On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 19:00:44 +0000, Graeme Wall
<rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:

>On 25/03/2022 18:23, Scott wrote:
>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 17:09:33 +0000, Graeme Wall
>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> On 25/03/2022 16:13, Scott wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 15:10:38 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 25/03/2022 12:54, Scott wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 12:17:12 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 25/03/2022 09:33, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Thu, 24 Mar 2022 21:55:35 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 24/03/2022 21:42, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 24 Mar 2022 21:26:47 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>>>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 24/03/2022 17:35, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 24 Mar 2022 08:32:03 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>>>>>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-60859046>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I still maintain there is an inconsistency. Here the driver is being
>>>>>>>>>>>> prosecuted for what appears to be a moment of inattention apparently
>>>>>>>>>>>> because he broke the speed limit. At Carmont the view seems to be
>>>>>>>>>>>> that the driver is not considered to have committed any crime because
>>>>>>>>>>>> he did not break the speed limit.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> No inconsistency at all, Carmont was a pure accident, Croydon was a
>>>>>>>>>>> combination of inattention by the driver and the lack of anyway to
>>>>>>>>>>> enforce a known speed limit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think you are missing the point.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No, you don't seem to understand how railways work.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you understand that I was proposing a change, not claiming that any
>>>>>>>> offence was committed on this occasion?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do you understand your proposed changes are unworkable?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't actually. A pilot at Heathrow has to over-ride air traffic
>>>>>> control if something happens that is not known to ATC but affects the
>>>>>> safety of the aircraft. I would expect no more and no less of a train
>>>>>> driver.
>>>>>
>>>>> You really don't understand what you are talking about, do you? Even
>>>>> with pilots, ATC usually are for more aware of the situation than the
>>>>> individual pilots. There was a case a few years back where a pilot
>>>>> ignored ATC instructions to go around at Southampton, made a downwind
>>>>> landing and ended up on the M27. The pilot lost his licence IIRC.
>>>>
>>>> I don't care what is 'usual'. The point is that the pilot has
>>>> responsibility for the safety of the aircraft and if the control
>>>> instructs an unsafe manoevre, quite obviously the pilot will not carry
>>>> it out.
>>> Why would ATC instruct an unsafe manoeuvre? Do you actually know
>>> anything about ATC?
>>
>> It's an example as you know perfectly well. Are you saying there are
>> no circumstances where the pilot would take emergency action without
>> an instruction from ATC? Do you know anything about the
>> responsibilities of the pilot of an aircraft?
>
>In other words you don't know and are constructing straw men to bolster
>an increasingly weak argument.

No but Roland does and has posted an example.

Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> On 25/03/2022 18:00, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <t1kt0d$lsf$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:09:33 on Fri, 25 Mar
>> 2022, Graeme Wall <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> remarked:
>>
>>>> The point is that the pilot has responsibility for the safety of the
>>>> aircraft and if the control instructs an unsafe manoevre, quite
>>>> obviously the pilot will not carry it out.
>>
>>> Why would ATC instruct an unsafe manoeuvre?
>>
>> By mistake. I'm sure I've heard about near misses which were a result of
>> ATC telling an aircraft to go up 1,000ft rather than down. Aircraft
>> (some?) have devices to detect that kind of thing (when working), which
>> wouldn't be necessary if ATC was infallible.
>
> What device is this?
>

<https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_collision_avoidance_system>

I recall watching a programme about the incident alluded to; the ACAS told
one pilot to climb and the other to descend, as it is designed to do. ATC
noticed the impending collision at the same moment, and instructed one
pilot to climb. Unfortunately, it was the one which ACAS has told to
descend. The pilot obeyed ATC rather than ACAS with fatal results.

This one, I think.
<https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Überlingen_mid-air_collision>

Anna Noyd-Dryver

On 25/03/2022 16:02, GB wrote:
> On 24/03/2022 20:28, NY wrote:
>> "GB" <NOTsomeone@microsoft.invalid> wrote in message
>> news:t1ig63$7en$1@dont-email.me...
>>> On 24/03/2022 16:16, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>
>>>> And it wasn't speeding just a little bit, it was completely out of
>>>> control.
>>>
>>> There's no doubt that that is what caused the accident. However, the
>>> severity of the outcome was due to the windows not keeping the
>>> passengers inside. The RAIB report makes that perfectly clear.
>>
>> I would regard the primary cause of the accident to be the excessive
>> speed: without that, the crash would not have happened. The poor
>> design of the windows was the secondary reason that the crash caused
>> so many casualties.
>>
>> As with so many horrific crashes, let's hope some good comes out of
>> it: firstly to avoid shifts which leave drivers tired and/or to test
>> drivers' alertness; secondly to improve the design of the windows
>> which if they were only toughened glass were not fit for the purpose
>> of restraining passengers from going through them and being sandwiched
>> between the tram and the ground.
>
> The RAIB made two additional points.
>
> First, the toughened glass windows met the current standards (which
> obviously need changing).
>

Toughened glass is fine in many circumstances. Its main problem is that
when scratched by hard surfaces with sharp edges, it is liable to
shatter into tiny fragments -- and granite ballast hit at high speed
provides lots of sharp hard edges.....

On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:02:53 +0000, GB <NOTsomeone@microsoft.invalid> wrote:

>On 24/03/2022 20:28, NY wrote:
>> "GB" <NOTsomeone@microsoft.invalid> wrote in message
>> news:t1ig63$7en$1@dont-email.me...
>>> On 24/03/2022 16:16, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>
>>>> And it wasn't speeding just a little bit, it was completely out of
>>>> control.
>>>
>>> There's no doubt that that is what caused the accident. However, the
>>> severity of the outcome was due to the windows not keeping the
>>> passengers inside. The RAIB report makes that perfectly clear.
>>
>> I would regard the primary cause of the accident to be the excessive
>> speed: without that, the crash would not have happened. The poor design
>> of the windows was the secondary reason that the crash caused so many
>> casualties.
>>
>> As with so many horrific crashes, let's hope some good comes out of it:
>> firstly to avoid shifts which leave drivers tired and/or to test
>> drivers' alertness; secondly to improve the design of the windows which
>> if they were only toughened glass were not fit for the purpose of
>> restraining passengers from going through them and being sandwiched
>> between the tram and the ground.
>
>The RAIB made two additional points.
>
>First, the toughened glass windows met the current standards (which
>obviously need changing).
>
>Second, exactly the same standards apply to coaches and minibuses.
>
>AFAIK, nothing at all has been done to change anything!
>
>More worryingly still, nothing seems to have been learnt from a similar
>coach accident that happened in 2007.
>
>https://www.irwinmitchell.com/news-and-insights/newsandmedia/2007/august/m4-m25-national-express-coach-accident-update
>
>(I remember that in the news. Was it really 15 years ago?)

So, I wonder if the latest UK trams, ordered post-Croydon, are any safer? Do they have securely-fixed, laminated
windows? Do they have automatic over-speed detectors? Are driver vigilance devices fitted? I fear that the answers
may not be positive.

On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:

>On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
><news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>
>>...
>>
>>All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>> dangerous to continue.
>>
>>Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>
>I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>*need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>step for a hint..

There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines that's worth a read.

It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion then implemented something different and less
safe, without documenting it).

Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.

<https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>

On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
<recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>><news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>>On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>
>>>...
>>>
>>>All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>
>>>Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>
>>I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>*need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>step for a hint..
>
>There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines that's worth a read.
>
>It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion then implemented something different and less
>safe, without documenting it).
>
>Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>
><https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>

I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.

I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
continuing the debate.

Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>
>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>
>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>> step for a hint..
>>
>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines that's worth a read.
>>
>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>> then implemented something different and less
>> safe, without documenting it).
>>
>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>
>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>
> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>
> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
> continuing the debate.
>

In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
can see. That would bring the average train down to walking pace. How would
a driver make that decision? It puts the driver in an impossible position.
Get blamed for going slowly and halting the railway or hit something and be
blamed for not going slowly.

On 27/03/2022 14:32, Recliner wrote:

> So, I wonder if the latest UK trams, ordered post-Croydon, are any safer?

Are there any? (has Manchester ordered any lately, perhaps?)

Do they have securely-fixed, laminated
> windows? Do they have automatic over-speed detectors? Are driver vigilance devices fitted? I fear that the answers
> may not be positive.

Much cheaper to just run a bus instead.

--
Arthur Figgis

On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 17:11:35 -0000 (UTC), Tweed
<usenet.tweed@gmail.com> wrote:

>Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>
>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>> step for a hint..
>>>
>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines that's worth a read.
>>>
>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>> then implemented something different and less
>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>
>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>
>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>
>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>
>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>> continuing the debate.
>>
>In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>can see. That would bring the average train down to walking pace. How would
>a driver make that decision? It puts the driver in an impossible position.
>Get blamed for going slowly and halting the railway or hit something and be
>blamed for not going slowly.

As a lawyer (now retired) I do not wish to comment on this individual
case. However, faced with circumstances such as these (and an option
to prosecute), my advice would be to get it before a jury and let the
jury decide.

Arthur Figgis <afiggis@example.invalid> wrote:
> On 27/03/2022 14:32, Recliner wrote:
>
>> So, I wonder if the latest UK trams, ordered post-Croydon, are any safer?
>
> Are there any? (has Manchester ordered any lately, perhaps?)

I think Brum and Manchester may have some new trams, for their growing
networks. They also completely replaced their poor quality original Italian
fleets fairly recently. I don't know if Blackpool needs any extra trams for
the services on its short new extension.

>
> Do they have securely-fixed, laminated
>> windows? Do they have automatic over-speed detectors? Are driver
>> vigilance devices fitted? I fear that the answers
>> may not be positive.
>
> Much cheaper to just run a bus instead.

Sadly, yes.

In message <ZIKdnZUhL_SlA93_nZ2dnUU7-f-dnZ2d@brightview.co.uk>, at
18:26:17 on Sun, 27 Mar 2022, Arthur Figgis <afiggis@example.invalid>
remarked:
>On 27/03/2022 14:32, Recliner wrote:
>
>> So, I wonder if the latest UK trams, ordered post-Croydon, are any
>>safer?
>
>Are there any? (has Manchester ordered any lately, perhaps?)

Phase two of the Nottingham tram system isn't very old (opened 2015),
although if the vehicles were better constructed it wouldn't be because
of the Croydon crash. The RAIB report was at the end of 2017 and
redesigning trams because of its recommendations would be a bit swift
even today.

>Do they have securely-fixed, laminated

>> windows? Do they have automatic over-speed detectors?

You'd need balisies or something to tell the tram what the speed limit
was.

>>Are driver vigilance devices fitted? I fear that the answers may not
>>be positive.
>
>Much cheaper to just run a bus instead.

Many tram systems in part use old railway lines, that it would be
difficult to run buses on (see also Cambridge Guided bus controversy).

--
Roland Perry

In message <t1q5s7$2ul$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:11:35 on Sun, 27 Mar
2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott
>>><newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>
>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>> step for a hint..
>>>
>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines
>>>that's worth a read.
>>>
>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>> then implemented something different and less
>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>
>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>
>>>
>>><https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-sa
>>>ys-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>
>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>
>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>> continuing the debate.
>
>In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>can see.

That's plainly an exaggeration. A driver could reduce to half-speed (or
some capped speed like 50mph) in bad weather, which would reduce the
consequences of any crash without bringing the network to a standstill.

Is it your view a driver has no responsibility to slow down if the rails
are clearly slippery (wheel slip en-route is something they will be
aware of when it happens), or if they can see the catenary being
buffeted by the wind.

>That would bring the average train down to walking pace. How would
>a driver make that decision? It puts the driver in an impossible position.
>Get blamed for going slowly and halting the railway or hit something and be
>blamed for not going slowly.

A false dichotomy. Bus drivers have the same decisions to make when
driving on slippery roads, or in high crosswinds, for example.
--
Roland Perry

Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
> In message <t1q5s7$2ul$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:11:35 on Sun, 27 Mar
> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>> Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott
>>>> <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>>
>>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>>> step for a hint..
>>>>
>>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines
>>>> that's worth a read.
>>>>
>>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>>> then implemented something different and less
>>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>>
>>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-sa
>>>> ys-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>>
>>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>>
>>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>>> continuing the debate.
>>
>> In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>> drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>> can see.
>
> That's plainly an exaggeration. A driver could reduce to half-speed (or
> some capped speed like 50mph) in bad weather, which would reduce the
> consequences of any crash without bringing the network to a standstill.
>
> Is it your view a driver has no responsibility to slow down if the rails
> are clearly slippery (wheel slip en-route is something they will be
> aware of when it happens), or if they can see the catenary being
> buffeted by the wind.
>
Both of your examples differ from that of avoiding collisions with
unexpected track obstructions. Leaf fall extends braking distances and can
(usually)be accounted for by mandating extended braking distances. Likewise
slowing for shaking catenary has nothing to do with avoiding a collision.
If you mandate slowing to mitigate the effects of a collision that needs to
be done at network level, not a decision to be placed upon the driver.

"Scott" <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote in message
news:vb514hlsrq96gk9cf0r3dh9np6tvk19s71@4ax.com...
> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>
>><https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>
> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.

I agree. Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too quickly
for poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of the railways,
drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not *solely* on seeing
that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is the same: I maintain
that a combination of driver and signaller should still drive with extra
caution when there are known to be track obstructions (landslips) in the
area. The train that crashed had earlier been turned round because of a
blockage closer to Glasgow, so the problem *was* known about, even if it was
assumed to be an isolated incident and not indication that there could be
other unknown landslips in the area.

I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver had
been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the impact.
How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him to have
sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train and
passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
landslip?

The train's speed made matters worse, but the ultimate cause was the very
shoddy construction, inspection and maintenance work on the drain, which
allowed the landslip to occur in the first place.

NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
> "Scott" <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:vb514hlsrq96gk9cf0r3dh9np6tvk19s71@4ax.com...
>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>
>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>
>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>
> I agree. Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too quickly
> for poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of the railways,
> drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not *solely* on seeing
> that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is the same: I maintain
> that a combination of driver and signaller should still drive with extra
> caution when there are known to be track obstructions (landslips) in the
> area. The train that crashed had earlier been turned round because of a
> blockage closer to Glasgow, so the problem *was* known about, even if it was
> assumed to be an isolated incident and not indication that there could be
> other unknown landslips in the area.

It was known that there were several other landslips in the area, but the
spot where the fatal crash occurred was regarded as being of relatively low
risk, thanks to the new drains that Carillion had recently installed.

>
> I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver had
> been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the impact.
> How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him to have
> sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train and
> passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
> landslip?

Pretty slowly, as the landslip occurred just after a curve. As it was, the
driver had only 3.5 seconds to respond, and applied the brakes just one
second before hitting the obstruction. The speed would probably have had to
be below 30mph for the train to stop safely before meeting the obstruction.

In fact, conditions were bad enough that train speeds should have been
reduced, and would be today, but BR in Scotland was not complying with its
own rules that day.

>
> The train's speed made matters worse, but the ultimate cause was the very
> shoddy construction, inspection and maintenance work on the drain, which
> allowed the landslip to occur in the first place.

Yes, definitely. Carillion had not constructed the safe design Arup had
provided, and no-one from any of the three organisations had checked the
work.

"Recliner" <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:t1rv84$8dg$1@dont-email.me...
>> I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver had
>> been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the impact.
>> How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him to have
>> sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train and
>> passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
>> landslip?
>
> Pretty slowly, as the landslip occurred just after a curve. As it was, the
> driver had only 3.5 seconds to respond, and applied the brakes just one
> second before hitting the obstruction. The speed would probably have had
> to
> be below 30mph for the train to stop safely before meeting the
> obstruction.

There is the other big problem that trains have which cars don't - their
much greater mass and hence poorer braking and acceleration. It is feasible
for a car to drive at higher speed on the straight, braking fairly (compared
with trains) close to a blind bend, then accelerating as soon as it is
beyond the bend and has good visibility again. A train has to start braking
much further ahead and takes a much greater distance to accelerate back up
to the good-visibility speed afterwards, so that style of driving is not
possible and trains need to drive at a much more constant speed close to the
minimum for negotiating bends that may conceal landslips.

> In fact, conditions were bad enough that train speeds should have been
> reduced, and would be today, but BR in Scotland was not complying with its
> own rules that day.

Hmmm. Not good when they fail to comply with their own rules.

>> The train's speed made matters worse, but the ultimate cause was the very
>> shoddy construction, inspection and maintenance work on the drain, which
>> allowed the landslip to occur in the first place.
>
> Yes, definitely. Carillion had not constructed the safe design Arup had
> provided, and no-one from any of the three organisations had checked the
> work.

There is no point in having a carefully vetted design if the constructor
then alters the construction to save money. If there are found to be local
conditions that make a design impracticable in some locations, the engineer
needs to be consulted, and to approve any local variations. I have a friend
who is a civil engineer (mainly road bridges) who spends a lot of time on
site supervising construction and reviewing any local variations that the
constructors may require. At the very least, some form of post-construction
review should have picked up the drainage problems, though fixing things
after the event is a lot more expensive than fixing them during
construction.

And "control" regarded Carmont as a low landslip risk because of the
drainage - false sense of security there :-(

In message <t1rttf$u19$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:07:49 on Mon, 28 Mar
2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:

>Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too quickly for
>poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of the
>railways, drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not
>*solely* on seeing that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is
>the same: I maintain that a combination of driver and signaller should
>still drive with extra caution when there are known to be track
>obstructions (landslips) in the area. The train that crashed had
>earlier been turned round because of a blockage closer to Glasgow, so
>the problem *was* known about, even if it was assumed to be an isolated
>incident and not indication that there could be other unknown landslips
>in the area.

And the elephant in the room is that the timetable didn't need to be
adhered to, because it had already been thrown out of the window
(unfortunate phrase in the circumstances, perhaps).
--
Roland Perry

In message <t1rv84$8dg$1@dont-email.me>, at 09:30:44 on Mon, 28 Mar
2022, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:

>> I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver had
>> been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the impact.
>> How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him to have
>> sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train and
>> passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
>> landslip?
>
>Pretty slowly, as the landslip occurred just after a curve. As it was, the
>driver had only 3.5 seconds to respond, and applied the brakes just one
>second before hitting the obstruction. The speed would probably have had to
>be below 30mph for the train to stop safely before meeting the obstruction.

A derailment could have had much less severe consequences at a lower
speed. Coming to a complete halt is not the only desirable outcome.
--
Roland Perry

On 28/03/2022 11:14, NY wrote:

> There is the other big problem that trains have which cars don't - their
> much greater mass and hence poorer braking and acceleration.

That's not quite the whole story.

First of all, acceleration: the simple fact is that trains are not very
powerful, compared to cars. A pretty powerful loco is 3000 hp, for a
train that weighs somewhere in the ballpark of 5000 to 20000 tons. So,
less than 1hp per ton, whereas a typical family car might be 100hp per ton.

Second, braking: the weight is not such a big factor as the coefficient
of friction between the wheels and the rails. That's assuming all the
wheels are braked, as on a car.

For train wheels, the COF is 0.3-0.5. For car tyres, it's around double
that. So, cars can brake twice as hard without the wheels locking up.

It may be that train brakes could be made more powerful, at the risk of
locking the wheels and producing flats. There's also the likely injuries
to passengers to consider at a deceleration of 0.5g.

In principle, with maximum possible braking, a train should be capable
of stopping within about twice the stopping distance of a car. If it
takes a much longer distance to stop, it's because other factors are
coming into play.

That's just what my schoolboy maths says, and I'd be pleased to hear
what happens in real life.

There was an answer to a parliamentary question about this:

Mr. Redwood To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what the safe
braking distance is for a diesel commuter train to stop from a speed of
70mph.

Mr. Spellar The Health and Safety Executive have advised that, assuming
a standard-load diesel commuter train, on a flat gradient with good
rail/wheel adhesion conditions, approximately:
816 metres using defensive driving brake application;
544 metres using full service brake application; and
408 metres using an emergency brake application.

For comparison, the Highway Code gives 96m for a car, of which 21m is
'thinking distance' and 75m is braking distance.

Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
> Arthur Figgis <afiggis@example.invalid> wrote:
>> On 27/03/2022 14:32, Recliner wrote:
>>
>>> So, I wonder if the latest UK trams, ordered post-Croydon, are any safer?
>>
>> Are there any? (has Manchester ordered any lately, perhaps?)
>
> I think Brum and Manchester may have some new trams, for their growing
> networks. They also completely replaced their poor quality original Italian
> fleets fairly recently. I don't know if Blackpool needs any extra trams for
> the services on its short new extension.
>
>>
>> Do they have securely-fixed, laminated
>>> windows? Do they have automatic over-speed detectors? Are driver
>>> vigilance devices fitted? I fear that the answers
>>> may not be positive.
>>
>> Much cheaper to just run a bus instead.
>
> Sadly, yes.

A bus with securely-fixed, laminated windows, automatic over-speed
detectors and driver vigilance devices?

Sam

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply

Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 15:10:38 +0000, Graeme Wall
> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> On 25/03/2022 12:54, Scott wrote:
>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 12:17:12 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 25/03/2022 09:33, Scott wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, 24 Mar 2022 21:55:35 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 24/03/2022 21:42, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>> On Thu, 24 Mar 2022 21:26:47 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 24/03/2022 17:35, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 24 Mar 2022 08:32:03 +0000, Graeme Wall
>>>>>>>>> <rail@greywall.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-60859046>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I still maintain there is an inconsistency. Here the driver is being
>>>>>>>>> prosecuted for what appears to be a moment of inattention apparently
>>>>>>>>> because he broke the speed limit. At Carmont the view seems to be
>>>>>>>>> that the driver is not considered to have committed any crime because
>>>>>>>>> he did not break the speed limit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No inconsistency at all, Carmont was a pure accident, Croydon was a
>>>>>>>> combination of inattention by the driver and the lack of anyway to
>>>>>>>> enforce a known speed limit.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think you are missing the point.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, you don't seem to understand how railways work.
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you understand that I was proposing a change, not claiming that any
>>>>> offence was committed on this occasion?
>>>>
>>>> Do you understand your proposed changes are unworkable?
>>>
>>> I don't actually. A pilot at Heathrow has to over-ride air traffic
>>> control if something happens that is not known to ATC but affects the
>>> safety of the aircraft. I would expect no more and no less of a train
>>> driver.
>>
>> You really don't understand what you are talking about, do you? Even
>> with pilots, ATC usually are for more aware of the situation than the
>> individual pilots. There was a case a few years back where a pilot
>> ignored ATC instructions to go around at Southampton, made a downwind
>> landing and ended up on the M27. The pilot lost his licence IIRC.
>
> I don't care what is 'usual'. The point is that the pilot has
> responsibility for the safety of the aircraft and if the control
> instructs an unsafe manoevre, quite obviously the pilot will not carry
> it out.

Except that neither the pilot nor ATC has complete knowledge of the
situation and they have to cooperate and in some cases negotiate. In
normal circumstances either may ask the other for a particular action or
clearance and the reply may be “unable” because some aspect of the
situation prevents it. In an emergency the pilot has effectively full
authority; ATC will try to accommodate and anticipate whatever the pilot
may request. In all cases the rule for the pilot is Aviate, Navigate,
Communicate - keep the plane flying, don’t hit anything, and when you’ve
managed that tell somewhat what you’re doing.

Sam (with knowledge gained from way too many YouTube videos and aviation
web sites)

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply

On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 09:30:44 +0000, Recliner wrote:

> NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
>> "Scott" <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote in message
>> news:vb514hlsrq96gk9cf0r3dh9np6tvk19s71@4ax.com...
>>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted
>>>> schedules.
>>>>
>>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-
says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>>
>>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>
>> I agree. Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too
>> quickly for poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of
>> the railways,
>> drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not *solely* on
>> seeing that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is the same: I
>> maintain that a combination of driver and signaller should still drive
>> with extra caution when there are known to be track obstructions
>> (landslips) in the area. The train that crashed had earlier been turned
>> round because of a blockage closer to Glasgow, so the problem *was*
>> known about, even if it was assumed to be an isolated incident and not
>> indication that there could be other unknown landslips in the area.
>
> It was known that there were several other landslips in the area, but
> the spot where the fatal crash occurred was regarded as being of
> relatively low risk, thanks to the new drains that Carillion had
> recently installed.
>
>
>> I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver
>> had been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the
>> impact. How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him
>> to have sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train
>> and passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
>> landslip?
>
> Pretty slowly, as the landslip occurred just after a curve. As it was,
> the driver had only 3.5 seconds to respond, and applied the brakes just
> one second before hitting the obstruction. The speed would probably have
> had to be below 30mph for the train to stop safely before meeting the
> obstruction.

A guess: If it was 3.5 s and the train was doing about 70 mi/h then it
had about 100 m of visibility.

A parliamentary answer that Google picked up suggests that with good
adhesion on the level and emergency brake application a train might stop
from 70 mi/h in 400 m.

So with stopping distance going as the square of speed, it might stop
from 70 mi/h in 100 m just at 35 mi/h.

But of course there is reaction time, and the time for the brake to be
applied fully, and maybe dirty rails, so in practice probably around 20-
something mi/h to be sure.

nib
> In fact, conditions were bad enough that train speeds should have been
> reduced, and would be today, but BR in Scotland was not complying with
> its own rules that day.
>
>
>> The train's speed made matters worse, but the ultimate cause was the
>> very shoddy construction, inspection and maintenance work on the drain,
>> which allowed the landslip to occur in the first place.
>
> Yes, definitely. Carillion had not constructed the safe design Arup had
> provided, and no-one from any of the three organisations had checked the
> work.

On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 12:45:18 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:

>In message <t1rv84$8dg$1@dont-email.me>, at 09:30:44 on Mon, 28 Mar
>2022, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>
>>> I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver had
>>> been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the impact.
>>> How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him to have
>>> sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train and
>>> passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
>>> landslip?
>>
>>Pretty slowly, as the landslip occurred just after a curve. As it was, the
>>driver had only 3.5 seconds to respond, and applied the brakes just one
>>second before hitting the obstruction. The speed would probably have had to
>>be below 30mph for the train to stop safely before meeting the obstruction.
>
>A derailment could have had much less severe consequences at a lower
>speed.

Yes, very likely. The question is the lowest speed at which the leading power car and first carriage would have become
detached and rolled down the embankment. That's what caused the fatalities.

> Coming to a complete halt is not the only desirable outcome.

Agreed

On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 12:48:49 -0000 (UTC), nib <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:

>On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 09:30:44 +0000, Recliner wrote:
>
>> NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
>>> "Scott" <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote in message
>>> news:vb514hlsrq96gk9cf0r3dh9np6tvk19s71@4ax.com...
>>>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted
>>>>> schedules.
>>>>>
>>>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-
>says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>>>
>>>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>>>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>>>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>>>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>>
>>> I agree. Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too
>>> quickly for poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of
>>> the railways,
>>> drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not *solely* on
>>> seeing that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is the same: I
>>> maintain that a combination of driver and signaller should still drive
>>> with extra caution when there are known to be track obstructions
>>> (landslips) in the area. The train that crashed had earlier been turned
>>> round because of a blockage closer to Glasgow, so the problem *was*
>>> known about, even if it was assumed to be an isolated incident and not
>>> indication that there could be other unknown landslips in the area.
>>
>> It was known that there were several other landslips in the area, but
>> the spot where the fatal crash occurred was regarded as being of
>> relatively low risk, thanks to the new drains that Carillion had
>> recently installed.
>>
>>
>>> I wonder how much less severe the crash would have been if the driver
>>> had been driving at 60, 50, 40 or 30 at the moments leading up to the
>>> impact. How slow would the train have had had to be travelling for him
>>> to have sufficient braking distance to stop (or at least for the train
>>> and passengers to survive the impact) when the driver first sighted the
>>> landslip?
>>
>> Pretty slowly, as the landslip occurred just after a curve. As it was,
>> the driver had only 3.5 seconds to respond, and applied the brakes just
>> one second before hitting the obstruction. The speed would probably have
>> had to be below 30mph for the train to stop safely before meeting the
>> obstruction.
>
>A guess: If it was 3.5 s and the train was doing about 70 mi/h then it
>had about 100 m of visibility.
>
>A parliamentary answer that Google picked up suggests that with good
>adhesion on the level and emergency brake application a train might stop
>from 70 mi/h in 400 m.
>
>So with stopping distance going as the square of speed, it might stop
>from 70 mi/h in 100 m just at 35 mi/h.
>
>But of course there is reaction time, and the time for the brake to be
>applied fully, and maybe dirty rails, so in practice probably around 20-
>something mi/h to be sure.

Apparently the driver only applied the brakes one second before hitting the obstruction (ie, 2.5 secs reaction time).

On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 06:42:27 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:

>In message <ZIKdnZUhL_SlA93_nZ2dnUU7-f-dnZ2d@brightview.co.uk>, at
>18:26:17 on Sun, 27 Mar 2022, Arthur Figgis <afiggis@example.invalid>
>remarked:
>>On 27/03/2022 14:32, Recliner wrote:
>>
>>> So, I wonder if the latest UK trams, ordered post-Croydon, are any
>>>safer?
>>
>>Are there any? (has Manchester ordered any lately, perhaps?)
>
>Phase two of the Nottingham tram system isn't very old (opened 2015),
>although if the vehicles were better constructed it wouldn't be because
>of the Croydon crash. The RAIB report was at the end of 2017 and
>redesigning trams because of its recommendations would be a bit swift
>even today.

Agreed, which is why I didn't mention NET.