On Friday, June 25, 2021 at 7:00:13 AM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
> On Thursday, June 24, 2021 at 12:32:44 PM UTC-4, Oleg Smirnov wrote:
> > Oleg Smirnov, <news:s7elqc$2hf$1...@os.motzarella.org>
> > > ltlee1, <news:23f4ab71-4db1-417e...@googlegroups.com>
> >
> > >> "A Russian-Chinese rapprochement is a bad outcome for the West.
> > >
> > >> https://asiatimes.com/2021/05/eurasian-anti-west-alliance-didnt-have-to-happen/
> > >
> > > Full text <https://archive.is/UrOx7>
> > >
> > > Guancha.cn outlet misleads its readers when it claims that
> > > Alexander Dugin is "known as the think tank of President Putin"
> > > <https://bit.ly/3f7RFHi>. He never was known so.
> > <https://archive.is/lxh9L> ft.com
> >
> > .. Surkov is a founding father of Putinism, and one of its key
> > enablers. He is the architect of Russia's "sovereign democracy"
> > .. Never elected, he was Putin's chief ideologist and by most
> > accounts his closest political confidant for more than a dozen
> > years ..
> >
> > ...
> >
> > The British FT outlet has published an interview with Vladislav
> > Surkov, one more man whom the Western media also used to call
> > think tank of Putin. In contrast to Dugin, Surkov has much more
> > reason to be called "chief ideologist", because he really worked
> > very close to Putin and to other top figures in the governance.
> > While basically being an administrative functionary, he became
> > known for his passion for philosophical-like exercises and even
> > fiction novels and poems. Since he was at the top, his exercises
> > stimulated many menial-minded persons to glorify him as a great
> > intellectual and subtle writer and art critic, and the like. In
> > 2008, Dugin was one of them (eg. <http://arcto.ru/article/1485>).
> >
> > Then, here is what Dugin wrote about Surkov later, May 2013:
> >
> > | I believe that Surkov was an absolute evil for Russia, this is
> > | my position. He laid in our ideology the idea of combining
> > | liberal values, Western, pro-American, oligarchic, associated
> > | with big capital, with cynicism, with a mockery of traditional
> > | values .. We lost exactly 13 years while this person was
> > | engaged .. All political, patriotic initiatives were simulacra,
> > | substitutes, forgeries .. <https://izborsk-club.ru/1236>
> >
> > It was few days after Surkov had been fired from the government,
> > where he occupied a high position of vice PM and head of office,
> > so Dugin was figuratively dancing on his grave.
> >
> > However, Putin soon re-appointed Surkov as his personal advisor.
> >
> > Here's what Dugin wrote about Surkov in summer 2014:
> >
> > | The ominous figure of Surkov is in the center of the conspiracy
> > | against Novorossiya, involving Ukrainian oligarchs, Atlanticist
> > | agents, liberals and corrupt siloviks .. Everything Surkov and
> > | his team of corrupt bastards did, turned out an empty shell,
> > | corrupt scheming or political sabotage <https://bit.ly/35FGzol>
> >
> > At the time, Dugin was among the hardliners demanded tough action
> > against the post-coup Ukraine. He rationalized the Kremlin's
> > unwillingness to unleash such an action with the [alleged] Surkov's
> > sinister influence. Shortly after - but not exactly due to - such
> > rants Dugin was fired from the Moscow State University.
> >
> > I point to these details to hint the Chinese, other 'outsiders' to
> > beware too simple ideas about "Putin's chief ideologists" and the
> > roles attributed to them in the West.
> >
> > It is likely that Surkov gave ideas to Putin. But, it looks like
> > Putin gets ideas from various people, and Surkov is / was not the
> > only one in and near the Kremlin who has ideas, while other great
> > thinkers might be less eager to expose their great ideas to mass
> > public (cf. <https://bit.ly/3qjvt1V>). Among other top Kremlin
> > officials, Surkov, in this regard, was more 'narcissist', seeking
> > for popular attention and public acclaim.
> >
> > Dugin was basically right in 2013, when he associated Surkov with
> > simulacra. Surkov himself spoke pretty openly for virtue of
> > simulacra. One can feel this accent also in the above FT article.
> >
> > In his recent 'program' article <https://bit.ly/2SE6zxL> (English
> > <https://bit.ly/3gOMUo7>), Surkov had written that the democratic
> > institutions in Russia are ritualistic rather then real. It's like
> > a formal dress for going out ["to the civilized world"?], to make
> > them believe we are similar, but in real life we wear other dress.
> > Nonetheless, this is, actually, good, and more 'honest', and many
> > other nations start increasingly learning and borrowing our model.
> >
> > The article caused mostly negative reactions, it didn't generate
> > much enthusiasm even among the loyalists, and after some popular
> > discussion, the term Deep People, invented by Surkov, has become
> > a meme to designate the ordinary people of Russia in ironical-
> > derogatory connotation.
> >
> > In Surkov's view, neither "civil society", nor political parties,
> > nor businesses etc should govern Russia, but The Leader and the
> > Siloviks - secret services, police, army - must have the last
> > word, since the noble caste of warriors is nobler than the caste
> > of merchants (and the merchant caste never ruled Russia before).
> >
> > All this is ambivalent to the Surkov's own conduct of backstage
> > manipulations, which is far from what the Siloviks like, because
> > they naturally like to do things in straighter and simpler way.
> > Some commentators interpreted the Surkov's narratives as a kind
> > of trolling. In turn, some of the Russia's Siloviks once made it
> > clear to Surkov <https://bit.ly/3zR3ACM> that they do not really
> > like him very much.
> >
> > The Surkov-inspired "patriotic youth" <https://bit.ly/3gY6RaW>
> > simulacra sought to combine the Soviet-style patriotic activism
> > with modernity and commercialization. In 2013, the Kremlin had
> > stripped them of strong patronage, and this 'movement' faded
> > away leaving in its legacy a few minor projects. For example,
> > one offshoot grown from this nest turned into a commercially
> > viable blogging based on civic activism <https://bit.ly/2TWhdjm>.
> >
> > Bonus link <https://bit.ly/3xCotja>
> >
> > By the way, Dugin has organized his own patriotic youth movement
> > as well <https://bit.ly/2TTksbs>. They made noises in the 2000s
> > and the early 2010s <https://youtu.be/os2Aq1dcCHU>. Look at their
> > website <http://rossia3.ru/> and at their 'traditionalist' quasi-
> > pagan aesthetics <https://youtu.be/1C9Oz7Qb1Bw?t=111>.
> >
> > Dugin and Surkov differ so that Dugin wants true totalitarian
> > style patriotism in traditionalist style, and for real, without
> > simulacra, while Surkov is such a 'cynical' and well-tempered
> > "enlightened bureaucrat" who believes the plebs should be allowed
> > to play with some toys under a clutch parental control.
> >
> > What both Dugin and Surkov have in common is their attitude to -
> > directly or indirectly - consider the society a caste-like system,
> > where political ruling class and ordinary people are distinctly
> > not the same entities. In essence they both advocate for monarchy,
> > but they don't dare to speak it out too explicitly. It may be so
> > because the Lenin's body still remains in the Mausoleum, and some
> > noticeable part of people feel nostalgic for the Soviet ideals.
> >
> > The reactionary dream about monarchy is a natural reaction to the
> > failure of the Soviet project (and then pursuit to 'democracy' has
> > not led to desirable result, in the 1990s). I still think this
> > dream is doomed to fail. The image of monarchy may look attractive
> > from the populist perspective, - we need a tough decisive leader
> > who might suppress all these useless shrill freaks and hateful
> > trolls that feel so comfortable under "democratic permissiveness".
> > However, a functional and non-symbolic monarchy would also need a
> > return to an institutionalized class inequality, hereditary status
> > system etc, what the Russian majority would hardly like and accept,
> > - even those of them who would like Tough Guy in power. Some more
> > time and, maybe, some painful practice is necessary to make people
> > realize they want mutually incompatible things at once.
> >
> > Monarchical inheritance is also a big issue. The North Korean
> > solution would hardly be acceptable for the Russians. But if every
> > next Tsar is somehow 'elected' then one might think about where in
> > this case legitimacy comes from, and how it differs from 'normal'
> > democracy.
> >
> > Generally it is good when a system runs smoothly and updates itself
> > smoothly. One of the basic flaws of the post-tsarist Soviet and
> > then Russian system is that it could not update itself smoothly.
> > If every change of leadership happens as a big shock and sea change,
> > accompanied by non-nice infightings etc, then, - from the national
> > perspective, - the functional-operational advantages of quasi-Tsar,
> > if any, are counter-weighted with the harmful transitional shocks.
> >
> > The reactionary as well as progressive philosophers love to play
> > with fetishized concepts, but here is more simple non-philosophical
> > technical issue: the necessity for non-destructive timely updates.
> >
> > There are serious reasons for the fact that Russia can neither join
> > the West nor "truly" implement the Western-style political system.
> > It remains in transitional mode searching for what would better fit
> > its specificity. When and where it 'finally' would lead to, - it's
> > difficult to say. The quasi-monarchy dream should be seen as "back
> > to the mother's uterus" aspiration, - it's non-realistic and self-
> > contradictory due to the reasons noted above. The Westen enmity to
> > Russia boosts nationalist sentiment among the patriots, and the
> > West is itself in crisis today, and all this encourages the Russian
> > reactionary thinkers, but it still does not make their ideas more
> > realistic and consistent. There may be also other trends of thought
> > in Russia, but the Western media would not promote them, because
> > they need to retain "good thought" primacy for themselves, while
> > Russia must be kept in an association with Dark Reaction. Promotion
> > of "chief ideologists" like Surkov and Dugin serves this goal.
> >
> > With regard to China, all this Russian stuff is not projected to
> > the China situation, as the Chinese face their own, China-specific,
> > issues, but there may be some intersection.
> Thank you for your long response.
>
> Frankly, I don't understand Dugin's article per 观察者网. So I would not
> necessarily object you calling him a freaky showman-philosopher. At
> the same time, my lack of understanding could be my personal problem.
> I don't understand a lot of things.
>
> As a matter of fact, I am now responding to you because I was reading
> Chapter 11 of Eurotragedy minutes ago. The author has the following vision of a new
> European Union:
>
> "They dismantle the economically counterproductive and politically corrosive system of administratively supervised fiscal rules and instead rely increasingly on financial markets to enforce fiscal discipline. Nation-states reclaim more of their sovereignty, and the apparent “fragmentation” of Europe becomes a source of creative energy. National leaders turn their attention to the critical task at home of rebuilding a technological base rooted in educational systems that provide an impetus to long-term growth and to reducing social inequalities. As each nation makes its (p.438) best effort, a vibrant competitive decentralization plays itself out. This is my pro-European vision. "
>
> I don't understand what make the author so sure laissez-faire would make Europe more united.
> Absence of internal effort, would it not make external force more effective?
> So I stop reading and do something else.
>
> I also appreciate your pointing to the Chinese, and other 'outsiders' to
> "beware too simple ideas about "Putin's chief ideologists" and the
> roles attributed to them in the West."
> But then may be one should also trust the Chinese people. If Dugin
> could not write something substantial and meaningful, 观察者网, readers would not
> continue to publish his article.

Whether Dugin is part of Putin's think tank is by itself non-material.