On Fri, 18 Aug 2023 19:06:27 -0500, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
><nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
>What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>entry?

p.s.
see https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortor.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor PreviousTopNext
>Tor is a real-time onion-routing system, which thereby allows anonymous
>Internet communication without any delay. That makes it useful to hide
>your identity especially while surfing the web or using other services,
>that aren't available by mail. But the lack of latency on the other
>hand substantially increases the chances for an adversary. So for
>anonymous mailing setting up a free email account through Tor is only
>the second best solution.
>Nevertheless OmniMix enables you to benefit from Tor with various kinds
>of communication, which require immediate response, e.g. the retrieval
>of remailer statistics or a stealthy Mixmaster packet delivery to entry
>remailers. The program is preconfigured to run its own Tor instance and
>use that for every Internet connection it establishes. You have to read
>the 'Configuration' chapter only when problems arise or in case you're
>interested in what's going on 'under the hood'.
>But there are further services provided by OmniMix based on Tor, which
>you can read about in the 'TorPlus' chapter.
>Configuration
https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortorconfig.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor * Configuration PreviousTopNext
>In order to hide your communication with the Mixmaster network, OmniMix
>has to bypass your ISP's mail server and connect directly to the entry
>remailer via the Tor network. Provided that Tor is installed on your
>system and running, activate the routing through Tor for the specific
>task by specifying the SOCKS protocol, which OmniMix has to use for the
>communication with Tor.
>E.g. to access the 'Anon Mail Host' by selecting SOCKS version 4, you
>have to enter the IP address of the remailer into the 'Host' field of
>the 'Anon Mail S(MTP)' tab, version 4a requires the host name, whereas
>with version 5 you have the choice. To access a hidden service, enter
>its name (ending with '.onion') as the remailer's host name. Since in
>this case Tor has to resolve a name, the protocol alternatives are only
>SOCKS version 4a and 5.
>Like Vidalia, the controller software that comes with Tor, OmniMix is
>capable of interacting with Tor in many ways, launching, remote
>controlling and shutting down the Tor instance it uses. That's what the
>options under the 'Tor' tab are designated for.
>There's always a risk that the Tor connections of different
>simultaneous tasks use the same routing up to the exit node, which may
>allow an adversary sitting there to figure out relations. Therefore,
>even if you already use Tor with your webbrowser, it's advisable to
>separate communication by running another instance for exclusive access
>by OmniMix, which is easy to achieve:
>At the 'Run' tab set the paths to Tor ('tor.exe') and its configuration
>file ('torrc'). With a 'Start' button click OmniMix launches that Tor
>executable and, with 'Autoconnect' at the 'Control' tab activated,
>establishes a connection with its control port. After clicking
>'Shutdown' OmniMix orders Tor to shut down, then closes the control
>port connection. To start and stop Tor automatically in conjunction
>with OmniMix itself activate 'Autostart' and 'Autoclose'.
>At least for your first experiments it can be wise to check the 'Tor
>Window' box, which opens a command window when starting Tor, showing
>the logged data and allowing to terminate the program by closing this
>window instead of having to end the 'tor.exe' process from within the
>Windows Task Manager. Finally when Tor runs and connects correctly
>uncheck the box to get rid of that window.
>With 'Check DNS' it's possible to recognize unsecure domain name
>resolutions, as it makes Tor generate a notice-level event for each
>connection to the SOCKS port, indicating whether the request uses a
>domain name or an IP address. Thereby it allows to detect the
>revelation of communication targets via unsecured DNS requests. If
>Tor gets an IP address it may have been resolved with a direct DNS
>server access bypassing the Tor gateway, which means that your target
>address has become public.
>A message like the following appearing in the Tor log therefore
>indicates, that everything is all right:
>17:01:25.062 650 NOTICE Your application (using socks5 to port 25)
>instructed Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if necessary.
>This is good.
>This option only takes effect with Tor instances newly launched by
>OmniMix.
>When Tor is started and a control port connection established the
>color of both Tor activity scales in the indicator field change from
>grey to yellow. If that doesn't happen first check whether a new
>'tor.exe' entry shows up in the Processes list of the Windows Task
>Manager. Furthermore look whether the paths to Tor and its
>configuration file are set correctly and whether SOCKS and control
>port through which Tor tries to communicate are available and not
>already occupied by another application.
>Setting 'Host', the address of the Tor instance, and 'Port', its
>SOCKS port, at the 'Config' tab is mandatory to allow OmniMix to
>route external connections with servers on the Internet through
>Tor's anonymizing SOCKS proxy service. The Tor SOCKS port number of
>the OmniMix system defaults to 9054, as 9050 and 9150 are usually
>occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor Browser. Shut
>down Tor before changing the port number.
>Using the 'Host' location from the 'Config' tab, the 'Port'
>parameter at the 'Control' tab is required to connect with Tor's
>control port in order to send commands and retrieve status data,
>which then are displayed at the 'Tor' list. The Tor control port
>number of the OmniMix system defaults to 9055, as 9051 and 9151 are
>usually occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor
>Browser. Shut down Tor before changing the port number.
>To protect Tor's control port from unauthorized access there are
>two authentication methods, both supported by OmniMix. Switching
>between them requires editing the 'torrc' configuration file
>manually.
>If you intend to control Tor from different computers, 'Password'
>authentication would be the right choice. At the 'ConTor' tab
>select 'Password' authentication and enter your password, e.g.
>'my_password'. Be aware, that leading and trailing spaces are
>relevant! Then at the command prompt within the Tor directory
>calculate the hash value for the chosen password with the command
>g:\Programs\OmniMix\tor>tor --hash-password my_password
>Oct 06 22:36:45.707 [notice] Tor v0.1.1.23. This is experimental
>software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity.
>16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
>Finally, to enable Tor to check, whether the sent password is
>correct, add the 'HashedControlPassword' option with the
>resulting hash code to the 'torrc' file
>HashedControlPassword
>16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
>The alternative to a constant password would be the 'Cookie'
>authentication method, where at each launch Tor generates a file
>named 'control_auth_cookie' anew within its data directory
>containing 32 random bytes. Those bytes then have to be read by
>the controller application in order to use them for
>authentication. That's why apart from the activation of that
>method by adding
>CookieAuthentication 1
>to the 'torrc' file, the location of this file has to be set by
>means of the 'Cookie' file selector.
>Cookie authentication, which usually is limited to local
>controllers, as it requires access to a file in Tor's data
>folder, is the default method when using the OmniMix system's
>Tor instance.
>There are further torrc parameters relevant for anonymity
>reasons:
>*MaxCircuitDirtiness defines for how long (in seconds) Tor
> continues reusing a circuit for new
> connections.
> 'MaxCircuitDirtiness 0' makes Tor set
> up a new route for every connection
> request.
>*NewCircuitPeriod determines how often (in seconds) Tor
> retries making new circuits if current
> ones are dirty, which means already used.
>At the 'Command' tab you find all instruments to influence a running
>Tor instance, but for sending commands a connection to the control
>port of the respective Tor instance has to be established.
>At the 'Events' list select the data you want to be logged at the 'Tor'
>tab. If you're connected press 'Set' to transfer the new settings to
>Tor. With 'Off' no more data are listed. That's advisable in particular
>for the period you request certain data from Tor by selecting an item
>from the dropdown list and pressing the 'Info' button. Otherwise you'd
>get a mixture of Tor events and the specific data you requested.
>Once connected
>*Info requests the information specified by the pulldown menu
> adjacent to it.
>*NewNym initiates the switch to a clean server circuit. This is a
> secure way to use separate Tor circuits for different jobs
> that are done one after another.
>The available 'Info' data are
>*Version The version of the server's software, including the
> name of the software.
>*Config location The path to Tor's configuration file 'torrc' on your
> disc.
>*Network Status A short space-separated listing of all router
> identities.
>*Known Routers A detailed listing of all routers known to Tor and
> their characteristics.
>*IP Address The best guess at our external IP address.
>*Circuit Status Information about the circuits built.
>*Stream Status Information about the stream status.
>*Connection Status Information about the onion routing connection
> status.
>*Entry Guards Listing of the currently chosen entry guards.
>A smart way to access the OmniMix system at home from throughout the
>Internet are Tor Hidden Services. You don't have to know the server's
>IP address and the communication is completely hidden and end-to-end
>encrypted, as it never leaves the Tor network.
>The 'Hidden' tab allows to attach four local server ports, which don't
>necessarily have to be offered by OmniMix, to the Tor network, making
>them available from the Internet.
>For each of the local services you intend to offer you just have to
>check the 'Active' box, enter the port number under which it has to be
>accessed from the Internet at 'Port Ext', the local IP address of your
>service at 'Address Int' and its local port number at 'Port Int'. To
>install the Hidden Service Tor finally has to be restarted. It now
>initializes the Hidden Service by creating an encryption key associated
>with a random .onion address, the future address of your Hidden Service.
>These credentials are stored in the files 'hostname' and 'private_key',
>located in the folder defined in the 'Hidden Svc Dir' field. You may
>backup them in a safe place.
>Instead of reading your Hidden Service's .onion address directly from
>the 'hostname' file you can also get it from the 'Data' tab. With a
>click on 'Update' OmniMix not only requests the Hidden Service's address,
>which you can copy to the clipboard by using the '*' button. It also
>tries to retrieve Tor's current SOCKS and control port number as well as,
>if available, the WAN IP address of Tor's host computer. By the way, the
>latter offers OmniMix a great opportunity to replace external DDNS
>services, which is explained in the 'TorIP' chapter.
>If you want to change the .onion address because you don't like the
>randomly created term, or you need a new one for a different task, press
>the '-' button next to the 'HS Address' field and restart Tor. But keep
>in mind, only backing up the files 'hostname' and 'private_key' from the
>Hidden Service directory before they are removed with a reset allows you
>to reactivate the old address some day.
[end quote]

OmniMix 2.6.8 (2022-11-27):
https://www.danner-net.de/om.htm
https://www.danner-net.de/omom/index.htm
https://www.danner-net.de/om/OmniMix_2.6.8_Uno_Setup.exe