from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine

What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?
America and Taiwan Need to Grasp—and Influence—Chinese Views of the Conflict
By David Sacks
May 16, 2022
Taiwanese soldiers on a ferry near Matsu, Taiwan, March 2022

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine

Beyond Europe, the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is being felt
most keenly 5,000 miles away, on the island of Taiwan. Many Taiwanese
worry that they might be the next to suffer an invasion by a more
powerful neighbor. Those fears are not unreasonable. While Ukraine and
Taiwan differ in many ways, as relatively young democracies living
alongside larger authoritarian neighbors with long-standing designs on
their territory, the two face strikingly similar strategic predicaments.

Much as Russian President Vladimir Putin has described restoring the
“historical unity” between Russia and Ukraine as a kind of spiritual
mission, Chinese President Xi Jinping believes that reuniting mainland
China with what he views as its lost province of Taiwan will help cement
his place in history. Xi speaks of Taiwan in much the same way Putin
talks about Ukraine, highlighting blood ties and arguing that China and
Taiwan are one family. Whereas Putin has recently challenged the
traditional understanding of state sovereignty, in order to suggest that
Ukraine does not deserve it, Xi (like his predecessors) denies Taiwan’s
sovereignty altogether.

These similarities notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to assume that
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will in any way hasten China’s desire to
achieve unification with Taiwan. Fundamentally, Chinese leaders’
calculations about whether to use force against Taiwan are political
decisions that Moscow’s actions will not influence. Moreover, Chinese
officials are well aware that attacking Taiwan now would likely fuel
Western fears that Beijing and Moscow are forming an authoritarian axis
and beginning to act in concert, thereby increasing the likelihood of
direct intervention by the United States and its allies.

Nevertheless, Xi and the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) are closely monitoring events in Ukraine, looking for lessons that
might be usefully applied in the event of a conflict with Taiwan.
Russia’s struggles will in no way shake China’s determination to bring
Taiwan under its control. From Beijing’s perspective, Russia’s war in
Ukraine is merely a realistic preview of the costs China would likely
bear if it resorted to war. Chinese leaders will examine Russia’s
failures and adapt their operational plans to avoid making similar mistakes.

Taiwan and the United States, therefore, would be well advised to do the
same, and to scrutinize each stage of the war in Ukraine from the
perspective of a Chinese official. By doing so, they may be able to
identify facts or patterns that may already be giving Chinese officials
pause as well as capabilities that Taiwan should adopt to buttress
deterrence. Although it would be a mistake to assume that Moscow’s
actions have any direct influence on Beijing’s decisions, identifying
the kind of evidence that could convince China that Putin’s decision to
attack Ukraine was a colossal strategic blunder could also help
Taiwanese and U.S. strategists deter China from a catastrophic attack on
Taiwan.

A WORLD LESS TRANQUIL
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirms Chinese leaders’ belief that they
are entering a more dangerous era and that they must prepare for a
greater likelihood of war. In his call with U.S. President Joe Biden
after the war began, Xi noted that “the prevailing trend of peace and
development is facing serious challenges” and that “the world is neither
tranquil nor stable.” Xi’s words strongly suggest that China will
continue to increase its defense spending, which remains focused on
developing the capabilities the PLA would need to conquer Taiwan.

As the United States has built a coalition of countries, including many
of the world’s top economies, to impose severe sanctions on Russia,
China has been examining these efforts for evidence of declining U.S.
influence. From Beijing’s perspective, any cracks in the coalition are
heartening news, and it has certainly noted that some close U.S.
partners, such as India, have not sanctioned Russia or forcefully
condemned its invasion of Ukraine, even after reports emerged of alleged
Russian war crimes. China likely assumes that global support for Taiwan
will be more muted than support for Ukraine has been, as few countries
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and many lack even robust
unofficial relations with the island. Moreover, Russia has successfully
leveraged its economic ties with some countries to keep them on the
sidelines, which has likely reassured China that its far greater
economic might will prevent many countries from supporting Taiwan.

The most important thing China has learned from war in Ukraine may be
that the U.S. will not directly intervene against a nuclear-armed opponent.
China will also study the sanctions applied to Russia and take steps to
decrease its own vulnerability to similar actions. As a first measure,
Beijing will accelerate its “dual circulation” strategy—seeking to
promote exports while simultaneously encouraging stronger domestic
demand—in a bid to increase other countries’ economic dependence on
China and reduce its dependence on others. This strategy would serve two
purposes: insulating China’s economy from sanctions and making any
sanctions that Western countries apply to Beijing to deter or punish an
invasion of Taiwan hurt the West more than China. China will also
attempt to produce critical technologies such as semiconductors
domestically, reduce its reliance on the U.S. financial system and the
dollar, and support an alternative to SWIFT, the dollar-based
international payments system. Regardless of how much progress China
makes on this front, its leaders are likely confident that U.S. allies
would be far more reticent to impose wide-ranging sanctions against
China, given its centrality to global supply chains.

Potentially the most important lesson China has learned from war in
Ukraine is that the United States will not contemplate direct military
intervention against a nuclear-armed opponent. Before Russia invaded
Ukraine, the United States took direct military intervention off the
table, with Biden warning that “direct confrontation between NATO and
Russia is World War III.” Chinese analysts and policymakers have likely
concluded that Russia’s nuclear arsenal deterred the United States from
intervening and that nuclear weapons create more room for conventional
operations. Chinese strategists likely believe that this validates the
country’s decision to invest heavily in increasing its nuclear arsenal,
which the U.S. Department of Defense recently estimated will reach at
least 1,000 warheads within the decade. Moreover, having witnessed
Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, China may conclude that it could deter
U.S. intervention on Taiwan’s behalf by raising its nuclear alert level
or conducting nuclear tests at the outset of a conflict.

Russia’s military blunders will help the PLA hone its plans and improve
its chances of conquering Taiwan. Russia has failed to achieve air
superiority over Ukraine; keep its forces supplied with fuel, food, and
munitions; and effectively conduct combined arms operations. The PLA’s
leadership was likely shocked that Russia’s military, with extensive
recent operational experience, failed to secure a decisive victory. For
the PLA, this vindicates the difficult military reforms it began in
2015, which focused on joint operations and logistics and incorporate
lessons learned from watching the United States conduct complex joint
operations. At the same time, the PLA fields a significant amount of
Russian military equipment and has sought to integrate elements of
Russia’s military reforms and therefore Russia’s struggles could prompt
the PLA to question its own readiness to conduct the operations
necessary for a fight with Taiwan. This worry is likely compounded by
the fact that the PLA assumes the United States would come to Taiwan’s
defense and the United States has sold Taiwan many of the same weapons
Ukraine is using to great effect. In the longer term, the PLA will
likely redouble its focus on integrating its land, sea, and air power
and improving its joint warfighting capabilities.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ability to rally the Ukrainian people and
international public opinion has shown Chinese leaders the importance of
eliminating Taiwan’s political and military leadership early in a
conflict and breaking the Taiwanese people’s determination to resist. In
practice, this would, at a minimum, entail attempting to assassinate
Taiwanese leaders to demoralize the population, inhibit command and
control, and prevent the emergence of a rallying figure. But China would
likely pursue even more expansive operations ahead of any assault,
including sowing divisions within Taiwanese society, spreading
disinformation, and severing Taiwan’s communications with the outside
world. China has already established essential platforms within Taiwan
for spreading pro-China messages through investments in media outlets
and recruitment of intelligence assets. It will surely continue to
refine this non-kinetic element of warfare.