On Sep 16, 2021, Lewis wrote
(in article<news:slrnsk6mp1.22a.g.kreme@m1mini.local>):
> And that is a lie. It is not ambiguous at all.

What government agencies and malware writers have you spoken to about this?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

In article <1311ghubt16y4$.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

>
> For now it seems Apple listened to privacy experts

they listened to privacy experts in *designing* it.

> so maybe there won't be
> these new back doors added to every phone which users can't opt out of.

there aren't any backdoors. full fucking stop.

> By opting out I mean what everyone means which is that the governments and
> malware writers will be opening these new back doors and that is what the
> user can't opt out of.

tin foil, aisle 4.

In article <1j9dvlh4o3hil$.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> > EFF called it a "narrow back door,"
>
> It doesn't matter how narrow a back door is since governments and malware
> writers around the world will be the ones opening them up on your phone.

there's nothing to open up. you're trolling.

On Sep 16, 2021, sms wrote
(in article<news:si0081$v96$1@dont-email.me>):
> it's a virtual certainty that they would insist.

Governments & malware writers are probably still working on expanding the
back doors for when Apple finally ships these new back doors, they're ready.
> Would Apple cave if such a government insisted is the real question.
> Based on historical evidence, it's entirely possible

Apple said they always follow the law in every country they sell phones.

The governments need only issue Apple a gag order and it's done that easy.
Malware writers won't even do that.

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 16, 2021, Jolly Roger wrote
(in article<news:iqh9l9F84bcU1@mid.individual.net>):
> Since these are all optional services, opting out is very easy to do.

How do you opt out of malware code & government use of the new back doors?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On 9/16/2021 11:22 AM, RonTheGuy wrote:
> On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
> (in article<news:160920211410457746%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
>>> And the question is not "could a
>>> malevolent government insist...?," it's a virtual certainty that they
>>> would insist.
>>
>> they might insist, but the question is will they succeed.
>>
>> the answer is a resounding no.
>
> Why then did Apple say they follow all the laws everywhere iPhones are sold?
>
> Is Apple now going to say a "resounding no" to the laws of those countries?

Based on the past, the answer is that it's likely that Apple would
comply with the insistence of a government, though it might depend on
how badly they want to sell their products into that country. If Cuba or
North Korea insisted then Apple would likely say no since the number of
units that could be sold to a poor country would be minimal. Of course
you won't know until it happens, and even then you might not know
because it could be kept secret.

The best approach is to not open a backdoor in the first place, however
slightly (or if someone doesn't want to call the CSAM proposal a
backdoor, then whatever they want to call it); it should not be put
there as a temptation.

Apple took the right approach by backing down and respecting the views
of human rights advocates, privacy advocates, child-protection
advocates, and others, in "delaying" this whole thing. Hopefully, as
everyone expects, the "delay" will turn into forever, at least in terms
of on-device scanning. What Apple does on their servers, to users'
iClould storage, is another story entirely.

See
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html>.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211429244883%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
> there aren't any backdoors. full fucking stop.

There isn't now because Apple put on hold their plans to add them.

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211429254937%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
>>> EFF called it a "narrow back door,"
>>
>> It doesn't matter how narrow a back door is since governments and malware
>> writers around the world will be the ones opening them up on your phone.
>
> there's nothing to open up

There's nothing now but only because Apple put on hold the plan to add them.

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On 9/16/2021 11:31 AM, RonTheGuy wrote:
> On Sep 16, 2021, sms wrote
> (in article<news:si0081$v96$1@dont-email.me>):
>> it's a virtual certainty that they would insist.
>
> Governments & malware writers are probably still working on expanding the
> back doors for when Apple finally ships these new back doors, they're ready.

It's highly unlikely that those back doors (or whatever someone want to
call them) will never ship. The push back by so many respected
organizations almost certainly had an effect. EFF flying a plane towing
a banner over Cupertino on Tuesday was a reminder that they are
remaining vigilant. People can donate to EFF at
<https://supporters.eff.org/donate/donate-eff-0>.

We don't even know if the CEO even knew about this idea or it was
proposed by some marketing person who didn't run a sanity check on the
proposal. It didn't take very long for Apple to back down. No doubt they
were concerned about the effect of the proposal on iPhone 13 sales,
though anyone that updated older models to iOS 15 would also have had
this system installed on their phones.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211425149884%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
>> Why then did Apple say they follow all the laws everywhere iPhones are sold?
>
> they do.

Then Apple isn't going to say no to governments who expand these back doors
& Apple can't say no to malware writers who will also expand the back doors.

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211410447675%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
> check apple's white papers for more detail.

Do you think governments & malware writers care what Apple asks them to do?

>> The only thing is, and this is something I've seen elsewhere, so it's
>> not my own, could a malevolent government insist that other hashes were
>> included in the database and therefore hijack the purpose of this move?
>
> it's designed specifically to prevent that.

Malevolent governments & malware writers will be expanding these back doors.

> the database used is an intersection of at least two entities, so at a
> minimum, you'd have to get all of them to conspire against the same set
> of images.

It doesn't matter to malware writers & malevolent governments how Apple
thinks it will be used.

> but that's only part of the process. once ~30 images are flagged, it
> goes to manual review, so you'd *also* have to get the manual review
> team on board with the conspiracy.

Malware writers & malevolent governments aren't going to follow Apple rules.

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

In article <1943ttkgn96el.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> Governments & malware writers are probably still working on expanding the
> back doors for when Apple finally ships these new back doors, they're ready.
>

>
> Apple said they always follow the law in every country they sell phones.
>
> The governments need only issue Apple a gag order and it's done that easy.
> Malware writers won't even do that.

stock up on the tin foil. you are running low.

In article <nf5ajfbfm3tz.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> > Since these are all optional services, opting out is very easy to do.
>
> How do you opt out of malware code & government use of the new back doors?

what part of there is no backdoor is unclear?

did you even read the white papers? (no, you didn't).
do you know what a backdoor is? (no, you don't).
are you going to keep repeating the same bullshit? (yes, you are).

In article <si02lp$h52$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

>
> The best approach is to not open a backdoor in the first place,

exactly why apple didn't do that.

>
> Apple took the right approach by backing down and respecting the views
> of human rights advocates, privacy advocates, child-protection
> advocates, and others, in "delaying" this whole thing.

that's a gross misrepresentation of what happened.

> Hopefully, as
> everyone expects, the "delay" will turn into forever, at least in terms
> of on-device scanning.

thereby making iphones the ideal platform for sexual predators.

maybe that's why you're so against it.

> What Apple does on their servers, to users'
> iClould storage, is another story entirely.

apple's csam is *only* for photos uploaded to icloud.

whether those photos are checked before they're sent or upon its
arrival is an implementation detail to prevent apple from seeing
non-csam photos, thereby guaranteeing the user's privacy.

In article <f74cpc2rjsuj.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> > there aren't any backdoors. full fucking stop.
>
> There isn't now because Apple put on hold their plans to add them.

there never were any plans to add them.

you obviously have chosen to not read apple's white papers on how it
works or learn about what a backdoor actually is, instead preferring to
spew about things you do not understand.

In article <2krpibocarxj$.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> >> It doesn't matter how narrow a back door is since governments and malware
> >> writers around the world will be the ones opening them up on your phone.
> >
> > there's nothing to open up
>
> There's nothing now but only because Apple put on hold the plan to add them.

there never was a plan to add them and repeating it doesn't make it
true.

go learn about how it actually works.

In article <si035g$klq$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

> EFF flying a plane towing
> a banner over Cupertino on Tuesday was a reminder that they are
> remaining vigilant. People can donate to EFF at

eff is doing those stunts to grift.

> We don't even know if the CEO even knew about this idea or it was
> proposed by some marketing person who didn't run a sanity check on the
> proposal.

tim cook knew about it along with everything else that goes on in the
company.

it's not possible for a random 'marketing person' to add a feature
because they felt like it.

> It didn't take very long for Apple to back down. No doubt they
> were concerned about the effect of the proposal on iPhone 13 sales,

that was not why.

> though anyone that updated older models to iOS 15 would also have had
> this system installed on their phones.

also not a concern.

In article <1i79n3b07ue7f$.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> >> Why then did Apple say they follow all the laws everywhere iPhones are
> >> sold?
> >
> > they do.
>
> Then Apple isn't going to say no to governments who expand these back doors
> & Apple can't say no to malware writers who will also expand the back doors.

you missed the part that it would require *multiple* governments to all
agree.

one government can insist on photos of people named ron to be flagged,
but unless other governments also do the same thing *and* the manual
review team is onboard, it won't have any effect whatsoever.

the entire system is designed so that what you describe is not
realistically possible.

In article <1p1zbu70gnbqt.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

>
> Malevolent governments & malware writers will be expanding these back doors.

you're using words you don't understand again.

On Sep 16, 2021, Wilf wrote
(in article<news:si01ji$1ucu$1@gioia.aioe.org>):
> I'll try to look at those white papers.

What's in any Apple white papers doesn't matter to those governments &
malware writers who won't care how Apple wants it to be used by them.

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211425139833%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
> read the white papers

Why do you think governments & malware writers care what Apple asks them to do?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211427388492%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
> read the white papers on how it actually works

The reason for the emergency white papers was for Apple to explain to a
sceptical world how Apple hopes it would work.

Governments and malware writers will read Apple's white papers to learn how
Apple expects the software to be used.

But why do you think malware writers & governments will care what Apple can
only wish they'd do?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 16, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:160920211452147063%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
> you obviously have chosen to not read apple's white papers

Apple wrote the emergency white papers to try to calm down a sceptical
world.

But why do you think malevolent governments and malware writers care what
Apple can only hope they'd do?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

Wilf <wilf@postingx.uk> wrote:
> On 16/09/2021 at 19:10, nospam wrote:
>> In article <shvvpm$11i8$3@gioia.aioe.org>, Wilf <wilf@postingx.uk>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>>> do they classify as a "back door", and why do some here say there is no
>>>>> "back door"? TIA.
>>>> A back door is a hidden feature or a flaw in software that allows unknown
>>>> and unauthorized access to a computer's data. There is no hidden
>>>> feature or flaw, not unknown access, no unauthorized access, no back
>>>> door.
>>>
>>> Might that just be semantics, though?
>>
>> nope. the definition is clear, except to those with agenda and the
>> usual trolls.
>>
>>> Ok, so if a back door is something
>>> hidden, then this is not a back door per se.
>>
>> exactly the point.
>>
>>> Maybe a 'Front Door'? But
>>> it could allow governments to insist that other hashes be included in
>>> the database used to identify offending pictures.
>>
>> multiple governments would need to conspire against the same images
>> (good luck getting multiple governments to agree on anything) *and* get
>> the manual review team to go along with it.
>>
>> <https://i1.wp.com/9to5mac.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2021/08/Screen-
>> Shot-2021-08-13-at-2.01.20-PM.jpeg>
>>
>
> Thank you, that does make sense.
>

Except it doesn’t when considering Islamic countries who find the very same
things objectionable under their Sharia law. And it doesn’t even have to
be images, how long before it gets expanded to keywords? The iMessage
scanning has the potential to be the one focused on by governments.

On 2021-09-16, Wilf <wilf@postingx.uk> wrote:
>
> Thank you, that is very interesting. And yes, I do "want to know"!!!

That's comforting, because the trolls here are definitely *not*
interested in having a rational, factual discussion about this. Their
primary interest is trolling.

> The only thing is, and this is something I've seen elsewhere, so it's
> not my own, could a malevolent government insist that other hashes were
> included in the database and therefore hijack the purpose of this move?

No, because Apple would learn that the database was modified, and Apple
employees who verify the secure safety vouchers as mentioned above would
see that the matching images are not actually CSAM. And if that happened
on a regular basis, it would be very obvious that the database is
tainted.

From Apple's FAQ (available at https://www.apple.com/child-safety):

---
Can the CSAM detection system in iCloud Photos be used to detect things
other than CSAM?

Our process is designed to prevent that from happening. CSAM detection
for iCloud Photos is built so that the system only works with CSAM image
hashes provided by NCMEC and other child safety organizations. This
set of image hashes is based on images acquired and validated to be
CSAM by at least two child safety organizations. There is no automated
reporting to law enforcement, and Apple conducts human review before
making a report to NCMEC. As a result, the system is only designed to
report photos that are known CSAM in iCloud Photos. In most countries,
including the United States, simply possessing these images is a crime
and Apple is obligated to report any instances we learn of to the
appropriate authorities.

Could governments force Apple to add non-CSAM images to the hash list?

No. Apple would refuse such demands and our system has been designed to
prevent that from happening. Apple’s CSAM detection capability is built
solely to detect known CSAM images stored in iCloud Photos that have
been identified by experts at NCMEC and other child safety groups. The
set of image hashes used for matching are from known, existing images of
CSAM and only contains entries that were independently submitted by two
or more child safety orga- nizations operating in separate sovereign
jurisdictions. Apple does not add to the set of known CSAM image hashes,
and the system is designed to be auditable. The same set of hashes is
stored in the operating system of every iPhone and iPad user, so
targeted attacks against only specific individuals are not possible
under this design. Furthermore, Apple conducts human re- view before
making a report to NCMEC. In a case where the system identifies photos
that do not match known CSAM images, the account would not be disabled
and no report would be filed to NCMEC.

We have faced demands to build and deploy government-mandated changes
that degrade the privacy of users before, and have steadfastly refused
those demands. We will continue to refuse them in the future. Let us be
clear, this technology is limited to detecting CSAM stored in iCloud and
we will not accede to any government’s request to expand it.

Can non-CSAM images be “injected” into the system to identify ac- counts
for things other than CSAM?

Our process is designed to prevent that from happening. The set of image
hashes used for matching are from known, existing images of CSAM that
have been acquired and validated by at least two child safety
organizations. Apple does not add to the set of known CSAM image hash-
es. The same set of hashes is stored in the operating system of every
iPhone and iPad user, so targeted attacks against only specific
individuals are not possible under our design. Finally, there is no
automated reporting to law enforcement, and Apple conducts human review
before making a report to NCMEC. In the unlikely event of the system
identifying images that do not match known CSAM images, the account
would not be disabled and no report would be filed to NCMEC.

Will CSAM detection in iCloud Photos falsely report innocent people to
law enforcement?

No. The system is designed to be very accurate, and the likelihood that
the system would incor- rectly identify any given account is less than
one in one trillion per year. In addition, any time an account is
identified by the system, Apple conducts human review before making a
report to NCMEC. As a result, system errors or attacks will not result
in innocent people being reported to NCMEC.
---

--
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JR