This is one of the judge's recent rulings, as always formatted for text to
speech reading. This time removed case numbers (or whatever) that are
unnecessary for non-legal purposes.

Legal Standards.

�Motions in limine are �designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial
and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.�� Graves v. District of
Columbia, (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., (3d
Cir. 1990)). They are not a vehicle to resolve factual disputes or weigh the
sufficiency of the evidence. Id. �Rather, parties should target their
arguments to demonstrating why certain items or categories of evidence
should (or should not) be introduced at trial, and direct the trial judge to
specific evidence in the record that would favor or disfavor the
introduction of those particular items or categories of evidence.� Id. at 11
(citing United States ex rel. El�Amin v. George Washington Univ. (D.D.C.
2008)). Trial judges retain broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings,
including determining the probative value or prejudicial effect of evidence.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, (2008). Evidence is only admissible
if it is relevant�meaning it �has any tendency to make a fact [of
consequence] more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,�
Fed. R. Evid. 401�and its probative value is not �substantially outweighed
by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence,� Fed. R. Evid. 403.

II.
Analysis.

A.
Evidence Regarding the Gathering of the Data The first motion presented
involves the data that Mr. Sussmann provided to the FBI. The data was
supplied to Mr. Sussmann by technology executive Rodney Joffe, and was
claimed to support the existence of an internet communications channel
between Donald Trump and Russia�s Alfa Bank. The government has notified the
defense under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that it intends to seek
admission of evidence concerning how that data was gathered. Gov�t Suppl.
Notice at 2 (Mar. 23, 2022). This evidence includes, according to the
government, facts suggesting that the �data was obtained in a manner that
may be considered objectionable.� Id. By that, the government presumably is
referring to an allegation that Mr. Joffe accessed some of the data in
breach of certain cybersecurity-related contracts he or his companies had
with the U.S. government. Indeed, the government has indicated to Mr.
Joffe�s counsel that his conduct with respect to the data remains subject to
criminal investigation by a grand jury. More on that later. The government
contends that evidence about the origins and gathering of the data
constitutes direct proof of the crime charged against Mr. Sussmann�a sole
count of lying to the FBI about whether he was providing the data and
related �white papers� on behalf of any client�because it provides
�important factual context for the defendant�s conduct� and tends to show
the existence of attorney-client relationships between the defendant and
both Mr. Joffe and Hillary Clinton�s 2016 presidential campaign. Id. The
government further argues that, if the Court deems the data-gathering
evidence not to be intrinsic to the charged offense, it is still admissible
under Rule 404(b) as �other act� evidence going the defendant�s motive,
intent, preparation, plan, and absence of mistake or accident. The defense
moves to exclude this evidence, at least to the extent that Mr. Sussmann was
uninvolved in or unaware of the data collection effort. This dispute is
framed by the parties� competing theories of how the data came to be. In
brief, the government contends that the Alfa Bank data was gathered as part
of a concerted effort to collect and disseminate derogatory opposition
research about Donald Trump. Participants in this purported joint
undertaking, according to the government, include the Clinton Campaign; the
Campaign�s General Counsel and then-partner in the Perkins Coie law firm,
Marc Elias; an investigative firm retained by Mr. Elias, Fusion GPS; the
defendant; Mr. Joffe; and several computer researchers working at Mr.
Joffe�s direction. The government has proffered the existence of at least
some circumstantial evidence connecting Mr. Sussmann to certain aspects of
the data gathering effort. See Gov�t Opp�n to Def.�s Mots. in Lim. at 17�18,
ECF No. 70 (promising that testimony will establish that Mr. Sussmann was
aware of the �corporate sources� of the data and assured Researcher-2 that
the data had been lawfully collected); Indictment �� 20, 23 (alleging that
beginning in mid-August, Mr. Sussmann, Mr. Joffe, and Mr. Elias met on two
different occasions and, shortly thereafter, Mr. Joffe emailed the
researchers about the data); id. � 24 (describing billing entries indicating
that Mr. Sussmann helped draft one of the white papers that was provided to
the FBI). The government contends that Mr. Sussmann�s desire to conceal this
joint venture�particularly the Clinton Campaign�s involvement�supplied a
motive for him to misrepresent to Mr. Baker that he was not providing the
data to the FBI on behalf of any client, when he was actually representing
both Mr. Joffe and the Campaign. The defense paints a different picture. As
the Court gleans from various of the defense�s pleadings and arguments, its
case will be that Mr. Joffe obtained and analyzed the relevant data
independently of Mr. Sussmann and the Clinton Campaign; that Mr. Joffe
enlisted the defendant, with whom he a preexisting attorney-client
relationship, for legal advice on how to handle and disseminate the data to
a wider audience; that Mr. Sussmann reasonably believed, based on the
understanding of the data that he gained from Mr. Joffe, that it tended to
support the existence of a communications link between Alfa Bank and Mr.
Trump; that Mr. Sussmann and Mr. Joffe shared the view that bringing the
potential communications channel to the FBI�s attention was important to
protect national security, regardless of any political implications; and
that Mr. Sussmann sought an audience with Mr. Baker for that purpose. The
defense has acknowledged that Mr. Sussmann at least received the data in
connection with his legal representation of Mr. Joffe, see Mot. Hr�g Tr. at
38:6�18, but (as the Court understands) denies that he had an attorney-
client relationship with the Clinton Campaign that covered activities
related to the Alfa Bank data. The jury is entitled to hear both these
narratives. The parties may therefore bring out otherwise admissible trial
evidence supporting their competing theories regarding the gathering and use
of the data. Permissible areas of inquiry include how the data came into
being and who was involved in its collection and analysis, as well as how
Mr. Sussmann came to possess the data, what he did with it, and why. The
basis for admission of the evidence depends on its purpose. To the extent
the evidence shows that Mr. Sussmann�s involvement in the data gathering was
part of legal work for either Mr. Joffe or the Clinton Campaign, it is
�intrinsic� to the charged offense. The D.C. Circuit defines intrinsic
evidence as �that [which] is part of the charged offense,� and �uncharged
acts performed contemporaneously with the charged crime . . . if they
facilitate the commission of the charged crime.� United States v. Bowie,
(D.C. Cir. 2000). Evidence of Mr. Sussmann�s client work is �part of the
charged offense� because in order to prove the alleged lie to the FBI, the
government necessarily must prove that Mr. Sussmann was in fact
representing a client. Otherwise, this evidence may be offered for a proper
404(b) purpose, the most applicable of which is Mr. Sussmann�s purported
motive for concealing the political nature of the Alfa Bank data effort. The
Court will impose certain limitations on the use of this evidence, however.
As the Court previously ruled, unless the defense opens the door for
admission by vouching for the data, the government will not be permitted to
put on extensive evidence about its accuracy. See Data Order at 3�4. The
Court will also provisionally limit the presentation of evidence that the
collection of the data by Mr. Joffe or others was somehow �objectionable.�
The Special Counsel has not proffered sufficient evidence showing that Mr.
Sussmann had concerns that the data was obtained inappropriately, or that he
had any independent knowledge about the data collection beyond whatever he
may have learned from Mr. Joffe through privileged communications. Evidence
of improper data collection by Mr. Joffe or others done without Mr.
Sussmann�s knowledge is, at best, only marginally probative of his supposed
motive to lie to the FBI. United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56, 64
(D.D.C. 1992); United States v. Libby, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15�16 (D.D.C.
2006) (evidence of �what others were told . . . will be excluded because it
is simply irrelevant to the defendant�s state of mind�). Moreover, whether
Mr. Joffe, who is not on trial, violated the terms of any of his contracts
with the government�let alone committed a crime�is the type of collateral
issue that risks confusing the jury and distracting from the pertinent
issues in the case. See United States v. Fonseca, (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(affirming exclusion of evidence that would have led to a ��mini-trial� on a
collateral matter�); Wade v. Mantello, (2d Cir. 2003) (holding testimony
supporting theory of third- party culpability properly excluded because
�marginal relevance was outweighed by dangers of juror prejudice and
confusion�).