RonTheGuy <ron@null.invalid> wrote:
> On Sep 18, 2021, Lewis wrote
> (in article<news:slrnskcl7j.ot1.g.kreme@m1mini.local>):
>> The EFF has become a fund-raising organization. They have consistently
>> and repeatedly overstated and lied about numerous things in order to
>> fearmonger to fill their coffers.
>
> You have successfully negated everything the EFF has or will ever say.
> Now how are you going to do that with the other 99 privacy organizations?
>
>>> "All it would take to widen the narrow backdoor that Apple is building
>>> is an expansion of the machine learning parameters to look for
>>
>> And there is the lie. Right there, in plain sight. They are
>> intentionally and knowingly mixing up tow thing to mislead their readers
>> into panic and donations to the EFF.
>
> How is it you know more about privacy than a hundred privacy organizations?

Sometimes the story is bigger than the narrow focus some view it by.

Yes, there are privacy concerns, but there are always privacy concerns when
online. Is Apple's CSAM process the biggest concern we should have when
online? I doubt it.

These concerns also need to be balanced against the potential benefit of
both reducing the dissemination of CSAM and additional harms to children.

As with always with topics where people have very strong opinions the real
aspects are lost.

There is no right answer here. Should we do everything we can to make CSAM
images harder to share? Yes, absolutely. Does Apple's system do this? Yes,
but how much is icloud being used for this in the first place?. It is
undoubtedly a very smart solution with several benefits.

Do the current and potential future privacy concerns outweigh the benefits?
Again, that's unknown.

I think the privacy people to engage more with the tech community rather
than cry foul every time new features are developed. Yes, tech has a patchy
history with people's data, but that doesn't mean they can't ever be
trusted.

> Ron, the humblest guy in town.
>
>

RonTheGuy <ron@null.invalid> wrote:
> On Sep 18, 2021, Lewis wrote
> (in article<news:slrnskcm1l.ot1.g.kreme@m1mini.local>):
>> Back door has several criteria, not a singl one is matched by the CSAM
>> system
>> *) A hidden feature or bug
>> *) Allow unauthorized access
>> *) Allows surreptitious access
>> *) allows accessing the data on the computer or device
>
> When will you realize real privacy experts & privacy organizations have
> shown all those criteria will happen by malevolent governments, parents,
> & malware developers after Apple puts these two new back doors into billions
> of iPhones around the world?

They've not shown anything. They've theorised based on hypotheticals.

It isn't an absolute truth that those things will ever actually happen.

In message <si1mbn$u1i$1@dont-email.me> sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> Matthew Green suggested in an article in Wired: “If they feel they
> must scan, they should scan unencrypted files on their servers,”

Which is STUPID. It means that Apple will have to decrypt all user data
on iCloud, and that is something they do not want to do, for obvious
reasons.

> which is the standard practice for other companies

that steal user images to train their ML models and to use in their
advertising.

> Facebook, which regularly scan for not only CSAM but also terroristic
> and other disallowed content types. Green also suggests that Apple
> should make iCloud storage end-to-end encrypted, so that it can’t view
> those images even if it wanted to."

So, they should scan server side but make it impossible to scan
server-side at the same time? I have a feeling you are misrepresenting
Mr Green, or you failed to comprehend all the words.

Here's the two facts that people need to reconcile:

1) Images WILL be scanned for CSAM. Period, end of discussion.
Apple is not going to be the sole outlier in scanning cloud
data for CSAM images.

2) Apple wants to be able to store ONLY encrypted user data.

There, those are the two facts. Now, come up with a better system than
the one Apple has developed to fit those two facts.

> See:
> <https://www.wired.com/story/apple-icloud-photo-scan-csam-pause-backlash/>.

That article is not by Matthew Green. Perhaps you should go find what
Green actually said instead of taking some quotes that are quite
probably out-of-context and somewhat screwed up by the author of that
article.

--
Man beats meat, loses fight, gets the girl.
(Rocky)

In message <170920211008539736%nospam@nospam.invalid> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <si1mbn$u1i$1@dont-email.me>, sms
> <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

>> What's more likely is that they end up doing is what Johns Hopkins
>> University cryptographer Matthew Green suggested in an article in Wired:
>> ³If they feel they must scan, they should scan unencrypted files on
>> their servers,² which is the standard practice for other companies, like
>> Facebook, which regularly scan for not only CSAM but also terroristic
>> and other disallowed content types.

> wanting apple to be like facebook is abhorrent.

> scanning on the servers violates the user's privacy, which is what
> apple wants to avoid.

>> Green also suggests that Apple
>> should make iCloud storage end-to-end encrypted, so that it can¹t view
>> those images even if it wanted to."

> matthew green is not very smart

No, he is.

> icloud is already encrypted, which prevents scanning server-side. they
> are two incompatible concepts.

Which makes me think this is a reporter fuck-up.

> apple's csam system is designed so that images can be checked *and*
> still continue with icloud being fully encrypted.

Yep.

--
THERE'S JUST ME, said Death. THE FINAL FRONTIER. --Moving Pictures

In message <si294q$qg9$1@dont-email.me> Joerg Lorenz <hugybear@gmx.ch> wrote:
> iCloud encryption is nothing that really matters. It is PR-bullshit.

And there, the anti-privacy kook reveals himself. Again.

--
"Kill yourself and roll a rogue. We'll wait"

In article <si79th$f4q$3@dont-email.me>, Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com>
wrote:

> >> Back door has several criteria, not a singl one is matched by the CSAM
> >> system
> >> *) A hidden feature or bug
> >> *) Allow unauthorized access
> >> *) Allows surreptitious access
> >> *) allows accessing the data on the computer or device
> >
> > When will you realize real privacy experts & privacy organizations have
> > shown all those criteria will happen by malevolent governments, parents,
> > & malware developers after Apple puts these two new back doors into billions
> > of iPhones around the world?
>
> They've not shown anything.

actually, those who make such claims have shown that they are ignorant
about what a backdoor is or how apple's system works, and have zero
interest in learning.

> They've theorised based on hypotheticals.

ones which do not apply because apple's system was designed to avoid
such scenarios.

> It isn't an absolute truth that those things will ever actually happen.

on the other hand, it's close to an absolute truth that they won't
happen because the obstacles needed to overcome are very, very high.

On 9/18/2021 11:10 PM, Robin Goodfellow wrote:
> sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> asked
>> It's likely that the NCMEC was upset that they were receiving so few
>> reports of CSAM from Apple (since Apple is not scanning iPhoto storage).
>
> Knowing full well the only time Apple ever tells the truth is when they're
> forced to, in court, we may never know what Apple was thinking they'd gain
> with this stupid idea of scanning iMessages and photos on your iPhone.

The reason is pretty clear. When they scan iCloud photos on the server,
they have to decrypt them prior to applying the hash. It would be less
burdensome to scan the unencrypted photos on the device to look for
CSAM. We're talking about hundreds of millions of photos per day to be
scanned. Meanwhile you have the Bionic processor in the phone with a
huge surplus of processing power.

> All we know is a hundred privacy organizations and many privacy experts
> around the world have criticized Apple for what is clearly a dumb move.

It was not CSAM, per se, that the privacy and human rights organizations
were concerned about, it was the potential for abuse by other entities
that would no doubt demand on-device scanning for other things.
Assurances by Apple that they would never comply with such requests fell
on deaf ears, due to past history, see
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html>.

Perhaps the belief was that since the photos would be scanned no matter
what, no one would care if it was done on the phone versus on the server.

sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> asked
> The reason is pretty clear. When they scan iCloud photos on the server,
> they have to decrypt them prior to applying the hash.

This is logical.

However... other things are as logical (IMHO)... given that...

There are at least two competing arguments we'd need to hash out before we
can come to that conclusion that "the reason is pretty clear" why Apple
chose to do something so stupid (without even asking security experts!)...

.... given it was "said" (yes, I know it was later found out to be incorrect)
that Apple "can" scan the hash of an encrypted file, as long as it was Apple
who did the initial encryption. (Whether or not that is technically feasible
would matter greatly if this is to be an option).

The second argument we'd have to hash out is why should Apple actively do
anything?

Why doesn't Apple barge into all our homes to look for contraband?
Why doesn't Apple track our GPS and report us for speeding?
Why doesn't Apple take all hit and run accidents and actively report the
cars in the vicinity of each one, without being specifically asked?

The number of illegal things Apple "can" scan for is enormous, is it not?

> It would be less
> burdensome to scan the unencrypted photos on the device to look for
> CSAM. We're talking about hundreds of millions of photos per day to be
> scanned. Meanwhile you have the Bionic processor in the phone with a
> huge surplus of processing power.

While I certainly "get" that any company would love to offload its computer
resources to billions of their captive devices around the world, I can't
believe that, if and when Apple decides to become an active arm of law
enforcement, that Apple can't spare the server resources. I just can't.

Apple is an almost purely MARKETING company (they spend almost nothing in
R&D - it's all marketing).

Hence, it's logical to believe Apple was hoping, much like Cuomo did, to get
a MARKETING coup out of doing things "differently" than the other guys do.

Let's never forget Apple does nothing for good reasons; all that Apple does
is for Marketing (did I mention Apple's R&D is less than anyone else in high
tech yet?)...

If Apple does it, it's for the MARKETING value. It's never "for the kids."
(It's _only_ for the profit that MARKETING garners Apple.)

*What MARKETING value was Apple _hoping_ to get*... is the real question
(I believe).

>> All we know is a hundred privacy organizations and many privacy experts
>> around the world have criticized Apple for what is clearly a dumb move.
>
> It was not CSAM, per se, that the privacy and human rights organizations
> were concerned about, it was the potential for abuse by other entities
> that would no doubt demand on-device scanning for other things.

I'm not sure why you said that as we all know this is the case.
It was a dumb implementation.

I even ask (see above) why Apple feels so desperate to become an active arm
of law enforcement.

Why doesn't Apple actively report all speeders for example?

Why doesn't Apple actively report people to authorities who sleep in other
homes than the ones that they normally sleep in?

Why doesn't Apple actively report anyone who trespasses in property that
they don't own?

What is it that is forcing Apple to become an active arm of law enforcement?

> Assurances by Apple that they would never comply with such requests fell
> on deaf ears, due to past history, see
> <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html>.

Apple lies, and you know that.
Apple only tells the truth in court.

Even when Apple "says" they follow the law, we clearly know Apple does not.

Otherwise Apple wouldn't have paid almost a billion dollars last year for
their public lies (e.g., they backdated release notes and then lied about
it, just to cover up that they throttled phones to make people buy new ones,
which is what they admitted criminal guilt to French criminal prosecutors).

> Perhaps the belief was that since the photos would be scanned no matter
> what, no one would care if it was done on the phone versus on the server.

Let's never forget Apple is all MARKETING (there's almost no R&D at Apple).

As with the politician Cuomo (see previous cites), everything Apple does is
focused on what MARKETING value Apple can get out of doing it.

Hence, I think Apple was attempting to get a MARKETING coup out of this.

I suspect the fact they got intense negative press is the _only_ reason they
stopped it.

But if they were attempting to get MARKETING value out of this stupid move,
why didn't Apple ask even a single reliable expert or privacy organization?

It doesn't make sense (to me) for Apple marketing to be _that_ stupid.
--
When the news finally reports the _real_ reason, please let us all know.

nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
> on the other hand, it's close to an absolute truth that they won't
> happen because the obstacles needed to overcome are very, very high.

How many zero-click zero-day holes are in your iPhone at this moment,
nospam?

nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
> it's not any type of backdoor, which means they didn't look at reality.
>
> they *did* look at perception and that by claiming it was, they could
> gain popularity and profit from it.

For once, nospam got it right...

What's prescient is how nospam described Apple marketing motives so well.
1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"

Never forget Apple spends the least in R&D than all high tech companies.
Apple is all marketing (with concomitant huge profits as a direct result).

Bearing in mind Apple marketing is arguably the finest in the world, one has
to wonder why Apple didn't ask even a single privacy organization (out of
hundreds) what _they_ thought of this hare-brained idea marketing cooked up.

Likewise, one has to wonder why Apple marketing didn't ask even a _single_
privacy expert (as far as we know) what _they_ thought of this marketing
idea.

Why?

Why did the smartest marketing org on the planet do something _that_ stupid?
--
Something is fishy here as Apple marketing isn't usually this stupid.

In article <si7oh8$gpe$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

>
> The reason is pretty clear.

yet you fail to see it.

> When they scan iCloud photos on the server,
> they have to decrypt them prior to applying the hash.

thereby violating the user's privacy.

facebook doesn't care about privacy, so they scan server-side, and for
much more than just csam.

apple does not want to do that.

> It would be less
> burdensome to scan the unencrypted photos on the device to look for
> CSAM. We're talking about hundreds of millions of photos per day to be
> scanned. Meanwhile you have the Bionic processor in the phone with a
> huge surplus of processing power.

that is a stupid conspiracy theory.

apple's servers have vastly more powerful processors and i/o bandwidth
than a phone ever will.

> It was not CSAM, per se, that the privacy and human rights organizations
> were concerned about, it was the potential for abuse by other entities
> that would no doubt demand on-device scanning for other things.

only because they didn't bother reading how it works and decided to
grift the stupids.

why don't those privacy and human rights organizations go after
facebook and google, who can *easily* expand their search to anything
at all.

> Assurances by Apple that they would never comply with such requests fell
> on deaf ears, due to past history,

past history shows that apple does *not* comply and has *zero*
intention of complying.

see apple vs doj, where requests to add a backdoor were met with the
legal equivalent of go fuck yourself.

not only that, but the apple employees who had the knowledge to
implement it went on record that if ultimately apple lost the legal
battle and was forced to do so, they would immediately quit, leaving
apple unable to comply.

past history also shows is that facebook, google and others *do* comply
with such requests, and have *already* done so.

> see
>
> <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.htm
> l>.

not relevant and you don't understand it either.

> Perhaps the belief was that since the photos would be scanned no matter
> what, no one would care if it was done on the phone versus on the server.

nope. it's because it is the only way to keep the user's photos
private, which you said was important.

In article <si80ok$pr9$1@gioia.aioe.org>, Robin Goodfellow
<Ancient-of-Days@Heaven.Net> wrote:

> What's prescient is how nospam described Apple marketing motives so well.
> 1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
> 2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"

i was talking about the eff.

stop lying.

On Sep 19, 2021, Chris wrote
(in article<news:si79th$f4q$2@dont-email.me>):
> These concerns also need to be balanced against the potential benefit of
> both reducing the dissemination of CSAM and additional harms to children.

What evidence exists anywhere this will have any effect on children at all?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
>> What's prescient is how nospam described Apple marketing motives so well.
>> 1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
>> 2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"
>
> i was talking about the eff.

Of all the apologists, nospam, you are the least ignorant.

What tells me you're a bullshitter is you KNOW Apple marketing perfectly!
1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"

Given Apple did this purely for marketing purposes, it seems rather stupid
of them to not ask even a _single_ privacy expert what they thought of it.

Nor did, apparently, Apple marketing ask even a _single_ privacy
organization what they thought of this stupid idea concocted by marketing.

What's odd is that Apple marketing is not normally this stupid.
Which leads me to believe there's more to this story than what we know.
--
Never forget nobody in tech spends LESS than does Apple in actual R&D.

RonTheGuy <ron@null.invalid> wrote:
> On Sep 19, 2021, Chris wrote
> (in article<news:si79th$f4q$2@dont-email.me>):
>> These concerns also need to be balanced against the potential benefit of
>> both reducing the dissemination of CSAM and additional harms to children.
>
> What evidence exists anywhere this will have any effect on children at all?

Define "this".

> Ron, the humblest guy in town.
>
>

In message <190920211452572811%nospam@nospam.invalid> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <si7oh8$gpe$1@dont-email.me>, sms
> <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

>>
>> The reason is pretty clear.

> yet you fail to see it.

>> When they scan iCloud photos on the server,
>> they have to decrypt them prior to applying the hash.

> thereby violating the user's privacy.

> facebook doesn't care about privacy, so they scan server-side, and for
> much more than just csam.

And then use your images to create advertisements fr you, leaving you to
believe that your contact are endorsing products Facebook is shilling.
Why anyone uses Facebook of anything is beyond me, they are easily the
worst company in the world, and dedicated to violating every users
privacy in every possible way by any possible means. The fuckers even
created a fake VPN so they could intercept every bit of data from people
dumb enough to use that VPN.

> apple does not want to do that.

Of course not, they actually care about privacy, unlike all these shill
trolls in these newsgroups.

>> It was not CSAM, per se, that the privacy and human rights organizations
>> were concerned about, it was the potential for abuse by other entities
>> that would no doubt demand on-device scanning for other things.

> only because they didn't bother reading how it works and decided to
> grift the stupids.

Yep.

> why don't those privacy and human rights organizations go after
> facebook and google, who can *easily* expand their search to anything
> at all.

Because they won't get headlines, everyone know facebook and google are
shit.

>> Assurances by Apple that they would never comply with such requests fell
>> on deaf ears, due to past history,

What past history? Be specific.

> past history shows that apple does *not* comply and has *zero*
> intention of complying.

Exactly. People also seem to misunderstand that this scanning for CSAM
is looking for SPECIFIC images. It would be basically useless for a
widespread system of trying to ban types of images.

> past history also shows is that facebook, google and others *do* comply
> with such requests, and have *already* done so.

>> Perhaps the belief was that since the photos would be scanned no matter
>> what, no one would care if it was done on the phone versus on the server.

> nope. it's because it is the only way to keep the user's photos
> private, which you said was important.

The trolls obviously do not care about privacy. They want all data to be
unencrypted and scanned on server.

--
'What is this thing, anyway?' said the Dean, inspecting the implement
in his hands. 'It's called a shovel', said the Senior Wrangler.
'I've seen the gardeners use them. You stick the sharp end in the
ground. Then it gets a bit technical.' --Reaper Man

In article <slrnskfdjm.2ii8.g.kreme@m1mini.local>, Lewis
<g.kreme@kreme.dont-email.me> wrote:

>
> > facebook doesn't care about privacy, so they scan server-side, and for
> > much more than just csam.
>
> And then use your images to create advertisements fr you, leaving you to
> believe that your contact are endorsing products Facebook is shilling.
> Why anyone uses Facebook of anything is beyond me, they are easily the
> worst company in the world, and dedicated to violating every users
> privacy in every possible way by any possible means. The fuckers even
> created a fake VPN so they could intercept every bit of data from people
> dumb enough to use that VPN.

which apple quickly shut down, going so far to pull their enterprise
cert, which caused their own internal apps to stop working.

On 9/19/2021 11:36 AM, Robin Goodfellow wrote:
> sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> asked
>> The reason is pretty clear. When they scan iCloud photos on the server,
>> they have to decrypt them prior to applying the hash.
>
> This is logical.
>
> However... other things are as logical (IMHO)... given that...
>
> There are at least two competing arguments we'd need to hash out before we
> can come to that conclusion that "the reason is pretty clear" why Apple
> chose to do something so stupid (without even asking security experts!)...
>
> ... given it was "said" (yes, I know it was later found out to be incorrect)
> that Apple "can" scan the hash of an encrypted file, as long as it was Apple
> who did the initial encryption. (Whether or not that is technically feasible
> would matter greatly if this is to be an option).

Yeah, I wondered about that too, but I don't think that scanning the
hash would work. A completely different hash could be generated from
essentially the same image based on very minor differences in the image.

> The second argument we'd have to hash out is why should Apple actively do
> anything?

Because other cloud service providers already do CSAM detection on their
servers.

<snip>

> While I certainly "get" that any company would love to offload its computer
> resources to billions of their captive devices around the world, I can't
> believe that, if and when Apple decides to become an active arm of law
> enforcement, that Apple can't spare the server resources. I just can't.
A "compute server" or "GPU server" is a different animal than a storage
server, it's designed with multiple high-power Xeon or EPYC, and Nvidia
Ampere processors. It's understandable why Apple wanted to offload the
photo scanning to users' devices.

On 9/19/2021 11:50 AM, Robin Goodfellow wrote:
> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
>> it's not any type of backdoor, which means they didn't look at reality.
>>
>> they *did* look at perception and that by claiming it was, they could
>> gain popularity and profit from it.
>
> For once, nospam got it right...
>
> What's prescient is how nospam described Apple marketing motives so well.
> 1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
> 2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"

He got #1 right anyway, but I doubt if anyone ever believed that they
would gain popularity from their proposal. If they didn't anticipate the
negative reaction from hundreds of privacy organizations and millions of
end users, then that's something they need to look into.

On 2021-09-20, sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> On 9/19/2021 11:50 AM, Robin Goodfellow wrote:
>> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
>>>
>>>> The EFF doesn't look at perception, they look at reality. And to be
>>>> fair, they did at least state that it is a "narrow back door."
>>>
>>> it's not any type of backdoor, which means they didn't look at
>>> reality.
>>>
>>> they *did* look at perception and that by claiming it was, they
>>> could gain popularity and profit from it.
>>
>> For once, nospam got it right...
>>
>> What's prescient is how nospam described Apple marketing motives so
>> well. 1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and, 2.
>> *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"
>
> He got #1 right anyway

He wasn't talking about Apple, and you both know that. And anyone who
can read can see he was talking about the *EFF* above. Your trolls are
just plain lame.

> but I doubt if anyone ever believed that they would gain popularity
> from their proposal. If they didn't anticipate the negative reaction

Again, as anyone who can read knows, he was talking about the *EFF* who
looked at public perception ad thought they could gain popularity. The
fact that you complete dipshit trolls think you can falsify what others
say here without anyone else noticing says way more about *you* than
nospam or anyone else. You argue in bad faith, misconstrue, and falsify
things other people say because it's the only way you can function -
rational, honest, fact-based discussions are literally beyond your
means. You are just fucking pathetic.

--
E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter.
I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR

On 2021-09-20, sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
>
> Yeah, I wondered about that too, but I don't think that scanning the
> hash would work. A completely different hash could be generated from
> essentially the same image based on very minor differences in the image.

Admit to the world that private set intersection is completely over your
head without saying "private set intersection is completely over my
head". : D

--
E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter.
I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR

In article <si8k4b$d4m$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

> A completely different hash could be generated from
> essentially the same image based on very minor differences in the image.

yet another thing you don't understand about apple's csam.

apple's neural hash is designed specifically to avoid alterations to
the images.

> Because other cloud service providers already do CSAM detection on their
> servers.

other providers scan for much more than just csam and can easily be
forced by another entity to scan for even more, the very thing you say
is so dangerous about what apple proposed.

apple's system is designed so that other entities *can't* force them to
scan for other stuff.

> A "compute server" or "GPU server" is a different animal than a storage
> server, it's designed with multiple high-power Xeon or EPYC, and Nvidia
> Ampere processors. It's understandable why Apple wanted to offload the
> photo scanning to users' devices.

completely wrong and an absurd conspiracy theory.

sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> asked
>> The second argument we'd have to hash out is why should Apple actively do
>> anything?
>
> Because other cloud service providers already do CSAM detection on their
> servers.

If everyone jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge, why should Apple follow them?

> It's understandable why Apple wanted to offload the photo scanning to users' devices.

Everything Apple does is to artificially differentiate Apple from the rest.

Had this marketing maneuver worked, it would have been as great a bullshit
marketing coup as it was when Apple claimed all off-brand chargers were
electrocuting people in their bathtubs.

The (rather gullible) user base _ate_ that Apple bullshit up... remember?
But nobody was eating this bullshit this time.

What's perplexing is _how_ could Apple have thought people were _that_
gullible?

Nobody is that gullible.
Are they?

In article <si8r7r$jpo$1@gioia.aioe.org>, Robin Goodfellow
<Ancient-of-Days@Heaven.Net> wrote:

> If everyone jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge, why should Apple follow them?

if 'everyone jumped off the brooklyn bridge', then who would be left to
follow? nobody.

you haven't thought this through.

On Sep 20, 2021, Jolly Roger wrote
(in article<news:iqq382Ftcq0U2@mid.individual.net>):
> Admit to the world that private set intersection is completely over your
> head without saying "private set intersection is completely over my
> head". : D

How did you confuse the issue of on the phone scanning with that of PSI?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.