Pete Feigal
Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years.Mon

How many B-29 bombers were shot down in WW2?

Four hundred and fourteen (414) B-29s were lost bombing Japan—147 of
them to flak and Japanese fighters, 267 to engine fires, mechanical
failures, takeoff crashes and other “operational losses.”

One of the main keys to the design’s success was the very high-lift,
low-drag wing that Boeing developed—similar to the Consolidated B-24
Liberator’s unique “Davis wing”—with sophisticated Fowler flaps, at the
time a high-tech innovation, to make the wing work at takeoff and
landing speeds.

But do the math and you’ll see that for every B-29 lost to the enemy,
almost two were lost to accidents and crashes.

The grim jest among the B-29 crews was that they were being killed more
by Curtiss-Wright, the makers of the B-29’s big R3350 radial engines,
the highest-displacement production engine in the world at the time,
than by the Japanese.

Except it wasn’t a joke.

The B-29 had 4 × Wright R-3350-23 Duplex-Cyclone 18-cylinder air-cooled
turbosupercharged radial piston engines, making 2,200 hp each, made
partially with magnesium and this was the LAST time magnesium was ever
used on an aircraft engine again.

The light-weight crankcase of the R3350 was made out of very flammable
magnesium crankcase, and when they went up like shooting stars, they
could quickly burn right through a wing spar.

The military wanted the B-29, Period, “We need it for this war, not the
next one,” USAAF General Henry H. “Hap”Arnold said, and the
Curtiss-Wright company was pressured to hurry up the R-3350 radial
engine, pushing them to do the engine development in just two years that
typically took five. Not that Curtiss Wright needed any help making bad
engines, as it was later revealed that Wright company officials had
conspired with civilian technical advisers and Army inspection officers
to approve substandard or defective aircraft engines for military use.
Arthur Miller’s play, ‘All my Sons’ was taken directly from this huge
scandal.

Possibly never in US history has as flawed and expensive a major weapons
system—(arguably the ultimate weapons system of the entire PTO)—been
knowingly deployed in as incomplete and imperfect a state of development
as the B-29 bomber.

One of the B-29’s Wright R-3350’s seemingly insoluble problems was
constant, premature failures of the reduction gears that slowed B-29
propellers down to very efficient low-rpm speeds. Finally, somebody
actually measured tolerances in a production gear set and found that an
automated gang drill press at the New Jersey factory that simultaneously
bored the holes for a dozen planetary-gear carrier shafts was…incredibly
out of whack. A team of experienced machinists was put to work around
the clock redrilling the holes, and the reduction-gear problem vanished.

There are photos of B-29 formations showing aircraft with broad,
sharp-edged, solid black bands on top of the wings, directly behind an
engine nacelle. “Invasion stripes?” Uh-uh: OIL. B-29 engines were
terrible leakers, largely as a result of vibration, and routine
post-mission maintenance involved a lot of systematic tightening of hose
clamps, banjo fittings and compression nuts. (And if an entire wing skin
was wet, imagine the scene inside the nacelle!)

It was Oil fires, not Fuel fires, that most often created B-29 engine
blazes, though the R-3350’s numerous large magnesium components
unfortunately fed the flames. A literally white-hot, wind-whipped
magnesium fire quickly burned through a B-29’s ineffectual
firewall—crewmen called them “tin pans”—and then melted the aluminum
wing spar close behind the nacelle. On a B-29 flying over the
ocean…catastrophe.

Backfires due to poor mixture distribution were another cause of engine
fires, when a super-lean cylinder would burp (its technical) flames back
into the intake manifold. If this ignited fuel that had pooled in the
frankly poorly designed induction system, it could set off the magnesium
supercharger case.

The two B-29 waist gunners were positioned in clear plastic blisters
amidships, on each side of the airplane, and from there they remotely
controlled M2 .50-caliber turrets through analog-computer gunsights that
calculated range, windage, target lead and even the ballistic drop of
the bullets over the distance to the target. But since active defensive
gunning occupied only a small slice of time during each mission, the
gunners were given a different primary duty: Watch the engines like a
hawk and report sudden oil leaks and fires. To my knowledge no other
bomber in WW2 history, on any side, actually carried on-board fire marshals.

The B-29’s R-3350s were lucky to survive for an average of 265 hours
before being literally thrown away. A few were overhauled, but most were
just junked, since Wright was cranking out plenty of replacements. Small
mountains of trashed R-3350 radials were standard features of B-29 bases
in the PTO.

Part of the problem was the B-29s weren't easy to fly. They had the
highest wing loading of any WWII airplane: 81.1 pounds per square foot
by the time the fully loaded Superforts took off for Japan. The B-29 was
so heavy that even taxiing was a task. Turns needed to be made
cautiously, to avoid rolling the tires right off the wheels, and the
B-29’s brakes were so weak they’d overheat if an anxious pilot taxied
even a bit too fast. Maximum ground-running time was 20 minutes, after
which the engines were too hot for takeoff.

It was impossible to fly true formations in B-29s at altitude.
Superforts flew in “streams” or loose groups. Why? Climbing to altitude
was agonizing, painfully slow, with one eye always on the cylinder-head
temperatures, and once a B-29 got established in long-range cruise,
typically at an indicated airspeed of 210 mph, flying became a delicate
dance of slowly closing the cowl flaps to avoid too much drag yet not
letting the engine heads get too hot. If an airplane began to fall back
from its buddies, a little more power was needed. But then the head
temps would rise. Open the cowl flaps some to compensate. But then the
speed would drop even more from the added drag. Close the cowl flaps a
little, but then more heat.That’s why. Flying the B-29 in any kind of
formation was a complicated dance.

The B-29 had one of the shortest combat careers of any US warplane—just
14 months—and suffered losses of one a day, every day, during that
career. Its simply criminal deficiencies remained so little understood
by the US public only because of creative spinning by Boeing and Army
Air Forces publicists and the existence of a captive press corps while
hostilities raged. Even the much-admired Ernie Pyle wrote a newspaper
piece: “Pilots Adore Cramped B-29,” and in it he gushed, “I’ve never
heard pilots so unanimous in their praise of an aeroplane.”

Was she beautiful? Completely. Did she modernize the Air Force?
Probably. Did she win the war in the Pacific? I knew a few Marines, Navy
and Army vets that might dispute that. But Boeing went on to
ever-increasing greatness, while the R-3350 engine ended up being the
death of Curtiss-Wright. Though the ultra-complex radial soldiered on
until the fast-approaching end of the piston-engine era, neither Curtiss
nor Wright were invited to join the U.S. Air Force and Navy in the new
jet age, and time just passed them by.

Thanks for the time!

9K viewsView 376 upvotesView 1 share
22 comments from
Lionel Stoodley
and more

"a425couple" wrote in message news:qJ%sK.7412$El2.4775@fx45.iad...

The grim jest among the B-29 crews was that they were being killed more
by Curtiss-Wright, the makers of the B-29’s big R3350 radial engines,
the highest-displacement production engine in the world at the time,
than by the Japanese.

----------------------

Wright Aeronautical (later Curtiss-Wright) started off with an excellent
design team which it lost due to the short-sightedness of its board of
directors.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Rentschler

https://www.ctexplored.org/the-skys-the-limit/

The Wright R-2600 which preceded the R-3350 was also troublesome.

https://www.enginehistory.org/Piston/Wright/R-2600/R-2600CaseHx.shtml

"When the contract was placed, the R-2600 was not fully developed and
occasioned much trouble before becoming an outstanding engine. There were,
as late as October 1943, accessory drive gear failures, cylinder failures
(caused by corroded or rusting barrels), supercharger clutch failures, and
excessive oil consumption."

The Commemorative Air Force's B-29 "Fifi" has custom hybrid R-3350s
assembled from the best late-production components from various versions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFI_(aircraft)

"Over the next three plus years, the original Wright R-3350-57AM engines
were exchanged for new engines built using parts from later model engines
that powered the Douglas A-1 Skyraider and Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar
during the Vietnam War, a custom built combination of the Wright R-3350-95W
and Wright R-3350-26WD engines."

They told me it's very reliable, but they don't push it or fly over 10,000'.
The formerly pressurized crew compartment now leaks rain.

On Thursday, June 23, 2022 at 11:33:45 AM UTC-4, a425couple wrote:
> Pete Feigal
> Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years.Mon
>
> How many B-29 bombers were shot down in WW2?
>
> Four hundred and fourteen (414) B-29s were lost bombing Japan—147 of
> them to flak and Japanese fighters, 267 to engine fires, mechanical
> failures, takeoff crashes and other “operational losses.”

"The B-29 was so heavy" when it was overloaded with fuel and bombs and flown to 30,000 feet.

They did well with more modest loads and especially when not flown over 8,000 feet.

On Thursday, June 23, 2022 at 6:41:34 PM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:
> The Commemorative Air Force's B-29 "Fifi" has custom hybrid R-3350s
> assembled from the best late-production components from various versions.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFI_(aircraft)
>
> "Over the next three plus years, the original Wright R-3350-57AM engines
> were exchanged for new engines built using parts from later model engines
> that powered the Douglas A-1 Skyraider and Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar
> during the Vietnam War, a custom built combination of the Wright R-3350-95W
> and Wright R-3350-26WD engines."
>
> They told me it's very reliable, but they don't push it or fly over 10,000'.
> The formerly pressurized crew compartment now leaks rain.

I saw Fifi a few years ago at an airshow held at Andrews Air Force base. Fifi still leaks oil as I got dripped on walking under a nacelle. One of the crew told me it was normal yet much improved over the WWII versions.

I wonder if the Russian (and Chinese) copies also had high loss rates?

Dean

On 6/23/2022 8:33 AM, a425couple wrote:
> Pete Feigal
> Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years.Mon
>
> How many B-29 bombers were shot down in WW2?
>
> Four hundred and fourteen (414) B-29s were lost bombing Japan—147 of
> them to flak and Japanese fighters, 267 to engine fires, mechanical
> failures, takeoff crashes and other “operational losses.”
>
> One of the main keys to the design’s success
>
I found this in my email's inbox from our friend
Geoffrey Sinclair.

> But do the math and you’ll see that for every B-29 lost to the enemy,
almost two were lost to accidents and crashes.

While there were real problems with the B-29 a factor to consider is the
strength of the opposition, natural and human, and also the ranges
involved. The following is heavy bombers in the given theatres versus
the B-29 in the 20th Air Force. %other is the percentage of losses on
combat missions to "other" causes, the %sortie is the percentage of
airborne sorties that had an "other" loss.

% other \ % sortie \ Theatre
11.84 \ 0.20 \ ETO
21.91 \ 0.32 \ MTO
34.02 \ 0.23 \ Pacific
35.87 \ 0.29 \ Far East AF
49.29 \ 0.64 \ CBI
30.30 \ 0.39 \ Alaska
64.49 \ 0.85 \ 20th AF

The B-29 definitely had problems.

Accidents in USA.

B-29 \ B-17 \ B-24 \ 1945, all year
203 \ 309 \ 383 \ All Accidents - number
35 \ 25 \ 29 \ All Accidents - rate
36 \ 34 \ 76 \ Fatal Accidents
278 \ 197 \ 386 \ Fatalities
83 \ 57 \ 112 \ Aircraft wrecked

So the still relatively new B-29 was more likely to have an accident.

As the USAAF noted about a third of its total aircraft losses were in
the US.

> The B-29’s R-3350s were lucky to survive for an average of 265 hours
before being literally thrown away. A few were overhauled, but most were
just junked, since Wright was cranking out plenty of replacements. Small
mountains of trashed R-3350 radials were standard features of B-29 bases
in the PTO.

Engine lifetime went up over 1944/45. As for thrown away, maybe
there was a problem with higher level maintenance and salvage
resources? The USAAF was air freighting engines back to the US.

Expected life prior to first overhaul, early operations from India, 163
hours, -23 engines. Using modified -23 engines this had risen to
280 hours by February/March 1945 for aircraft operating from India
and 304 hours from the Marianas.

The figures for B-29s used in training were 221 hours and 310 hours
versus the 163 and 280 hours figures above.

Operating from India a comparison between the modified and
unmodified -23 engines showed 80% of the unmodified and 95.3%
of the modified engines survived to over 100 hours, 33.9 of the
unmodified and 81.5% of the modified engines survived to over 200
hours, 0.2% of the unmodified and 47.3% of the modified engines
survived to over 300 hours.

In the Marianas, as of 20 November 1944 the average hours on each
-23 engine removed was 91, by 20 January 1945 it was 151, as of 30
April it was 234. These figures include removals for engine model
changes, modifications, accidents and battle damage. They are also
under estimates of the normal engine lifetime because so many of
the engines were new. The figures include new and overhauled
engines, so it is either the number of hours since the engine was
built for new engines or since overhaul for the overhauled engines.

Engine hours before removal as of 31 May was 259 hours, and 31
July 272 hours. These figures are for engines removed because of
mechanical problems only.

Even in July the steady number of new B-29s arriving drove down
the average engine hours per removed engine.

A study as of 31 July 1945 noted in the Marianas the -23 engines
96.8% of new and 92.5% of overhauled logged more than 100 hours
before replacement, 87.5% and 75.7% respectively logged over 200
hours, 62.7 and 43.4 logged over 300 hours, 19% and 8% logged
over 400 hours, none logged over 500 hours.

As noted above the training schools in the US went through
R-3350 engines quicker than the combat units in the Marianas,
for example 57.9% and 36.4% logged over 300 hours, but once
this mark was passed the engines in the US held up more, so
24.6% and 10.4% logged over 400 hours, and 1.2% and 0.2%
managed over 500 hours.

The fuel injected -57 engine had a higher time between overhauls,
so in the above study 31.2% used in training logged over 400
hours, and 4.9% logged over 500 hours.

> Maximum ground-running time was 20 minutes, after which the engines
were too hot for takeoff.

Was this in the tropics or in the US in winter or both?

> It was impossible to fly true formations in B-29s at altitude.
Superforts flew in “streams” or loose groups. Why? Climbing to altitude
was agonizing, painfully slow, with one eye always on the cylinder-head
temperatures, and once a B-29 got established in long-range cruise,
typically at an indicated airspeed of 210 mph, flying became a delicate
dance of slowly closing the cowl flaps to avoid too much drag yet not
letting the engine heads get too hot. If an airplane began to fall back
from its buddies, a little more power was needed. But then the head
temps would rise. Open the cowl flaps some to compensate. But then the
speed would drop even more from the added drag. Close the cowl flaps a
little, but then more heat.That’s why. Flying the B-29 in any kind of
formation was a complicated dance.

Talking to the B-17 and B-24 pilots, flying over Europe indicated how
much effort was involved in close formation flying. The operations
against Japan rarely required close formations, which were quite
fuel demanding.

The big problem was taking off in tropical heat conditions, the best
way was shown to simply fly at low level after take off to allow the
engine temperatures to come down, then a slow climb, given it was
hours to target. A weight reduction program also helped.

> The B-29 had one of the shortest combat careers of any US
warplane—just 14 months—and suffered losses of one a day, every day,
during that career.

Korea?

The USAAF lost a daily average of 6.75 heavy bombers during WWII,
on operations.

In terms of combat careers, the late WWI types, the late 1930's types,
the late WWII types, like the Bearcat and Tigercat all come to mind,
even the P-61. F-84? You need combat to have a combat career.

> Though the ultra-complex radial soldiered on until the
fast-approaching end of the piston-engine era, neither Curtiss nor
Wright were invited to join the U.S. Air Force and Navy in the new jet
age, and time just passed them by.

Apart from the licensed built Sapphires for the B-57. The use of the
R-3350 in the C-119, Skyraider, Constellation and Neptune

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

On 6/23/2022 8:33 AM, a425couple wrote:
> Pete Feigal
> Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years.Mon
>
> How many B-29 bombers were shot down in WW2?
>
> Four hundred and fourteen (414) B-29s were lost bombing Japan—147 of
> them to flak and Japanese fighters, 267 to engine fires, mechanical
> failures, takeoff crashes and other “operational losses.”
>
Another Quora,
really well worth going to the source, in able to see the
pictures and drawings.

Pete Feigal
Former Pro Military Artist for 25 Years.Tue

Was the B-29 a good plane?

I heard something once from “Corky” Meyer, Grumman’s top test pilot
during WWII and Korea who “brought in” the Hellcat, Bearcat, Tigercat
and Panther jet, who knew and spoke with some other test pilots that
while the B-29 was in its testing phase, her main test pilot, an Air
Force flyer famous for his skill, balls of steel and “Never say die”
attitude…demanded something almost unheard of from a test pilot…he asked
to be allowed to quit the project…to save his life.

Just guess what happened to the very next B-29 test pilot, Eddie Allen
and his entire crew, a few weeks later?

That’s how bad it was.

“There were scores of defects – either readily apparent – or worse-
appearing when an aircraft was actually at work and at
altitude”.-General Curtis Le May:

“Because of disappointing results garnered from high-altitude B-29
bombing using high-explosive ordnance, LeMay decided to switch to
low-altitude incendiary missions…”

It was the most advanced aircraft of WWII, and America is brainwashed
into believing that “advanced technology” can fix any problem, but that
doesn't make it “good,” or make it “work,” and if all that “advancement”
was hurried ands pushed before it was ready, leaving it dangerous and
unreliable, all the “advancement” just makes it dangerous, cranky and
complex, crammed so full of so many advanced systems, all at the cutting
edge of technology, that very few things in it worked perfectly. That’s
called “Technological immaturity.”

Its a lot of myth, folks, just like the Norden Bombsight. All folks read
today about the B-29 is positive things: “Greatest Plane that Ever
Flew!”…because as far back as early 1943, the Air Force knew the B-29
was going to be a lemon and started an official PR campaign to push and
promote this aircraft, as it was THE most expensive project of the
entire war, costing $1 Billion MORE than the Manhattan Project, as the
greatest thing since Sliced Bread.

The B-29, while a revolutionary aircraft that modernized the Air Force,
was not very good as originally deployed, and many of her crews
considered her a death trap, but the Air Force had a huge PR campaign of
both Silence and Pretty Lies to fool both the American public…and the
Soviets, that it was ready to fly to Alpha Centari.

As a matter of fact the second XB-29 (Serial Number 41-0003) that first
flew on December 30, 1942. Shortly after noon on February 18, 1943,
crashed, killing test pilot Eddie Allen and his crew. They were flight
testing the second XB-29 when an engine fire developed, an almost daily
event on a B -29. The magnesium engine parts (yes) caught fire and the
white-hot magnesium burned right through the port wing spar, and
collapsed the entire wing, sending the huge bomber crashing into the
Frye Meat Packing Plant three miles from Boeing Field. All eleven men
aboard the plane and 18 in the plant were killed instantly. It got worse
from there…

The Frye packing plant on fire, 18 February 1943.

2,970 aircraft were built of all types, and was incredible, and amongst
its “advanced” features was the first ever fully pressurized nose and
cockpit in a bomber; an aft area for the crew was also pressurized.
Since the bomb bays were not pressurized, a pressurized tunnel was
devised to connect the fore and aft crew areas. A retractable tail
bumper was provided for tail protection during nose-high takeoffs and
landings.

It had a very high-lift, low-drag wing that Boeing developed—similar to
the Consolidated B-24 Liberator’s unique “Davis wing”—with sophisticated
Fowler flaps, (at the time a high-tech innovation,) to make the wing
work at takeoff and landing speeds.

It could cruise at 50mph faster than a B-17, carrying 2.5 Xs the bombs,
up to 20,000 lbs internally, and potentially could fly at 10,000 feet
higher…not factoring that pesky 140 mph winds in the Gulf Stream.

It had a centrally controlled, computer-corrected, remotely operated gun
turret, incredible for the 1940’s, their “Star Wars,” that could control
Ballistics, Lead and Parallax Error.

GE, Sperry, Westinghouse and Bendix all worked *separately* to make this
amazing gunsight but major problems with the periscope sighting and the
hydraulic turrets plagued the system and in April of ‘42, the United
States Army Air Forces, as it was now known, decided that the Sperry
system would not be used on the B-29. It was incredibly over-elaborate
and heavily maintenance-reliant, a poor system for day-to-day combat,
that demands simplicity our at least well-thought out, well-de eloped
systems, not intricate machines whipped up out of some designer’s butt
and the fact that the gunsight was developed separately in four
different companies workshops and then cobbled together into one machine
didn't give crews much confidence.

Very cool, very expensive, very intricate and very accurate…when it
worked. Often it didn’t. As it turned out the Air Force started simply
removing the four-gun top turret, officially “for extra speed and fuel
savings.” Very likely…and because it never worked. A big part of the
problem was the maintenance crews…they had never even heard of the
advanced computers ’n gyros ’n stuff in this gun system let alone seen
them, and even though trained to fix them, like every other aspect of
the B-29, it was rushed.

These young 19 year old, gum-chewin’, ball cap wearin’ mechanics had
trouble synchronizing the guns, which they constantly needed. Just
training the flight crews to fly this monster was a huge undertaking and
headache, and in that aspect alone the B-29 fell way behind in schedule
for combat readiness.

The problem was the system simply didn’t work. It often failed to keep
Japanese fighters at bay and was absolutely plagued with mechanical and
technical glitches, problems the often poorly trained crew members could
fix-it was only THE most complicated gun on the planet.

The four frontal guns – doubled from 2 to 4 to prevent frontal attacks
-had very poor ballistics as a compromise for streamlining, leaving a
4-gun turret where it was ballistically impossible to hit a target with
more than two guns…with a large blind spot to head on attack.

The 200lb CFC computers suffered from terrible build quality and rarely
ever worked as advertised – a common glitch was for the turret to slew
20 degrees and then wildly spray out its entire ammunition,1,000 rds, in
that direction. This fault – caused by bad wiring design and
occasionally badd wiring harnesses, – was only tracked down and fixed in
Jan 1945, when the B-29 had been in action for seven months.

A late-but-cool B-29 gun upgrade enabled the gunners to set the turrets
to track motion – cool, huh? In theory..until in raids over Japan when
they tried it out, 17 bombers had their bomb-bays riddled with .50
caliber bullets during the bomb run – the motion of opening their bomb
doors had triggered other bombers in their formation’s automatic turret
fire.

The B-29’s gun turrets, amazing as their were over the other bomber’s
plain old .50s were also impossible to access in flight – so any
malfunction set off by even slight jars to jam the guns couldn’t be
repaired in the air. The impressive tail turret – fitted with an
additional impressive with 20mm cannon – was hampered by bad ballistic
design so the two .50 machine guns and the 20mm cannon could NOT hit the
same target, and the incredible radar guiding the tail 20mm cannon was
also incredibly intricate…and never really functioned well in combat.
(Eventually, like the four gun top turret, the tail cannon & radar were
completely removed, and only the twin .50 cals, like other US bombers,
was remained.)

Ultimately almost the entire complex defensive system was so
unsatisfactory that it was removed from all aircraft in February 1945
(bar the tail turret), and the B-29B was built without any turrets at
all, as by then the USAAF had realized defensive guns on a bomber – even
super advanced defensive guns – actually had to work and that they were
less useful than flying high and fast and at night.

And more B-29s were lost to mechanical failure than any other cause; in
its first 6 months, regularly 10% of B-29s that took off would be lost –
per mission – to mechanical defects alone.

As stated, four hundred and fourteen (414) B-29s were lost bombing
Japan—147 of them to flak and Japanese fighters, 267 to engine fires,
mechanical failures, takeoff crashes and other “operational losses.”

But do the math and you’ll see that for every B-29 lost to the enemy,
almost two were lost to accidents and crashes.