European federalism ·

Brian Coughlan
Updated Sun

Angela Merkel was widely praised. Why did people not realize what
terrible mistakes she was making in letting Germany become dependent on
Russian energy while completely hollowing out the German military?

To my dying day - and that may now be sooner than I’d like - I will
maintain that this was the right move.

The European Union and Germany in particular were correct to draw Russia
into a tight, mutually beneficial economic relationship. The gradual
outcome, a peaceful continent full of good neighbors and very few
weapons stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. A Eurasian Union. Why
would anyone disrupt that for hypothetical, 19th century strategic
fears? The logical conclusion is that they would not.

This was reasonable, sensible and it should have worked. Plan A has
always been to draw Russia ever tighter into the sphere of the EU,
because the alternative, let’s call it Plan B, sucked fat, suppurating,
donkey balls.

That alternative was to respond to Russian paranoia and threatening
noises by collapsing all the mutually beneficial trading links and
arming ourselves to the teeth. This was Plan B and Plan B is now in effect.

That Russia, or more correctly Putin, has tossed decades of integration
and peaceful co-existence on the trash heap is no ones fault but his.

Putin’s Kleptocracy, with it’s piddling €1,5 Trillion GDP has just
pissed off the EU and the US with a combined GDP of €42 Trillion or
about 40% of the entire global economy. This doesn’t end well for him.

Let’s hope someone takes him out before he tries to take us with him.

Edit 3rd of April: Our Ukrainian family has been with us for a week now.
A grandmother, mother and 10 year old girl. Tens of thousands of
families throughout the EU are similarly hosting Ukrainian refugees. I
understood at the beginning that this was a nation building moment for
Ukraine, but I had not appreciated how it was a nation building moment
for the EU as well.

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10 comments from
Johan Olofsson
and more

Johan Olofsson
· Fri
The error was not the plan.
The error was to hold on to the plan despite Georgia — and despite
Crimea, Donbas and Syria.

Brian Coughlan
· Fri
Fair enough.

Johan Olofsson
· Fri
Just the other day, in a German debate program, I heard Michael Roth
(SPD), 2013–21 federal minister for European cooperation. Like most
German politicians, he was self-critical. Among other things, he
mentioned how he was unprepared for how unpopular Nordstream 2 was in
all other capitals except for in Vienna.

He didn’t say it explicitly, it is rather my interpretation, but I think
his explanation is groupthink, echo-chamber and political inertia.

When he realized this, it was already “too late.” The decision was made,
the contract was signed, and he was alone in his understanding. This is
what I think of as political inertia.

Brian Coughlan
· Fri
I generally agree with what you’re saying. Rather it’s this often stated
sense that Russia couldn’t possibly be trusted under any circumstances,
that not to operate in an atmosphere of mutual paranoia was somehow a
mistake. It’s this that I disagree with.

However, by 2016/7 it was clear the stuff in Crimea and Donbas was not
going away. After the obvious manipulation of the US election and the
Brexit vote, from this period onward I think the EU should have been
more critical.

Juergen Nieveler
· Sat
There was no error, arguably — BECAUSE of this, Russias economy is now
heavily intertwine with Europe, which means there's a lot of leverage
for sanctions. Imagine if Europe had isolated Russia in the last thirty
years, driving them to close cooperation with China…

Brian Coughlan
· Sat
Exactly. It’s a kind of positively reinforcing version of mutually
assured destruction. But it’s not like the zero sum game of nuclear MAD.
The country (or regional block) with the bigger economy and richer
friends always wins.

Jobst von Steinsdorff
· Sat
As they say hindsight is always 20/20, but we probably had a too deeply
rooted belief in the „homo oeconomicus“ idea we have. Hitler had some
economic successes early on that carried him further, Putin has
absolutely nothing to show for on that front and still clings to power.
For me that is really… a paradigm shift since I can’t think of a
dictator that was as economically unsuccessful as Putin.

Rory O Brien
· Mon
While I totally agree with your analysis, I would add that there should
have been some kind of Plan B in place for Germany. No doubt Merkel
meant well but surely her advisers could have told her that no one
conducts international negotiations by placing all your cards face up on
the table. At least…
At least we now have the satisfaction in Europe that dealing with dodgy
regimes has to be done at a distance. If you're going to sup with the
devil, bring a long spoon.

Jussi Salmi
· 21h ago
I agree. There should’ve been more integration, not less.

Evangelos Lolos
· 18h ago
This seems to me like a false dichotomy.

The plan should have been “keep your friend close and your enemies
closer”, not becoming friends with a dictator.

Unlike most other EU states, some German politicians seem to have
crossed the line and compromised on European principles for the sake of
doing business, corrupting themselves rather than helping move Putin to
the “light”.

>A new biography covering Chancellor life in East Germany has caused a stir by suggesting she was closer to the communist apparatus and its ideology than previously thought.

>The book makes the "perfidious" suggestion that secret powers aided Merkel's path into politics, that she is some kind of Soviet plant
https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-book-suggests-angela-merkel-was-closer-to-communism-than-thought-a-899768.html