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Why Putin Attacked Ukraine When He Did
And why he has the blind spots that he does.
by GABRIEL SCHOENFELD MAY 15, 2023 5:30 AM
Why Putin Attacked Ukraine When He Did
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with members of the Legislative
Council of the Federal Assembly ahead of Russia's Parliamentary Day in
Saint Petersburg on April 28, 2023. (Photo by Alexey DANICHEV / SPUTNIK
/ AFP) (Photo by ALEXEY DANICHEV/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)
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Cover for Overreach
BOOK REVIEW
Overreach
The Inside Story of Putin and Russia’s War Against Ukraine
by Owen Matthews
Mudlark (HarperCollins), 414 pp.
AMAZON BOOKSHOP BARNES & NOBLE
As I write, some evidence suggests that the first ripples of the
long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive are finally in motion. For
months, Russian forces have been pounding away at Ukrainian positions in
the small city of Bakhmut, driving the defenders into a shrinking
pocket. But now, the tables appear to be turning. Ukrainian troops are
attacking Russian positions in Bakhmut on their flanks, driving them
back. Retreating Russian soldiers, in an army of ill-fed and
ill-equipped conscripts and convicts, are being executed by their own
officers. Seizing Bakhmut has been a key Russian goal. It is supposedly
also a Russian strong point and as of today Russia still controls 90
percent of the city. But if it begins to crumble, morale, already at a
low point in Russia’s battered army, will further crumble with it.

How did Russia get into this fix? Why did Russian strongman Vladimir
Putin launch a war that he cannot win and that has wrecked Russia’s
military, costing it tens of thousands of lives and the destruction of
much of its armored force? The story is told in Overreach, an engaging
mixture of analysis and close-up reportage by the British
journalist-historian Owen Matthews. In addition to a long career as a
Moscow correspondent for Newsweek, Matthews has an intimate personal
connection to Russia: His mother was born in 1934 in Kharkiv into a
family that for two centuries served both the tsars and the Soviet
Communists, and suffered dearly for their pains.

Matthews begins his analysis with a long view, recounting Ukraine’s
history from its earliest days in the late ninth century as Kyivan Rus
through to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and slices of eastern Ukraine in
2014. This is a necessary exercise given that the Russian strongman
Vladimir Putin has himself delved into this ancient past to justify his
military misadventure.

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In 2021, Putin published a 7,000-word historical essay that was to
serve, as Matthew reports, as the “ideological blueprint for war.” Putin
wrote therein of the “great common misfortune and tragedy” that a “wall”
had been erected between Russian and Ukraine, dividing “what is
essentially the same historical and spiritual place.” Putin placed
particular emphasis on the plight of ethnic Russians in Ukraine who, in
his telling, were “being forced not only to deny their roots . . . but
also to believe that Russia is their enemy.” Compulsory Ukrainian
assimilation and “the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state,
aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences,” wrote
Putin, “to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us.”

Comparable to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us? This is
nothing if not paranoia, which is the flip side of extreme Russian
nationalism. Both have a long and ugly history and Matthews explores
their contemporary manifestations. He places particular emphasis on the
role of key ideologues in shaping Russian public opinion while feeding
Putin’s black view of Ukraine and the West.

Prominent among these ideologues is Aleksandr Dugin, the prophet of
Russian nationalism. “We conservatives,” said Dugin a decade ago, “want
a strong, solid state, want order and healthy family, positive values,
the reinforcing of the importance of religion and the Church in
society.” This formulation bears a striking resemblance to some strains
of American conservatism—especially the “national conservatism”
propounded by Yoram Hazony—although Dugin, now being celebrated in some
quarters of American conservatism as a thinker from whom much can be
learned, goes much further. In 1988 he founded the organization Pamyat
(Memory), which in Matthews’s summary “posited that the holy, divinely
ordained Russian Empire had been hijacked, undermined and ultimately
destroyed by godless Bolshevik Jews.” For Russia, Dugin wrote in 1997
that he favors a “genuine, true, radically revolutionary and consistent,
fascist fascism.”

Such ideas have been in circulation in Russia since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, accompanied by exaggerated fears about NATO expansion
eastward, the rise of supposed “Nazis” to power in Ukraine, the plight
of millions of ethnic Russians subject to alleged Ukrainian persecution,
and regrets about the collapse of the Soviet empire, famously
characterized by Putin in 2005 as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the century.” Indeed, as Matthews points out, “every contributing
factor behind the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 had been
in place for years, even decades.” The interesting question which thus
arises is “not why Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
2022, but why he did not do it sooner?”

Matthews offers several answers: For one thing, by the beginning of this
decade, the Russian efforts to meddle in Ukrainian affairs and constrain
its political drift westward had ended in failure. Matthews highlights
as a decisive turning point Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensksy’s
decision to have Ukraine take part in NATO military exercises in March
2021. By the close of that year “the jeopardy from Western influence in
Ukraine,” as seen from the Kremlin, “had become too threatening to ignore.”

At the same point in time, Russia’s economic position seemed
particularly favorable. Not only did Europe depend heavily on Russian
energy imports, but the country had accumulated a strategic reserve of
$650 billion. The former, it was believed, would serve as a damper on
Western support for Ukraine, while the latter was sufficient to prevail
in the teeth of even draconian sanctions.

Most important of all, argues Matthews, was the opening of a window, or
several windows: “A confluence of Western weakness in the aftermath of
the humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan, the retirement of Angela
Merkel as Europe’s senior statesperson, the electoral weakness of
Zelensky and a revamped Russian army seemed to present a once-in-a
lifetime opportunity.”

But it was all a mirage. Putin’s “fundamental error was to imagine that
Russian-speaking Ukrainians naturally considered themselves ethnically
and politically Russian.” This proved false and “millions of
Russian-speaking Ukrainians fled from Moscow’s forces, and tens of
thousands volunteered to fight against their would be ‘liberators.’”

Misled about the true state of affairs in Ukraine, Putin also badly
underestimated the Ukrainian military. By 2022, Ukrainian officers and
soldiers had already for some time been training in staff colleges in
the United States and other NATO countries and taking part in NATO
exercises. In the more than half-decade of fighting since the Russian
incursions of 2014, the Ukrainian military has been in the midst of a
transformation from a top-down Soviet style force into a modern Western
army where daring and initiative count.

Putin also badly underestimated the reaction of the West. In 2022, the
United States alone provided $55 billion in military aid to Ukraine, an
amount almost equivalent to Russia’s entire annual military budget.
Highly lethal arms, like anti-tank Javelin missiles, had a decisive
effect on repelling Russia’s initial invasion. Longer range systems,
most notably, the HIMARS rocket system, have been wearing down Russia’s
capacity to concentrate forces and mobilize for offensive action.
European contributions to Ukraine’s military prowess have also been
substantial.

Perhaps most egregiously, Putin overestimated the Russian military into
which so much money had been poured over the previous decade. Much of it
had been looted by its intended beneficiaries. Matthews draws on an
account offered by a professional soldier, Pavel Filatyev. On joining
the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment, he found

no beds in his barracks, and often no power or water. A pack of wild
dogs roamed through the buildings. Nor was there enough food, just stale
bread and “soup” that was raw potatoes in water. On paper his unit had
500 soldiers, but it was really just 300. He had to buy his own winter
uniform after being given summer clothes and boots in the wrong size.
His rifle was rusty and jammed after a few shots, and he was deployed to
Ukraine without a flak jacket, which he assumed had been stolen and sold
off by his officers.

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