dizum gateway test

Template used:
Fcc: alt.privacy.anon-server
Host: tnet
From: anonymous@anonymous.com
Chain: *,*,dizum; copies=3;
To: mail2news@dizum.com
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
Subject: dizium gateway working with QSL if you see this

On 8/18/2023 3:32 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> dizum gateway test
>
> Template used:
> Fcc: alt.privacy.anon-server
> Host: tnet
> From: anonymous@anonymous.com
> Chain: *,*,dizum; copies=3;
> To: mail2news@dizum.com
ormation> Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
> Subject: dizium gateway working with QSL if you see this

That is helpful information.

Thanks for posting.

My template looks like so, and has been rock solid for me.

Fcc: outbox
Host: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
From: anonymous@anonymous.com
Chain: *,*; copies=2;
To:
mail2news@dizum.com,mail2news@m2n.mixmin.net,mail2news@neodome.net
References:
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
Subject:

On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
<nobody@dizum.com> wrote:

>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion

What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
entry?

In article <958ce45c86de79f8aec2342012acb35f@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> On 8/18/2023 3:32 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>
> > dizum gateway test
> >
> > Template used:
> > Fcc: alt.privacy.anon-server
> > Host: tnet
> > From: anonymous@anonymous.com
> > Chain: *,*,dizum; copies=3;
> > To: mail2news@dizum.com
> ormation> Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
> > Subject: dizium gateway working with QSL if you see this
>
>
> That is helpful information.
>
> Thanks for posting.
>
> My template looks like so, and has been rock solid for me.
>
>
> Fcc: outbox
> Host: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
> From: anonymous@anonymous.com
> Chain: *,*; copies=2;
> To:
> mail2news@dizum.com,mail2news@m2n.mixmin.net,mail2news@neodome.net
> References:
> Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
> Subject:

I figured I'd post this info because the high tech info in here
baffles the heck outta me. I figured I'd keep it simple.

So far my dizum and neodome gateway posts have shown up. My mixmin
gateway pody has not shown up yet.

On Fri, 18 Aug 2023 19:06:27 -0500, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
><nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
>What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>entry?

see https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/
>How do Onion Services work?
>Learn how Onion Services work.
>https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/
>Onion services are services that can only be accessed over Tor. Running
>an Onion Service gives your users all the security of HTTPS with the
>added privacy benefits of Tor Browser.
>Why Onion Services?
>Onion services offer various privacy and security benefits to their users.
>Location hiding
>An Onion Service's IP address is protected. Onion services are an overlay
>network on top of TCP/IP, so in some sense IP addresses are not even
>meaningful to Onion Services: they are not even used in the protocol.
>End-to-end authentication
>When a user visits a particular onion, they know that the content they
>are seeing can only come from that particular onion. No impersonation is
>possible, which is generally not the case. Usually, reaching a website
>does not mean that a man-in-the-middle did not reroute to some other
>location (e.g. DNS attacks).
>End-to-end encryption
>Onion service traffic is encrypted from the client to the onion host.
>This is like getting strong SSL/HTTPS for free.
>NAT punching
>Is your network filtered and you can't open ports on your firewall? This
>could happen if you are in a university campus, an office, an airport,
>or pretty much anywhere. Onion services don't need open ports because
>they punch through NAT. They only establish outgoing connections.
>The Onion Service Protocol: Overview
>Now the question becomes what kind of protocol is needed to achieve all
>these properties? Usually, people connect to an IP address and are done,
>but how can you connect to something that does not have an IP address?
>In particular, an Onion Service's address looks like this:
>vww6ybal4bd7szmgncyruucpgfkqahzddi37ktceo3ah7ngmcopnpyyd.onion
>This looks weird and random because it's the identity public key of the
>Onion Service. That's one of the reasons we can achieve the security
>properties above.
>The Onion Service protocol uses the Tor network so that the client can
>introduce itself to the service, and then set up a rendezvous point with
>the service over the Tor network. Here is a detailed breakdown of how
>this happens:
>Act 1: Where the Onion Service sets up its introduction points
>Let's imagine that your local newspaper decides to set up an Onion
>Service (using SecureDrop) to receive anonymous tips. As the first step
>in the protocol, the Onion Service will contact a bunch of Tor relays
>and ask them to act as its introduction points by establishing long-term
>circuits to them. These circuits are anonymized circuits, so the server
>does not reveal the service location to the introduction points.
>The Onion Service will hide and protect itself behind the Tor network by
>only allowing access through three introduction points that it connects
>to through a two-hop Tor circuit.
>Act 2: Where the Onion Service publishes its descriptors
>Now that the introduction points are set up, we need to create a way for
>clients to be able to find them.
>For this reason, the Onion Service assembles an Onion Service descriptor,
>containing a list of its introduction points (and "authentication keys"),
>and signs this descriptor with the Onion Service's identity private key.
>The identity private key used here is the private part of the public key
>that is encoded in the Onion Service address.
>The Onion Service upload that signed descriptor to a distributed hash
>table, which is part of the Tor network, so that clients can also get it.
>It uses an anonymized Tor circuit to do this upload so that it does not
>reveal its location.
>Act 3: Where a client wants to visit the Onion Service
>Say you want to anonymously send some tax fraud data to your local
>newspaper through its SecureDrop. You find the onion address for the
>newspaper's SecureDrop from a public website or friend.
>Act 4: Where the client introduces itself to the Onion Service
>All the previous steps were just set up for the Onion Service so that
>it's reachable by clients. Now let's fast-forward to the point where an
>actual client wants to visit the service.
>In this case, the client has the onion address of SecureDrop and want
>to visit it, so they connect to the service with Tor Browser. Now the
>next thing that needs to happen is that the client goes to the
>distributed hash table from Step 2 and ask for the signed descriptor of
>SecureDrop's Onion Service.
>Act 5: Where the client verify onion address signature
>When the client receives the signed descriptor, they verify the
>signature of the descriptor using the public key that is encoded in the
>onion address. This provides the end-to-end authentication security
>property, since we are now sure that this descriptor could only be
>produced by that Onion Service and no one else.
>And inside the descriptor, there are the introduction points that allow
>the client to introduce themselves to SecureDrop's Onion Service.
>Act 6: Where the client establishes a rendezvous point
>Before the introduction takes place, the client (in this case, you)
>picks a Tor relay and establishes a circuit to it. The client asks the
>relay to become their rendezvous point and give it an "one-time secret"
>that will be used as part of the rendezvous procedure.
>Act 7: Where the Onion Service rendezvous with the client
>The introduction point passes your details (secret string and
>rendezvous address) on to the Onion Service, which runs multiple
>verification processes to decide whether you're trustworthy or not.
>Act 8: Where the rendezvous point verifies the client's secret
>The Onion Service connects to the rendezvous point (through an
>anonymized circuit) and sends the "one-time secret" to it. The
>rendezvous point makes one final verification to match the secret
>strings from you and service (the latter also comes from you but has
>been relayed through the service).
>The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages
>from client to service and vice versa.
>Act 9: Where the Onion Service rendezvous with the client
>In general, the complete connection between client and Onion Service
>consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client, with the
>third being the rendezvous point, and the other 3 were picked by the
>Onion Service. This provides location hiding to this connection.
>Finally, using the rendezvous point, a Tor circuit is formed between
>you and your newspaper's SecureDrop Onion Service.
>Further resources
>This was just a high-level overview of the Tor Onion Services
>protocol. Here are some more resources if you want to learn more:
> The Tor design paper describing the original design.
> The Tor v3 Onion Services protocol specification.
> Presentations about Onion Services: Understanding Tor Onion
>Services and Their Use Cases - HOPE XI 2016, DEF CON 25 - Roger
>Dingledine - Next Generation Tor Onion Services.
[end quote]

Tor Browser 12.5.2 (2023-8-2):
https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1252/
https://www.torproject.org/
https://www.torproject.org/download/

In article <7f6ae02dc1996ea8744d1fd7c55de86c@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> In article <958ce45c86de79f8aec2342012acb35f@dizum.com>
> Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 8/18/2023 3:32 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
> >
> > > dizum gateway test
> > >
> > > Template used:
> > > Fcc: alt.privacy.anon-server
> > > Host: tnet
> > > From: anonymous@anonymous.com
> > > Chain: *,*,dizum; copies=3;
> > > To: mail2news@dizum.com
> > ormation> Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
> > > Subject: dizium gateway working with QSL if you see this
> >
> >
> > That is helpful information.
> >
> > Thanks for posting.
> >
> > My template looks like so, and has been rock solid for me.
> >
> >
> > Fcc: outbox
> > Host: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
> > From: anonymous@anonymous.com
> > Chain: *,*; copies=2;
> > To:
> > mail2news@dizum.com,mail2news@m2n.mixmin.net,mail2news@neodome.net
> > References:
> > Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
> > Subject:
>
> I figured I'd post this info because the high tech info in here
> baffles the heck outta me. I figured I'd keep it simple.
>
> So far my dizum and neodome gateway posts have shown up. My mixmin
> gateway pody has not shown up yet.

In case you're wondering, 'pody' means post. :o(

On 8/18/2023 5:06 PM, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:

> On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
> <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
>> 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
> What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
> entry?

Mark: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion

This is Zax�s Tor Hidden Service address.

Many people send their remailer messages through Tor in order to
hide or obscure their IP address.

If you connect directly to a mail host, the mail host operator can
see your IP address.

Using a Tor hidden service improves your anonymity.

On Fri, 18 Aug 2023 19:06:27 -0500, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
><nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
>What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>entry?

p.s.
see https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortor.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor PreviousTopNext
>Tor is a real-time onion-routing system, which thereby allows anonymous
>Internet communication without any delay. That makes it useful to hide
>your identity especially while surfing the web or using other services,
>that aren't available by mail. But the lack of latency on the other
>hand substantially increases the chances for an adversary. So for
>anonymous mailing setting up a free email account through Tor is only
>the second best solution.
>Nevertheless OmniMix enables you to benefit from Tor with various kinds
>of communication, which require immediate response, e.g. the retrieval
>of remailer statistics or a stealthy Mixmaster packet delivery to entry
>remailers. The program is preconfigured to run its own Tor instance and
>use that for every Internet connection it establishes. You have to read
>the 'Configuration' chapter only when problems arise or in case you're
>interested in what's going on 'under the hood'.
>But there are further services provided by OmniMix based on Tor, which
>you can read about in the 'TorPlus' chapter.
>Configuration
https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortorconfig.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor * Configuration PreviousTopNext
>In order to hide your communication with the Mixmaster network, OmniMix
>has to bypass your ISP's mail server and connect directly to the entry
>remailer via the Tor network. Provided that Tor is installed on your
>system and running, activate the routing through Tor for the specific
>task by specifying the SOCKS protocol, which OmniMix has to use for the
>communication with Tor.
>E.g. to access the 'Anon Mail Host' by selecting SOCKS version 4, you
>have to enter the IP address of the remailer into the 'Host' field of
>the 'Anon Mail S(MTP)' tab, version 4a requires the host name, whereas
>with version 5 you have the choice. To access a hidden service, enter
>its name (ending with '.onion') as the remailer's host name. Since in
>this case Tor has to resolve a name, the protocol alternatives are only
>SOCKS version 4a and 5.
>Like Vidalia, the controller software that comes with Tor, OmniMix is
>capable of interacting with Tor in many ways, launching, remote
>controlling and shutting down the Tor instance it uses. That's what the
>options under the 'Tor' tab are designated for.
>There's always a risk that the Tor connections of different
>simultaneous tasks use the same routing up to the exit node, which may
>allow an adversary sitting there to figure out relations. Therefore,
>even if you already use Tor with your webbrowser, it's advisable to
>separate communication by running another instance for exclusive access
>by OmniMix, which is easy to achieve:
>At the 'Run' tab set the paths to Tor ('tor.exe') and its configuration
>file ('torrc'). With a 'Start' button click OmniMix launches that Tor
>executable and, with 'Autoconnect' at the 'Control' tab activated,
>establishes a connection with its control port. After clicking
>'Shutdown' OmniMix orders Tor to shut down, then closes the control
>port connection. To start and stop Tor automatically in conjunction
>with OmniMix itself activate 'Autostart' and 'Autoclose'.
>At least for your first experiments it can be wise to check the 'Tor
>Window' box, which opens a command window when starting Tor, showing
>the logged data and allowing to terminate the program by closing this
>window instead of having to end the 'tor.exe' process from within the
>Windows Task Manager. Finally when Tor runs and connects correctly
>uncheck the box to get rid of that window.
>With 'Check DNS' it's possible to recognize unsecure domain name
>resolutions, as it makes Tor generate a notice-level event for each
>connection to the SOCKS port, indicating whether the request uses a
>domain name or an IP address. Thereby it allows to detect the
>revelation of communication targets via unsecured DNS requests. If
>Tor gets an IP address it may have been resolved with a direct DNS
>server access bypassing the Tor gateway, which means that your target
>address has become public.
>A message like the following appearing in the Tor log therefore
>indicates, that everything is all right:
>17:01:25.062 650 NOTICE Your application (using socks5 to port 25)
>instructed Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if necessary.
>This is good.
>This option only takes effect with Tor instances newly launched by
>OmniMix.
>When Tor is started and a control port connection established the
>color of both Tor activity scales in the indicator field change from
>grey to yellow. If that doesn't happen first check whether a new
>'tor.exe' entry shows up in the Processes list of the Windows Task
>Manager. Furthermore look whether the paths to Tor and its
>configuration file are set correctly and whether SOCKS and control
>port through which Tor tries to communicate are available and not
>already occupied by another application.
>Setting 'Host', the address of the Tor instance, and 'Port', its
>SOCKS port, at the 'Config' tab is mandatory to allow OmniMix to
>route external connections with servers on the Internet through
>Tor's anonymizing SOCKS proxy service. The Tor SOCKS port number of
>the OmniMix system defaults to 9054, as 9050 and 9150 are usually
>occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor Browser. Shut
>down Tor before changing the port number.
>Using the 'Host' location from the 'Config' tab, the 'Port'
>parameter at the 'Control' tab is required to connect with Tor's
>control port in order to send commands and retrieve status data,
>which then are displayed at the 'Tor' list. The Tor control port
>number of the OmniMix system defaults to 9055, as 9051 and 9151 are
>usually occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor
>Browser. Shut down Tor before changing the port number.
>To protect Tor's control port from unauthorized access there are
>two authentication methods, both supported by OmniMix. Switching
>between them requires editing the 'torrc' configuration file
>manually.
>If you intend to control Tor from different computers, 'Password'
>authentication would be the right choice. At the 'ConTor' tab
>select 'Password' authentication and enter your password, e.g.
>'my_password'. Be aware, that leading and trailing spaces are
>relevant! Then at the command prompt within the Tor directory
>calculate the hash value for the chosen password with the command
>g:\Programs\OmniMix\tor>tor --hash-password my_password
>Oct 06 22:36:45.707 [notice] Tor v0.1.1.23. This is experimental
>software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity.
>16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
>Finally, to enable Tor to check, whether the sent password is
>correct, add the 'HashedControlPassword' option with the
>resulting hash code to the 'torrc' file
>HashedControlPassword
>16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
>The alternative to a constant password would be the 'Cookie'
>authentication method, where at each launch Tor generates a file
>named 'control_auth_cookie' anew within its data directory
>containing 32 random bytes. Those bytes then have to be read by
>the controller application in order to use them for
>authentication. That's why apart from the activation of that
>method by adding
>CookieAuthentication 1
>to the 'torrc' file, the location of this file has to be set by
>means of the 'Cookie' file selector.
>Cookie authentication, which usually is limited to local
>controllers, as it requires access to a file in Tor's data
>folder, is the default method when using the OmniMix system's
>Tor instance.
>There are further torrc parameters relevant for anonymity
>reasons:
>*MaxCircuitDirtiness defines for how long (in seconds) Tor
> continues reusing a circuit for new
> connections.
> 'MaxCircuitDirtiness 0' makes Tor set
> up a new route for every connection
> request.
>*NewCircuitPeriod determines how often (in seconds) Tor
> retries making new circuits if current
> ones are dirty, which means already used.
>At the 'Command' tab you find all instruments to influence a running
>Tor instance, but for sending commands a connection to the control
>port of the respective Tor instance has to be established.
>At the 'Events' list select the data you want to be logged at the 'Tor'
>tab. If you're connected press 'Set' to transfer the new settings to
>Tor. With 'Off' no more data are listed. That's advisable in particular
>for the period you request certain data from Tor by selecting an item
>from the dropdown list and pressing the 'Info' button. Otherwise you'd
>get a mixture of Tor events and the specific data you requested.
>Once connected
>*Info requests the information specified by the pulldown menu
> adjacent to it.
>*NewNym initiates the switch to a clean server circuit. This is a
> secure way to use separate Tor circuits for different jobs
> that are done one after another.
>The available 'Info' data are
>*Version The version of the server's software, including the
> name of the software.
>*Config location The path to Tor's configuration file 'torrc' on your
> disc.
>*Network Status A short space-separated listing of all router
> identities.
>*Known Routers A detailed listing of all routers known to Tor and
> their characteristics.
>*IP Address The best guess at our external IP address.
>*Circuit Status Information about the circuits built.
>*Stream Status Information about the stream status.
>*Connection Status Information about the onion routing connection
> status.
>*Entry Guards Listing of the currently chosen entry guards.
>A smart way to access the OmniMix system at home from throughout the
>Internet are Tor Hidden Services. You don't have to know the server's
>IP address and the communication is completely hidden and end-to-end
>encrypted, as it never leaves the Tor network.
>The 'Hidden' tab allows to attach four local server ports, which don't
>necessarily have to be offered by OmniMix, to the Tor network, making
>them available from the Internet.
>For each of the local services you intend to offer you just have to
>check the 'Active' box, enter the port number under which it has to be
>accessed from the Internet at 'Port Ext', the local IP address of your
>service at 'Address Int' and its local port number at 'Port Int'. To
>install the Hidden Service Tor finally has to be restarted. It now
>initializes the Hidden Service by creating an encryption key associated
>with a random .onion address, the future address of your Hidden Service.
>These credentials are stored in the files 'hostname' and 'private_key',
>located in the folder defined in the 'Hidden Svc Dir' field. You may
>backup them in a safe place.
>Instead of reading your Hidden Service's .onion address directly from
>the 'hostname' file you can also get it from the 'Data' tab. With a
>click on 'Update' OmniMix not only requests the Hidden Service's address,
>which you can copy to the clipboard by using the '*' button. It also
>tries to retrieve Tor's current SOCKS and control port number as well as,
>if available, the WAN IP address of Tor's host computer. By the way, the
>latter offers OmniMix a great opportunity to replace external DDNS
>services, which is explained in the 'TorIP' chapter.
>If you want to change the .onion address because you don't like the
>randomly created term, or you need a new one for a different task, press
>the '-' button next to the 'HS Address' field and restart Tor. But keep
>in mind, only backing up the files 'hostname' and 'private_key' from the
>Hidden Service directory before they are removed with a reset allows you
>to reactivate the old address some day.
[end quote]

On Fri, 18 Aug 2023 19:06:27 -0500, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
><nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
>What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>entry?

see https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/
>How do Onion Services work?
>Learn how Onion Services work.
>https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/
>Onion services are services that can only be accessed over Tor. Running
>an Onion Service gives your users all the security of HTTPS with the
>added privacy benefits of Tor Browser.
>Why Onion Services?
>Onion services offer various privacy and security benefits to their users.
>Location hiding
>An Onion Service's IP address is protected. Onion services are an overlay
>network on top of TCP/IP, so in some sense IP addresses are not even
>meaningful to Onion Services: they are not even used in the protocol.
>End-to-end authentication
>When a user visits a particular onion, they know that the content they
>are seeing can only come from that particular onion. No impersonation is
>possible, which is generally not the case. Usually, reaching a website
>does not mean that a man-in-the-middle did not reroute to some other
>location (e.g. DNS attacks).
>End-to-end encryption
>Onion service traffic is encrypted from the client to the onion host.
>This is like getting strong SSL/HTTPS for free.
>NAT punching
>Is your network filtered and you can't open ports on your firewall? This
>could happen if you are in a university campus, an office, an airport,
>or pretty much anywhere. Onion services don't need open ports because
>they punch through NAT. They only establish outgoing connections.
>The Onion Service Protocol: Overview
>Now the question becomes what kind of protocol is needed to achieve all
>these properties? Usually, people connect to an IP address and are done,
>but how can you connect to something that does not have an IP address?
>In particular, an Onion Service's address looks like this:
>vww6ybal4bd7szmgncyruucpgfkqahzddi37ktceo3ah7ngmcopnpyyd.onion
>This looks weird and random because it's the identity public key of the
>Onion Service. That's one of the reasons we can achieve the security
>properties above.
>The Onion Service protocol uses the Tor network so that the client can
>introduce itself to the service, and then set up a rendezvous point with
>the service over the Tor network. Here is a detailed breakdown of how
>this happens:
>Act 1: Where the Onion Service sets up its introduction points
>Let's imagine that your local newspaper decides to set up an Onion
>Service (using SecureDrop) to receive anonymous tips. As the first step
>in the protocol, the Onion Service will contact a bunch of Tor relays
>and ask them to act as its introduction points by establishing long-term
>circuits to them. These circuits are anonymized circuits, so the server
>does not reveal the service location to the introduction points.
>The Onion Service will hide and protect itself behind the Tor network by
>only allowing access through three introduction points that it connects
>to through a two-hop Tor circuit.
>Act 2: Where the Onion Service publishes its descriptors
>Now that the introduction points are set up, we need to create a way for
>clients to be able to find them.
>For this reason, the Onion Service assembles an Onion Service descriptor,
>containing a list of its introduction points (and "authentication keys"),
>and signs this descriptor with the Onion Service's identity private key.
>The identity private key used here is the private part of the public key
>that is encoded in the Onion Service address.
>The Onion Service upload that signed descriptor to a distributed hash
>table, which is part of the Tor network, so that clients can also get it.
>It uses an anonymized Tor circuit to do this upload so that it does not
>reveal its location.
>Act 3: Where a client wants to visit the Onion Service
>Say you want to anonymously send some tax fraud data to your local
>newspaper through its SecureDrop. You find the onion address for the
>newspaper's SecureDrop from a public website or friend.
>Act 4: Where the client introduces itself to the Onion Service
>All the previous steps were just set up for the Onion Service so that
>it's reachable by clients. Now let's fast-forward to the point where an
>actual client wants to visit the service.
>In this case, the client has the onion address of SecureDrop and want
>to visit it, so they connect to the service with Tor Browser. Now the
>next thing that needs to happen is that the client goes to the
>distributed hash table from Step 2 and ask for the signed descriptor of
>SecureDrop's Onion Service.
>Act 5: Where the client verify onion address signature
>When the client receives the signed descriptor, they verify the
>signature of the descriptor using the public key that is encoded in the
>onion address. This provides the end-to-end authentication security
>property, since we are now sure that this descriptor could only be
>produced by that Onion Service and no one else.
>And inside the descriptor, there are the introduction points that allow
>the client to introduce themselves to SecureDrop's Onion Service.
>Act 6: Where the client establishes a rendezvous point
>Before the introduction takes place, the client (in this case, you)
>picks a Tor relay and establishes a circuit to it. The client asks the
>relay to become their rendezvous point and give it an "one-time secret"
>that will be used as part of the rendezvous procedure.
>Act 7: Where the Onion Service rendezvous with the client
>The introduction point passes your details (secret string and
>rendezvous address) on to the Onion Service, which runs multiple
>verification processes to decide whether you're trustworthy or not.
>Act 8: Where the rendezvous point verifies the client's secret
>The Onion Service connects to the rendezvous point (through an
>anonymized circuit) and sends the "one-time secret" to it. The
>rendezvous point makes one final verification to match the secret
>strings from you and service (the latter also comes from you but has
>been relayed through the service).
>The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages
>from client to service and vice versa.
>Act 9: Where the Onion Service rendezvous with the client
>In general, the complete connection between client and Onion Service
>consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client, with the
>third being the rendezvous point, and the other 3 were picked by the
>Onion Service. This provides location hiding to this connection.
>Finally, using the rendezvous point, a Tor circuit is formed between
>you and your newspaper's SecureDrop Onion Service.
>Further resources
>This was just a high-level overview of the Tor Onion Services
>protocol. Here are some more resources if you want to learn more:
> The Tor design paper describing the original design.
> The Tor v3 Onion Services protocol specification.
> Presentations about Onion Services: Understanding Tor Onion
>Services and Their Use Cases - HOPE XI 2016, DEF CON 25 - Roger
>Dingledine - Next Generation Tor Onion Services.
[end quote]

Tor Browser 12.5.2 (2023-8-2):
https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1252/
https://www.torproject.org/
https://www.torproject.org/download/

On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 04:54:10 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
<nobody@dizum.com> wrote:

>On 8/18/2023 5:06 PM, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
>> <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>
>>> 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>>
>> What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>> entry?
>
>
>Mark: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
>This is Zax’s Tor Hidden Service address.
>
>Many people send their remailer messages through Tor in order to
>hide or obscure their IP address.
>
>If you connect directly to a mail host, the mail host operator can
>see your IP address.
>
>Using a Tor hidden service improves your anonymity.

That's nice to know.

Thanks!

On Fri, 18 Aug 2023 19:06:27 -0500, MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
><nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
>What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>entry?

p.s.
see https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortor.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor PreviousTopNext
>Tor is a real-time onion-routing system, which thereby allows anonymous
>Internet communication without any delay. That makes it useful to hide
>your identity especially while surfing the web or using other services,
>that aren't available by mail. But the lack of latency on the other
>hand substantially increases the chances for an adversary. So for
>anonymous mailing setting up a free email account through Tor is only
>the second best solution.
>Nevertheless OmniMix enables you to benefit from Tor with various kinds
>of communication, which require immediate response, e.g. the retrieval
>of remailer statistics or a stealthy Mixmaster packet delivery to entry
>remailers. The program is preconfigured to run its own Tor instance and
>use that for every Internet connection it establishes. You have to read
>the 'Configuration' chapter only when problems arise or in case you're
>interested in what's going on 'under the hood'.
>But there are further services provided by OmniMix based on Tor, which
>you can read about in the 'TorPlus' chapter.
>Configuration
https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortorconfig.htm
>OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor * Configuration PreviousTopNext
>In order to hide your communication with the Mixmaster network, OmniMix
>has to bypass your ISP's mail server and connect directly to the entry
>remailer via the Tor network. Provided that Tor is installed on your
>system and running, activate the routing through Tor for the specific
>task by specifying the SOCKS protocol, which OmniMix has to use for the
>communication with Tor.
>E.g. to access the 'Anon Mail Host' by selecting SOCKS version 4, you
>have to enter the IP address of the remailer into the 'Host' field of
>the 'Anon Mail S(MTP)' tab, version 4a requires the host name, whereas
>with version 5 you have the choice. To access a hidden service, enter
>its name (ending with '.onion') as the remailer's host name. Since in
>this case Tor has to resolve a name, the protocol alternatives are only
>SOCKS version 4a and 5.
>Like Vidalia, the controller software that comes with Tor, OmniMix is
>capable of interacting with Tor in many ways, launching, remote
>controlling and shutting down the Tor instance it uses. That's what the
>options under the 'Tor' tab are designated for.
>There's always a risk that the Tor connections of different
>simultaneous tasks use the same routing up to the exit node, which may
>allow an adversary sitting there to figure out relations. Therefore,
>even if you already use Tor with your webbrowser, it's advisable to
>separate communication by running another instance for exclusive access
>by OmniMix, which is easy to achieve:
>At the 'Run' tab set the paths to Tor ('tor.exe') and its configuration
>file ('torrc'). With a 'Start' button click OmniMix launches that Tor
>executable and, with 'Autoconnect' at the 'Control' tab activated,
>establishes a connection with its control port. After clicking
>'Shutdown' OmniMix orders Tor to shut down, then closes the control
>port connection. To start and stop Tor automatically in conjunction
>with OmniMix itself activate 'Autostart' and 'Autoclose'.
>At least for your first experiments it can be wise to check the 'Tor
>Window' box, which opens a command window when starting Tor, showing
>the logged data and allowing to terminate the program by closing this
>window instead of having to end the 'tor.exe' process from within the
>Windows Task Manager. Finally when Tor runs and connects correctly
>uncheck the box to get rid of that window.
>With 'Check DNS' it's possible to recognize unsecure domain name
>resolutions, as it makes Tor generate a notice-level event for each
>connection to the SOCKS port, indicating whether the request uses a
>domain name or an IP address. Thereby it allows to detect the
>revelation of communication targets via unsecured DNS requests. If
>Tor gets an IP address it may have been resolved with a direct DNS
>server access bypassing the Tor gateway, which means that your target
>address has become public.
>A message like the following appearing in the Tor log therefore
>indicates, that everything is all right:
>17:01:25.062 650 NOTICE Your application (using socks5 to port 25)
>instructed Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if necessary.
>This is good.
>This option only takes effect with Tor instances newly launched by
>OmniMix.
>When Tor is started and a control port connection established the
>color of both Tor activity scales in the indicator field change from
>grey to yellow. If that doesn't happen first check whether a new
>'tor.exe' entry shows up in the Processes list of the Windows Task
>Manager. Furthermore look whether the paths to Tor and its
>configuration file are set correctly and whether SOCKS and control
>port through which Tor tries to communicate are available and not
>already occupied by another application.
>Setting 'Host', the address of the Tor instance, and 'Port', its
>SOCKS port, at the 'Config' tab is mandatory to allow OmniMix to
>route external connections with servers on the Internet through
>Tor's anonymizing SOCKS proxy service. The Tor SOCKS port number of
>the OmniMix system defaults to 9054, as 9050 and 9150 are usually
>occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor Browser. Shut
>down Tor before changing the port number.
>Using the 'Host' location from the 'Config' tab, the 'Port'
>parameter at the 'Control' tab is required to connect with Tor's
>control port in order to send commands and retrieve status data,
>which then are displayed at the 'Tor' list. The Tor control port
>number of the OmniMix system defaults to 9055, as 9051 and 9151 are
>usually occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor
>Browser. Shut down Tor before changing the port number.
>To protect Tor's control port from unauthorized access there are
>two authentication methods, both supported by OmniMix. Switching
>between them requires editing the 'torrc' configuration file
>manually.
>If you intend to control Tor from different computers, 'Password'
>authentication would be the right choice. At the 'ConTor' tab
>select 'Password' authentication and enter your password, e.g.
>'my_password'. Be aware, that leading and trailing spaces are
>relevant! Then at the command prompt within the Tor directory
>calculate the hash value for the chosen password with the command
>g:\Programs\OmniMix\tor>tor --hash-password my_password
>Oct 06 22:36:45.707 [notice] Tor v0.1.1.23. This is experimental
>software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity.
>16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
>Finally, to enable Tor to check, whether the sent password is
>correct, add the 'HashedControlPassword' option with the
>resulting hash code to the 'torrc' file
>HashedControlPassword
>16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31
>The alternative to a constant password would be the 'Cookie'
>authentication method, where at each launch Tor generates a file
>named 'control_auth_cookie' anew within its data directory
>containing 32 random bytes. Those bytes then have to be read by
>the controller application in order to use them for
>authentication. That's why apart from the activation of that
>method by adding
>CookieAuthentication 1
>to the 'torrc' file, the location of this file has to be set by
>means of the 'Cookie' file selector.
>Cookie authentication, which usually is limited to local
>controllers, as it requires access to a file in Tor's data
>folder, is the default method when using the OmniMix system's
>Tor instance.
>There are further torrc parameters relevant for anonymity
>reasons:
>*MaxCircuitDirtiness defines for how long (in seconds) Tor
> continues reusing a circuit for new
> connections.
> 'MaxCircuitDirtiness 0' makes Tor set
> up a new route for every connection
> request.
>*NewCircuitPeriod determines how often (in seconds) Tor
> retries making new circuits if current
> ones are dirty, which means already used.
>At the 'Command' tab you find all instruments to influence a running
>Tor instance, but for sending commands a connection to the control
>port of the respective Tor instance has to be established.
>At the 'Events' list select the data you want to be logged at the 'Tor'
>tab. If you're connected press 'Set' to transfer the new settings to
>Tor. With 'Off' no more data are listed. That's advisable in particular
>for the period you request certain data from Tor by selecting an item
>from the dropdown list and pressing the 'Info' button. Otherwise you'd
>get a mixture of Tor events and the specific data you requested.
>Once connected
>*Info requests the information specified by the pulldown menu
> adjacent to it.
>*NewNym initiates the switch to a clean server circuit. This is a
> secure way to use separate Tor circuits for different jobs
> that are done one after another.
>The available 'Info' data are
>*Version The version of the server's software, including the
> name of the software.
>*Config location The path to Tor's configuration file 'torrc' on your
> disc.
>*Network Status A short space-separated listing of all router
> identities.
>*Known Routers A detailed listing of all routers known to Tor and
> their characteristics.
>*IP Address The best guess at our external IP address.
>*Circuit Status Information about the circuits built.
>*Stream Status Information about the stream status.
>*Connection Status Information about the onion routing connection
> status.
>*Entry Guards Listing of the currently chosen entry guards.
>A smart way to access the OmniMix system at home from throughout the
>Internet are Tor Hidden Services. You don't have to know the server's
>IP address and the communication is completely hidden and end-to-end
>encrypted, as it never leaves the Tor network.
>The 'Hidden' tab allows to attach four local server ports, which don't
>necessarily have to be offered by OmniMix, to the Tor network, making
>them available from the Internet.
>For each of the local services you intend to offer you just have to
>check the 'Active' box, enter the port number under which it has to be
>accessed from the Internet at 'Port Ext', the local IP address of your
>service at 'Address Int' and its local port number at 'Port Int'. To
>install the Hidden Service Tor finally has to be restarted. It now
>initializes the Hidden Service by creating an encryption key associated
>with a random .onion address, the future address of your Hidden Service.
>These credentials are stored in the files 'hostname' and 'private_key',
>located in the folder defined in the 'Hidden Svc Dir' field. You may
>backup them in a safe place.
>Instead of reading your Hidden Service's .onion address directly from
>the 'hostname' file you can also get it from the 'Data' tab. With a
>click on 'Update' OmniMix not only requests the Hidden Service's address,
>which you can copy to the clipboard by using the '*' button. It also
>tries to retrieve Tor's current SOCKS and control port number as well as,
>if available, the WAN IP address of Tor's host computer. By the way, the
>latter offers OmniMix a great opportunity to replace external DDNS
>services, which is explained in the 'TorIP' chapter.
>If you want to change the .onion address because you don't like the
>randomly created term, or you need a new one for a different task, press
>the '-' button next to the 'HS Address' field and restart Tor. But keep
>in mind, only backing up the files 'hostname' and 'private_key' from the
>Hidden Service directory before they are removed with a reset allows you
>to reactivate the old address some day.
[end quote]

In article <so10eidq9su34f4ucrnu0hrkln4sm2803b@4ax.com>
MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>
> On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
> <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> >3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
> What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
> entry?

Use with Tor proxy connection

Host:
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion

On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 14:09:41 +0200, Fritz Wuehler
<fritz@spamexpire-202308.rodent.frell.theremailer.net> wrote:

>In article <so10eidq9su34f4ucrnu0hrkln4sm2803b@4ax.com>
>MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
>> <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>>
>> >3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>>
>> What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
>> entry?
>
>Use with Tor proxy connection
>
>Host:
>3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion

Somebody else already filled me in on that, but it later occured to me
that no one has mentioned a necessary port or TSL /SSL stuff.

My other Hosts have that info. Don't I need the same info for this
onion one?

??

In article <7tm1ei9drvhuuaa02cu48iqs1d403sochp@4ax.com>
MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
>
> On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 14:09:41 +0200, Fritz Wuehler
> <fritz@spamexpire-202308.rodent.frell.theremailer.net> wrote:
>
> >In article <so10eidq9su34f4ucrnu0hrkln4sm2803b@4ax.com>
> >MarkC@invalid.com wrote:
> >>
> >> On Sat, 19 Aug 2023 01:07:31 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio
> >> <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
> >>
> >> What is that 'onion' stuff? How does it differ from a usual Host
> >> entry?
> >
> >Use with Tor proxy connection
> >
> >Host:
> >3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
>
> Somebody else already filled me in on that, but it later occured to me
> that no one has mentioned a necessary port or TSL /SSL stuff.
>
> My other Hosts have that info. Don't I need the same info for this
> onion one?
>
> ??

If you're already using a Tor proxy, the port number will be the
same for this one.

There are any number of Tor Proxy solution available, each use
different listener ports. Tor browser at various releases
listens on the ports below for example.

127.0.0.1:9050
127.0.0.1:9150

>
> Thanks for posting.
>
> My template looks like so, and has been rock solid for me.
>

I tried your template and I obrain this error

Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 4
Proxy: none
Connecting to
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
ERROR: 11001 Host not found
Error at Session Connected
ERROR: 11001 Host not found
Error at Session Closed
Connection closed!
Failed

0 in message queue
1 in problem queue
0 sent

ERROR: 11001 Host not found
Error at Request Done

>
> Thanks for posting.
>
> My template looks like so, and has been rock solid for me.
>

I tried your template and I obrain this error

Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 4
Proxy: none
Connecting to
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
ERROR: 11001 Host not found
Error at Session Connected
ERROR: 11001 Host not found
Error at Session Closed
Connection closed!
Failed

0 in message queue
1 in problem queue
0 sent

ERROR: 11001 Host not found
Error at Request Done

On 8/22/23 15:51, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> I tried your template and I obrain this error
>
>
> Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 4
> Proxy: none
> Connecting to
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
> ERROR: 11001 Host not found
> Error at Session Connected
> ERROR: 11001 Host not found
> Error at Session Closed
> Connection closed!
> Failed

"Proxy: none" indicates that you haven't configured QSL to use Tor.

Click on Tools | Proxies | new

and fill it out like this:

<https://www.sec3.net/misc/QSL_proxy.png>

Now try to send a message again. But this time choose "SMTP-onion" from
the Proxy dropdown box.

--
SEC3

YAMN Help Tutorial - https://www.sec3.net/yamnhelp/

>
> "Proxy: none" indicates that you haven't configured QSL to use Tor.
>
> Click on Tools | Proxies | new
>
> and fill it out like this:
>
> <https://www.sec3.net/misc/QSL_proxy.png>
>
> Now try to send a message again. But this time choose "SMTP-onion" from the
> Proxy dropdown box.

Thank You. Something changed, but I obtain an error:

Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 2
Proxy: SMTP-onion
Connecting to
3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
Connection closed!
ERROR: 10061 Connection refused
Error at Request Done
Failed

0 in message queue
1 in problem queue
0 sent

In article <d1aa7b2100a6df3d70598fad72e42ee4@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > "Proxy: none" indicates that you haven't configured QSL to use Tor.
> >
> > Click on Tools | Proxies | new
> >
> > and fill it out like this:
> >
> > <https://www.sec3.net/misc/QSL_proxy.png>
> >
> > Now try to send a message again. But this time choose "SMTP-onion" from the
> > Proxy dropdown box.
>
> Thank You. Something changed, but I obtain an error:
>
> Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 2
> Proxy: SMTP-onion
> Connecting to
> 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
> Connection closed!
> ERROR: 10061 Connection refused
> Error at Request Done
> Failed
>
> 0 in message queue
> 1 in problem queue
> 0 sent

Try b42o7yhesx3fon7bzak4rkq7ax2yoanzapykqpzyznil6obcybe3zlyd.onion

On 8/22/23 18:17, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>>
>> "Proxy: none" indicates that you haven't configured QSL to use Tor.
>>
>> Click on Tools | Proxies | new
>>
>> and fill it out like this:
>>
>> <https://www.sec3.net/misc/QSL_proxy.png>
>>
>> Now try to send a message again. But this time choose "SMTP-onion"
>> from the Proxy dropdown box.
>
> Thank You. Something changed, but I obtain an error:
>
> Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 2
> Proxy: SMTP-onion
> Connecting to
> 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
> Connection closed!
> ERROR: 10061 Connection refused
> Error at Request Done
> Failed
>
> 0 in message queue
> 1 in problem queue
> 0 sent
>

Hmmm. Have you downloaded and installed Tor?
<https://www.torproject.org/download/>

To interface with Tor, QSL expects users to already have Tor running in
the background.

--
SEC3

YAMN Help Tutorial - https://www.sec3.net/yamnhelp/

>
> Hmmm. Have you downloaded and installed Tor?
> <https://www.torproject.org/download/>
>
> To interface with Tor, QSL expects users to already have Tor running in the
> background.

I am executing both Tor Browser and Omnimix, when I use QSL
using this template

Fcc: outbox
Host: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
From: anonymous@anonymous.com
Chain: *,*; copies=2;
To: mail2news@dizum.com, mail2news@neodome.net
Newsgroups: alt.test
Subject: test

having tor browser and omnimix in execution is it not sufficient?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

In article <8cef9ff9f8acfba258893de0a8704eaa@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> In article <d1aa7b2100a6df3d70598fad72e42ee4@dizum.com>
> Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > "Proxy: none" indicates that you haven't configured QSL to use Tor.
> > >
> > > Click on Tools | Proxies | new
> > >
> > > and fill it out like this:
> > >
> > > <https://www.sec3.net/misc/QSL_proxy.png>
> > >
> > > Now try to send a message again. But this time choose "SMTP-onion" from the
> > > Proxy dropdown box.
> >
> > Thank You. Something changed, but I obtain an error:
> >
> > Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 2
> > Proxy: SMTP-onion
> > Connecting to
> > 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
> > Connection closed!
> > ERROR: 10061 Connection refused
> > Error at Request Done
> > Failed
> >
> > 0 in message queue
> > 1 in problem queue
> > 0 sent
>
> Try b42o7yhesx3fon7bzak4rkq7ax2yoanzapykqpzyznil6obcybe3zlyd.onion

That worked! Thanks a lot.

Paranoid Pete

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In article
<6d9040be44a5ea5705539f076288d65c@remailer.paranoici.org>
Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
> >
> > Thanks for posting.
> >
> > My template looks like so, and has been rock solid for me.
> >
>
> I tried your template and I obrain this error
>
>
> Sending mixmaster packet 1 of 4
> Proxy: none
> Connecting to
> 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25
> ERROR: 11001 Host not found
> Error at Session Connected
> ERROR: 11001 Host not found
> Error at Session Closed
> Connection closed!
> Failed
>
> 0 in message queue
> 1 in problem queue
> 0 sent
>
> ERROR: 11001 Host not found
> Error at Request Done

Your error is here

Proxy: none

You have failed to configure a Tor proxy.

Proxy: 127.0.0.1:WHATEVER THE PORT# IS

In article
<1be7028bf91d0a7394f1dacd42c37f83@remailer.paranoici.org>
Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hmmm. Have you downloaded and installed Tor?
> > <https://www.torproject.org/download/>
> >
> > To interface with Tor, QSL expects users to already have Tor running in the
> > background.
>
> I am executing both Tor Browser and Omnimix, when I use QSL
> using this template
>
> Fcc: outbox
> Host: 3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion
> From: anonymous@anonymous.com
> Chain: *,*; copies=2;
> To: mail2news@dizum.com, mail2news@neodome.net
> Newsgroups: alt.test
> Subject: test
>
> having tor browser and omnimix in execution is it not sufficient?

You need more modern software.

http://frogadmin.chez.com/MyDownLoad.html

On Thu, 24 Aug 2023 06:39:22 +0200, Fritz Wuehler <fritz@spamexpire-202308.rodent.frell.theremailer.net> wrote:
>In article
><1be7028bf91d0a7394f1dacd42c37f83@remailer.paranoici.org>
>Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>> > Hmmm. Have you downloaded and installed Tor?
>> > <https://www.torproject.org/download/>
>> >
>> > To interface with Tor, QSL expects users to already have Tor running in the
>> > background.
snip
>>
>You need more modern software.
>http://frogadmin.chez.com/MyDownLoad.html

https://web.archive.org/web/20040603171614/http://frogadmin.free.fr/MyDownLoad.html