In message <tct9m5$1bpaq$1@dont-email.me>, at 10:33:57 on Tue, 9 Aug
2022, MB <MB@nospam.net> remarked:
>On 09/08/2022 09:43, Roland Perry wrote:
>> A process of vetting, similar to that used for access to government
>> classified information. A sort of visa-on-steroids.
>
>Presumably the lowest level of vetting which I think just has a check
>that the person is not in anyone's files.

I wouldn't presume that.

And of course if they aren't in the credit checking agency's files, it
would probably be an instant fail.

>Higher levels get very expensive with deeper searches and interviews
>with the person and their relatives and neighbours. Not really
>practical just to allow them to jump the queue!

Indeed, but there are many other layers in your excluded middle.
--
Roland Perry

hounslow3@yahoo.co.uk <hounslow3@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> On 08/08/2022 15:29, Recliner wrote:
>> On Mon, 8 Aug 2022 15:27:43 +0100, "hounslow3@yahoo.co.uk" <hounslow3@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> On 08/08/2022 15:15, Recliner wrote:
>>>> On Mon, 8 Aug 2022 14:54:21 +0100, "hounslow3@yahoo.co.uk"
>>>> <hounslow3@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I understand and agree with the need for security screens at aeroports.
>>>>> Indeed, they are logical.
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem, of course, is that the queues can create quite a bottleneck
>>>>> as well as being a pain and stressful experience for all involved.
>>>>>
>>>>> I am thus wondering if there is anything in the works, or even a pilot
>>>>> programme, that will allow passengers to simply walk through whilst
>>>>> being scanned.
>>>>>
>>>>> Passengers would not have to take computers out of briefcases or almost
>>>>> literally strip, for example, just walk through a scanner as they are.
>>>>>
>>>>> It would not surprise me if there is a pilot programme somewhere in the
>>>>> works or if authorities are working on this -- anything, really, to make
>>>>> the registration-to-boarding process more seamless.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, there's a new generation of x-ray machines for carry-on bags that
>>>> doesn't require anything to be taken out of the
>>>> bags. I've encountered one in LCY, don't know how soon they'll appear
>>>> in the larger airports.
>>>>
>>>> But people still have to go through scanners, and most fail if the
>>>> settings are too high, which is usually the case in
>>>> Heathrow. So you end up getting re-scanned in the body scanner, having
>>>> removed absolutely everything from your pockets.
>>>>
>>>> <https://www.rd.com/article/what-do-airport-body-scanners-see/>
>>>
>>> I was thinking that a passenger would need to simply scroll through a
>>> security scanner as is. No need to put anything on a conveyor belt or
>>> strip down or even stop walking.
>>
>> That's a long way off. But I think some countries have schemes where
>> trustworthy passengers can register (and be vetted,
>> presumably?)
>
> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?

Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
hijacking.

Sam

--
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In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>
>Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>hijacking.

There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
--
Roland Perry

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>
>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>
> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
> between the lid and the keyboard.

Well it seems to be a solved problem at an increasing number of airports
around the world. I suspect a lack of willingness to invest in new
expensive equipment is holding back their introduction in the UK.

Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> wrote:
> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>
>>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>>
>> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
>> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
>> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
>> between the lid and the keyboard.
>
> Well it seems to be a solved problem at an increasing number of airports
> around the world. I suspect a lack of willingness to invest in new
> expensive equipment is holding back their introduction in the UK.

I've encountered them in the UK. But, I suspect that that sort of
investment was put on hold when the airports were dying during Covid.

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>
>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>> hijacking.
>
> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.

Derivation?

Sam

--
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Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>
>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>> hijacking.
>>
>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>
> Derivation?
>

<https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/992/913>

Such machines already exist and some airports have them. The trouble is
they effectively make clothing invisible. While the operators consoles
just show icons indicting items/places of interest, the underlying
technology can basically make images that effectively make you appear naked.
This scares people with the potential that some one does something
antisocial to the computer that runs it and collects actual images.

On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
<recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:

>Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>
>>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>>
>> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
>> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
>> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
>> between the lid and the keyboard.
>
>Yes, it's probably something like that. Maybe it's the battery that acts as
>a shield? I was surprised that Norway now requires cameras to be removed
>from bags, presumably for similar reasons.
>
>There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.

There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
refusal.

I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's
seen as a lower risk so tested for less often.

On Wed, 10 Aug 2022 09:20:34 +0100
Ken <ken@birchanger.com> wrote:
>On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
><recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>>bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>>they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.
>
>There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
>travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
>carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
>refusal.
>
>I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's

A block of semtex pretending to be a battery I should imagine.

On 10/08/2022 09:20, Ken wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
>>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>
>>>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>>>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>>>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>>>
>>> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
>>> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
>>> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
>>> between the lid and the keyboard.
>>
>> Yes, it's probably something like that. Maybe it's the battery that acts as
>> a shield? I was surprised that Norway now requires cameras to be removed
>>from bags, presumably for similar reasons.
>>
>> There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>> bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>> they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.
>
> There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
> travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
> carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
> refusal.
>
> I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's
> seen as a lower risk so tested for less often.

It has been publicised for many years and on many occasions that
travellers should be able to power up their equipment.

Presumably the problem is likely to be that people who only follow
social media news have not seen such articles and one of them has been
caught out yet again.

<martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote:
> On 10/08/2022 09:20, Ken wrote:
>> On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
>>>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>
>>>>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>>>>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>>>>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>>>>
>>>> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
>>>> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
>>>> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
>>>> between the lid and the keyboard.
>>>
>>> Yes, it's probably something like that. Maybe it's the battery that acts as
>>> a shield? I was surprised that Norway now requires cameras to be removed
>>> from bags, presumably for similar reasons.
>>>
>>> There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>>> bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>>> they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.
>>
>> There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
>> travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
>> carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
>> refusal.
>>
>> I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's
>> seen as a lower risk so tested for less often.
>
> It has been publicised for many years and on many occasions that
> travellers should be able to power up their equipment.
>
> Presumably the problem is likely to be that people who only follow
> social media news have not seen such articles and one of them has been
> caught out yet again.
>

From my own experience, it's now very rare that the security people ask
that a device be powered up. My assumption was that the x-ray scanners now
have AI-based abilities to spot lumps of explosive, or that they can
automatically eliminate normal devices with Li-Ion batteries. So, only a
very few borderline cases need to be checked by hand.

<Muttley@dastardlyhq.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Aug 2022 09:20:34 +0100
> Ken <ken@birchanger.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>>> bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>>> they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.
>>
>> There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
>> travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
>> carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
>> refusal.
>>
>> I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's
>
> A block of semtex pretending to be a battery I should imagine.

I think the x-ray scanners can spot those.

Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
> Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>>
>>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>>> hijacking.
>>>
>>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>>
>> Derivation?
>>
>
> <https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/992/913>

Thank you. On first skim I’m not sure what Roland’s “that” refers to, but
I’ll read it properly later.

Sam

--
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Spit the dummy to reply

Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
> <martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote:
>> On 10/08/2022 09:20, Ken wrote:
>>> On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
>>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
>>>>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>>>>>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>>>>>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>>>>>
>>>>> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
>>>>> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
>>>>> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
>>>>> between the lid and the keyboard.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, it's probably something like that. Maybe it's the battery that acts as
>>>> a shield? I was surprised that Norway now requires cameras to be removed
>>>> from bags, presumably for similar reasons.
>>>>
>>>> There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>>>> bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>>>> they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.
>>>
>>> There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
>>> travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
>>> carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
>>> refusal.
>>>
>>> I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's
>>> seen as a lower risk so tested for less often.
>>
>> It has been publicised for many years and on many occasions that
>> travellers should be able to power up their equipment.
>>
>> Presumably the problem is likely to be that people who only follow
>> social media news have not seen such articles and one of them has been
>> caught out yet again.
>>
>
> From my own experience, it's now very rare that the security people ask
> that a device be powered up. My assumption was that the x-ray scanners now
> have AI-based abilities to spot lumps of explosive, or that they can
> automatically eliminate normal devices with Li-Ion batteries. So, only a
> very few borderline cases need to be checked by hand.

I remember seeing a snippet of video showing some kind of scanner
highlighting a chunk of suspect material in orange on an otherwise
monochrome image, but it was a long while ago and I’m sure things will have
moved on. It did make me wary of carrying a chunk of Red Leicester in my
hand baggage.

Sam

--
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Spit the dummy to reply

Matthew Geier <matthew@sleeper.apana.org.au> wrote:
> Such machines already exist and some airports have them.

No, no such facilities exist, and nor are they coming.

Body scanners are something quite different, and many large airports have
them. They're normally used instead of a pat-down if someone gets pinged in
the metal detector arch. You have to completely empty (and that means every
last piece of paper or tissue) all your pockets, then stand still on the
marked footprints and hold your arms up in the prescribed position (now
only one, it used to be two or three) while they scan you. It's the exact
opposite to what Hounslow was asking for.

> The trouble is
> they effectively make clothing invisible. While the operators consoles
> just show icons indicting items/places of interest, the underlying
> technology can basically make images that effectively make you appear naked.

The machines have long stopped showing those unprocessed images to the
operators. Modern millimeter wave scanners don't even capture that level of
detail in the raw images.

> This scares people with the potential that some one does something
> antisocial to the computer that runs it and collects actual images.

Most people have stopped worrying about that sort of thing. It's much less
of an indignity than an intimate pat-down (yes, they do check if you have
anything strapped to your upper, inner thighs or down your trousers), which
would be the other alternative.

The early backscatter machines didn't do the body masking of the modern
machines, and I cheekily asked to inspect my own images when the machines
were first on trial at Heathrow, many years ago, when you could opt not to
be scanned. They only showed me one of my images, and it didn't leave much
to the imagination.

There was then a period when the operators had to be in a remote location,
so they couldn't actually see who was being scanned (eg, a famous actress
or politician), and the machines were male/female, with matching operators
(possibly a plum job for gay staff?). But with the modern machines, the
images are much less revealing about body details, and it wouldn't be
possible for an operator to tamper with them.

<https://www.rd.com/article/what-do-airport-body-scanners-see/>

Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>>>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>>>
>>>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>>>> hijacking.
>>>>
>>>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>>>
>>> Derivation?
>>>
>>
>> <https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/992/913>
>
> Thank you. On first skim I’m not sure what Roland’s “that” refers to, but
> I’ll read it properly later.
>

This is the key summary:

We will now present an algorithm that a terrorist cell can employ to
increase their probability of mounting a successful attack under the CAPS
[Computer Assisted Passenger Screening] system as opposed to an airport
security system that employs only random searches. The key idea is that a
terrorist cell can probe the security system to ascertain which of their
members have low CAPS scores. Then they can send these members on
destructive missions. Since security manpower is disproportionately spent
on people with high CAPS scores, and the operative has a low score, he will
most likely face reduced scrutiny.

The algorithm, which we call Carnival Booth, then is as follows: (1) Probe
the system by sending an operative on a flight. The operative has no intent
of causing harm. He has no explosives. He has no weapons. He has nothing.
He simply takes the flight and notes whether or not CAPS flags him. (2) If
he is flagged, then send another operative in the same manner. (3) Repeat
this process until a member who consistently eludes CAPS flags is found.
(4) Now send this operative on a mission with intent to harm, complete with
weapons or explosives. Since CAPS didn't flag him last time, he likely
won't be flagged this time, so he incurs much less risk of special
scrutiny.

To better understand how a terrorist cell using this algorithm stands a
better chance of success under CAPS than under a random system, let's
consider the numerical example illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose an airport
only has the personnel resources to give eight percent of people special
scrutiny; the other 92 percent undergo standard screening through a metal
detector. Under a system where people are selected at random, this airport
can afford to flag eight percent randomly. This means that every time a
terrorist attempts to go through security, he stands an eight percent
chance of increased scrutiny. This will be true no matter what tactic or
algorithm the terrorist uses.

Now compare this to the same airport using a CAPS system, which may for
example flag the six percent of passengers with the highest threat indices
and two percent randomly in order to equal their personnel-constrained
eight percent limit. By employing the algorithm described above, the
terrorist cell knows that since their operative has previously probed the
system without a flag, CAPS likely will not flag him again. In essence, the
terrorist cell is able to relegate its harmful activities outside of the
six percent CAPS flag zone. Now, their operative only has a two percent
chance of calling up a thorough inspection. Compare this to the eight
percent chance the terrorist would incur under the random system. It's
clear that terrorist cells would therefore prefer airports fortified by
CAPS.

On 10/08/2022 10:39, Recliner wrote:
> Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
>> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
>>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>>>>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>>>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>>>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>>>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>>>>> hijacking.
>>>>>
>>>>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>>>>
>>>> Derivation?
>>>>
>>>
>>> <https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/992/913>
>>
>> Thank you. On first skim I’m not sure what Roland’s “that” refers to, but
>> I’ll read it properly later.
>>
>
> This is the key summary:
>
> We will now present an algorithm that a terrorist cell can employ to
> increase their probability of mounting a successful attack under the CAPS
> [Computer Assisted Passenger Screening] system as opposed to an airport
> security system that employs only random searches. The key idea is that a
> terrorist cell can probe the security system to ascertain which of their
> members have low CAPS scores. Then they can send these members on
> destructive missions. Since security manpower is disproportionately spent
> on people with high CAPS scores, and the operative has a low score, he will
> most likely face reduced scrutiny.
>
> The algorithm, which we call Carnival Booth, then is as follows: (1) Probe
> the system by sending an operative on a flight. The operative has no intent
> of causing harm. He has no explosives. He has no weapons. He has nothing.
> He simply takes the flight and notes whether or not CAPS flags him. (2) If
> he is flagged, then send another operative in the same manner. (3) Repeat
> this process until a member who consistently eludes CAPS flags is found.
> (4) Now send this operative on a mission with intent to harm, complete with
> weapons or explosives. Since CAPS didn't flag him last time, he likely
> won't be flagged this time, so he incurs much less risk of special
> scrutiny.
>
> To better understand how a terrorist cell using this algorithm stands a
> better chance of success under CAPS than under a random system, let's
> consider the numerical example illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose an airport
> only has the personnel resources to give eight percent of people special
> scrutiny; the other 92 percent undergo standard screening through a metal
> detector. Under a system where people are selected at random, this airport
> can afford to flag eight percent randomly. This means that every time a
> terrorist attempts to go through security, he stands an eight percent
> chance of increased scrutiny. This will be true no matter what tactic or
> algorithm the terrorist uses.
>
> Now compare this to the same airport using a CAPS system, which may for
> example flag the six percent of passengers with the highest threat indices
> and two percent randomly in order to equal their personnel-constrained
> eight percent limit. By employing the algorithm described above, the
> terrorist cell knows that since their operative has previously probed the
> system without a flag, CAPS likely will not flag him again. In essence, the
> terrorist cell is able to relegate its harmful activities outside of the
> six percent CAPS flag zone. Now, their operative only has a two percent
> chance of calling up a thorough inspection. Compare this to the eight
> percent chance the terrorist would incur under the random system. It's
> clear that terrorist cells would therefore prefer airports fortified by
> CAPS.

This section explains the derivation of the term:

This transparency is the Achilles' Heel of CAPS; the fact that
individuals know their CAPS status enables the system to be reverse
engineered. You, like Simonyi, know if your carry-ons have been manually
inspected. You know if you've been questioned. You know if you're asked
to stand in a special line. You know if you've been frisked. All of this
open scrutiny makes it possible to learn an anti-profile to defeat CAPS,
even if the profile itself is always kept secret. We call this the
"Carnival Booth Effect" since, like a carnie, it entices terrorists to
"Step Right Up! See if you're a winner!" In this case, the terrorist can
step right up and see if he's been flagged.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 2022-08-10 09:13:58 +0000, Sam Wilson said:

> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>> <martin.coffee@round-midnight.org.uk> wrote:
>>> On 10/08/2022 09:20, Ken wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:53:44 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
>>>> <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>>>> In message <tcrfng$1004k$1@dont-email.me>, at 17:04:48 on Mon, 8 Aug
>>>>>> 2022, Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> remarked:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Lisbon airport has had high tech scanners where you don’t have to remove
>>>>>>> laptops and liquids since before covid. Heathrow did have one trial lane,
>>>>>>> which I used, but I’ve no idea what has become of that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I gather that part of the problem with laptops is that they often use
>>>>>> materials like titanium which might be very difficult to "see through".
>>>>>> So a weapon could be concealed, sandwiched between a pair of them, or
>>>>>> between the lid and the keyboard.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, it's probably something like that. Maybe it's the battery that acts as
>>>>> a shield? I was surprised that Norway now requires cameras to be removed
>>>>> from bags, presumably for similar reasons.
>>>>>
>>>>> There was a time when laptops, tablets and phones were treated as potential
>>>>> bombs, and you had to be prepared to switch them on to demonstrate that
>>>>> they worked, but that doesn't seem to happen any more.
>>>>
>>>> There was a recent press article (possibly last week's Sunday's Times
>>>> travel section) warning that devices in hand baggage should always be
>>>> carried charged, as an inability to turn the device on can mean its
>>>> refusal.
>>>>
>>>> I assume something must have triggered the warning, but perhaps it's
>>>> seen as a lower risk so tested for less often.
>>>
>>> It has been publicised for many years and on many occasions that
>>> travellers should be able to power up their equipment.
>>>
>>> Presumably the problem is likely to be that people who only follow
>>> social media news have not seen such articles and one of them has been
>>> caught out yet again.
>>>
>>
>> From my own experience, it's now very rare that the security people ask
>> that a device be powered up. My assumption was that the x-ray scanners now
>> have AI-based abilities to spot lumps of explosive, or that they can
>> automatically eliminate normal devices with Li-Ion batteries. So, only a
>> very few borderline cases need to be checked by hand.
>
> I remember seeing a snippet of video showing some kind of scanner
> highlighting a chunk of suspect material in orange on an otherwise
> monochrome image, but it was a long while ago and I’m sure things will have
> moved on. It did make me wary of carrying a chunk of Red Leicester in my
> hand baggage.

I have on occasion brough some cheese from Switzerland, that is hard to
find in the UK, in my airline hand luggage. On the first occasion, my
bag got flagged for checking, but when they saw the cheese, they were
happy to let me go (I had deliberately brough the receipt for it with
me in case that would help put their minds at ease. On subsequent
occasions I transported cheese, I took it out of my bag, and I noticed
the machine operator looking confused at the screen, then looking at
the tray of bag-and-cheese come out, seeing what it was and letting it
go without question.

Robin

In message <tcunqq$1gluv$1@dont-email.me>, at 22:41:30 on Tue, 9 Aug
2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>
>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>> hijacking.
>>
>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>
>Derivation?

Google is your friend. I had it first explained to me when 9/11 kneejerk
was introduced, and my correspondent said "this won't stop any
terrorists familiar with Carnival Booth".
--
Roland Perry

In message <tcvtus$1ptjv$2@dont-email.me>, at 09:32:12 on Wed, 10 Aug
2022, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:

>> This scares people with the potential that some one does something
>> antisocial to the computer that runs it and collects actual images.
>
>Most people have stopped worrying about that sort of thing. It's much less
>of an indignity than an intimate pat-down (yes, they do check if you have
>anything strapped to your upper, inner thighs or down your trousers), which
>would be the other alternative.

I recall a security person at Schiphol, without any warning, shoving
both his hands down the front of my trousers and having a grope around
(having asked me to raise my arms). I was sufficiently taken off guard I
didn't have the presence of mind to knee him in the balls. I didn't want
to complain because my flight was leaving momentarily(sic) and I didn't
want to miss it.
--
Roland Perry

In message <EuhENGNns58iFAxw@perry.uk>, at 12:48:55 on Wed, 10 Aug 2022,
Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> remarked:
>In message <tcvtus$1ptjv$2@dont-email.me>, at 09:32:12 on Wed, 10 Aug
>2022, Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> remarked:
>
>>> This scares people with the potential that some one does something
>>> antisocial to the computer that runs it and collects actual images.
>>
>>Most people have stopped worrying about that sort of thing. It's much less
>>of an indignity than an intimate pat-down (yes, they do check if you have
>>anything strapped to your upper, inner thighs or down your trousers), which
>>would be the other alternative.
>
>I recall a security person at Schiphol, without any warning, shoving
>both his hands down

(inside if that wasn't clear)

>the front of my trousers and having a grope around (having asked me to
>raise my arms). I was sufficiently taken off guard I didn't have the
>presence of mind to knee him in the balls. I didn't want to complain
>because my flight was leaving momentarily(sic) and I didn't want to
>miss it.

--
Roland Perry

On 10/08/2022 12:48, Roland Perry wrote:
> I recall a security person at Schiphol, without any warning, shoving
> both his hands down the front of my trousers and having a grope around
> (having asked me to raise my arms). I was sufficiently taken off guard I
> didn't have the presence of mind to knee him in the balls. I didn't want
> to complain because my flight was leaving momentarily(sic) and I didn't
> want to miss it.

And how many time did you go around again. :-)

A local chap (who is a very good story teller) claimed he met his wife
when in the Army in Northern Ireland, he said she regularly visited his
checkpoint to be 'patted down'.

Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <tcunqq$1gluv$1@dont-email.me>, at 22:41:30 on Tue, 9 Aug
> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>>
>>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>>> hijacking.
>>>
>>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>>
>> Derivation?
>
> Google is your friend. I had it first explained to me when 9/11 kneejerk
> was introduced, and my correspondent said "this won't stop any
> terrorists familiar with Carnival Booth".

… and by that measure you aren’t. Other people have helped, however.

Sam

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply

Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
> Recliner <recliner.usenet@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
>>> Roland Perry <roland@perry.uk> wrote:
>>>> In message <tcttfj$1dv70$1@dont-email.me>, at 15:11:47 on Tue, 9 Aug
>>>> 2022, Sam Wilson <ukr@dummy.wislons.fastmail.co.uk> remarked:
>>>>>> On what basis would some passengers be considered trustworthy?
>>>>>
>>>>> Hopefully better than it was 30-odd years ago, the first time I flew from
>>>>> Edinburgh to London on business. The guys in suits got waved through, and
>>>>> two of us (not travelling together - he was unknown to me) in sweaters and
>>>>> anoraks were patted down. I vowed to wear a suit should I ever take up
>>>>> hijacking.
>>>>
>>>> There's a name for that: Carnival Booth.
>>>
>>> Derivation?
>>>
>>
>> <https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/992/913>
>
> Thank you. On first skim I’m not sure what Roland’s “that” refers to, but
> I’ll read it properly later.

And thanks to Recliner and Graeme I now conclude that Roland’s “that”
refers to my deciding to wear a suit. JFTR I’ve never worn a suit on a
plane, and I’ve never taken up hijacking.

Sam

--
The entity formerly known as Sam.Wilson@ed.ac.uk
Spit the dummy to reply