On Sep 18, 2021, sms wrote
(in article<news:si5gmj$uk2$1@dont-email.me>):
> We all know what the eventual outcome of all this is going to be. Apple
> will scan unencrypted files on their servers, which is what other
> companies, like Facebook, already do.

Why does Apple need to change anything from what they're doing today?

> Apple can still use the CSAM hashes, but on their servers

Doesn't Apple already scan the encrypted messages for known images?

> Repairing the bruised image of NCMEC needs to also be attempted. Their
> ill-advised message to Apple employees, labeling those who favor privacy
> "the screeching voices of the minority" should never have happened (this
> was an internal memo from Apple quoting a separate memo from NCMEC

Why does Apple & NCMEC feel privacy experts are the "screeching minority?"

> Hopefully Apple will put procedures in place that will prevent this kind
> of thing in the future. Perhaps set up an advisory committee with
> participants from leading privacy and human rights organizations to vet
> anything they plan to add to their devices that affect privacy.

Why didn't Apple test this idea out with any privacy experts first?

> In a few months this whole debacle will fall out of the news cycle

Does Apple really think privacy experts are only a "screeching minority?"

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

In article <tx7rvtkj58yb.dlg@news.solani.org>, RonTheGuy
<ron@null.invalid> wrote:

> Why didn't Apple test this idea out with any privacy experts first?

they did, along with cryptographic experts and many others.

On 2021-09-20, RonTheGuy <ron@null.invalid> wrote:
> On Sep 20, 2021, Jolly Roger wrote
> (in article<news:iqq382Ftcq0U2@mid.individual.net>):
>> Admit to the world that private set intersection is completely over
>> your head without saying "private set intersection is completely over
>> my head". : D
>
> How did you confuse the issue of on the phone scanning with that of
> PSI?

The only confusion is coming from you, dipshit troll.

> Ron, the dizziest troll in town.

Word.

--
E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter.
I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR

On Sep 19, 2021, Jolly Roger wrote
(in article<news:iqqhh5F1dqvU1@mid.individual.net>):
>> How did you confuse the issue of on the phone scanning with that of
>> PSI?
>
> The only confusion is coming from you, dipshit troll.

Do you understand the issues or not?

How is it that you are still unaware that PSI isn't the issue here.

How can it be that you are unaware that the issue is on the phone scanning?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 19, 2021, nospam wrote
(in article<news:190920212316281663%nospam@nospam.invalid>):
>> Why didn't Apple test this idea out with any privacy experts first?
>
> they did, along with cryptographic experts and many others.

How is it that you are still unaware that cryptography & privacy are
different issues in this situation?

A hundred respected privacy organizations weren't consulted by Apple.
There is no evidence that Apple consulted any respected privacy experts.

How is it that you can say Apple did without any evidence supporting that?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 19, 2021, Chris wrote
(in article<news:si8bek$c0h$1@dont-email.me>):
>> What evidence exists anywhere this will have any effect on children at all?
>
> Define "this".

How can you still be unaware of what Apple did?

Since we already know Apple never asked any privacy organizations nor any
privacy experts, then it's obvious that Apple wasn't concerned with privacy.

What was Apple concerned about then if it isn't privacy?

What evidence is there that implementing these scans on the phone will have
any effect on the global amount of illegal photographs in people's
possession?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

RonTheGuy <ron@null.invalid> wrote:
> On Sep 19, 2021, Chris wrote
> (in article<news:si8bek$c0h$1@dont-email.me>):
>>> What evidence exists anywhere this will have any effect on children at all?
>>
>> Define "this".
>
> How can you still be unaware of what Apple did?
>
> Since we already know Apple never asked any privacy organizations nor any
> privacy experts, then it's obvious that Apple wasn't concerned with privacy.
>
> What was Apple concerned about then if it isn't privacy?
>
> What evidence is there that implementing these scans on the phone will have
> any effect on the global amount of illegal photographs in people's
> possession?

The point is that law enforcement all over the world are doing everything
they can to stop this dissemination and catch those involved. Many online
services are indirectly involved and they should try to do as much as they
can to help.

It's all part of the jigsaw.

There won't be any evidence until the system is turned on, so impossible to
answer right now.

sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> On 9/19/2021 11:50 AM, Robin Goodfellow wrote:
>> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
>>> it's not any type of backdoor, which means they didn't look at reality.
>>>
>>> they *did* look at perception and that by claiming it was, they could
>>> gain popularity and profit from it.
>>
>> For once, nospam got it right...
>>
>> What's prescient is how nospam described Apple marketing motives so well.
>> 1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
>> 2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"
>
> He got #1 right anyway, but I doubt if anyone ever believed that they
> would gain popularity from their proposal. If they didn't anticipate the
> negative reaction from hundreds of privacy organizations and millions of
> end users, then that's something they need to look into.

They did. Which is why they published their white papers carefully
describing the technology. What they perhaps didn't anticipate was how many
didn't read them or didn't understand them.

On 9/20/2021 1:19 AM, Chris wrote:

<snip>

> They did. Which is why they published their white papers carefully
> describing the technology. What they perhaps didn't anticipate was how many
> didn't read them or didn't understand them.

What they actually didn't anticipate was how many people read them,
understood them, but didn't believe the assertions that the technology
would not be expanded beyond CSAM. There are lots of governments that
would love to scan for images of various things, including some very
wealthy countries that buy a lot of iPhones.

The whole patronizing attitude of "let us explain to you why what we're
doing is wonderful," when in fact all the privacy experts, human rights
experts, and child protection organizations explained why it's _not_
wonderful, needs to change. And it did change when the "delay" was
announced. You know that they're not going to bring back on-device
scanning and will simply do what other cloud service providers already
do--scan on the server side.

You can get the facts here:
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life>.

In article <si9hud$1lc$1@dont-email.me>, sms
<scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

> > They did. Which is why they published their white papers carefully
> > describing the technology. What they perhaps didn't anticipate was how many
> > didn't read them or didn't understand them.
>
> What they actually didn't anticipate was how many people read them,
> understood them, but didn't believe the assertions that the technology
> would not be expanded beyond CSAM.

such assertions are the result of *not* reading and understanding it.

apple's system is specifically designed so that expanding it is not
realistically possible.

> There are lots of governments that
> would love to scan for images of various things, including some very
> wealthy countries that buy a lot of iPhones.

then why isn't anyone complaining about google, facebook, etc.?

it's *trivial* to force a company to search for more things on their
own servers, without anyone ever knowing.

> The whole patronizing attitude of "let us explain to you why what we're
> doing is wonderful," when in fact all the privacy experts, human rights
> experts, and child protection organizations explained why it's _not_
> wonderful, needs to change.

what needs to change is those groups need to learn how it works rather
than grift.

> And it did change when the "delay" was
> announced. You know that they're not going to bring back on-device
> scanning and will simply do what other cloud service providers already
> do--scan on the server side.

that is absolutely false.

you just said all those experts are concerned about expanding the
search, which is easy if done server-side and nearly impossible with
apple's system.
> You can get the facts here:
> <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2

no, those are not the facts.

On Sep 20, 2021, Chris wrote
(in article<news:si9g6b$vql$1@dont-email.me>):
> They did. Which is why they published their white papers carefully
> describing the technology. What they perhaps didn't anticipate was how many
> didn't read them or didn't understand them.

How can you be still unaware malevolent governments and malware writers will
not voluntarily restrict themselves to what Apple puts in their white paper?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

On Sep 20, 2021, Chris wrote
(in article<news:si9fr1$p26$1@dont-email.me>):
> The point is that law enforcement all over the world are doing everything
> they can to stop this dissemination and catch those involved. Many online
> services are indirectly involved and they should try to do as much as they
> can to help.

Why do you believe scanning messages & photos on your phone is meaningful?

> It's all part of the jigsaw.

Why do you believe that an Apple "feel good" PR blitz accomplishes anything?

> There won't be any evidence until the system is turned on, so impossible to
> answer right now.

What do you think is a meaningfully effective method to combat child abuse?

Ron, the humblest guy in town.

RonTheGuy <ron@null.invalid> wrote:
> On Sep 20, 2021, Chris wrote
> (in article<news:si9g6b$vql$1@dont-email.me>):
>> They did. Which is why they published their white papers carefully
>> describing the technology. What they perhaps didn't anticipate was how many
>> didn't read them or didn't understand them.
>
> How can you be still unaware malevolent governments and malware writers will
> not voluntarily restrict themselves to what Apple puts in their white paper?

Have you read them?

sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> On 9/20/2021 1:19 AM, Chris wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>> They did. Which is why they published their white papers carefully
>> describing the technology. What they perhaps didn't anticipate was how many
>> didn't read them or didn't understand them.
>
> What they actually didn't anticipate was how many people read them,
> understood them, but didn't believe the assertions that the technology
> would not be expanded beyond CSAM. There are lots of governments that
> would love to scan for images of various things, including some very
> wealthy countries that buy a lot of iPhones.
>
> The whole patronizing attitude of "let us explain to you why what we're
> doing is wonderful," when in fact all the privacy experts, human rights
> experts, and child protection organizations explained why it's _not_
> wonderful, needs to change. And it did change when the "delay" was
> announced. You know that they're not going to bring back on-device
> scanning and will simply do what other cloud service providers already
> do--scan on the server side.
>
> You can get the facts here:
> <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life>.

Your loaded language isn't helping.

There are organisations urging Apple to implement their system. This isn't
a straightforward issue.
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/sep/17/child-abuse-apple-urged-to-roll-out-image-scanning-tool-swiftly

Like I said upthread it's a balance between harm reduction and data
privacy.

nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> asked
>> If everyone jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge, why should Apple follow them?
>
> if 'everyone jumped off the brooklyn bridge', then who would be left to
> follow? nobody.
>
> you haven't thought this through.

Apple (via a joint internal memo) proved what they think of "privacy"
by calling all the privacy experts of the world a "screeching minority."

I admit I know Apple well enough to know Apple does everything for profit
(nothing wrong with that) where Apple will _always_ lie as to their motive.

Apple spends almost nothing in R&D compared to their Marketing budget for
one reason and one reason only - which is Apple cares _only_ about profits.

*Apple throttled secretly and then publicly lied about it for profit only.*

Apple removed the aux jack so you'd have to buy back the missing
functionality, just as Apple strategically decided to NEVER give you the
option of cheap expandable memory (always... never forget, for profit only).

I don't mind a company cheaping out on their iPHone 12 batteries for profit,
but when Apple brazenly lies that they removed the charger
*"for the environment"*
then I know Apple is nothing but a bullshitter - just like you are, nospam.

Given I respect Apple marketing and yet I know Apple _never_ tells the
truth, what I'm trying to figure out is _why_ Apple did such a dumb thing.

Why didn't Apple ask even a _single_ security researcher or even a single
privacy group if this was a good idea _before_ rolling it out to the world?

Compounding the problem by calling all privacy experts a "screeching
minority" shows what Apple _really_ thinks about privacy concerns, nospam.

What I don't yet understand is...
Why did the smartest marketing in the world do something THIS stupid?

There is _more_ to this story that we don't yet know.

Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> asked
> Admit to the world that private set intersection is completely over your
> head without saying "private set intersection is completely over my
> head". : D

It's revealing that the (rather gullible) apologists fell for the "private
set intersection" complete & utter bullshit from the Apple marketing team.

*Apple's Private Set Intersection "Opens a Backdoor to your Private Life"*
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life>

"Make no mistake: [private set intersection] is a *decrease in privacy*
for all iCloud Photos users, not an improvement."
--
What's consistent is apologists do NOT own independent thought processes.

Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> asked
> He wasn't talking about Apple, and you both know that. And anyone who
> can read can see he was talking about the *EFF* above. Your trolls are
> just plain lame.

The iron-clad proof that Apple doesn't give a shit about privacy is the fact
that Apple didn't ask even a _single_ privacy expert before rolling it out.

Given both Jolly Roger & nospam habitually _change_ quoted facts just so
that they stand a chance of responding to them, I think it's again prescient
that both Jolly Roger and nospam agree that Apple did it for two reasons:

1. *Apple marketing "_didn't look at reality_"*, and,
2. *Apple marketing wanted to "_gain popularity and profit from it_.*"

Apple's need to artificially differentiate themselves from the other
products makes sense, where the issue that makes no sense is why did Apple
marketing not even ask a _single_ security professional about their plan?

And why didn't Apple check in with not a _single_ privacy organization with
their plan?

Notice what this tells us:
a. Apple doesn't give a shit about privacy.
b. This isn't about privacy.

This is about exactly what both nospam and Jolly Roger are upset about:
1. Apple didn't think this through (because it's not about privacy)
2. Apple was hoping to gain product differentiation from this effort.

> Again, as anyone who can read knows, he was talking about the *EFF* who
> looked at public perception ad thought they could gain popularity.

No. It's about Apple.
You & nospam blame the EFF (and the entire world) as much as you can.

But that doesn't change this is about Apple doing two things you said:
1. Apple didn't even ask privacy experts (it's not well thought out)
2. Apple did it purely for the marketing value (product differentiation)

In fact, the proof that Apple doesn't give a shit about privacy is the fact
that Apple didn't ask even a _single_ privacy expert before rolling it out.
--
If Apple cared about privacy, they would have asked privacy experts first.

In message <190920211829423123%nospam@nospam.invalid> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <slrnskfdjm.2ii8.g.kreme@m1mini.local>, Lewis
> <g.kreme@kreme.dont-email.me> wrote:

>>
>> > facebook doesn't care about privacy, so they scan server-side, and for
>> > much more than just csam.
>>
>> And then use your images to create advertisements fr you, leaving you to
>> believe that your contact are endorsing products Facebook is shilling.
>> Why anyone uses Facebook of anything is beyond me, they are easily the
>> worst company in the world, and dedicated to violating every users
>> privacy in every possible way by any possible means. The fuckers even
>> created a fake VPN so they could intercept every bit of data from people
>> dumb enough to use that VPN.

> which apple quickly shut down, going so far to pull their enterprise
> cert, which caused their own internal apps to stop working.

For certain values of "quickly", yes. But the point is, this is the sort
of company facebook is. They are as trustworthy as a scorpion.

--
I can't die, I haven't seen The Jolson Story

In message <si8k4b$d4m$1@dont-email.me> sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> On 9/19/2021 11:36 AM, Robin Goodfellow wrote:
>> sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> asked
>>> The reason is pretty clear. When they scan iCloud photos on the server,
>>> they have to decrypt them prior to applying the hash.
>>
>> This is logical.
>>
>> However... other things are as logical (IMHO)... given that...
>>
>> There are at least two competing arguments we'd need to hash out before we
>> can come to that conclusion that "the reason is pretty clear" why Apple
>> chose to do something so stupid (without even asking security experts!)...
>>
>> ... given it was "said" (yes, I know it was later found out to be incorrect)
>> that Apple "can" scan the hash of an encrypted file, as long as it was Apple
>> who did the initial encryption. (Whether or not that is technically feasible
>> would matter greatly if this is to be an option).

> Yeah, I wondered about that too, but I don't think that scanning the
> hash would work. A completely different hash could be generated from
> essentially the same image based on very minor differences in the image.

The CSAM hashing algorithm is specifically designed to still match
images that have been altered, cropped, rotated, etc. It is not simply
a `md5 image.jpg` sort of hash.

>> The second argument we'd have to hash out is why should Apple actively do
>> anything?

> Because other cloud service providers already do CSAM detection on their
> servers.

AND the government is trotting out "protect the children" in their
efforts to undermine encryption. That said, there is a lot more CSAM out
there than anyone would have guessed, and the people collecting it will
have thousands of photos.

>> While I certainly "get" that any company would love to offload its computer
>> resources to billions of their captive devices around the world, I can't
>> believe that, if and when Apple decides to become an active arm of law
>> enforcement, that Apple can't spare the server resources. I just can't.

Of course they have the resources to do the scanning on the servers, but
there are very very good reasons for not doing that. I would much prefer
having my data stored ONLY encrypted on Apple's servers with no one by
me and my designated account recovery person being able to access that
data than to have all my photos decrypted every time they are sent to
iCloud and thus have, effectively, no protection at all other than the
fact that Apple will not decrypt the data.

And no, the state of iCloud RIGHT NOW is not TNO encryption, and Apple
right now CAN decrypt the data, but despite the frothing idiots here,
Apple does NOT do that. And if things go along this trajectory, they
will not be able to.

> A "compute server" or "GPU server" is a different animal than a storage
> server, it's designed with multiple high-power Xeon or EPYC, and Nvidia
> Ampere processors. It's understandable why Apple wanted to offload the
> photo scanning to users' devices.

That is not why. The processing is trivial.

--
WHO KNOWS WHAT EVIL LURKS IN THE HEART OF MEN? The Death of Rats
looked up from the feast of potato. SQUEAK, he said. Death waved
a hand dismissively. WELL, YES, OBVIOUSLY *ME*, he said. I JUST
WONDERED IF THERE WAS ANYONE ELSE. --The Truth

In message <190920212034332561%nospam@nospam.invalid> nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote:
> In article <si8k4b$d4m$1@dont-email.me>, sms
> <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:

>> A completely different hash could be generated from
>> essentially the same image based on very minor differences in the image.

> yet another thing you don't understand about apple's csam.

> apple's neural hash is designed specifically to avoid alterations to
> the images.

To be fair, the hashing algorithm itself was developed by Microsoft. It
is the same system that Dropbox, Amazon, Google, AOL/Yahoo, and dozens,
if not hundreds, of other companies use to scan for CSAM.

> other providers scan for much more than just csam

Yes, that too.

> apple's system is designed so that other entities *can't* force them to
> scan for other stuff.

Apple's system is a lot more complex that just the simple hashing, and
all of that complexity and the hundreds of engineering hours it took to
develop that system are all in the service of preserving as much privacy
as possible while still being able to report pedophiles trafficking in
CSAM images.

> completely wrong and an absurd conspiracy theory.

Consider the source of that idiocy.

--
"Are you pondering what I'm pondering?"
"I think so, Brain, but if the plural of mouse is mice, wouldn't the
plural of spouse be spice?"

In message <si9hud$1lc$1@dont-email.me> sms <scharf.steven@geemail.com> wrote:
> And it did change when the "delay" was announced. You know that
> they're not going to bring back on-device scanning and will simply do
> what other cloud service providers already do--scan on the server
> side.

Only anti-privacy morons think this is a good idea.

--
Don't be too sure I'm as crooked as I'm supposed to be. ~ Sam Spade

Lewis <g.kreme@kreme.dont-email.me> asked
> To be fair, the hashing algorithm itself was developed by Microsoft.

I'm surprised Lewis knows that it's Microsoft's algorthim (and that the
developer himself said it's inherently flawed)...

*Image Scanning on iCloud Photos: A Decrease in Privacy*
�<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life>
"Apple's plan for scanning photos that get uploaded into iCloud Photos
is similar in some ways to Microsoft's PhotoDNA."

>> other providers scan for much more than just csam
>
> Yes, that too.

It's shocking how _ignorant_ all you apologists always prove to be!

*Apologists never fail to blame everyone else for what _only_ Apple did.*
"The main difference is that Apple's scanning will happen on-device."

*Image Scanning on iCloud Photos: A Decrease in Privacy*
�<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life>
>> apple's system is designed so that other entities *can't* force them to
>> scan for other stuff.
>
> Apple's system is a lot more complex that just the simple hashing, and
> all of that complexity and the hundreds of engineering hours it took to
> develop that system are all in the service of preserving as much privacy
> as possible while still being able to report pedophiles trafficking in
> CSAM images.

Can apologists name even _one_ privacy organization Apple consulted?
Can apologists name even _one_ privacy expert Apple consulted?

The answer is no.
Which proves Apple didn't do it for privacy.

In fact, the facts prove Apple doesn't give a shit about privacy.

It's shocking apologists aren't aware privacy was NOT a concern of Apple!
*Whatever Apple Calls It, It's No Longer Secure Messaging*
�<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life>
"When that same server has a channel for revealing information
about the contents of a significant portion of messages,
that's not end-to-end encryption."
--
Apple belatedly brought up privacy because they had to defend themselves.

Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> asked
> There are organisations urging Apple to implement their system.

Apologists' belief systems are based on exactly zero (0) actual facts.

Can Chris name even a _single_ privacy organization "urging Apple to
implement" this CSAM scanning on your phone & scanning of iMessages?

If not, then _everything_ Chris just claimed is another imaginary belief.
--
Apologists' belief systems are based on exactly zero (0) actual facts.

Lewis <g.kreme@kreme.dont-email.me> asked
> Only anti-privacy morons think this is a good idea.

Apologists' belief systems are based on exactly zero (0) actual facts.

Can Lewis name even a _single_ privacy organization who thinks this CSAM
scanning on your phone & scanning of iMessages is a "good idea?"

If not, then _everything_ Lewis just claimed is another imaginary belief.
--
Apologists' belief systems are based on exactly zero (0) actual facts.

Lewis <g.kreme@kreme.dont-email.me> asked
> And no, the state of iCloud RIGHT NOW is not TNO encryption, and Apple
> right now CAN decrypt the data, but despite the frothing idiots here,
> Apple does NOT do that.

*Apologists' belief systems are based on exactly _zero_ (0) actual facts.*

Can Lewis not be aware that Apple provides decrypted data all the time to
law enforcement (remember, Apple claims they follow all the local laws)?

If not, then _everything_ Lewis just claimed is another imaginary belief.
--
Apologists' belief systems are based on exactly zero (0) actual facts.