Oleg Smirnov, <news:s7elqc$2hf$1@os.motzarella.org>
> ltlee1, <news:23f4ab71-4db1-417e-bdd8-f2dfe776b694n@googlegroups.com>

>> "A Russian-Chinese rapprochement is a bad outcome for the West.
>
>> https://asiatimes.com/2021/05/eurasian-anti-west-alliance-didnt-have-to-happen/
>
> Full text <https://archive.is/UrOx7>
>
> Guancha.cn outlet misleads its readers when it claims that
> Alexander Dugin is "known as the think tank of President Putin"
> <https://bit.ly/3f7RFHi>. He never was known so.

<https://archive.is/lxh9L> ft.com

... Surkov is a founding father of Putinism, and one of its key
enablers. He is the architect of Russia's "sovereign democracy"
... Never elected, he was Putin's chief ideologist and by most
accounts his closest political confidant for more than a dozen
years ..

....

The British FT outlet has published an interview with Vladislav
Surkov, one more man whom the Western media also used to call
think tank of Putin. In contrast to Dugin, Surkov has much more
reason to be called "chief ideologist", because he really worked
very close to Putin and to other top figures in the governance.
While basically being an administrative functionary, he became
known for his passion for philosophical-like exercises and even
fiction novels and poems. Since he was at the top, his exercises
stimulated many menial-minded persons to glorify him as a great
intellectual and subtle writer and art critic, and the like. In
2008, Dugin was one of them (eg. <http://arcto.ru/article/1485>).

Then, here is what Dugin wrote about Surkov later, May 2013:

| I believe that Surkov was an absolute evil for Russia, this is
| my position. He laid in our ideology the idea of combining
| liberal values, Western, pro-American, oligarchic, associated
| with big capital, with cynicism, with a mockery of traditional
| values .. We lost exactly 13 years while this person was
| engaged .. All political, patriotic initiatives were simulacra,
| substitutes, forgeries .. <https://izborsk-club.ru/1236>

It was few days after Surkov had been fired from the government,
where he occupied a high position of vice PM and head of office,
so Dugin was figuratively dancing on his grave.

However, Putin soon re-appointed Surkov as his personal advisor.

Here's what Dugin wrote about Surkov in summer 2014:

| The ominous figure of Surkov is in the center of the conspiracy
| against Novorossiya, involving Ukrainian oligarchs, Atlanticist
| agents, liberals and corrupt siloviks .. Everything Surkov and
| his team of corrupt bastards did, turned out an empty shell,
| corrupt scheming or political sabotage <https://bit.ly/35FGzol>

At the time, Dugin was among the hardliners demanded tough action
against the post-coup Ukraine. He rationalized the Kremlin's
unwillingness to unleash such an action with the [alleged] Surkov's
sinister influence. Shortly after - but not exactly due to - such
rants Dugin was fired from the Moscow State University.

I point to these details to hint the Chinese, other 'outsiders' to
beware too simple ideas about "Putin's chief ideologists" and the
roles attributed to them in the West.

It is likely that Surkov gave ideas to Putin. But, it looks like
Putin gets ideas from various people, and Surkov is / was not the
only one in and near the Kremlin who has ideas, while other great
thinkers might be less eager to expose their great ideas to mass
public (cf. <https://bit.ly/3qjvt1V>). Among other top Kremlin
officials, Surkov, in this regard, was more 'narcissist', seeking
for popular attention and public acclaim.

Dugin was basically right in 2013, when he associated Surkov with
simulacra. Surkov himself spoke pretty openly for virtue of
simulacra. One can feel this accent also in the above FT article.

In his recent 'program' article <https://bit.ly/2SE6zxL> (English
<https://bit.ly/3gOMUo7>), Surkov had written that the democratic
institutions in Russia are ritualistic rather then real. It's like
a formal dress for going out ["to the civilized world"?], to make
them believe we are similar, but in real life we wear other dress.
Nonetheless, this is, actually, good, and more 'honest', and many
other nations start increasingly learning and borrowing our model.

The article caused mostly negative reactions, it didn't generate
much enthusiasm even among the loyalists, and after some popular
discussion, the term Deep People, invented by Surkov, has become
a meme to designate the ordinary people of Russia in ironical-
derogatory connotation.

In Surkov's view, neither "civil society", nor political parties,
nor businesses etc should govern Russia, but The Leader and the
Siloviks - secret services, police, army - must have the last
word, since the noble caste of warriors is nobler than the caste
of merchants (and the merchant caste never ruled Russia before).

All this is ambivalent to the Surkov's own conduct of backstage
manipulations, which is far from what the Siloviks like, because
they naturally like to do things in straighter and simpler way.
Some commentators interpreted the Surkov's narratives as a kind
of trolling. In turn, some of the Russia's Siloviks once made it
clear to Surkov <https://bit.ly/3zR3ACM> that they do not really
like him very much.

The Surkov-inspired "patriotic youth" <https://bit.ly/3gY6RaW>
simulacra sought to combine the Soviet-style patriotic activism
with modernity and commercialization. In 2013, the Kremlin had
stripped them of strong patronage, and this 'movement' faded
away leaving in its legacy a few minor projects. For example,
one offshoot grown from this nest turned into a commercially
viable blogging based on civic activism <https://bit.ly/2TWhdjm>.

Bonus link <https://bit.ly/3xCotja>

By the way, Dugin has organized his own patriotic youth movement
as well <https://bit.ly/2TTksbs>. They made noises in the 2000s
and the early 2010s <https://youtu.be/os2Aq1dcCHU>. Look at their
website <http://rossia3.ru/> and at their 'traditionalist' quasi-
pagan aesthetics <https://youtu.be/1C9Oz7Qb1Bw?t=111>.

Dugin and Surkov differ so that Dugin wants true totalitarian
style patriotism in traditionalist style, and for real, without
simulacra, while Surkov is such a 'cynical' and well-tempered
"enlightened bureaucrat" who believes the plebs should be allowed
to play with some toys under a clutch parental control.

What both Dugin and Surkov have in common is their attitude to -
directly or indirectly - consider the society a caste-like system,
where political ruling class and ordinary people are distinctly
not the same entities. In essence they both advocate for monarchy,
but they don't dare to speak it out too explicitly. It may be so
because the Lenin's body still remains in the Mausoleum, and some
noticeable part of people feel nostalgic for the Soviet ideals.

The reactionary dream about monarchy is a natural reaction to the
failure of the Soviet project (and then pursuit to 'democracy' has
not led to desirable result, in the 1990s). I still think this
dream is doomed to fail. The image of monarchy may look attractive
from the populist perspective, - we need a tough decisive leader
who might suppress all these useless shrill freaks and hateful
trolls that feel so comfortable under "democratic permissiveness".
However, a functional and non-symbolic monarchy would also need a
return to an institutionalized class inequality, hereditary status
system etc, what the Russian majority would hardly like and accept,
- even those of them who would like Tough Guy in power. Some more
time and, maybe, some painful practice is necessary to make people
realize they want mutually incompatible things at once.

Monarchical inheritance is also a big issue. The North Korean
solution would hardly be acceptable for the Russians. But if every
next Tsar is somehow 'elected' then one might think about where in
this case legitimacy comes from, and how it differs from 'normal'
democracy.

Generally it is good when a system runs smoothly and updates itself
smoothly. One of the basic flaws of the post-tsarist Soviet and
then Russian system is that it could not update itself smoothly.
If every change of leadership happens as a big shock and sea change,
accompanied by non-nice infightings etc, then, - from the national
perspective, - the functional-operational advantages of quasi-Tsar,
if any, are counter-weighted with the harmful transitional shocks.

The reactionary as well as progressive philosophers love to play
with fetishized concepts, but here is more simple non-philosophical
technical issue: the necessity for non-destructive timely updates.

There are serious reasons for the fact that Russia can neither join
the West nor "truly" implement the Western-style political system.
It remains in transitional mode searching for what would better fit
its specificity. When and where it 'finally' would lead to, - it's
difficult to say. The quasi-monarchy dream should be seen as "back
to the mother's uterus" aspiration, - it's non-realistic and self-
contradictory due to the reasons noted above. The Westen enmity to
Russia boosts nationalist sentiment among the patriots, and the
West is itself in crisis today, and all this encourages the Russian
reactionary thinkers, but it still does not make their ideas more
realistic and consistent. There may be also other trends of thought
in Russia, but the Western media would not promote them, because
they need to retain "good thought" primacy for themselves, while
Russia must be kept in an association with Dark Reaction. Promotion
of "chief ideologists" like Surkov and Dugin serves this goal.

With regard to China, all this Russian stuff is not projected to
the China situation, as the Chinese face their own, China-specific,
issues, but there may be some intersection.