it a novel accidence,
> and whether it's same, i.e. in the same modality,
> here temporality, having a fuller dialectic,
> and demonstratively.
>
> That's also direct for De Morgan and the
> rules of causality by definition the contrapositive,
> which "material implication" also fails to fulfill.
>
> That "the weak dialectic" is any old rhetorical disputation,
> or an argument, has that a "fuller dialectic"
> makes for that "the basic truths" are mathematics',
> science's, those being about it, and that the
> "reasoned facts" then are not withstanding sophism.
> Then: that they are, "reasoned facts".
>
> Then here "geometrical" is "logical".
>
>
> I don't see why think that that relevance logic
> is limited in scope, considering any matters of,
> "true", relation, at all. I think instead that
> that's specious and sophist and just reflects
> that it takes more time to get right, or,
> what you want.
>
> The larger the bag-of-facts or the body-of-knowledge
> gets, the more things are related. This is why it's
> mostly great to have a least and simplest theory
> that's always "reasoning the fact", vis-a-vis,
> mathematical reasoning, science, domains, genera,
> then particulars, it results a science.
>
> So, the great old bag-of-fact, it's baggage.
> Some of which Aristotle's daemon treats like
> a Samsonite baggage handler, with the idea
> of not having "neither material, nor implied",
> values in the truth tables.
>
> I.e., it all goes through the wash,
> and there is no accidence.
>
>
>
>
>

On 3/19/24 5:10 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 3/18/2024 5:59 AM, Stefan Ram wrote:
>> Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote or quoted:
>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>
>>    "Truth" is a word created by humans, so it must have some
>>    definition (which might be implicit in the way it's used).
>>    People may not agree upon what exactly is the correct definition,
>>    but such a disagreement only shows that it's a matter of definition.
>
> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
> these Facts.
>

No, you CLAIM to be doing that, but I have seen ZERO work on actually
trying to do that.

I'm not sure you actually understand what that task entails.

On 3/21/2024 6:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-03-20 12:49:50 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
>>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute truth.
>>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical
>>>>>> truth can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that bachelors
>>>>>> are unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>>>>>
>>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>>>>
>>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the basis of
>>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>>>>
>>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true sentences.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in comp.thery
>>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually excludes
>>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>>>> these Facts.
>>>
>>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
>>> yield different analytical truths.
>>>
>>
>> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
>> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
>> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
>> of human reasoning.
>
> In sci.logic one should be careful with the word "model". Most of
> the common meanings of the word are not valid here.
>
> When you redefine the term "analytical truth" you should tell in
> the inroduction how it differs from the traditional concepts of
> "analytic truth", "synthetic truth", "empirical truth", and perhaps
> others.
>

Every detail about the general knowledge of the actual world is encoded
in formalized natural language knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
In other words all general knowledge that can be encoded in language.

Specific knowledge about a situation context can be input to any
analysis of the current situation. I am thinking that such a definition
could get Quine to understand that the semantic meaning of Bachelor(x)
is simply inherited from ~Married(x) & Male(x) & Adult(x).

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

On 03/20/2024 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 03/20/2024 11:19 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 03/20/2024 08:43 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 3/20/2024 9:21 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> > On 03/20/2024 05:49 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> >> On 3/20/2024 4:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> >>> On 2024-03-19 21:11:59 +0000, olcott said:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> On 3/18/2024 5:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> >>>>> On 2021-03-27 14:54:31 +0000, olcott said:
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>> Most people construe the term "absolute truth" as necessarily
>>> >>>>>> coming from the mind of God, thus atheists reject absolute
>>> truth.
>>> >>>>>> Philosophy leaves religion out of it and says that analytical
>>> truth
>>> >>>>>> can be verified on the basis of its meaning.
>>> >>>>>>
>>> >>>>>> Because Quine had such a hard time understanding that
>>> bachelors are
>>> >>>>>> unmarried in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" I have adapted the
>>> >>>>>> definition of analytical truth so that it can be more directly
>>> >>>>>> divided from other forms of truth:
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> It is a sin to say anything untrue about other people.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>> (1) Expressions of language that are defined to be true and
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Truth is not a matter of definition.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>> (2) Expressions of language that have been derived on the
>>> basis of
>>> >>>>>> applying truth preserving operations.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Only affirmative sentences and only if derived from true
>>> sentences.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Note that the word "sentence" has different meanings in
>>> comp.thery
>>> >>>>> and sci.lang. In the former (and in sci.logic) it usually
>>> excludes
>>> >>>>> all but affirmative sentences.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> I am redefining analytical truth such that it is entirely
>>> >>>> comprised of expressions that are stipulated to be true
>>> >>>> Facts, and expressions that are a necessary consequence of
>>> >>>> these Facts.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> By the proposed redefinition different sets of stipulations
>>> >>> yield different analytical truths.
>>> >>>
>>> >>
>>> >> The stipulations are merely all of the Facts that comprise the
>>> >> model of the actual world. When properly formalized in knowledge
>>> >> ontology inheritance hierarchy this gives an AI mind the capability
>>> >> of human reasoning.
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > Reasoning gets involved teleology and ontology,
>>> > the epistemology, with regards to all sorts
>>> > aspects the philosophy of being and reasoning,
>>> > then there's the empirical and what results
>>> > why today for "scientism", that logical positivism,
>>> > results that there's science, vis-a-vis,
>>> > beliefs.
>>> >
>>> Every element of the relevant details of the current model of the actual
>>> world would seem to be able to be encoded in formalized natural language
>>> semantics. Relevant details are defined as the degree of details
>>> required to perform at least the equivalent of human reasoning.
>>>
>>> > I.e., "facts", are as "beliefs", that any fact
>>> > alone is a stand-alone little model of a stated
>>> > belief, then with regards to that not being,
>>> > "infallibilistic".
>>> >
>>> Actual Facts are stipulated to be true (like in Prolog)
>>> Expressions of language that are a necessary consequence
>>> of these Facts are also true. This gets a little trickier
>>> with inductive inference and judgement calls.
>>> "Pluto is no longer considered a planet."is true.
>>>
>>> > This is also "Russell: is not the Pope".
>>> > A usual doctrine and dogma of Catholicism,
>>> > a major belief system historically,
>>> > is that its leader the Pope, is infallible,
>>> > then that Russell who is secular, once joked
>>> > that 1=0 so that according to the Principle
>>> > of Explosion, that he was the Pope, thus by
>>> > extension infallible, and that's considered
>>> > fallacious, and specious.
>>> >
>>> The Principle of Explosion is hokum and tried to override and
>>> supersede the way the semantic logical entailment really works.
>>>
>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>>> nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be
>>> invalid. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>
>>> The above also contradicts the way the semantic logical entailment
>>> really works. P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>>>
>>> > So, the belief system that a bag-of-facts is
>>> > the entire world is specious.
>>> >
>>> Not at all. These are called propositional attitudes.
>>> They are not necessarily true themselves they are merely
>>> the positions that some people really hold.
>>>
>>> > The human reasoning then these days is that
>>> > we have an entire philosophy of science, and
>>> > the objective and subjective, and for intersubjectivity
>>> > and interobjectivity, about first-principle/final-cause,
>>> > and teleology from the theoretical and philosophical
>>> > side the examination of reason of being by reason
>>> These things are anchored in value judgments that are themselves
>>> anchored in subjectivity.
>>>
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism
>>> Is correct only when the optimal criterion measure is the basis.
>>>
>>> > in being, examination and test, and ontology from
>>> > the theoretical and empirical side, with regards
>>> > to those being among the usual concepts and
>>> > exploring the fuller dialectic including
>>> > deconstructive accounts for the elementarily
>>> > fundamental.
>>> >
>>> Deconstruction denotes the pursuing of the meaning of a text to the
>>> point of exposing the supposed contradictions and internal oppositions
>>> upon which it is founded—supposedly showing that those foundations are
>>> irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction
>>>
>>> The model of the actual world can be completely coherent.
>>> Propositional attitudes account for subjective beliefs.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_attitude
>>>
>>> > It's not to be confused large-scale data aggregation
>>> > and corresponding summary as mechanical inference,
>>> > and correctness and thoroughness, of reasoning.
>>> >
>>> > When Aristotle wrote about syllogism that
>>> > their truths aren't common, that's to be
>>> > considered from the universe of syllogism,
>>> > that they all have to be commonly true together,
>>> > and that involves that things change and so
>>> > that the modality is a temporality, and all
>>> > else the quasi-modal is always contingent,
>>> > which makes a statistical interpretation,
>>> > which makes a scientific interpretation.
>>> >
>>> Yes these differences account for knowledge of things
>>> changing over time. Pluto is no longer considered a planet.
>>> This "fact" has been updated.
>>>
>>> > Otherwise of course, for any syllogism
>>> > there's an opposite, for any stipulation
>>> > there's an opposite, the juxtaposition,
>>> > so that there's no default certification
>>> > of stipulation, and it results rather
>>> *This is my system of categorically exhaustive reasoning*
>>> Different premises derive different conclusions about the same
>>> subject matter. Exactly one of a set of categorically exhaustive
>>> and mutually exclusive premises must be true.
>>>
>>> > that our canon and dogma and doctrine
>>> > guides our conscience, the logical conscience
>>> > and mathematical conscience, for rigorous
>>> > formalists and a common world of logical
>>> > and mathematical fact, vis-a-vis, what's
>>> > in any sense opinionated or incomplete,
>>> > at all.
>>> >
>>> As far as moral right and wrong goes adhering to a value system
>>> that derives the maximum beneficial consequences is the objectively
>>> correct one.
>>>
>>> The definition of maximum beneficial consequences seems to
>>> have subjective aspects. For example maximizing happiness
>>> (the subjective sense of well being) may have different
>>> fulfillment for differing individuals.
>>>
>>> > This is that overgeneralizations are flawed,
>>> > except insofar as they're truly logical absolutes.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Matters of definition ....
>>> >
>>> Most of the knowledge of the actual world does seem to be a matter
>>> of definition. The concept of "cats are animals" would seem to
>>> remain true even if every experience of a cat is actually the experience
>>> of an alien android perfectly disguised as a cat.
>>>
>>> >
>>> > It seems that instead what you have there
>>> > is "an invisible hand's selection of arbitrary
>>> > statements of fact collected as common sense",
>>> > and this means specifically in the notion
>>> > that it is the _senses_ that describe the
>>> > phenomenological and the entire empirical setting,
>>> Yes even if every details of reality is a mere figment of the
>>> imagination our mental model of reality continues to remain
>>> coherent and thus an accurate model of what at least appear
>>> to be a set of physical sensations.
>>>
>>> The key most important possible error in the human model of
>>> the actual world might be the human notion of cause-and-effect.
>>>
>>> It does seem to be the case that our expectations about what
>>> events will occur (held silently within the mind with no
>>> corresponding physical actions) do have an effect on which
>>> events will occur and how they will occur.
>>>
>>> > vis-a-vis reason and rationality as of its
>>> > relation to the noumenological, then as with
>>> Assuming away the possibility that our model of the world
>>> is inaccurate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomology
>>> True by definition: {cats are animals} is impossibly false.
>>> Considered true yet not True by definition is possibly false.
>>>
>>> > regards to usually a platonistic world where
>>> > the only common truths are purely logical and
>>> > by extension mathematical, while all else is
>>> True by definition.
>>>
>>> > only as so disclosed the aletheia what results
>>> > for a conscientious philosophy of science,
>>> > interpretations for considerations what so
>>> > result statistical and scientific experiment.
>>> >
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aletheia
>>> Truth by definition is always necessarily true everything
>>> else construed as true is less certainly true.
>>>
>>> > So, every single item in bag-of-facts,
>>> > is contingent the lineage of its body
>>> > of definition, in matters of definition.
>>> > No, all of the things that are true by definition are
>>> necessarily true.
>>>
>>> >
>>> > "Anybody who buys or sells material implication
>>> > is a fool or a fraud." -- Invisible Hand
>>> >
>>> That is why I recently replaced this with
>>> P □□ Q means that Q is a necessary consequence of P.
>>>
>>> This seems to be superior to relevance logic in that it
>>> seems all encompassing, whereas relevance logic has a more
>>> limited scope.
>>>
>>> >
>>> > So, "an ontology via specification and
>>> > various graphical relations", isn't much
>>> > more than the _senses_ of a mechanical reasoner,
>>> > that if that's codified in the reasoning its
>>> > beliefs, has that humans examine and test
>>> > their beliefs, and furthermore "know" that
>>> > the non-logical is always contingent,
>>> > that otherwise is just a bot.
>>> > ("Unconscious" reasoning, "unconscientious" reasoning.)
>>> >
>>> > Then it's "matter of definition" as with
>>> > regards to matters of expectation, with regards
>>> > to matters of communication, what result
>>> > rather generally systems of information.
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Aristotle the other day:
>>
>> If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition
>> embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction,
>> and if each science has its peculiar propositions
>> from which its peculiar conclusion is developed,
>> there there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific
>> question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses
>> from which the 'appropriate' conclusion of each science
>> is developed. Hence it is clear that not every question
>> will be relevant to geometry, nor to medicine, nor to
>> any other science: only those questions will be geometrical
>> which form premisses for the proof of the theorems of geometry
>> or of any other science, such as optics, which uses the
>> same basic truths as geometry. Of the other sciences
>> the like is true. Of these questions the geometer is bound
>> to give his account, using the basic truths of geometry
>> in conjunction with his previous conclusions; of the
>> basic truths of the geometer, as such, is not bound to
>> give any account. The like is true of the other sciences.
>> There is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put
>> to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound
>> to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only
>> such as fall within the defined field of his own science.
>> If, then, in controversy with a geometer qua geometer the
>> disputant confines himself to geometry and proves anything
>> from geometrical premisses, he is clearly to be applauded;
>> if he goes outside these he will be at fault, and obviously
>> cannot even refute the geometer except accidentally. One should
>> therefore not discuss geometry among those who are not geometers,
>> for in such company an unsound argument will pass unnoticed.
>> This is correspondingly true in the other science.
>>
>> - Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 12, McKeon, trans.
>>
>>
>> Here as a matter of usage, "accident" means in the
>> ordering of the consideration of things, "accidence".
>>
>> Then, 'bound to give any account', includes both the
>> notions of 'can' and 'must', capability and obligation,
>> and the negative applied, implies 'can not', and, 'must not'.
>> I.e., capability and obligation are combined: conscientiousness.
>>
>> He sort of lays it into "sophists" as unconscientious.
>>
>> "... the reason being that 'ungeometrical', like
>> 'unrhythmical', is equivocal, meaning in the one case
>> not geometry at all, in the other bad geometry? It
>> is this error, i.e. error based on premisses of this kind -
>> 'of' the science but false - that is the contrary of science.
>> In mathematics the formal fallacy is not so common,
>> because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies,
>> since the major is predicated of the hole of the middle
>> and the middle of the whole of the minor (the predicate
>> of course never has the prefix 'all'); and in mathematics
>> one can, so to speak, see these middle terms with an
>> intellectual vision, while in dialectic the ambiguity
>> may escape detection. E.G. 'Is every circle a figure?'
>> A diagram shows that this is so, but the minor premiss
>> 'Are epics circles?' is shown by the diagram to be false.
>> If a proof has an inductive minor premiss, one should
>> not bring an 'objection' against it. For since every
>> premiss must be applicable to a number of cases (otherwise
>> it will not be true in every instance, which, since the
>> syllogism proceeds from universals it must be), then
>> assuredly the same is true of an 'objection'; since
>> premisses and 'objections' are so far the same that
>> anything which can be validly advanced as an 'objection'
>> must be such that it could take the form of a premiss,
>> either demonstrative or dialectical."
>>
>>
>>
>> So, for Aristotle's dialectic (and the demonstratives)
>> and Hegel's dialectic, is the idea that Hegel's dialectic
>> is always the further synthesis, here with the idea
>> that "Aristotle's eudamon has a fuller dialectic and
>> a scientific synthesis", in terms of any matters of
>> contradiction, vis-a-vis any matters of non-contradiction
>> (in mutual relevance).
>>
>> Aristotle separates mathematical reasoning from
>> dialectical disputations, ...
>>
>> "A science expands not by the interposition of
>> fresh middle terms, but by the apposition of
>> fresh extreme terms. [... direct implication...]"
>>
>> "Knowledge of the fact
>> differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact."
>>
>>
>>
>> So, introducing "the reciprocals", Aristotle
>> makes for a modern accoutrement of "Aristotle's daemon",
>> to take any argument, provide it a novel accidence,
>> and whether it's same, i.e. in the same modality,
>> here temporality, having a fuller dialectic,
>> and demonstratively.
>>
>> That's also direct for De Morgan and the
>> rules of causality by definition the contrapositive,
>> which "material implication" also fails to fulfill.
>>
>> That "the weak dialectic" is any old rhetorical disputation,
>> or an argument, has that a "fuller dialectic"
>> makes for that "the basic truths" are mathematics',
>> science's, those being about it, and that the
>> "reasoned facts" then are not withstanding sophism.
>> Then: that they are, "reasoned facts".
>>
>> Then here "geometrical" is "logical".
>>
>>
>> I don't see why think that that relevance logic
>> is limited in scope, considering any matters of,
>> "true", relation, at all. I think instead that
>> that's specious and sophist and just reflects
>> that it takes more time to get right, or,
>> what you want.
>>
>> The larger the bag-of-facts or the body-of-knowledge
>> gets, the more things are related. This is why it's
>> mostly great to have a least and simplest theory
>> that's always "reasoning the fact", vis-a-vis,
>> mathematical reasoning, science, domains, genera,
>> then particulars, it results a science.
>>
>> So, the great old bag-of-fact, it's baggage.
>> Some of which Aristotle's daemon treats like
>> a Samsonite baggage handler, with the idea
>> of not having "neither material, nor implied",
>> values in the truth tables.
>>
>> I.e., it all goes through the wash,
>> and there is no accidence.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Samuelson was an economist,
> he defined a "Utility Function",
> that every quantity and qualia,
> has a value in a common, inelastic milieu,
> that a factory had value and ore had value,
> that clean air had value and a flower had value,
> that any thing and even opinions, had a value.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Samuelson
>
> Even his utility function has a value.
>
> Two cents.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_two_cents
>
>
> This is, "optimization", here is reasoning,
> what combinations, of quantified quantities,
> result qualities, of quantities, as of,
> a maximum, or a minimum, "all else held constant".
>
> So, that's pretty easy in quasi-modal theory,
> just add what you want it to be and it's so.
>
> Is it objective, though?
>
> So, the quasi-modal implementation, meets a criterion,
> that among cheap, fast, and thoroughly coherent,
> it's figured that in computing that time is money
> so "fast" suffices that it's optimum, yet,
> incorporating that for example it has to consume
> otherwise its own inferences as _tabula rasa_ or
> blank slate, ab initio, those quasi-modal outputs,
> are _not_ truth values.
>
> It's dynamics.
>
>
> Then, here, about the objects of the logical universe,
> there is infinity and continuity and these kinds of
> things, there's "all", there's a universal quantifier
> to disambiguate any/each/every/all, there's an existential
> quantifier to disambiguate plural/some/one, there are
> sentential diagrams to disambiguate in order and accidence,
> and types and categories to disambiguage inverse and reciprocal,
> all the inner and outer products of all the complementary duals,
> and the graph of relation and where it meets and doesn't
> and where it ends.
>
> So, it's simplest to have that theory first, then,
> every other notion results "reasoned fact, about reasoned fact".
>
> Much less baggage.
>
>
>
>

Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> writes:
[...]
> (Some have that "life must be carbon-based because
> only carbon-rings make sequences with enough
> information", but, "live rust", steam vents, and so on.)
[...]

What is "live rust"? The only references I can find are to the 1979
album by Neil Young and Crazy Horse.

--
Keith Thompson (The_Other_Keith) Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com
Working, but not speaking, for Medtronic
void Void(void) { Void(); } /* The recursive call of the void */

On 03/21/2024 04:20 PM, Keith Thompson wrote:
> Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> writes:
> [...]
>> (Some have that "life must be carbon-based because
>> only carbon-rings make sequences with enough
>> information", but, "live rust", steam vents, and so on.)
> [...]
>
> What is "live rust"? The only references I can find are to the 1979
> album by Neil Young and Crazy Horse.
>

It's when you have a new shovel,
and you're digging some fence posts,
and there's a lot of iron in the soil,
rusty live old iron and live rust.

Anyways the next day the shovel's covered with rust.

It's like when you use an iron bar,
and digging fence-post holes to lay out
some barb-wire fence, there's lots of iron,
and it's got a lot of oxidation.

Anyways the next day the iron bar's all covered with rust.

Live rust.

They don't have anything for live rust,
but if you scrape yourself up on old barb wire fence,
it's maybe not a bad idea to get a tetanus shot.

There's the Gaia hypothesis, "the Earth is alive",
like in the movie "Final Fantasy: the Spirits Within",
anyways it's not like that, live rust.

Basically "live rust" is a state of
highly accelerated oxidation of ferrous materials,
with associations to organic materials, then
whether that's just catalyst, or, particular symbiosis.

Or that's the kind I know maybe there are others.

Otherwise I've looked into "live rust" before
and there's not much about it. For example,
on Google, this thread isn't there.

Yet, it's definitely a thing.

Yet, it's not in the ephemeral knowledge base, ....

The idea about "the Upper Ontology" and this kind of thing,
and thanks for your interest or thanks for writing,
is a great thing, things change.

Somehow we must always be _parsing_ the things
and making _theory_ and _science_ of the things,
vis-a-vis our internalized knowledge base, facts,
representations, memory, recall, lack thereof.

About "Live Rust", one imagines it's a play on
words as, "live music", while, where did they get it?
That album and its music has had great revival several
times, and has greatly influenced generations of listeners.

There's an intersection of streets near here, in one
direction it's one-way traffic, in the other there's
a spur that joins it, that way two-way traffic.
Anyways though, it's one-way traffic the main, and
all the lanes are usually having constant traffic, one way.
So anyways one thing I've observed is people taking
the "fake left", as if some ontology informed them
that it was not one way traffic, which it is. So,
I wonder, how to add the "no left turn", sign,
that also punches a hole all the way up to, the,
"Upper Ontology", before people just following
directions, head-on a bus.

It's not technically wrong, just under-defined, ....

"Live rust: not to be confused with microthrombosis
associated with platelet complications of COVID disease,
and don't forget pertussis."

Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> writes:
> On 03/21/2024 04:20 PM, Keith Thompson wrote:
>> Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> writes:
>> [...]
>>> (Some have that "life must be carbon-based because
>>> only carbon-rings make sequences with enough
>>> information", but, "live rust", steam vents, and so on.)
>> [...]
>>
>> What is "live rust"? The only references I can find are to the 1979
>> album by Neil Young and Crazy Horse.
>
> It's when you have a new shovel,
> and you're digging some fence posts,
> and there's a lot of iron in the soil,
> rusty live old iron and live rust.
>
> Anyways the next day the shovel's covered with rust.

Yes, iron oxidizes.

[snip]

> They don't have anything for live rust,
> but if you scrape yourself up on old barb wire fence,
> it's maybe not a bad idea to get a tetanus shot.

Quoting Wikipedia, "Although rust itself does not cause tetanus, objects
that accumulate rust are often found outdoors or in places that harbor
anaerobic bacteria."

[...]
> Otherwise I've looked into "live rust" before
> and there's not much about it. For example,
> on Google, this thread isn't there.

Because Google Groups recently stopped archiving Usenet posts.

> Yet, it's definitely a thing.

If it were a thing, it would not be relevant to any of the newsgroups
we're posting on. You seemed to be implying that it's some previously
unacknowledged category of life, which would be fascinating *if* it were
true.

[...]

> About "Live Rust", one imagines it's a play on
> words as, "live music", while, where did they get it?
> That album and its music has had great revival several
> times, and has greatly influenced generations of listeners.

It was a live performance recorded during the "Rust Never Sleeps" tour.
Nothing to do with whatever you're talking about.

[...]

--
Keith Thompson (The_Other_Keith) Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com
Working, but not speaking, for Medtronic
void Void(void) { Void(); } /* The recursive call of the void */

On 03/21/2024 06:29 PM, Keith Thompson wrote:
> Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> writes:
>> On 03/21/2024 04:20 PM, Keith Thompson wrote:
>>> Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> writes:
>>> [...]
>>>> (Some have that "life must be carbon-based because
>>>> only carbon-rings make sequences with enough
>>>> information", but, "live rust", steam vents, and so on.)
>>> [...]
>>>
>>> What is "live rust"? The only references I can find are to the 1979
>>> album by Neil Young and Crazy Horse.
>>
>> It's when you have a new shovel,
>> and you're digging some fence posts,
>> and there's a lot of iron in the soil,
>> rusty live old iron and live rust.
>>
>> Anyways the next day the shovel's covered with rust.
>
> Yes, iron oxidizes.
>
> [snip]
>
>> They don't have anything for live rust,
>> but if you scrape yourself up on old barb wire fence,
>> it's maybe not a bad idea to get a tetanus shot.
>
> Quoting Wikipedia, "Although rust itself does not cause tetanus, objects
> that accumulate rust are often found outdoors or in places that harbor
> anaerobic bacteria."
>
> [...]
>> Otherwise I've looked into "live rust" before
>> and there's not much about it. For example,
>> on Google, this thread isn't there.
>
> Because Google Groups recently stopped archiving Usenet posts.
>
>> Yet, it's definitely a thing.
>
> If it were a thing, it would not be relevant to any of the newsgroups
> we're posting on. You seemed to be implying that it's some previously
> unacknowledged category of life, which would be fascinating *if* it were
> true.
>
> [...]
>
>> About "Live Rust", one imagines it's a play on
>> words as, "live music", while, where did they get it?
>> That album and its music has had great revival several
>> times, and has greatly influenced generations of listeners.
>
> It was a live performance recorded during the "Rust Never Sleeps" tour.
> Nothing to do with whatever you're talking about.
>
> [...]
>

Yes: sci.logic, comp.theory, and sci.lang,
have not so much here to do with live rust.

They do however have lots to do with models
of computation, the foundations of logic,
and the purposes and contents of language.

It is sort of an implication that biological processes
are involved in this catalyst of rust, it's the
nutrients, live rust, vis-a-vis, live steam.

These days one might aver "Usenet is just a shambles,
in fact a lot of its traffic is bots".

Yet, to arrive at notions of foundations, and
especially, "non-standard", yet real, foundations,
and the considerations of for example this thread,
that analyzes "classical quasi-modal logic" with
regards to relevance logic and the structure of
language and natural language fulfilling any role
of symbolic and logical language, it's a thing.

So, one might juxtapose Neil Young, and Lynyrd Skynyrd,
in the era of the late 60's and the remarkable times
of the Equal Rights Amendment and Civil Rights Act,
in the backdrop of the Cold War and Vietnam War,
in as to where, due the archival and preservation,
of these works, it was possible for later generations,
and even today, to rediscover their concepts and
revisit the dialog, what results that the ERA and CRA
had always been, and those wars were over.

These days it's again for civil liberties, privacy mostly,
then with regards to the Malthusian dilemma, that it's
not only the ontology we've arrived at, yet also
the ontology of how the ontology is arrived at.

(Some are particularly sensitive to ending phrases
with prepositions, so "arrived at" is that at
which is arrived, at.)

Consider for example the Frankfurt School.

Perhaps the most unexpected development is, after
models of computation and the transistorized computer
circuit, four decades of Moore's law then to these
days even more novel models of computation like
the free-form 3-D I-C, besides models of ultra-low-power
reversible computing and such, into ubiquity, and
the implementation of resources for pretty much any
manner of, "mechanical reasoning", vis-a-vis the
silver thread back through all teleology which
advises that the same theory, is still a monism.

Remarkably, standardization is very thorough.

Not relevant here: indeed, speaks to exactly why
relevance logic, is relevant here, and "material",
"implication": is neither. That is just a particular,
yet, somehow, the meta-theory is the theory, and,
it's natural language.

When I'm curious about NLP I study archives,
for example the great ACL anthology, https://aclanthology.org/ .

I figure what can read that can read
pretty good, or rather, rather well.

Warm regards, no offense intended

Indeed, Google has surfaced Usenet several times
in its epochs of organization with regards to
the latest spam-walling of the Internet, then
regardless its literal or semantic content,
it's swept under the entburgung rug,
the hide & show huff & stuff,
where it accumulates. Belles lettres.

That's not to say it doesn't _read_ Usenet.

Warm regards, and as they say, "keep on
rocking in the free world", and,
"keep on trucking", was the idea.