On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 12:43:41 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:

>In message <t1rttf$u19$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:07:49 on Mon, 28 Mar
>2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>
>>Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too quickly for
>>poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of the
>>railways, drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not
>>*solely* on seeing that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is
>>the same: I maintain that a combination of driver and signaller should
>>still drive with extra caution when there are known to be track
>>obstructions (landslips) in the area. The train that crashed had
>>earlier been turned round because of a blockage closer to Glasgow, so
>>the problem *was* known about, even if it was assumed to be an isolated
>>incident and not indication that there could be other unknown landslips
>>in the area.
>
>And the elephant in the room is that the timetable didn't need to be
>adhered to, because it had already been thrown out of the window
>(unfortunate phrase in the circumstances, perhaps).

I think one issue in this case was that the passengers had been on the train for hours, while it waited for decisions to
be made about where it should head, and then for points to be secured. Given the criticism of how long passengers are
held on trains when things go wrong, I guess they were keen to let the passengers off (presumably to then continue their
journeys by bus).

In message <t1rlee$4gd$1@dont-email.me>, at 06:43:26 on Mon, 28 Mar
2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
>> In message <t1q5s7$2ul$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:11:35 on Sun, 27 Mar
>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>> Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott
>>>>> <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>>>> step for a hint..
>>>>>
>>>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines
>>>>> that's worth a read.
>>>>>
>>>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>>>> then implemented something different and less
>>>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>>>
>>>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-sa
>>>>> ys-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>>>
>>>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>>>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>>>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>>>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>>>
>>>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>>>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>>>> continuing the debate.
>>>
>>> In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>>> drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>>> can see.
>>
>> That's plainly an exaggeration. A driver could reduce to half-speed (or
>> some capped speed like 50mph) in bad weather, which would reduce the
>> consequences of any crash without bringing the network to a standstill.
>>
>> Is it your view a driver has no responsibility to slow down if the rails
>> are clearly slippery (wheel slip en-route is something they will be
>> aware of when it happens), or if they can see the catenary being
>> buffeted by the wind.
>>
>Both of your examples differ from that of avoiding collisions with
>unexpected track obstructions. Leaf fall extends braking distances and can
>(usually)be accounted for by mandating extended braking distances. Likewise
>slowing for shaking catenary has nothing to do with avoiding a collision.
>If you mandate slowing to mitigate the effects of a collision that needs to
>be done at network level, not a decision to be placed upon the driver.

You've therefore recognised that driver responsibility is not just
avoiding banging into obstructions, but also driving at speeds which
make it less likely that in the prevailing circumstances if they did
encounter an obstruction it would be less serious. Heavy rainfall causes
landslips, so drive slower in case you encounter a newly-formed one.
--
Roland Perry

In message <udf34hlutp4acftn9jfcnncvsbr67tsnge@4ax.com>, at 14:57:02 on
Mon, 28 Mar 2022, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 12:43:41 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>In message <t1rttf$u19$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:07:49 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>
>>>Car drivers would be rightly condemned if they drove too quickly for
>>>poor conditions (torrential rain, fog etc). In the case of the
>>>railways, drivers drive under instructions from signallers and not
>>>*solely* on seeing that the track ahead is clear, but the principle is
>>>the same: I maintain that a combination of driver and signaller should
>>>still drive with extra caution when there are known to be track
>>>obstructions (landslips) in the area. The train that crashed had
>>>earlier been turned round because of a blockage closer to Glasgow, so
>>>the problem *was* known about, even if it was assumed to be an isolated
>>>incident and not indication that there could be other unknown landslips
>>>in the area.
>>
>>And the elephant in the room is that the timetable didn't need to be
>>adhered to, because it had already been thrown out of the window
>>(unfortunate phrase in the circumstances, perhaps).
>
>I think one issue in this case was that the passengers had been on the
>train for hours, while it waited for decisions to
>be made about where it should head, and then for points to be secured.

>Given the criticism of how long passengers are held on trains when
>things go wrong, I guess they were keen to let the passengers off
>(presumably to then continue their journeys by bus).

Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to be
detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm train
for longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
--
Roland Perry

"Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to be
> detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm train for
> longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.

It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station (train or
bus) from which you can either continue your journey or else return home
(abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have to wait for the train that
you are on to get going again.

When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came as a
shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which require a visit
from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay for passengers), and which
can't be operated remotely from a signalling centre.

When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven, would
there have been other trains on the southbound track which would have
prevented the train which later crashed from returning on the same
(southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an alternative to waiting for
ages for a signaller to travel to operate the point lever so it could return
on the northbound track? Ironic that if it *had* been on the other track, it
may have survived because I don't think the landslip extended to the
southbound track.

Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not yours"
quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change non-signaller-controllable
points after suitable triple-checked authority from the signaller, to
prevent a signaller attending a remote location?

In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>"Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to be
>>detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm train
>>for longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>
>It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station (train
>or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or else return
>home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have to wait for the
>train that you are on to get going again.

It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think road
transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont Signal Box is
pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station (other than
Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it derailed) is the fairly
remote small town of Laurencekirk, and it's possible that was beyond the
landslip which had caused the HST to need to turn round.

>When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came as a
>shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which require a
>visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay for passengers),
>and which can't be operated remotely from a signalling centre.

The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used points.
I think that rather than have complicated plans to run trains wrong-way,
having obtained a full possession for the line, they just wait for
someone who can operate the points.

>When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven,
>would there have been other trains on the southbound track which would
>have prevented the train which later crashed from returning on the same
>(southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an alternative to waiting
>for ages for a signaller to travel to operate the point lever so it
>could return on the northbound track? Ironic that if it *had* been on
>the other track, it may have survived because I don't think the
>landslip extended to the southbound track.
>
>Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a remote
>location?

You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
--
Roland Perry

On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
> 2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>> news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to be
>>> detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm train
>>> for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>>
>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station (train
>> or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or else return
>> home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have to wait for the
>> train that you are on to get going again.
>
> It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think road
> transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont Signal Box is
> pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station (other than
> Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it derailed) is the fairly
> remote small town of Laurencekirk, and it's possible that was beyond the
> landslip which had caused the HST to need to turn round.
>
>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came as
>> a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which require
>> a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay for
>> passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a signalling
>> centre.
>
> The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used points.
> I think that rather than have complicated plans to run trains wrong-way,
> having obtained a full possession for the line, they just wait for
> someone who can operate the points.
>
>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven,
>> would there have been other trains on the southbound track which would
>> have prevented the train which later crashed from returning on the
>> same (southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an alternative to
>> waiting for ages for a signaller to travel to operate the point lever
>> so it could return on the northbound track? Ironic that if it *had*
>> been on the other track, it may have survived because I don't think
>> the landslip extended to the southbound track.
>>
>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>> yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>> non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>> authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>> remote location?
>
> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.

They do. But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside
his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.

<martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote in message
news:t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me...

>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not yours"
>>> quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>> non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>> authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a remote
>>> location?
>>
>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>
> They do. But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside his
> signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.

The system needs to be both safe and expedient. The driver is there at the
point (pun not intended - OK, maybe it was!) where the points need to be
changed. It seems supremely sensible to equip him to change the points if at
all possible, after a stringent safety dialogue with the signaller - maybe
even photos of the point lever (normal position, exceptional position, back
to normal position). Anything which avoids trains being delayed for a long
time while a signal technician drives to the remote location.

If the points need special tools (as opposed to a key and/or a
combination-lock number) then the system is too complicated. Ideally, *all*
points should be equipped so they can be operated remotely. What is the cost
of equipping a rarely-used set of crossover points with a point motor (etc)
compared with the cost of delay to many trains and the cost of sending
someone from their normal base to the remote location.

In message <t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:15:42 on Tue, 29 Mar
2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to
>>>>be detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm
>>>>train for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>>>
>>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station
>>>(train or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or
>>>else return home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have
>>>to wait for the train that you are on to get going again.

>> It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think
>>road transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont Signal
>>Box is pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station (other
>>than Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it derailed) is the
>>fairly remote small town of Laurencekirk, and it's possible that was
>>beyond the landslip which had caused the HST to need to turn round.
>>
>>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came
>>>as a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which
>>>require a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay for
>>>passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a signalling centre.

>> The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used
>>points. I think that rather than have complicated plans to run trains
>>wrong-way, having obtained a full possession for the line, they just
>>wait for someone who can operate the points.
>>
>>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven,
>>>would there have been other trains on the southbound track which
>>>would have prevented the train which later crashed from returning on
>>>the same (southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an
>>>alternative to waiting for ages for a signaller to travel to operate
>>>the point lever so it could return on the northbound track? Ironic
>>>that if it *had* been on the other track, it may have survived
>>>because I don't think the landslip extended to the southbound track.
>>>
>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>remote location?

>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>
>They do. But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside
>his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.

"Wrong kind of signaller", or "wrong trade union"?
--
Roland Perry

On 29/03/2022 11:00, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:15:42 on Tue, 29 Mar
> 2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>> On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>> 2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>> news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to
>>>>> be  detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm
>>>>> train  for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>>>>
>>>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station
>>>> (train  or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or
>>>> else return  home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have
>>>> to wait for the  train that you are on to get going again.
>
>>>  It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think
>>> road  transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont Signal
>>> Box is  pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station (other
>>> than  Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it derailed) is
>>> the fairly  remote small town of Laurencekirk, and it's possible that
>>> was beyond the  landslip which had caused the HST to need to turn round.
>>>
>>>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came
>>>> as  a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which
>>>> require  a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay
>>>> for passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a
>>>> signalling centre.
>
>>>  The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used
>>> points.  I think that rather than have complicated plans to run
>>> trains wrong-way,  having obtained a full possession for the line,
>>> they just wait for  someone who can operate the points.
>>>
>>>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven,
>>>> would there have been other trains on the southbound track which
>>>> would  have prevented the train which later crashed from returning
>>>> on the  same (southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an
>>>> alternative to  waiting for ages for a signaller to travel to
>>>> operate the point lever  so it could return on the northbound track?
>>>> Ironic that if it *had*  been on the other track, it may have
>>>> survived because I don't think  the landslip extended to the
>>>> southbound track.
>>>>
>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>> yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>> non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>> authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>> remote location?
>
>>>  You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>>
>> They do.  But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside
>> his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>
> "Wrong kind of signaller", or "wrong trade union"?

Neither. A decision was made to NOT train signallers.

In message <t1uljh$urm$1@dont-email.me>, at 11:04:09 on Tue, 29 Mar
2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
><martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote in message
>news:t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me...
>
>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>>non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>>remote location?
>>>
>>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>>
>> They do. But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just
>>outside his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>
>The system needs to be both safe and expedient. The driver is there at
>the point (pun not intended - OK, maybe it was!) where the points need
>to be changed. It seems supremely sensible to equip him to change the
>points if at all possible, after a stringent safety dialogue with the
>signaller - maybe even photos of the point lever (normal position,
>exceptional position, back to normal position). Anything which avoids
>trains being delayed for a long time while a signal technician drives
>to the remote location.
>
>If the points need special tools (as opposed to a key and/or a
>combination-lock number) then the system is too complicated. Ideally,
>*all* points should be equipped so they can be operated remotely. What
>is the cost of equipping a rarely-used set of crossover points with a
>point motor (etc) compared with the cost of delay to many trains and
>the cost of sending someone from their normal base to the remote location.

I think you are being far too optimistic in your assessment of the
costs of the new regime(s), and far too pessimistic when it comes
to the affect of the existing regime.
--
Roland Perry

Am 29.03.2022 um 12:04 schrieb NY:
> <martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote in message
> news:t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me...
>
>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>> yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>> non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>> authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>> remote location?
>>>
>>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>>
>> They do.  But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside
>> his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>
> The system needs to be both safe and expedient. The driver is there at
> the point (pun not intended - OK, maybe it was!) where the points need
> to be changed.

In tram systems, the drivers usually have the equipment to change
points. Trams usually run without signalling (typically the max speed
on manually changed points is 20 mph or lower).
>
> If the points need special tools (as opposed to a key and/or a
> combination-lock number) then the system is too complicated. Ideally,
> *all* points should be equipped so they can be operated remotely. What
> is the cost of equipping a rarely-used set of crossover points with a
> point motor (etc) compared with the cost of delay to many trains and the
> cost of sending someone from their normal base to the remote location.

In train systems, points usually are actively tied in with the
signalling system and thus must be remote operated from the (central)
signal box. Especially there is no use case for crossover points not to
be remote operable.

A realistic use case for 'local only' points is for access tracks that
are used very rarely (once a month or less). In this case the train
that needs the points changed to carry along a points operator (and the
signalling system only verifies that changed points are locked in the
correct position).

NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
>
> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven, would
> there have been other trains on the southbound track which would have
> prevented the train which later crashed from returning on the same
> (southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an alternative to waiting for
> ages for a signaller to travel to operate the point lever so it could return
> on the northbound track? Ironic that if it *had* been on the other track, it
> may have survived because I don't think the landslip extended to the
> southbound track.

[Lots of snippage above]

No one seems to have commented on this paragraph. Railway tracks are
signalled for specific directions, and there may be physical equipment that
is also arranged unidirectionally such as protective ramps for AWS magnets
or crossings. I’d be surprised if the tracks in that area are
bidirectionally signalled, and if they aren’t then the driver would have
had to drive on sight at about 25 mph or so for the whole distance, and
there would have been huge administrative hurdles to overcome.

Sam

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply

In message <t1umk6$603$1@dont-email.me>, at 11:21:58 on Tue, 29 Mar
2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>On 29/03/2022 11:00, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:15:42 on Tue, 29 Mar
>>2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>>> On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>>>2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>>>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>>>news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>>>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need
>>>>>>to be  detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice
>>>>>>warm train  for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station
>>>>>(train  or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or
>>>>>else return  home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have
>>>>>to wait for the  train that you are on to get going again.
>>
>>>>  It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think
>>>>road  transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont
>>>>Signal Box is  pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station
>>>>(other than  Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it
>>>>derailed) is the fairly  remote small town of Laurencekirk, and
>>>>it's possible that was beyond the  landslip which had caused the
>>>>HST to need to turn round.
>>>>
>>>>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came
>>>>>as  a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which
>>>>>require  a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay
>>>>>for passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a
>>>>>signalling centre.
>>
>>>>  The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used
>>>>points.  I think that rather than have complicated plans to run
>>>>trains wrong-way,  having obtained a full possession for the line,
>>>>they just wait for  someone who can operate the points.
>>>>
>>>>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to
>>>>>Stonehaven, would there have been other trains on the southbound
>>>>>track which would  have prevented the train which later crashed
>>>>>from returning on the  same (southbound) track that it had arrived
>>>>>on, as an alternative to  waiting for ages for a signaller to
>>>>>travel to operate the point lever  so it could return on the
>>>>>northbound track? Ironic that if it *had*  been on the other
>>>>>track, it may have survived because I don't think  the landslip extended to the southbound track.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>>>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>>>non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>>>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a remote location?
>>
>>>>  You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special
>>>>tools.
>>>
>>> They do.  But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just
>>>outside his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.

>> "Wrong kind of signaller", or "wrong trade union"?
>
>Neither. A decision was made to NOT train signallers.

Oh I see, the chap who unlocked it was a track worker, not a signaller
then. Maybe there aren't enough such sets of points close enough to a
signalbox (which would then be unmanned for the duration) to warrant
training and equipping the number of signalmen you'd need, to have a
different scheme.
--
Roland Perry

In message <t1uo20$i16$1@dont-email.me>, at 12:46:24 on Tue, 29 Mar
2022, Rolf Mantel <news@hartig-mantel.de> remarked:
>Am 29.03.2022 um 12:04 schrieb NY:
>> <martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote in message
>>news:t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me...
>>
>>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>>>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change non-
>>>>>signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>>>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>>>remote location?
>>>>
>>>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>>>
>>> They do.  But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just
>>>outside his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.

>> The system needs to be both safe and expedient. The driver is there
>>at the point (pun not intended - OK, maybe it was!) where the points
>>need to be changed.
>
>In tram systems, the drivers usually have the equipment to change
>points.

I wonder how often they have to change a set of points that aren't
normally used? Here's a points accident I think:

Although I was no longer living locally, I happened to be in the City
the following day, and have some of my own photos of the fairly
impressive "skid"-marks.

<https://nottstv.com/full-cause-of-tram-derailment-may-never-be-made-
public/>

>Trams usually run without signalling (typically the max speed on
>manually changed points is 20 mph or lower).

>> If the points need special tools (as opposed to a key and/or a
>>combination-lock number) then the system is too complicated. Ideally,
>>*all* points should be equipped so they can be operated remotely. What
>>is the cost of equipping a rarely-used set of crossover points with a
>>point motor (etc) compared with the cost of delay to many trains and
>>the cost of sending someone from their normal base to the remote
>>location.
>
>In train systems, points usually are actively tied in with the
>signalling system and thus must be remote operated from the (central)
>signal box. Especially there is no use case for crossover points not
>to be remote operable.
>
>A realistic use case for 'local only' points is for access tracks that
>are used very rarely (once a month or less). In this case the train
>that needs the points changed to carry along a points operator (and the
>signalling system only verifies that changed points are locked in the
>correct position).

--
Roland Perry

On Tue, 29 Mar 2022 12:14:55 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:

>In message <t1umk6$603$1@dont-email.me>, at 11:21:58 on Tue, 29 Mar
>2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>>On 29/03/2022 11:00, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:15:42 on Tue, 29 Mar
>>>2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>>>> On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>>>>2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>>>>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>>>>news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>>>>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need
>>>>>>>to be  detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice
>>>>>>>warm train  for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station
>>>>>>(train  or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or
>>>>>>else return  home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have
>>>>>>to wait for the  train that you are on to get going again.
>>>
>>>>>  It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think
>>>>>road  transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont
>>>>>Signal Box is  pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station
>>>>>(other than  Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it
>>>>>derailed) is the fairly  remote small town of Laurencekirk, and
>>>>>it's possible that was beyond the  landslip which had caused the
>>>>>HST to need to turn round.
>>>>>
>>>>>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came
>>>>>>as  a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which
>>>>>>require  a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay
>>>>>>for passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a
>>>>>>signalling centre.
>>>
>>>>>  The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used
>>>>>points.  I think that rather than have complicated plans to run
>>>>>trains wrong-way,  having obtained a full possession for the line,
>>>>>they just wait for  someone who can operate the points.
>>>>>
>>>>>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to
>>>>>>Stonehaven, would there have been other trains on the southbound
>>>>>>track which would  have prevented the train which later crashed
>>>>>>from returning on the  same (southbound) track that it had arrived
>>>>>>on, as an alternative to  waiting for ages for a signaller to
>>>>>>travel to operate the point lever  so it could return on the
>>>>>>northbound track? Ironic that if it *had*  been on the other
>>>>>>track, it may have survived because I don't think  the landslip extended to the southbound track.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>>>>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>>>>non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>>>>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a remote location?
>>>
>>>>>  You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special
>>>>>tools.
>>>>
>>>> They do.  But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just
>>>>outside his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>
>>> "Wrong kind of signaller", or "wrong trade union"?
>>
>>Neither. A decision was made to NOT train signallers.
>
>Oh I see, the chap who unlocked it was a track worker, not a signaller
>then.

No, the MoM clamped and scotched the crossover points. He was called at 0740, arrived at 0855, and completed the task by
0917. The driver of 1T08 was radioed and told to head north at 0928, and passed the signal box at 0934, by which time
the rain had stopped and the sun was shining.

> Maybe there aren't enough such sets of points close enough to a
>signalbox (which would then be unmanned for the duration) to warrant
>training and equipping the number of signalmen you'd need, to have a
>different scheme.

It's all described in the detailed account and analysis in Rail issue 953.

In message <thr54hdecn1rn6jjee31j0ap3ni6b48mv5@4ax.com>, at 12:39:18 on
Tue, 29 Mar 2022, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>On Tue, 29 Mar 2022 12:14:55 +0100, Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>In message <t1umk6$603$1@dont-email.me>, at 11:21:58 on Tue, 29 Mar
>>2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>>>On 29/03/2022 11:00, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:15:42 on Tue, 29 Mar
>>>>2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>>>>> On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>>>> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>>>>>2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>>>>>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>>>>>news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>>>>>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need
>>>>>>>>to be  detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice
>>>>>>>>warm train  for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in
>>>>>>>>the world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station
>>>>>>>(train  or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or
>>>>>>>else return  home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have
>>>>>>>to wait for the  train that you are on to get going again.
>>>>
>>>>>>  It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think
>>>>>>road  transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont
>>>>>>Signal Box is  pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station
>>>>>>(other than  Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it
>>>>>>derailed) is the fairly  remote small town of Laurencekirk, and
>>>>>>it's possible that was beyond the  landslip which had caused the
>>>>>>HST to need to turn round.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came
>>>>>>>as  a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which
>>>>>>>require  a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay
>>>>>>>for passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a
>>>>>>>signalling centre.
>>>>
>>>>>>  The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used
>>>>>>points.  I think that rather than have complicated plans to run
>>>>>>trains wrong-way,  having obtained a full possession for the line,
>>>>>>they just wait for  someone who can operate the points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to
>>>>>>>Stonehaven, would there have been other trains on the southbound
>>>>>>>track which would  have prevented the train which later crashed
>>>>>>>from returning on the  same (southbound) track that it had arrived
>>>>>>>on, as an alternative to  waiting for ages for a signaller to
>>>>>>>travel to operate the point lever  so it could return on the
>>>>>>>northbound track? Ironic that if it *had*  been on the other
>>>>>>>track, it may have survived because I don't think  the landslip
>>>>>>>extended to the southbound track.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>>>>>yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>>>>>non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>>>>>authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>>>>>remote location?
>>>>
>>>>>>  You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special
>>>>>>tools.
>>>>>
>>>>> They do.  But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just
>>>>>outside his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>>
>>>> "Wrong kind of signaller", or "wrong trade union"?
>>>
>>>Neither. A decision was made to NOT train signallers.
>>
>>Oh I see, the chap who unlocked it was a track worker, not a

....different signaller brought in so the box wouldn't be unmanned.

>No, the MoM clamped and scotched the crossover points.

Doesn't he count as a track worker (as opposed to a signaller)?

>He was called at 0740, arrived at 0855, and completed the task by
>0917. The driver of 1T08 was radioed and told to head north at 0928,
>and passed the signal box at 0934,

I was originally looking at the RAIB report, and the summary didn't have
that detail, however the long version:

There was no requirement for clamps and scotches to be held at
Carmont signal box and the signaller was neither trained, nor
expected by Network Rail, to apply them (this differs from some
historical practice). Therefore, a Network Rail mobile operations
manager (MOM) was tasked (at 07:40 hrs) to travel to Carmont with
the equipment for temporarily securing the crossover to allow the
passage of train 1T08.

There's an implication there that at *some* boxes signallers might have
historically (sadly no dates given) the equipment and be trained.

"The MOM, who was based in Aberdeen, experienced considerable
difficulty in reaching Carmont because of the many flooded
roads in the area, and eventually arrived there at
approximately 08:55 hrs.

And so road replacement passenger transport would have had great
difficulty too.

>by which time the rain had stopped and the sun was shining.
>
>> Maybe there aren't enough such sets of points close enough to a
>>signalbox (which would then be unmanned for the duration) to warrant
>>training and equipping the number of signalmen you'd need, to have a
>>different scheme.
>
>It's all described in the detailed account and analysis in Rail issue 953.

Well good for them; if I ever need to know about the relative locations
of such points and signalboxes across the country, and how that informs
the modern (rather than historic) policy of not using signallers, I'll
refer to it.

--
Roland Perry

Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
> In message <t1rlee$4gd$1@dont-email.me>, at 06:43:26 on Mon, 28 Mar
> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
>>> In message <t1q5s7$2ul$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:11:35 on Sun, 27 Mar
>>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>> Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>>>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott
>>>>>> <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>>>>> step for a hint..
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines
>>>>>> that's worth a read.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>>>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>>>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>>>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>>>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>>>>> then implemented something different and less
>>>>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>>>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>>>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-sa
>>>>>> ys-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>>>>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>>>>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>>>>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>>>>
>>>>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>>>>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>>>>> continuing the debate.
>>>>
>>>> In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>>>> drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>>>> can see.
>>>
>>> That's plainly an exaggeration. A driver could reduce to half-speed (or
>>> some capped speed like 50mph) in bad weather, which would reduce the
>>> consequences of any crash without bringing the network to a standstill.
>>>
>>> Is it your view a driver has no responsibility to slow down if the rails
>>> are clearly slippery (wheel slip en-route is something they will be
>>> aware of when it happens), or if they can see the catenary being
>>> buffeted by the wind.
>>>
>> Both of your examples differ from that of avoiding collisions with
>> unexpected track obstructions. Leaf fall extends braking distances and can
>> (usually)be accounted for by mandating extended braking distances. Likewise
>> slowing for shaking catenary has nothing to do with avoiding a collision.
>> If you mandate slowing to mitigate the effects of a collision that needs to
>> be done at network level, not a decision to be placed upon the driver.
>
> You've therefore recognised that driver responsibility is not just
> avoiding banging into obstructions, but also driving at speeds which
> make it less likely that in the prevailing circumstances if they did
> encounter an obstruction it would be less serious. Heavy rainfall causes
> landslips, so drive slower in case you encounter a newly-formed one.
>

By the time the derailment occurred, it was a clear and sunny day;
therefore presumably drivers will need to drive at caution for a (n
unspecified?) number of hours after a period of heavy rain? (How heavy? How
long a period of rain before it's necessary? What if the rain passed by
before the train came through? What if the train is following the storm and
the driver didn't see any rain at all?)

Anna Noyd-Dryver

NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to be
>> detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm train for
>> longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>
> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station (train or
> bus) from which you can either continue your journey or else return home
> (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have to wait for the train that
> you are on to get going again.
>
> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came as a
> shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which require a visit
> from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay for passengers), and which
> can't be operated remotely from a signalling centre.
>
> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven, would
> there have been other trains on the southbound track which would have
> prevented the train which later crashed from returning on the same
> (southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an alternative to waiting for
> ages for a signaller to travel to operate the point lever so it could return
> on the northbound track? Ironic that if it *had* been on the other track, it
> may have survived because I don't think the landslip extended to the
> southbound track.
>
> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not yours"
> quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change non-signaller-controllable
> points after suitable triple-checked authority from the signaller, to
> prevent a signaller attending a remote location?
>
>

The points were controlled by the signaller, but not signalled [1] (ie
trains have to be verbally authorised to move) and, most significantly
here, not fitted with Facing Point Locks (FPL). This is not uncommon in
legacy signalling areas such as this; they'll never be needed for booked
passenger trains, and if they're planned to be needed, perhaps for Single
Line Working (SLW) around engineering works, a suitably-trained person will
be provided.

What *has* changed in the last few decades is that signallers no longer
have PTS (personal track safety), and are no longer trained to clip and
scotch points.

Had the train been empty, it could have used the crossover immediately; but
as there was passengers on board, the points needed to be secured.

In 24 years as a driver, I've only twice been in a situation we’re having
the ability to clip points myself would have been useful; I suspect that
the costs of the training and the continued certification of competence (eg
for something like that, I'd expect to actually have to go to a suitable
location once every few years and actually *do* the thing, not just tell
someone how I would do it in a rules exam) would outweigh the benefits.

You can't just randomly decide to run trains on the wrong line (unless
properly signalled for that) just because it saves waiting for the proper
procedure to be carried out. In any case, the train AIUI was already south
of the crossover when it stopped, so it couln't have proceeded over the
points in question regardless of which way they were set.

There are specific reasons why running wrong line can be authorised; the
right line being blocked would be one, but waiting for the MOM to arrive,
would not. Also I strongly suspect that you'd need to implement it as SLW
with Pilotman, even if the pilotman then doesn't actually travel with the
train; so you'd need to wait for the MOM to arrive regardless.

[1] you can see point rodding going to the crossover, which means it's
operated by the signaller; but only one set of rodding, which means no FPL.
And you can see that there's no signals provided (ground discs).

Anna Noyd-Dryver

On Tue, 29 Mar 2022 13:57:13 -0000 (UTC), Anna Noyd-Dryver
<anna@noyd-dryver.com> wrote:

>Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
>> In message <t1rlee$4gd$1@dont-email.me>, at 06:43:26 on Mon, 28 Mar
>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
>>>> In message <t1q5s7$2ul$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:11:35 on Sun, 27 Mar
>>>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>> Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>>>>>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott
>>>>>>> <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>>>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>>>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>>>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>>>>>> step for a hint..
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines
>>>>>>> that's worth a read.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>>>>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>>>>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>>>>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>>>>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>>>>>> then implemented something different and less
>>>>>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>>>>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>>>>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-sa
>>>>>>> ys-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>>>>>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>>>>>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>>>>>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>>>>>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>>>>>> continuing the debate.
>>>>>
>>>>> In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>>>>> drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>>>>> can see.
>>>>
>>>> That's plainly an exaggeration. A driver could reduce to half-speed (or
>>>> some capped speed like 50mph) in bad weather, which would reduce the
>>>> consequences of any crash without bringing the network to a standstill.
>>>>
>>>> Is it your view a driver has no responsibility to slow down if the rails
>>>> are clearly slippery (wheel slip en-route is something they will be
>>>> aware of when it happens), or if they can see the catenary being
>>>> buffeted by the wind.
>>>>
>>> Both of your examples differ from that of avoiding collisions with
>>> unexpected track obstructions. Leaf fall extends braking distances and can
>>> (usually)be accounted for by mandating extended braking distances. Likewise
>>> slowing for shaking catenary has nothing to do with avoiding a collision.
>>> If you mandate slowing to mitigate the effects of a collision that needs to
>>> be done at network level, not a decision to be placed upon the driver.
>>
>> You've therefore recognised that driver responsibility is not just
>> avoiding banging into obstructions, but also driving at speeds which
>> make it less likely that in the prevailing circumstances if they did
>> encounter an obstruction it would be less serious. Heavy rainfall causes
>> landslips, so drive slower in case you encounter a newly-formed one.
>>
>By the time the derailment occurred, it was a clear and sunny day;
>therefore presumably drivers will need to drive at caution for a (n
>unspecified?) number of hours after a period of heavy rain? (How heavy? How
>long a period of rain before it's necessary? What if the rain passed by
>before the train came through? What if the train is following the storm and
>the driver didn't see any rain at all?)
>
I think the legalistic answer is that s/he would need to meet the
standards of a careful and competent driver. Witnesses (including
rail industry experts and others) would give evidence and then the
jury would have to consider all the evidence and answer the question
of whether the actions of the accused fell far below those of a
competent and careful driver.

On 27/03/2022 18:11, Tweed wrote:
> Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>> On Sun, 27 Mar 2022 14:45:17 +0100, Recliner
>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 16:06:16 +0000, Scott <newsgroups@gefion.myzen.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:53:52 -0000 (UTC), nib
>>>> <news@ingram-bromley.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 13:16:28 +0000, Scott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>> All I am saying is that it seems to me that the responsibility should
>>>>>> be more clearly defined if it does not include weather conditions and
>>>>>> other circumstances such as returning to start because it is too
>>>>>> dangerous to continue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course the driver can't just "return to start". He has to contact
>>>>> signalling / control and ask for a route back to be set up.
>>>>>
>>>> I never suggested that. It is quite clear that the train was
>>>> returning to Aberdeen with permission. What I am saying is that the
>>>> *need* to return because it was not safe to proceed should have been a
>>>> step for a hint..
>>>
>>> There's quite a lengthy analysis in the latest MR and Rail magazines that's worth a read.
>>>
>>> It's striking that NR Scotland wasn't following its own bad weather
>>> rules on the day, which are in any case slacker than
>>> NR England's rules. And NR never inspected Carillion's work on the drain
>>> (Carillion had the design/build contract, but
>>> outsourced the design to Arup, which did a good job. However, Carillion
>>> then implemented something different and less
>>> safe, without documenting it).
>>>
>>> Since the accident, drivers have been instructed to drive at reduced
>>> speeds in bad weather, and more trains cancelled,
>>> only for the politicians to then complaint about the disrupted schedules.
>>>
>>> <https://www.railmagazine.com/news/network/2022/03/07/storms-shapps-says-railway-was-overly-cautious>
>>
>> I have read the article in Modern Railways, which seems to focus on
>> engineering and decision making by control. I am astonished that the
>> judgement of the driver does not appear to play any part in deciding
>> what is a safe speed. I think this needs to change.
>>
>> I have made my point many times now and people seem simply to disagree
>> with me and claim I know nothing about railways. I see no purpose in
>> continuing the debate.
>>
>
> In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
> drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
> can see.

Half length of sighting, IIRC.

On 28/03/2022 13:19, Sam Wilson wrote:
> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Arthur Figgis <afiggis@example.invalid> wrote:
>>> On 27/03/2022 14:32, Recliner wrote:

>>>
>>> Do they have securely-fixed, laminated
>>>> windows? Do they have automatic over-speed detectors? Are driver
>>>> vigilance devices fitted? I fear that the answers
>>>> may not be positive.
>>>
>>> Much cheaper to just run a bus instead.
>>
>> Sadly, yes.
>
> A bus with securely-fixed, laminated windows, automatic over-speed
> detectors and driver vigilance devices?

You don't need them, it's a bus...

--
Arthur Figgis

Roland Perry <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote:
> In message <t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:15:42 on Tue, 29 Mar
> 2022, martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk remarked:
>> On 29/03/2022 07:21, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <t1t5rs$38l$1@dont-email.me>, at 21:29:16 on Mon, 28 Mar
>>> 2022, NY <me@privacy.invalid> remarked:
>>>> "Roland Perry" <roland@perry.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>> news:pKwPUiGT4fQiFA2c@perry.uk...
>>>>> Most of such criticisms focus on passengers who ultimately need to
>>>>> be detrained and use alternative transport. Sitting on a nice warm
>>>>> train for  longer than expected isn't the worst thing in the world.
>>>>
>>>> It is if the alternative is that you can be taken to a station
>>>> (train or bus) from which you can either continue your journey or
>>>> else return home (abandoning the journey), sooner than if you have
>>>> to wait for the train that you are on to get going again.
>
>>> It was very early in the morning, and wild weather. I don't think
>>> road transport would have been quicker to source. And Carmont Signal
>>> Box is pretty remotely situated. The nearest actual station (other
>>> than Stonehaven which is where it was headed when it derailed) is the
>>> fairly remote small town of Laurencekirk, and it's possible that was
>>> beyond the landslip which had caused the HST to need to turn round.
>>>
>>>> When I heard about the circumstances of the Carmont crash, it came
>>>> as a shock to learn that there are some rarely-used points which
>>>> require a visit from a trained signaller (and hence a long delay for
>>>> passengers), and which can't be operated remotely from a signalling centre.
>
>>> The Virgin train which crashed at Grayrigg did so on rarely-used
>>> points. I think that rather than have complicated plans to run trains
>>> wrong-way, having obtained a full possession for the line, they just
>>> wait for someone who can operate the points.
>>>
>>>> When it was decided to cancel the train and return it to Stonehaven,
>>>> would there have been other trains on the southbound track which
>>>> would have prevented the train which later crashed from returning on
>>>> the same (southbound) track that it had arrived on, as an
>>>> alternative to waiting for ages for a signaller to travel to operate
>>>> the point lever so it could return on the northbound track? Ironic
>>>> that if it *had* been on the other track, it may have survived
>>>> because I don't think the landslip extended to the southbound track.
>>>>
>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not
>>>> yours" quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>> non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>> authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a
>>>> remote location?
>
>>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>>
>> They do. But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside
>> his signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>
> "Wrong kind of signaller", or "wrong trade union"?

I think that both signallers and unions were keen for signallers to retain
PTS and clip/scotch competence, where appropriate at least (not so useful
for signallers in TVSC, for example); so perhaps Wrong Kind Of Management?

Anna Noyd-Dryver

NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
> <martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote in message
> news:t1uinu$92t$1@dont-email.me...
>
>>>> Is there any fundamental reason (beyond petty "that's my job, not yours"
>>>> quibbles) why drivers can't be equipped to change
>>>> non-signaller-controllable points after suitable triple-checked
>>>> authority from the signaller, to prevent a signaller attending a remote
>>>> location?
>>>
>>> You'd need special training too, I expect. And maybe special tools.
>>
>> They do. But when a signaller cannot lock his own points just outside his
>> signal box you realise the system has got too stupid.
>
> The system needs to be both safe and expedient. The driver is there at the
> point (pun not intended - OK, maybe it was!) where the points need to be
> changed. It seems supremely sensible to equip him to change the points if at
> all possible, after a stringent safety dialogue with the signaller - maybe
> even photos of the point lever (normal position, exceptional position, back
> to normal position). Anything which avoids trains being delayed for a long
> time while a signal technician drives to the remote location.
>
> If the points need special tools (as opposed to a key and/or a
> combination-lock number) then the system is too complicated. Ideally, *all*
> points should be equipped so they can be operated remotely. What is the cost
> of equipping a rarely-used set of crossover points with a point motor (etc)
> compared with the cost of delay to many trains and the cost of sending
> someone from their normal base to the remote location.
>
>

I think we need to back-track several layers up this conversation.

The points at Carmont were connected to, and controlled by, the adjacent
signalbox. What they don't have is facing point lock (FPL), required for
passenger trains by not ECS or freight.

Such installations generally only exist in areas of legacy signalling ie
semaphore, which many rail enthusiasts generally wish to continue to exist.

Ground-frame operated crossovers in the middle of nowhere do still exist,
but they're considerably rarer now than they were.

Ground frames elsewhere will usually be controlling entrance to a siding or
yard, and even under colour-light signalling, will require attendance of
someone on site to operate the ground frame (which may be either a small
lever frame, or a push-button panel). They may or may not have an
associated crossover, depending on location, which may or may not have FPLs
(eg a push button GF controlling clamp-lock points will have FPLs by
default). Whenever they're required to be used by a train, a member of
staff will be present to operate, either NR or suitably-trained FOC
groundstaff.

The points in the running line will have detection, ie something to prove
that they're positioned correctly; if the detection fails, the points will
need to be clipped and scotched before trains can be authorised to pass the
signal in rear. It happens so rarely (twice in 24 years for me) that I
don't think training drivers to clip and scotch is worth it.

I'm not sure what equipment is required to open a ground frame (definitely
a release from the signaller!) but for the push-button ones there's at
least a locked cabinet door to open. I'd imagine that ideal you want
something secure; codes can get passed around on text/messaging, keys end
up on eBay - you ideally want something vandal-proof.

Anna Noyd-Dryver

In message <t1v37p$c82$5@dont-email.me>, at 13:57:13 on Tue, 29 Mar
2022, Anna Noyd-Dryver <anna@noyd-dryver.com> remarked:
>>>>> In practical terms the only safe speed a driver could decide upon is to
>>>>> drive on sight, ie being able to stop within the range of what the driver
>>>>> can see.
>>>>
>>>> That's plainly an exaggeration. A driver could reduce to half-speed (or
>>>> some capped speed like 50mph) in bad weather, which would reduce the
>>>> consequences of any crash without bringing the network to a standstill.
>>>>
>>>> Is it your view a driver has no responsibility to slow down if the rails
>>>> are clearly slippery (wheel slip en-route is something they will be
>>>> aware of when it happens), or if they can see the catenary being
>>>> buffeted by the wind.
>>>>
>>> Both of your examples differ from that of avoiding collisions with
>>> unexpected track obstructions. Leaf fall extends braking distances and can
>>> (usually)be accounted for by mandating extended braking distances. Likewise
>>> slowing for shaking catenary has nothing to do with avoiding a collision.
>>> If you mandate slowing to mitigate the effects of a collision that needs to
>>> be done at network level, not a decision to be placed upon the driver.
>>
>> You've therefore recognised that driver responsibility is not just
>> avoiding banging into obstructions, but also driving at speeds which
>> make it less likely that in the prevailing circumstances if they did
>> encounter an obstruction it would be less serious. Heavy rainfall causes
>> landslips, so drive slower in case you encounter a newly-formed one.
>
>By the time the derailment occurred, it was a clear and sunny day;

It's not about being able to see big obstructions and stop in time (or
even hit the obstruction at a significantly lower speed) it's a more
fuzzy thing about "prevailing conditions".

>therefore presumably drivers will need to drive at caution for a (n
>unspecified?) number of hours after a period of heavy rain? (How heavy? How
>long a period of rain before it's necessary? What if the rain passed by
>before the train came through? What if the train is following the storm and
>the driver didn't see any rain at all?)

Does rain make rails as perilously slippery as leaf-fall, or cause
catenary to wave around dangerously? If it does, then one might a driver
to be ware of this, and moderate speed accordingly.

JOOI, what do drivers do in a blizzard?
--
Roland Perry

In message <t1v37p$c82$6@dont-email.me>, at 13:57:13 on Tue, 29 Mar
2022, Anna Noyd-Dryver <anna@noyd-dryver.com> remarked:

>In 24 years as a driver, I've only twice been in a situation we’re having
>the ability to clip points myself would have been useful; I suspect that
>the costs of the training and the continued certification of competence (eg
>for something like that, I'd expect to actually have to go to a suitable
>location once every few years and actually *do* the thing, not just tell
>someone how I would do it in a rules exam) would outweigh the benefits.
>
>You can't just randomly decide to run trains on the wrong line (unless
>properly signalled for that) just because it saves waiting for the proper
>procedure to be carried out. In any case, the train AIUI was already south
>of the crossover when it stopped, so it couln't have proceeded over the
>points in question regardless of which way they were set.
>
>There are specific reasons why running wrong line can be authorised; the
>right line being blocked would be one, but waiting for the MOM to arrive,
>would not. Also I strongly suspect that you'd need to implement it as SLW
>with Pilotman, even if the pilotman then doesn't actually travel with the
>train; so you'd need to wait for the MOM to arrive regardless.

Many thanks for adding that detail, consistent with the gut feeling I
had a few days ago. Things are often the way they are for very good
reasons, not just because someone is being awkward.
--
Roland Perry